Government drought support by Productivity Commission
Productivity Commission
Inquiry Report
Government 
Drought Support
No. 46, 27 February 2009
© COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 2009 
ISSN 1447-1329  
ISBN 978-1-74037-275-6 
This work is subject to copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 
1968, the work may be reproduced in whole or in part for study or training purposes, 
subject to the inclusion of an acknowledgment of the source. Reproduction for commercial 
use or sale requires prior written permission from the Attorney-General’s Department. 
Requests and inquiries concerning reproduction and rights should be addressed to the 
Commonwealth Copyright Administration, Attorney-General’s Department, Robert Garran 
Offices, National Circuit, Canberra ACT 2600. 
This publication is available in hard copy or PDF format from the Productivity 
Commission website at www.pc.gov.au. If you require part or all of this publication in a 
different format, please contact Media and Publications (see below). 
Publications Inquiries: 
Media and Publications 
Productivity Commission 
Locked Bag 2 Collins Street East 
Melbourne    VIC    8003 
Tel: (03) 9653 2244 
Fax: (03) 9653 2303 
Email: maps@pc.gov.au 
General Inquiries: 
Tel: (03) 9653 2100 or (02) 6240 3200 
An appropriate citation for this paper is: 
Productivity Commission 2009, Government Drought Support, Report No. 46, Final 
Inquiry Report, Melbourne 
JEL code: E31 
The Productivity Commission 
The Productivity Commission is the Australian Government’s independent research 
and advisory body on a range of economic, social and environmental issues affecting 
the welfare of Australians. Its role, expressed most simply, is to help governments 
make better policies, in the long term interest of the Australian community. 
The Commission’s independence is underpinned by an Act of Parliament. Its 
processes and outputs are open to public scrutiny and are driven by concern for the 
wellbeing of the community as a whole. 
Further information on the Productivity Commission can be obtained from the 
Commission’s website (www.pc.gov.au) or by contacting Media and Publications on 
(03) 9653 2244 or email: maps@pc.gov.au 

   
IV TERMS OF 
REFERENCE 
 
 
Terms of reference 
I, CHRIS BOWEN, Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Competition Policy and 
Consumer Affairs, pursuant to Parts 2 and 3 of the Productivity Commission Act 1998, 
hereby refer government assistance for drought events to the Commission for inquiry and 
report by the end of February 2009. The Commission is to hold hearings for the purpose of 
the inquiry and produce a draft report by the end of October 2008. 
Background 
Government assistance for drought events is guided by the current National Drought Policy 
(NDP). Under the NDP, drought assistance or support is intended to be a short term 
measure to help farmers prepare for, manage and recover from drought. The objectives of 
the NDP are to: 
• encourage primary producers and other sections of rural Australia to adopt self-reliant 
approaches for managing a changing climate; 
• maintain and protect Australia’s agricultural and environmental resource base during 
periods of extreme climate stress; and 
• ensure early recovery of agricultural and rural industries, consistent with long-term 
sustainable levels. 
Although self-reliance is a key objective, the NDP also recognises that there are rare and 
severe events that are beyond the ability of even the most prudent farmer to manage. The 
Commonwealth Government provides support to farmers and rural communities under the 
Exceptional Circumstances (EC) arrangements and other drought programs. The states and 
territory governments also participate in the NDP and provide support measures of their 
own. 
To be classified as an EC event, the event must be rare, that is, it must not have occurred 
more than once on average in every 20 to 25 years. Australia is experiencing a drought that 
has been unprecedented in its geographic extent, length and severity. Some areas have 
been drought declared for 13 of the last 16 years, leading to some recipients receiving EC 
assistance since 2002. 
Climate change will bring with it significant challenges for Australian agriculture. Climate 
change is expected to increase the frequency, severity and length of drought periods in 
future.  
Australian primary industries ministers have agreed that current approaches to drought and 
EC are no longer the most appropriate in the context of a changing climate. They agreed 
that drought policy must be improved to create an environment of self-reliance and 
preparedness, and encourage the adoption of appropriate climate change management 
practices.  
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To improve drought policy, ministers agreed to consider: 
• relevant social dimensions and policy responses to drought and Exceptional 
Circumstances; 
• the provision of accessible social welfare support, including eligibility criteria; 
• the effectiveness of business support payments; 
• the effectiveness of financial risk management strategies, including Farm Management 
Deposits; 
• the effectiveness of preparedness policies; and 
• cost-benefit analysis of state and federal drought assistance. 
The Productivity Commission is requested to assess drought support provided to farmers, 
farm businesses and farm dependent rural small businesses.  
This inquiry, as part of a review of drought policy, will be supported by: 
• an expert panel’s assessment of the social dimensions of the impacts of drought and the 
extent and range of current government and non-government social support services 
available to farm families and rural communities; and 
• an assessment by the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) and Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation’s (CSIRO) of what a changing climate means for 
drought in Australia and the appropriateness of using the concept of exceptional 
climatic circumstances to trigger the availability of assistance measures. 
Scope of the inquiry 
The Commission is requested to: 
1. Report on the appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of the Commonwealth, state 
and territory governments’ business support and income support measures provided to 
help farmers, farm businesses and farm dependent rural small businesses manage 
drought. Support measures assessed will include, but not be limited to, EC Relief 
Payments, EC Interest Rate Subsidies, Exit Assistance, Farm Management Deposits, 
Professional Advice and Planning Grants, Irrigation Management Grants and rate 
rebate schemes. 
In undertaking this inquiry, the Commission is requested to report on the impact 
that the provision of support to farmers, farm businesses and farm dependent 
rural small businesses has on performance and productivity at the individual, 
business, industry, regional and state levels. 
2. Identify impediments to farmers, farm businesses and farm dependent rural small 
businesses improving self-reliance and preparedness for periods of financial difficulty. 
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3. Identify the most appropriate, effective and efficient Commonwealth, state and 
territory government response to build farmers’, farm businesses’ and farm dependent 
rural small businesses’ self-reliance and preparedness to manage drought.  
The Commission may draw lessons from the broad range of support measures 
that are or have been available to farmers, farm businesses and farm dependent 
rural small businesses, or which are more broadly available to the Australian 
community. 
The Commission is to take into consideration the NDP objectives and the Commonwealth 
Government’s Expenditure Review Principles. The identification of appropriate, effective 
and efficient government support should be consistent with these objectives and principles. 
With reference to the findings of the expert panel and the BoM and CSIRO, the 
Commission should examine the interaction between current government social support 
services and business support and income support measures, and the impact of social 
support services on self-reliance, preparedness and performance. 
The Government will consider the Commission’s recommendations, and the Government’s 
response will be announced as soon as possible after the receipt of the Commission’s final 
report. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHRIS BOWEN  
20 June 2008 
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Key points 
• Many Australian farmers and rural communities have been experiencing hardship 
from the latest severe and prolonged drought. While this is not new to dryland 
farming, ‘irrigation drought’ is uncharted territory. 
• Australia has always had a variable climate, with drought being a recurring feature. 
Looking to the future, experts predict higher temperatures and, for some regions, 
more frequent periods of exceptionally low rainfall.  
• Most farmers are sufficiently self-reliant to manage climate variability. 
– In 2007-08, 23 per cent of Australia’s 143 000 farms received drought assistance, 
totalling over $1 billion, with some on income support continuously since 2002. 
– In drought declared areas, most farmers manage without assistance. From 
2002-03 to 2007-08, on average, about 70 per cent of dairy and broadacre farms 
in drought areas received no drought assistance. 
• The National Drought Policy’s (NDP) Exceptional Circumstance (EC) declarations 
and related drought assistance programs do not help farmers improve their 
self-reliance, preparedness and climate change management.  
– EC interest rate subsidies and state-based transactions subsidies are ineffective, 
can perversely encourage poor management practices and should be terminated. 
– EC household relief payments are limited to those in drought-declared areas, 
ignoring hardship elsewhere or for other reasons. They should be replaced. 
– The EC declaration process is inequitable and unnecessary. It should not be 
extended to new areas. Current declarations should lapse as soon as practicable. 
• Governments need to commit to a long term reform path that recognises that the 
primary responsibility for managing risks, including from climate variability and 
change, rests with farmers. To this end:  
– research, development, extension, professional advice and training to improve 
farmers’ business management skills and build self-reliance warrant significant 
government funding where they deliver a demonstrable community benefit. 
– Farm Management Deposits, notwithstanding their use for tax management, have 
encouraged farmers to save and to be more self-reliant, and should be retained. 
– policies relating to water, natural resource management and climate change, 
which all impact on farm businesses and local communities, are often at 
cross-purposes and need to be better coordinated and integrated. 
– all farm households in hardship — regardless of cause or location — should have 
access to an income support scheme that is designed for farming circumstances. 
• Similar recommendations from the previous reviews of the NDP have not been 
adopted. To ensure that this new policy direction is credible and enduring: 
– the NDP should be replaced with extended objectives for Australia’s Farming 
Future.  
– an intergovernmental agreement with independent monitoring and financial 
incentives for complying with agreed commitments should be established.  
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Overview 
Droughts can have devastating social and financial impacts on farmers and their 
communities, as well as adverse environmental effects. Australia has one of the 
most variable climates in the world, with wet years, and even wet decades such as 
the 1950s, contrasting with dry periods. In terms of rainfall in south-western, 
southern and eastern Australia, the latest drought has been severe and prolonged, 
and has been compared with the Federation drought and the drought of the 1940s. 
One difference this time is that it has been hotter — by about one degree Celsius. 
Another significant feature of the latest drought is its impact on many irrigators, 
especially in the Murray-Darling Basin. Severely reduced water allocations that 
have occurred in the last three years represent uncharted territory as low rainfall has 
interacted with policy failure. The river system is grossly over allocated.  
The variability of Australia’s climate, and the frequency of droughts, is reflected in 
Murray system inflows over the last century (figure 1).  
Figure 1 Murray system inflows (including Darling), 1892 to 2008 
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Given the frequency of drought, it is easy to overlook that the Australian agriculture 
sector is highly successful. It leads domestic productivity growth, is an innovative 
adopter of technologies, and has proved resilient to myriad forces of change. For 
example, despite facing long-term pressure on commodity prices and rising input 
costs, sectoral output continues to increase — with more than half of that exported. 
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Figure 2 Agricultural output and farm numbers, 1974-75 to 2007-08 
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Agricultural output is value added in 2006-07 prices. Comparable time series data on farm numbers are not 
available after 2004-05, and so Australian Taxation Office business numbers are used. Light shaded bars 
indicate drought years.   
The rural sector has always adjusted to changing circumstances, including drought 
which is one of many risks inherent in farming. In the main, this adjustment occurs 
autonomously through the independent decisions of farmers and others. Resilience 
to the impacts of the droughts of 1982, 1994, 2002 and 2006 is demonstrated by 
agricultural output (figure 2). Indeed, although 2002 to 2007 is regarded by many as 
one long drought, it includes three of the four highest ever years for total 
agricultural output. Moreover, notwithstanding the severity of the latest extended 
dry period, in 2007-08 only about 23 per cent of farms received drought assistance. 
This sectoral success masks a complex story of diversity and contrasting fortunes:  
• in 2005-06, the largest 30 per cent of farms generated 82 per cent of the value of 
agricultural operations, whereas the smallest 50 per cent generated 7 per cent 
• as a group, the bottom 25 per cent of broadacre farms has not recorded a profit in 
any year from 1988-89 to 2007-08. 
Farm performance is strongly correlated to vulnerability to drought. Apart from 
local climatic circumstances, how drought affects farming families and farm 
businesses depends on farm management practices, the degree of income 
diversification and the store of capital that farmers can draw on — the natural and 
physical capital of their farm, their financial and human capital and that embodied 
in their social networks.  
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The National Drought Policy  
Governments’ responses to droughts are guided by the National Drought Policy 
(NDP). Adopted in 1992, the NDP is based on a recognition that drought is a 
recurring feature of the climate. Its objectives, which correspond to phases 
associated with farming in a variable climate — preparedness before drought, 
managing and coping during drought, and recovering after drought — are to: 
• encourage primary producers and other sections of rural Australia to adopt 
self-reliant approaches to managing for climatic variability 
• maintain and protect Australia’s agricultural and environmental resource base 
during periods of extreme climate stress 
• ensure early recovery of agricultural and rural industries, consistent with long-term 
sustainable levels. (Crean, Minister for Primary Industries and Energy 1992) 
In contrast to its objectives, the NDP’s programs focus on providing relief primarily 
to farm households and farm businesses suffering hardship during severe drought.  
To be eligible for assistance, a farm must be in an area declared as being in 
Exceptional Circumstances (EC) — the ‘trigger’ — and satisfy the eligibility 
criteria of the individual programs: 
• The EC Relief Payment (ECRP) provides up to $405 per fortnight each for the 
farmer and partner. While the payment is equivalent to that provided to 
unemployed people in hardship under Newstart, the ECRP’s assets and income 
thresholds are more generous. In 2007-08, around 29 000 farm families received 
payments at a cost of approximately $380 million (figure 3) — by the start of 
2009, this had fallen to around 20 000 families.  
• EC Interest Rate Subsidies (ECIRS) are provided to farm businesses and farm 
dependent rural small businesses that are in financial difficulty but deemed 
viable in the long-term. A subsidy of up to 50 per cent of the interest payable on 
loans (excluding recent property purchases) is provided in the first year and up 
to 80 per cent in subsequent years. Recipients’ payments are capped at $500 000 
over five years. Total ECIRS payments have grown substantially to around 
$604 million in 2007-08 (figure 3). In that year, average payments of around 
$37 000 were made to about 16 000 recipients. 
• The EC Exit Package is available for farm businesses whose owners are willing 
to leave the industry. This little used package (around $10 million has been paid 
since 2007) consists of an Exit Grant, which provides a taxable one-off payment 
of up to $150 000, an Advice and Retraining Grant, and a Relocation Grant.  
• Other EC programs include a Professional Advice and Planning Grant scheme 
and a Small Business Income Support scheme.  
   
XXIV GOVERNMENT 
DROUGHT SUPPORT 
 
 
Figure 3 EC declared area and total EC support payments, 1992-93 to 
2008-09  
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
19
92
-9
3
19
93
-9
4
19
94
-9
5
19
95
–9
6
19
96
–9
7
19
97
–9
8
19
98
–9
9
19
99
-0
0
20
00
-0
1
20
01
-0
2
20
02
-0
3
20
03
-0
4
20
04
-0
5
20
05
-0
6
20
06
-0
7
20
07
-0
8
20
08
-0
9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Percentage of agricultural land EC
 declared
Percentage of total agricultural land ECIRS DRP/ECRP
EC
 p
ay
m
en
ts
 ($
 m
illi
on
)
DRP/ECRP includes payments to farm households made through the former Drought Relief Payment (DRP).  
Review of drought policy 
There is a mismatch between the NDP’s policy objectives and its programs. From 
its inception, policy has ostensibly centred on helping farmers build their 
self-reliance to manage climate variability and preparedness for droughts. Program 
expenditures, however, have not been directed to this end but have mainly flowed as 
emergency payments to a minority of farmers in hardship and to stressed farm 
businesses. The National Farmers’ Federation submitted that:  
Committing to a long-term drought policy is vital to securing an agricultural base that 
is resilient to a changing climate … one of the dangers of the government’s current 
Exceptional Circumstances policy package is that it includes policies which, while 
bearing an impact on drought management, primarily target other objectives. (sub. 51) 
Ministers with responsibility for primary industries consider that the current 
approaches to drought are no longer the most appropriate. They have concluded that 
policy must be improved to create an environment of self-reliance, preparedness 
and adoption of climate change management practices. These views are echoed in 
governments’ submissions (box 1).  
Given these concerns, Ministers’ asked for three reports. The first two — from 
Bureau of Meteorology–CSIRO and from the Expert Social Panel — were 
completed in 2008 (box 2). The Commission’s report completes the series and: 
• reports on the appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of governments’ 
business and income support measures to help manage drought 
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• identifies impediments to improving self-reliance and preparedness for periods 
of financial difficulty 
• identifies the most appropriate, effective and efficient responses by governments 
to build self-reliance and preparedness to manage drought. 
 
Box 1 Governments’ views on the NDP and self-reliance 
Victorian Government 
While the objective of the NDP is to promote self-reliance in farm risk management by 
(appropriately) shifting more of the risk burden of drought events from taxpayers onto 
farmers, there are questions whether the EC provisions and associated government 
payments have been undermining farmer’s incentives to do this. (sub. 110) 
Western Australian Government 
Collectively the money spent, over the past decade on Exceptional Circumstances … could 
have, arguably, been better spent on bolstering public sector research and development, 
and building farm business and financial management capacity … (sub. DR186) 
South Australian Government 
While the current suite of national drought support programs has assisted many businesses 
and families in need, they will not facilitate the level of reform required to meet these new 
and emerging challenges [of climate change]. A new approach is required. (sub. 91) 
Tasmanian Department of Primary Industries and Water 
The current assistance programs are proving to be disincentives for self reliance and 
drought preparedness strategies because safety nets are there to help farming businesses 
through difficult periods. (sub. 85) 
 
Most farmers manage without EC assistance 
The concept of EC was developed for droughts of such severity that they would be 
‘beyond the ability of even the most prudent farmer to manage’. And yet, during 
2007-08, nearly half of Australia’s dairy and broadacre farms in drought-declared 
areas did manage without EC assistance. Over the six years to 2007-08, on average 
nearly 70 per cent of these farms managed without EC assistance (table 1).  
Overall, of the 143 000 farms in Australia (with an estimated value of agricultural 
operations of $5000 or more), only 23 per cent received EC support in 2007-08. 
Farmers in EC declared areas who did not receive support were generating higher 
farm net cash incomes, had higher off-farm investment income to draw on and were 
earning more off-farm wage and salary income (figure 4).  
The analysis of farm liquidity and debt tells the same story. Unassisted farmers in 
drought areas had higher liquid assets than those on EC support in the same areas, 
and had the lowest debt levels (and interest payment obligations) of all groups of 
farmers.  
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Box 2 Climate science and the social impacts of drought  
The BoM-CSIRO report 
The joint assessment by the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) and CSIRO reports:  
• the extent and frequency of exceptionally hot years have been increasing and this is 
projected to continue, with exceptionally hot years likely to occur every one to two 
years, on average, over the period 2010–2040 
• while trends in rainfall are highly dependent on the period of analysis due to large 
inter-decadal variability, exceptionally low rainfall years are projected to become 
more frequent in southwest Western Australia, the South Australian agricultural 
region, Victoria and Tasmania 
• exceptionally low soil moisture is projected to become more frequent in line with the 
projected increase in exceptionally low rainfall years.  
The Expert Social Panel report  
The Expert Social Panel consulted widely across the country and found:  
• there is widespread distress in drought-affected rural communities and too many 
farm decisions are made under stress 
• while it is hard to separate the social impacts of drought from long-term trends 
contributing to decline in some rural populations, drought adversely impinges on the 
wellbeing of farm families and communities 
• policy needs to address the social needs of farm families, rural businesses and 
communities in ways that do not inhibit the efficiency of agricultural industries  
• the connection between the farm as a place of work, residence and family tradition 
has important implications for the effectiveness of institutional support.  
 
Table 1 Drought assistance recipients, 2002-03 to 2007-08 
  
 
2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 
 
 
2007-08 
Annual 
average 
2003-08
Farms on ECRP and/or 
ECIRS 
9 094 12 508 11 143 19 243 21 791 25 517 16 549 
(32%)
Farms in EC areas not 
on EC payments 
46 696 41 980 34 971 28 597 25 378 31 438 34 843 
(68%)
Estimated number of broadacre and dairy farms. Horticultural and other farms are not included in totals. 
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Figure 4 Income levels, liquidity and debt  
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This high level of preparedness reflects an accumulated understanding of 
Australia’s climate variability. Many farmers have rainfall records going back 120 
years and, depending on where their farms are situated, can readily point out the 
Federation drought and the long dry spell in the 1940s. Most were farming through 
the droughts of 1982 and 1994.  
The impact of climate change 
The BoM-CSIRO report presents projections for changes in temperature, rainfall 
and soil moisture. The meteorological evidence is that the geographic extent and 
frequency of exceptionally hot years has been increasing rapidly over recent 
decades. The report predicts that temperatures will keep rising.  
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Rainfall in most regions is expected to remain highly variable. While periods of 
exceptionally low rainfall are projected to increase in the southwest of the country 
(including southwest Western Australia and the South Australian agricultural 
region) and Victoria and Tasmania, BoM-CSIRO caution that these projections are 
less reliable than the temperature outlook. The pattern of exceptionally low soil 
moisture years is projected to be similar to, though more pronounced than, that for 
rainfall. 
Given the implications of this outlook for agriculture, it is even less appropriate to 
continue with programs that target those least prepared to manage climate 
variability, and to do so after droughts have arisen.  
Assessment of current programs 
Exceptional Circumstances declarations 
The institutional arrangements underlying the EC application process provide strong 
incentives for applications to be submitted. Local communities initiate an 
application and are the beneficiaries of the subsequent programs. State and territory 
governments assessing and endorsing such a declaration are acknowledged by the 
local communities as understanding their plight, yet are responsible for only 10 per 
cent of the cost of business assistance. The Commonwealth Government contributes 
all of the household relief funding and 90 per cent of the business assistance, 
leaving it with the fiscal and political consequences of accepting or rejecting an 
application. 
There is no formal requirement for transparency of the advice to the 
Commonwealth Minister from the National Rural Advisory Council and others on 
which the decision was based. To illustrate, in September 2007, the then 
Commonwealth Government declared 14 interim assistance areas (encompassing 
46 per cent of agricultural land in Western Australia and 51 per cent of Tasmania), 
thus triggering a round of non-recoverable interim assistance for additional areas. 
None of the communities in those areas subsequently applied for formal EC status 
— in refusing to do so, the Tasmanian Minister for Primary Industries and Water 
described the interim EC declaration as ‘an election stunt’.  
Despite the NDP’s one in 20 to 25 year criterion for an area to be EC declared, it 
has been common for 30 per cent or more of Australia to be declared (figure 3). In 
June 2008, more than half of the country was declared and some areas have been 
declared for 14 of the past 17 years. It appears that a generous interpretation of the 
criteria, rather than protracted low rainfall, is mainly responsible for this.  
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Looking ahead, the BoM–CSIRO report concludes: 
The current EC trigger, based on historical records, has already resulted in many areas 
of Australia being drought declared in more than 5% of years, and the frequency and 
severity are likely to increase. The principal implication … is that the existing trigger is 
not appropriate under a changing climate. (Hennessy et al. 2008) 
Several participants indicated that EC declaration has intrinsic psychological value 
in that it sends a message to the wider community that farmers in a declared area are 
facing difficult times because of drought. Against this, declaration raises significant 
equity issues inherent in any approach that relies on delineating specific areas 
(‘lines on maps’). Farmers who are experiencing largely the same drought 
circumstances but are on the other side of a boundary road are ineligible for 
assistance and are seen as not being in drought. 
It is evident that attempts to declare areas according to the severity of drought is 
inappropriate, ineffective and inequitable.  
EC Interest Rate Subsidies 
The ECIRS scheme directs assistance only to those in debt. Average payments and 
the number of recipients increased rapidly over the three years to 2007-08 even 
though the extent of EC declared land remained fairly constant (figure 5).  
Figure 5 EC interest rate subsidy recipients and average payment,   
2001-02 to 2007-08 
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Much of the expenditure increase appears to have been driven by changes in scheme 
criteria. For example, in late 2006 the maximum subsidy payable over five years 
was increased from $300 000 to $500 000. A year later, in September 2007, the 
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off-farm asset threshold was lifted from $500 000 to $750 000. (A similar trend is 
evident with the relaxation of the off-farm income test for ECRP.) 
The ECIRS has proved highly divisive in rural communities. Those who have 
benefited endorse the program as a means to address a short-term liquidity crisis. 
Non-recipients are highly critical of this measure. Box 3 presents a range of views 
from broadacre farmers, graziers and orchardists. 
 
Box 3 Farmers’ views on drought assistance 
Farmers in favour of drought assistance  
The support we have received with Interest Subsidy was vital in assisting us. With this 
assistance we have utilised the drought as an opportunity … For without the Interest 
Subsidy assistance this knowledge gained would not have happened. (D. and T. Allen) 
… interest subsidy is useful and practical. It is helpful the way it is because much debt is 
because of farm-build-up to remain viable … (Crocker Farming Co.) 
The existing interest subsidy and household support have been very useful in getting 
through the difficult time, with our business ready to produce again when it rains. (Belalie 
Pastoral Company) 
Farmers not in favour of drought assistance  
The same producers are queuing every time assistance is offered which proves there is no 
adapting to seasonal variability. … Those of us who have embraced new technology and 
diversification are excluded from assistance as [we] are self-sufficient. (G. Schmidt) 
It is disconcerting to see a number of ‘inefficient’ graziers … receiving drought assistance 
when they have done little to plan and manage the risks of drought … (J. Cooper)  
… the current exceptional circumstances assistance system does not encourage the 
efficient operation of farm businesses through economies of scale, in fact they encourage 
the opposite. (L. Mann)  
Efficient farmers who save and invest off farm are penalised, whilst farmers who waste 
money [and] spend everything get more help. (H. Clark) 
A farmer who has diversified risk, managed borrowings conservatively, kept operating costs 
low and planned a financially secure retirement is less likely to qualify … (P. Wallace) 
 
 
While the ECIRS aims to assist otherwise viable farmers who are experiencing 
liquidity problems, the evidence shows that the average recipient has an equity level 
of over 80 per cent of the total farm asset value. Any rationale for a scheme that 
rests on farmers’ inability to access carry-on finance requires evidence that capital 
markets are unwilling to extend credit in the face of such balance sheet strength. To 
this end, the Australian Bankers’ Association submitted that, in times of drought, 
viable farmers should be able to access carry-on finance, have loans restructured to 
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reduce repayments or defer payment without cost. The Commission found no 
evidence that farmers’ access to capital differed in any significant way from that 
faced by other small businesses, even with changes in economic cycles.  
Contrary to the objectives of the NDP, there are no requirements on recipients of 
ECIRS to demonstrate that they are improving their farm management practices or, 
in other ways, increasing their self-reliance. Indeed, the ECIRS generates perverse 
incentives in that it can lead to: 
• some farm businesses failing to adopt self-reliant strategies, such as earning 
off-farm income or building financial reserves as a hedge against drought risks, 
in the belief that governments will support them during droughts:  
If we had not carried out farm contracting during the 2007 year it is quite possible we 
would have received the maximum interest subsidy of $100 000 … other farmers … 
made more money from receiving interest subsidy than we netted from farm 
contracting. (S. and A. Boardman, sub. 43) 
• recipients being less responsive to drought conditions and being financially 
assisted to continue business-as-usual; 
[EC interest rate subsidies] promote ‘worst practice’ farming i.e. To overgraze and 
overspend in good times, knowing the criteria for subsidy will be met in the drought 
(D. and M. Geldard and T. Reid, sub. 46). 
Interest rate subsidies were criticised strongly in the reports to government of the 
Drought Policy Taskforce (1997), the Mid-Term Review of the Rural Adjustment 
Scheme (1997), the Drought Review Panel (2004), and the Agriculture and Food 
Policy Reference Group (2006). On the evidence provided to this inquiry, and its 
own analysis, the Commission agrees with the findings of these reviews. 
Exceptional Circumstances interest rate subsidies should be terminated, subject to 
transition arrangements. 
Transactions subsidies  
New South Wales, Queensland and the Northern Territory provide subsidies for the 
transport of fodder, water and livestock for farmers in drought-declared areas. This 
is despite previously agreeing to end such subsidies in the face of evidence of 
perverse consequences and the potential for misuse, including:  
• exacerbating environmental damage from retaining excessive stock for the 
prevailing conditions. As one participant noted ‘one can see adjacent properties 
that have been subjected to very different land management regimes, one with 
many starving cattle picking at round bales brought in by subsidised freight, next 
door to a few fat unsubsidised cattle’ (P. Morris, sub. 23) 
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• bidding up the price of fodder in regions where there is no subsidy, thereby 
increasing costs for other users, particularly the intensive livestock sector. 
Fixed water rates and municipal rates are legitimate and known business costs that 
should be budgeted for, yet some states also provide rebates and waivers on these. 
Where there are concerns about hardship, deferred payment models would be 
preferable to shifting the burden onto other ratepayers and/or the wider community. 
States and territories should, as previously agreed, terminate transactions-based 
subsidies.  
EC Exit packages  
At December 2008, around 100 applicants had received an EC exit package from 
nearly 500 processed claims. One reason for the low uptake of the package is the 
grant’s strict eligibility requirements. The program also fails to address the 
non-monetary reasons why many farmers remain on the farm — the lack of formal 
recognition and portability of the skills learned during farming and the reluctance to 
move away from the family home and local community. (The Australia’s Farming 
Future initiative includes a similar package badged as Re-establishment Grants.) 
The Exceptional Circumstances exit package should be terminated, subject to 
transition arrangements. The Re-establishment grants that are provided under the 
Australia’s Farming Future initiative should similarly end. 
Recently the Australian Government announced a program for small irrigators in 
the Murray-Darling Basin involving purchase of their water entitlements, assistance 
to remove permanent plantings, training services and an exit grant. Recipients can 
remain in the family home on their farms. As many of these ‘blockies’ are located 
near settlements where alternative employment may be available, the scheme 
addresses some of the failings of the EC exit grant. The Commission considers that 
this scheme, which is intended to run for a short period, should be evaluated. 
The appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of the Small Block Irrigators 
Exit Grant package should be evaluated following its conclusion. 
Irrigation Management Grant 
The Irrigation Management Grant program provides up to $20 000 to 
Murray-Darling Basin irrigators. At December 2008, around 9 500 irrigators had 
accessed the program, which is scheduled to end on 30 June 2009. By any measure 
the grants are generous and largely unrestricted in eligibility and use.  
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There are no obvious constraints that prevent irrigators from undertaking 
infrastructure improvements. The grants assist farmers to increase returns from their 
water allocations and they appropriate the benefits. The evidence for any broader 
environmental benefit is ambiguous at best. The grants support businesses in their 
current location and reward irrigators who have not updated their infrastructure. It 
can also lead farmers to delay their decisions to leave the industry and/or to sell 
water entitlements, thereby increasing the costs of eventual adjustment.  
The Murray-Darling Basin Irrigation Management Grants program should 
conclude, as scheduled, on 30 June 2009. 
EC Relief Payments 
The ECRP scheme treats farmers in EC areas very favourably relative to others in 
hardship in the community. Owners of other businesses that fail (other than farm 
dependent rural small businesses) and others in the labour market who have no 
significant income, are not entitled to support unless they meet the standard safety 
net criteria. To receive income support under Newstart, an unemployed couple must 
seek work, have assets valued at less than $243 500 (excluding their own home) and 
can only jointly earn $62 per week before their benefit reduces.  
Under ECRP, a farming couple is not required to seek alternative employment, 
partly in recognition that in drought, farmers still need to manage their land and 
stock and maintain the underlying viability of their farms. The value of a farming 
couple’s farm is not assessed for eligibility purposes, they also can own up to 
$243 500 in off-farm assets and can earn over $400 per week in off-farm income 
before incurring any loss of benefit. While almost half of ECRP beneficiaries have 
received support for one to two years, around half have been supported for longer, 
with almost ten per cent having received payments continuously since 2003 
(figure 6).  
Long-term government support encourages dependency that is inimical to 
self-reliance and preparedness, perpetuates many social problems identified by the 
Expert Social Panel and generally impedes adjustment.  
Exceptional Circumstances relief payments should be replaced, subject to 
transition arrangements.  
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Figure 6 Length of time in continuous receipt of ECRP 
Recipients current at 9 January 2009 
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The Commission proposes that the ECRP scheme be replaced by a Farming Family 
Income Support scheme that aims to achieve a balance between four objectives: 
• equity — by enabling all farming families in hardship to access income support, 
not just those within administratively-determined drought boundaries 
• recognition of farm viability — by setting the asset threshold at a higher level 
than Newstart  
• avoidance of welfare dependence — by limiting the duration of income support 
and assisting farmers to undertake farm planning or training suited to earning 
off-farm income 
• helping recipients determine their future in farming — by providing support for 
viability assessments, counselling and succession planning.  
The expression of these aims underpins the recommended scheme (figure 7). 
The Commission considers that, on equity grounds, farming families experiencing 
hardship should apply for assistance like other Australians and be subject to the 
same income test — with support starting to taper after a household earns $62 per 
week (where both adults receive assistance) from other sources. 
  
 
 OVERVIEW XXXV
 
Figure 7 Farming Family Income Support scheme 
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The assets test under Newstart, however, does not sit easily in the farm sector. 
Given the usually high level of farm assets, Newstart’s asset threshold of $243 500 
(not including the house) would render most farm households ineligible for support. 
Running down the capital value of the farm to that threshold could jeopardise future 
farm viability. In recognition of this, and that hardship may be only temporary 
(about half of all ECRP recipients receive support for one to two years), the scheme 
should depart from Newstart’s asset threshold.  
The net asset threshold under the Transitional Income Support (TIS) scheme, which 
is scheduled to end in June 2009, is $1.5 million. The Commission considers, 
however, that a net asset threshold of $2 million, tapering out at $3 million, would 
best meet the objectives of its proposed scheme. A liquid asset sub-cap of $20 000, 
the same as for TIS, recognises that farms require more working capital than, say, 
urban households, but also requires that funds in excess of $20 000 (including Farm 
Management Deposits) be drawn down before taxpayer support is provided. 
Unlike the unconditional ECRP scheme, the Commission’s recommended scheme 
would involve mutual responsibility. Many farmers and the National Farmers’ 
Federation supported some form of mutual conditions. Others were of a similar 
view. For example, the ACT Department of Territory and Municipal Services said:  
Encouraging self reliance may be enhanced by a mutual obligation approach to future 
drought assistance e.g. assistance measures will be dependent on the implementation of 
a business plan incorporating risk management strategies. (sub. 101) 
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Income support beneficiaries would have to develop a ‘Mutual Responsibility 
Contract’ specifying the actions that are to be taken to improve self-reliance. For 
most, the contract would require a household financial plan and/or a farm financial 
and business plan to, at least, indicate the sustainable earning potential of the farm 
business. For viable farmers this requirement would not be particularly onerous — 
most would have such plans already.  
The contract would make allowance for particular farmers’ circumstances and 
preferences. Hence, it could involve commitments to gain skills suited to earning 
off-farm income or participation in programs such as Landcare or those conducted 
by Catchment Management Authorities. To help farmers determine their future, 
assistance would be available to assess farm viability, for counselling, and to 
encourage the preparation of succession plans. 
Assistance would be re-assessed every six months on the basis of compliance with 
conditions — including actions set out in the contract. Acquittal of payments 
against income earned would occur annually. To ensure that assistance did not 
become entrenched, assistance would be limited to three years out of every seven 
for a farm household. After that period, members of the household would no longer 
be eligible for assistance until they met the income, assets and activity requirements 
of other generally available income support programs.  
The regular assessment of the farm’s financial position in tandem with the time 
limit on the more generous asset threshold would encourage the owners of 
non-viable farms to investigate alternative management arrangements, such as 
leasing or sharefarming, or exiting the industry. For farmers wishing to leave the 
industry, access to counselling, training and advice would be available in 
conjunction with income support.  
All farmers facing hardship should have access to a Farming Family Income 
Support scheme designed for farming circumstances. It would provide payments 
and have income eligibility thresholds at Newstart levels, subject to: 
• an overall net asset cap, inclusive of the value of the farm house, beginning at 
$2 million with a taper to $3 million 
• a liquid asset sub-cap of $20 000 inclusive of bank balances and Farm 
Management Deposits balances. 
While the scheme should operate at the farm household level, eligibility and 
payments should be on an individual basis and conditional on: 
• meeting the definition of a farmer, based on a similar test to that used 
currently for the Transitional Income Support scheme 
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• seeking independent financial advice on the viability of the farming business 
• developing and carrying out a plan of action to improve household 
self-reliance 
• eligibility being reviewed, mutual responsibilities being met and plans updated 
every six months.  
The scheme should be limited to a maximum claim per farm household for three 
years out of every seven. The seven year period should commence from the date of 
receiving the first income support payment. Payments should be acquitted 
annually. 
The Farming Family Income Support scheme should commence on 1 July 2009 
in conjunction with programs to provide counselling, the recognition of prior 
learning and grants for training and professional advice. 
Small Business Income Support 
At present, agriculture-dependent small business operators based within or outside 
EC declared areas can apply for small business income support. The scheme was 
introduced with little justification in late 2006 and expanded in September 2007 to 
allow non-agriculture-dependent business operators to apply. It is scheduled to end 
in June 2009. Across Australia, other small businesses are not afforded such 
treatment — as evidenced by bankruptcies in any given year.  
The scheme is intended to assist with living expenses, rather than business operating 
expenses. However, small business operators do not generally face the same 
constraints as farmers in accessing broader income support measures — they 
generally do not have such lumpy non-divisible assets; do not face the same 
difficulties in diversifying income; and are usually located in towns and so would be 
more able to meet program obligations, such as those that are required of Newstart 
recipients. Preferential access to income support for these small businesses is not 
justified. 
Exceptional Circumstances small business income support should be terminated, 
subject to transition arrangements. 
What about regional communities? 
Some participants proposed that a rationale for drought assistance is that the 
injection of funds into regional areas helps communities retain a critical mass of 
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population and preserve their social fabric. Clearly, droughts can add to pressure for 
change, but the underlying long-term economic and social forces appear inexorable.  
Over the last 100 years, small rural towns have felt the impact of bigger and better 
machinery, farm amalgamations and the reduced need for on-farm labour (see 
figure 2). Better roads and vehicles have made it easier for farmers to conduct their 
commerce in larger regional centres. Reliance on agriculture is falling in many rural 
areas relative to other economic activities. Growth from ‘sea change’ and ‘tree 
change’ is altering some rural profiles. Adding to this, climate projections indicate 
that current agricultural practices in some regions may not be sustainable. 
Economic activity and industry fortunes will continue to wax and wane and the 
pattern of settlement will change regardless of intermittent funding tied to climatic 
events. Against this backdrop, the efficacy of using temporary drought relief as a 
regional development tool is most unlikely.  
If governments are committed to supporting small towns per se, then more enduring 
regional development initiatives and policy consideration would be needed. In the 
short term, the Expert Social Panel cautioned:  
… state and territory governments must consider the unintended consequences of 
withdrawing services and infrastructure during periods of stress, such as dryness. The 
Panel is supportive of any Australian Government initiatives which will provide 
incentives to consider the social impact of decisions regarding the provision of rural 
services and infrastructure (for example, schools, school bus services and local 
hospitals). (Kenny et al. 2008) 
Governments’ attempts to achieve equitable access to a wide range of services can 
entail them devoting more resources to certain groups in the community. For 
example, governments often spend more per person on delivering equivalent 
services to people in rural and regional areas than people in major cities. While this 
can be appropriate, it is also important to consider the opportunity costs of 
maintaining services in the face of changing patterns of settlement. 
Terminating the EC process and transition of current declared areas  
The Commission’s analysis concludes that an EC trigger is not an essential element 
of any future programs. When coupled with the inherent flaws in the declaration 
process itself, the Commission considers that the EC trigger should be dispensed 
with. In transitioning from the current arrangements to the new approach, however, 
there should be no sudden change to the arrangements in currently EC declared 
areas.  
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Under the Commission’s recommendations, farm families in hardship could access 
income support, regardless of drought events, from 1 July 2009. But for areas still 
under declaration, ECRP recipients would continue to access assistance under much 
more favourable conditions than those available to the rest of the community. 
Similarly, current recipients of the ECIRS would continue to access unconditional 
funds, whereas farm businesses in non-declared areas could not. To mitigate the 
inequities that would inevitably arise between EC areas and non-declared areas, a 
dual stream regime should not run in parallel for longer than absolutely necessary.  
However, given the high level of benefits flowing to some producers in EC areas, 
the pressure placed on assessments to extend EC status would be amplified. That 
process has been shown to lack transparency and to have been subject to 
manipulation. This also needs to be addressed.  
The Exceptional Circumstances (EC) declaration process should be terminated. 
No new areas, full or interim, should be declared. Currently declared areas could 
have their EC status extended where they meet the criteria. To mitigate the 
inequities and costs of running two regimes in parallel: 
• assessments and advice made by the National Rural Advisory Council on 
extension or revocation of EC declarations and the Minister’s reasons for the 
subsequent decision should be made public 
• in areas that remain declared, only active recipients of EC assistance 
measures should be eligible to reapply, but enrolments for EC relief payments 
should cease once the Farming Family Income Support scheme commences 
• continuing recipients of EC interest rate subsidies should be subject to 
rigorous assessment including demonstration of appropriate financial and 
business management plans 
• continuing recipients of EC relief payments should be subject to similar 
case-management arrangements as those applying to recipients of the 
Farming Family Income Support scheme 
• an end date for all EC arrangements that provides sufficient time for a 
transition to the new arrangements should be pre-announced. 
Drought triggers — whether attempted to be defined as ‘exceptional’, ‘extreme’ or 
any other such variation — have proven to be a failure. They are not relevant to the 
formulation of programs aimed at developing self-reliance, preparedness and 
sustainability and there is no place for them in any future policy architecture.  
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The future policy framework 
The Commission has argued for the termination of the EC declaration process and 
the various programs that it triggers. Yet, the rationale underlying most of the 
NDP’s objectives are sound. Accordingly, the Commission considers that there is a 
case for extending the Commonwealth Government’s Australia’s Farming Future 
initiative to embrace risk management and climate variability more broadly. 
The objectives of the Australia’s Farming Future initiative should be revised and 
extended to the following: 
• assist primary producers to adapt and adjust to the impacts of climate 
variability and climate change 
• encourage primary producers to adopt self-reliant approaches to managing 
risks 
• assist primary producers to manage greenhouse gas emissions and other 
adverse impacts on the environment 
• ensure that farming families in hardship have temporary access to an income 
support scheme that recognises the special circumstances of farmers. 
Measures to facilitate self-reliance and preparedness 
Farmers in drought-declared areas who cope without support from EC programs 
generally have stronger natural and physical capital on their farms and greater 
financial and human capital to draw on. Governments have a role where market 
failures impede farmers building that capital, or where policy settings and programs 
inhibit its growth.  
Research, development and extension 
There are sound rationales for governments to assist farmers to build their capacity 
through funding for research, development and extension services. While 
governance structures of the Rural Research and Development Corporations 
(RRDCs) are reasonably sound, improvements to ensure that researchers, businesses 
and governments come together and disseminate information can improve outcomes 
further.  
Given the projected climate outlook, sufficient funding needs to be directed to 
agricultural research, seasonal forecasting, and development and extension activities 
designed to improve risk management for climate variation and change.  
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Agricultural extension services and their delivery have changed markedly from the 
era of linear, top-down advice on how to improve yields and apply fertiliser and 
pesticides. There is now more private sector delivery, use of fees for service and 
more emphasis on information flows and stakeholder participation. Whatever the 
format, there need to be effective two-way links between researchers and farmers.  
Public investment in agricultural R&D to manage climate variability and climate 
change should be pursued such that: 
• programs are subject to monitoring and evaluation to ensure funds are expended 
where there are net public benefits — where research provides private benefits, 
contributions from beneficiaries should be required 
• excessive use of short-term funding arrangements is avoided because it hinders 
effective relationships developing between researchers and primary producers 
• there is integration with extension services to ensure researchers are aware of 
farmers’ priorities and farmers are able to appropriately adopt new practices 
• funding is channelled through a few well functioning institutions (such as 
several of the RRDCs and Co-operative Research Centres rather than having 
multiple funding pools. 
Significant public funding should be directed to research, development and 
extension to assist farmers prepare for, manage, and recover from the impacts of 
climate variability and change. 
Information and advice  
With the increasing complexity of farming, farmers need more than public advice, 
information and extension services. Indeed, the largest 30 per cent of farms that 
generate most of Australia’s output ‘buy in’, often multiple, forms of advice — 
agronomic, business, financial and marketing. At the other end of the spectrum, 
however, many small and middle tier farmers do not seek much outside advice.  
The Rural Financial Counselling Service (RFCS) can meet a need for objective 
information in some areas. For its clients, the RFCS provides information, acts as a 
referral point for other services and helps clients unable to pay for financial and 
other advice services.  
The largely private benefits from financial counselling suggest that the rationale for 
government provision is weak. The Expert Social Panel recommended that the role 
played by the rural financial counsellors be reviewed ‘as soon as practical’. The 
Commission concurs, but acknowledges that the RFCS is moving to a new case 
management approach with funding to 2011.  
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The Rural Financial Counselling Service program should be reviewed prior to 
the end of its current funding. The review should assess whether the program 
delivers net benefits to the community and, in doing so, examine:  
• the extent to which alternative sources of information are lacking in certain 
areas 
• whether counsellors refer their clients to relevant services in a timely and 
effective manner 
• the future role of the service in view of the wide ranging case management 
options under the Farming Family Income Support scheme.  
Professional Advice and Planning Grants of up to $5500 allow farm businesses to 
obtain professional advice for drought management and recovery. The grants, which 
are only available in EC declared areas, have helped some farmers manage for, and 
recover from, drought. Nevertheless, there are better ways to meet educational and 
training needs than through reactive support based on drought boundaries. 
Exceptional Circumstances professional advice and planning grants should be 
terminated, subject to transition arrangements. 
Education and training 
The FarmReady (and former FarmBis) programs provide financial assistance to 
primary producers and rural land managers to undertake business and natural 
resource management training and education activities. FarmBis was strongly 
endorsed across the agricultural community on the basis that the financial and 
business training had led to improved drought preparedness.  
Grants for business training and professional advice that are well targeted and have 
an educational outcome are likely to provide private and broader community 
benefits. A continuous learning program for farmers can provide a mix of public 
and private benefits. The more specific the training is to a particular farmer’s 
circumstances, the more likely it is that they would choose to undertake the training 
without government funding. In these circumstances, a co-contribution would mean 
that recipients would have a greater stake in the outcomes of education and training 
activities and would be more likely to ensure that training met their needs. The most 
successful elements of FarmBis should be brought within FarmReady in a 
strengthened program. 
Significant public funding should be directed to a continuous learning program, 
incorporating the successful elements of the former FarmBis within an enhanced 
FarmReady platform. The revised program should encompass advice and training 
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for managing climate variability and for farm business management. Funding 
should be provided in the form of a subsidy which covers a proportion of the cost 
of training, with the recipient contributing the balance. 
Farm Management Deposits  
The Farm Management Deposits (FMD) scheme enables individual farmers to 
deposit up to $400 000 of pre-tax income into an FMD for later withdrawal. The 
scheme plays a positive role in encouraging self-reliance and preparedness.  
Some of the criticisms of FMDs revolve around their evident use for tax deferral 
and tax saving, particularly given that an income tax averaging scheme for farmers 
already exists. Nonetheless, FMDs may contribute to tax equity, especially for the 
minority of farmers who do not practise tax averaging.  
More importantly, evidence points to FMDs encouraging farmers to save for 
periods of low income (such as drought) and for recovery (such as replanting and 
restocking). While the aggregate level of FMD holdings could suggest that they are 
not being drawn down in drought periods, the sectoral data indicate that the pattern 
of deposits and withdrawals is generally consistent with preparedness for, and 
recovery after, drought events.  
FMDs do not generate the perverse incentives and outcomes for resource use 
decisions that are characteristic of other government business assistance (such as 
interest rate and transport subsidies). FMDs are therefore likely to be a more 
efficient means of encouraging financial self-reliance than some other measures.  
Some participants called for an increase in the cap on funds that could be held in an 
FMD and/or submitted that other forms of farm structures should have access to the 
scheme. The Commission found no compelling case for either of these proposals.  
The Farm Management Deposits scheme should be retained with its current cap 
of $400 000 and no widening of its eligibility criteria.  
Making the transition 
The Commission’s recommendations are consistent with the findings and 
recommendations of previous reports to government on drought. That such 
recommendations have not been adopted, or followed only briefly, highlights that 
the potential benefits of the recommended policy approach will be realised only if 
there is confidence that it will be consistently applied. Progress will be undermined 
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if there is an expectation that governments will revert to providing reactive support 
when droughts recur. To date, such expectations have proved well-founded.  
Following reaction to the draft report, the Commission has come to the view that 
there is a strong case for an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) that embodies a 
systematic assessment of compliance. The principle arguments for this are: the 
benefits on offer from reform; the adverse consequences of reverting to past policy 
stances; and the benefits from policy coordination between Commonwealth, state 
and territory governments. 
The Commonwealth, state and territory governments should enter into an 
intergovernmental agreement linking Commonwealth funding to the states and 
territories to a range of commitments. These commitments should include: 
• ensuring policies and instruments are compatible with the extended objectives 
of the Australia’s Farming Future initiative  
• avoiding the use of reactive business assistance measures such as interest rate 
subsidies and other transactions-based subsidies, including waivers for 
legitimate business expenses 
• ensuring that if assistance is provided to farm businesses rather than farm 
households, it is conditional on an assessment of whether the farm will be 
self-supporting in the longer term and be directed to reinforcing longer term 
capacity building. 
The disbursement of funds linked to an intergovernmental agreement should be 
dependent on an arms-length evaluation of the extent to which the parties have 
met their agreed commitments. The agreement should be established, and 
independent monitoring and assessments undertaken, at the Council of 
Australian Governments level. 
The quantum of funds that should be linked to any IGA is properly a function of 
governments to determine, taking into account commitments entered into and the 
relative roles and responsibilities ascribed to the Commonwealth, state and territory 
governments.  
A further new pool of dedicated incentive payments for an IGA would not be 
required. Conditional commitments could be tied to the funds identified as 
necessary to meet the specified objectives of the new suite of programs aimed at 
improving farmers’ self-reliance and preparedness. Past expenditures — especially 
the peak expenditures of recent years — are not a relevant basis for ascertaining 
future funding needs for refocused programs. State and territory governments also 
provide significant drought-related expenditures, some of which are inconsistent 
with the new policy framework. Terminating such programs would liberate state 
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funds that could be used for more appropriate programs. This is part of the overall 
funding calculus and leaves open the possibility of an IGA with some matching 
funding components.  
The Commission’s recommendations refocus drought policy on the broader issue of 
climate variability and change. Within this revised framework, the Commission has 
proposed removing impediments to self-reliance and preparedness and providing 
support to better equip farmers to deal with climate and other risks. The removal of 
reactive drought-triggered measures (such as the ECIRS) which impede the 
development of private arrangements for risk sharing will encourage alternative 
forms of farm business activity — such as sharefarming or leasing. More generally, 
it will improve the self-reliance and preparedness of the current population of 
farmers. Those who are unwilling or unable to accept these risks may be more likely 
to exit and, importantly, less likely to enter farming in the first place.  
In terms of building financial capital, FMDs will become more attractive in this 
changed risk management environment. Further, incorporating the most successful 
elements of FarmBis into an enhanced FarmReady scheme will improve the human 
capital of the lower to middle tiers of farmers. The linkages between continuous 
learning and agricultural research and development will be enhanced by significant 
funding initiatives. These measures focus on the achievement of the policy 
objectives proposed for the Australia’s Farming Future initiative. Figure 8  
summarises the nature and timing of the proposed changes. 
The broader policy context 
Agricultural policy must be developed and managed within the context of economy-
wide policy frameworks (figure 9). The new objectives that the Commission has 
proposed for Australia’s Farming Future focus on the centre ring of the figure. But, 
as many participants properly pointed out, there are concerns about the 
uncoordinated impacts of other government policy ‘silos’. 
While it would not be appropriate to redefine other policies in the context of this 
inquiry, the Commission notes that disparate policy areas including water, natural 
resource management and climate change all impact on the agricultural sector.  
Irrigators, in particular, stressed the interactions between water and other policies — 
from state water trading rules to local land use and zoning regulations — and 
drought policy. For example, water trading has presented some farmers with greater 
financial and production options during drought, while allowing water to move to 
higher value uses. Yet these options can be constrained by barriers to water trades, 
the imposition of exit fees and the time taken to process interstate trades. EC 
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programs have also supported some farmers who may otherwise have exited, 
allowing them to retain water for irrigation or to purchase more water than they 
otherwise would have. And, where governments subsidise preparedness measures, 
such as farm dams, this can benefit one farmer at the expense of others where on-
farm water capture reduces run-off.  
Figure 8 Current and proposed arrangements  
Jun 2008 Jun 2010Jun 2009 Jun 2011 Jun 2012
Transitional Income Support
FarmReady
EC exit package
Climate Change Adjustment Program (CCAP) grants for exit & advice
Current
EC Interest Rate Subsidy (ECIRS)
Rural Financial Counselling Service
Farm Management Deposits
Research, development and extension
Transaction-based subsidies
Irrigation Management Grants
Small Business Income Support
Prof. Advice and Planning Grant
EC Relief Payment (ECRP)
Jun 2008 Jun 2010Jun 2009 Jun 2011 Jun 2012
CCAP grants for exit & advice
Rural Financial Counselling Service (pending review)
Farm Management Deposits (retained as is)
Research, development and extension (enhanced)
Farming Family Income Support scheme (proposed)
Proposed
Grants for training, financial planning and advice (proposed)
FarmReady (with increased scope similar to FarmBis)
Counselling and Recognition of Prior Learning (proposed)
Transitional Income Support
Irrigation Management Grants
Prof. Advice and Planning Grant
EC exit package
Transaction-based subsidies
Small Business Income Support
ECIRS
ECRP
transition
transition
transition
transition
transition
transition
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Figure 9 Policy elements of a new approach 
Non-agricultural policies that influence farmers’ 
ability to manage climate variability and change
Agricultural policy measures that 
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- extension and other information provision
- farmer-specific income support
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coordination coordination
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Industrial relations
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Social security safety net
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Animal welfare 
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Occupational 
health and 
safety
 
Natural resource management policies is another area that can either ameliorate or 
exacerbate environmental damage from drought. To this policy mix must be added 
the potential impacts on farmers of the impending Carbon Pollution Reduction 
scheme.  
A self-reliant and prepared farming sector that is well placed to manage risks will 
benefit farmers, farm businesses and rural communities. Achieving this outcome, 
however, will require a degree of policy coordination that is not yet evident. 
Currently, different polices are providing signals and incentives that are potentially 
conflicting, or worse still, clearly at cross-purposes. Jurisdictional variations add 
another layer of complexity to this. Better communication, coordination and in 
some cases integration, between policy areas is needed.  
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Recommendations 
Drought-triggered programs for farm businesses  
Exceptional Circumstances interest rate subsidies should be terminated, subject to 
transition arrangements. 
The Exceptional Circumstances exit package should be terminated, subject to 
transition arrangements. The Re-establishment grants that are provided under the 
Australia’s Farming Future initiative should similarly end.  
The appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of the Small Block Irrigators 
Exit Grant package should be evaluated following its conclusion.  
States and territories should, as previously agreed, terminate transactions-based 
subsidies. 
The Murray-Darling Basin Irrigation Management Grants program should 
conclude, as scheduled, on 30 June 2009.   
Income support for farm and farm-related households 
Exceptional Circumstances relief payments should be replaced, subject to 
transition arrangements. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 6.3 
RECOMMENDATION 6.4 
RECOMMENDATION 6.5 
RECOMMENDATION 6.6 
RECOMMENDATION 6.8 
RECOMMENDATION 6.1 
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Exceptional Circumstances small business income support should be terminated, 
subject to transition arrangements. 
All farmers facing hardship should have access to a Farming Family Income 
Support scheme designed for farming circumstances. It would provide payments 
and have income eligibility thresholds at Newstart levels, subject to: 
• an overall net asset cap, inclusive of the value of the farm house, beginning at 
$2 million with a taper to $3 million 
• a liquid asset sub-cap of $20 000 inclusive of bank balances and Farm 
Management Deposits balances. 
While the scheme should operate at the farm household level, eligibility and 
payments should be on an individual basis and conditional on: 
• meeting the definition of a farmer, based on a similar test to that used 
currently for the Transitional Income Support scheme 
• seeking independent financial advice on the viability of the farming business 
• developing and carrying out a plan of action to improve household 
self-reliance 
• eligibility being reviewed, mutual responsibilities being met and plans updated 
every six months. 
The scheme should be limited to a maximum claim per farm household for three 
years out of every seven. The seven year period should commence from the date of 
receiving the first income support payment. Payments should be acquitted 
annually.  
The Farming Family Income Support scheme should commence on 1 July 2009 
in conjunction with programs to provide counselling, the recognition of prior 
learning and grants for training and professional advice. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 6.2 
RECOMMENDATION 9.1 
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Transition from the drought-triggered framework 
The Exceptional Circumstances (EC) declaration process should be terminated. 
No new areas, full or interim, should be declared. Currently declared areas could 
have their EC status extended where they meet the criteria. To mitigate the 
inequities and costs of running two regimes in parallel: 
• assessments and advice made by the National Rural Advisory Council on 
extension or revocation of EC declarations and the Minister’s reasons for the 
subsequent decision should be made public 
• in areas that remain declared, only active recipients of EC assistance 
measures should be eligible to reapply, but enrolments for EC relief payments 
should cease once the Farming Family Income Support scheme commences 
• continuing recipients of EC interest rate subsidies should be subject to 
rigorous assessment including demonstration of appropriate financial and 
business management plans 
• continuing recipients of EC relief payments should be subject to similar 
case-management arrangements as those applying to recipients of the 
Farming Family Income Support scheme 
• an end date for all EC arrangements that provides sufficient time for a 
transition to the new arrangements should be pre-announced. 
New policy framework for self-reliance and preparedness 
The objectives of the Australia’s Farming Future initiative should be revised and 
extended to the following: 
• assist primary producers to adapt and adjust to the impacts of climate 
variability and climate change 
• encourage primary producers to adopt self-reliant approaches to managing 
risks 
• assist primary producers to manage greenhouse gas emissions and other 
adverse impacts on the environment 
• ensure that farming families in hardship have temporary access to an income 
support scheme that recognises the special circumstances of farmers. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 11.1 
RECOMMENDATION 7.1 
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Significant public funding should be directed to research, development and 
extension to assist farmers prepare for, manage, and recover from the impacts of 
climate variability and change. 
RECOMMENDATION 8.2 
The Rural Financial Counselling Service program should be reviewed prior to 
the end of its current funding. The review should assess whether the program 
delivers net benefits to the community and, in doing so, examine:  
• the extent to which alternative sources of information are lacking in certain 
areas 
• whether counsellors refer their clients to relevant services in a timely and 
effective manner 
• the future role of the service in view of the wide ranging case management 
options under the Farming Family Income Support scheme. 
Exceptional Circumstances professional advice and planning grants should be 
terminated, subject to transition arrangements. 
Significant public funding should be directed to a continuous learning program, 
incorporating the successful elements of the former FarmBis within an enhanced 
FarmReady platform. The revised program should encompass advice and training 
for managing climate variability and for farm business management. Funding 
should be provided in the form of a subsidy which covers a proportion of the cost 
of training, with the recipient contributing the balance. 
The Farm Management Deposits scheme should be retained with its current cap 
of $400 000 and no widening of its eligibility criteria. 
RECOMMENDATION 8.1 
RECOMMENDATION 6.7 
RECOMMENDATION 8.3 
RECOMMENDATION 8.4 
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Intergovernmental cooperation  
The Commonwealth, state and territory governments should enter into an 
intergovernmental agreement linking Commonwealth funding to the states and 
territories to a range of commitments. These commitments should include: 
• ensuring policies and instruments are compatible with the extended objectives 
of the Australia’s Farming Future initiative  
• avoiding the use of reactive business assistance measures such as interest rate 
subsidies and other transactions-based subsidies, including waivers for 
legitimate business expenses 
• ensuring that if assistance is provided to farm businesses rather than farm 
households, it is conditional on an assessment of whether the farm will be 
self-supporting in the longer term and be directed to reinforcing longer term 
capacity building. 
The disbursement of funds linked to an intergovernmental agreement should be 
dependent on an arms-length evaluation of the extent to which the parties have 
met their agreed commitments. The agreement should be established, and 
independent monitoring and assessments undertaken, at the Council of 
Australian Governments level. 
 
RECOMMENDATION 11.2 
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1 Introduction 
Key points 
• The latest drought has been severe and prolonged in many parts of Australia but 
such events are not new in the history of dryland farming. In contrast, the irrigation 
drought over the last three years in the Murray Darling Basin has been 
unprecedented. In the future, most expert predictions are that agricultural regions 
will experience increased temperatures and, for some, more frequent periods of 
very low rainfall. 
• Drought policy has shifted from natural disaster management to a recognition that 
drought is a normal feature of Australia’s climatic variability. 
• Australian ministers for primary industries consider that current policy settings are 
no longer the most appropriate in the context of a changing climate. There are 
concerns about the extent  of areas declared as being in exceptional circumstances 
and the duration of declarations in the latest drought period, and about the 
effectiveness and efficiency of current government programs in response. 
• This inquiry is one of three studies contributing to a review of drought policy. The 
other two are a scientific assessment of the changing climate and its relevance to 
drought policy, and a report on the social and community impacts of drought by an 
expert panel. 
• The Commission’s report draws on the findings of these other two studies and 
addresses: 
– current business and income support measures 
– impediments to improving self-reliance and preparedness 
– the role that should be played by governments.  
 
1.1 Drought policy — a continuing evolution 
What constitutes a drought may seem readily apparent. But in fact it is difficult to 
disentangle a confluence of factors — for example: the quantity, location and timing 
of rainfall and runoff; temperature, evaporation and soil moisture; water storages 
and allocations; commodity prices and input costs; land values and equity levels; 
off-farm diversification and so on.  
Drought is a recurring feature of Australia’s variable climate. However, the latest 
drought has been one of the three most severe and prolonged in the last one hundred 
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years. For example, in relation to the Murray Darling Basin (MDB) the Bureau of 
Meteorology (BoM) considers that in terms of rainfall, ‘the post 2001 period, the 
1937–1946 period and the 1895–1903 period (the “Federation Drought”) are 
essentially indistinguishable in broad terms’ (BoM 2008, p. 2). 
Early last century, government drought policy centred on the construction of 
irrigation infrastructure in an attempt to ‘drought proof’ farms. Subsequently, a 
policy approach developed that saw drought treated as a natural disaster and in 
1971, drought was incorporated under joint Commonwealth-State Natural Disaster 
Relief Arrangements (NDRA). In 1989, however, the Commonwealth decided to 
remove drought from the NDRA and commissioned a review of drought policy that 
found that drought support was poorly targeted and worked against farmers 
becoming self-reliant. The review recommended that a new national drought policy 
be developed (McInnes et al. 1990). 
The National Drought Policy (NDP), announced in 1992, was based on the 
recognition of the recurrence of droughts in Australia. Farmers were expected to 
assume responsibility for managing drought risks, with the role of government 
being to provide an environment conducive to promoting self-reliance. 
Nevertheless, provision was made to assist those farmers with sound prospects who 
were temporarily experiencing financial difficulty during abnormally severe 
droughts. That is, the NDP made a distinction between normal droughts and 
‘exceptional circumstances’ (EC) — rare events that do not occur more than once 
on average in every 20 to 25 years. That policy framework continues today 
(box 1.1). 
However, subsequent policy reviews (Review of the National Drought Policy 
(Matthews et al. 1997), Rural Adjustment – Managing Change (McColl et al. 1997), 
Consultations on National Drought Policy (Drought Review Panel 2004), and 
Creating our Future: Agriculture and Food Policy for the Next Generation 
(Agriculture and Food Policy Reference Group 2006)) have all found that the actual 
drought assistance programs implemented by governments have been incompatible 
with the NDP objective of promoting farmers’ self-reliance.  
Despite endeavours to establish a stable and credible foundation for drought policy, 
prolonged dry conditions have prompted various ad hoc changes to the design of the 
programs. For example, in response to the latest drought, new initiatives and 
modifications to existing measures have been introduced — including interim 
assistance arrangements, EC buffer zones, new forms of grants and transport 
subsidies. Some of these measures are only tenuously related to the agreed NDP 
objectives and others revisit approaches previously found wanting, such as the 
distortionary subsidies for the transport of fodder and livestock. 
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Box 1.1 The NDP and ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
The objectives of the NDP are to: 
• encourage primary producers and other sections of rural Australia to adopt self-reliant 
approaches to managing for climatic variability 
• maintain and protect Australia’s agricultural and environmental resource base during 
periods of extreme climate stress 
• ensure early recovery of agricultural and rural industries, consistent with long-term 
sustainable levels. (Crean 1992)  
While self-reliance is a key objective, the NDP allows for short term drought assistance 
where there are rare and severe drought events — exceptional circumstances (EC) — 
that are beyond the ability of even the most prudent farmer to manage.  
To be classified as an EC event, the event:  
• must be rare, that is, it must not have occurred more than once on average in every 20 
to 25 years 
• must result in a rare and severe downturn in farm income over a prolonged period of 
time (e.g. greater than 12 months), and  
• must be a discrete event that is not part of long-term structural adjustment processes or 
normal fluctuations in commodity prices. (DAFF 2008e)    
 
As the New South Wales Government submitted: 
The NDP approached drought as a foreseeable business risk for Australian farmers, and 
focused on helping farmers to assess, manage and mitigate this risk. Since then, both 
Commonwealth and State drought programs have been modified by increasing the 
availability of welfare to drought-affected farmers, loosening eligibility criteria for 
assistance, and continuing or reinstating State transaction-based farmer subsidies that 
had previously been ceased. These changes may have slowed the NDP’s drive towards 
a preparedness and risk management approach to drought. (sub. 90, p. 1)  
This inquiry provides another opportunity to address the uneasy nexus between 
policy intent and governments’ reactions when droughts occur. It also enables an 
examination of the relationship between drought policy, rural adjustment, and 
greater productivity in agriculture. 
The impact of the more recent droughts of 1982-83, 1994-95, 2002-03 and 2006-07 
on winter crop production are demonstrated in figure 1.1. But that figure also shows 
an increasing, but variable, winter crop output over time (as influenced by natural 
climate variability and improving farm productivity) and continuing adjustment 
(declining farm numbers). How government drought policies impinge on long term 
adjustment across the range of agricultural industries is a critical issue.  
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Figure 1.1 Drought policy and adjustment in agriculture, 1981-82 to 
2008-09ab 
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a
 Comparable time series data on farm numbers are not available after 2004-05. See chapter 2 for details. b 
2008-09 is an ABARE forecast. 
Data sources: ABARE (2008a); ABARE (2008d); ABS (Principle Agricultural Commodities, Australia, 
Preliminary, 2007-08, Cat. no. 7111.0). 
Inherent climate variability and climate change 
As noted in box 1.1, the NDP allows for the provision of assistance in 
circumstances of ‘exceptional’ events. In practice, in recent years, a significant 
proportion of Australia has been declared as experiencing EC. As at January 2009, 
some areas had been declared as experiencing EC for 14 of the past 17 years.  
This is the first time, however, that Australia has experienced a widespread 
‘irrigation drought’. There had been an expectation that most irrigation districts 
were drought proof, but the substantially lower inflows into the MDB, coupled with 
a significant over-allocation of water resources and reduced runoff, have resulted in 
severely reduced water allocations for many producers. 
The climate change outlook prepared by BoM and CSIRO (Hennessy et al. 2008) 
reports that:  
• the extent and frequency of exceptionally hot years have been increasing and are 
projected to continue, with exceptionally hot years likely to occur every 1-2 
years, on average, over the period 2010–2040 
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• while trends in rainfall are highly dependent on the period of analysis due to 
large inter-decadal variability, exceptionally low rainfall years are projected to 
become more frequent in southwest Western Australia, the South Australian 
agricultural region, Victoria and Tasmania 
• exceptionally low soil moisture is projected to become more frequent in line 
with the projected increase in exceptionally low rainfall years.  
Given this outlook for agriculture, the need for government programs to encourage 
and assist self-reliance and preparedness is accentuated.  
1.2 The national review of drought policy 
The Primary Industries Ministerial Forum in February 2008 (PIMF 2008a) and the 
subsequent meeting of the Primary Industries Ministerial Council in April 2008 
(PIMC 2008) identified the need to reform drought policy. Australian primary 
industries ministers agreed that current approaches to drought and EC are no longer 
the most appropriate and that drought policy must be improved to create an 
environment of self-reliance and preparedness and encourage the adoption of 
appropriate climate change management practices.  
Subsequently, the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry stated that:  
The band of climate variation is shifting … confirmed by a growing body of credible 
science … Against this background, the government believes that it is time for 
Australia’s farming community and rural policy makers to reconsider the meaning of 
EC for the future. 
By undertaking reform to drought policy now, we can help farmers to adapt and 
respond to climate change, as well as develop closer links between the objectives of 
drought policy and the challenges of climate change. (Burke 2008c, pp. 4–5) 
The Commission’s public inquiry into government arrangements for drought 
support is one of three studies that constitute the Commonwealth Government’s 
national review of drought policy, with the other two comprising:  
• the assessment by the BoM–CSIRO of what a changing climate means for 
drought in Australia (Hennessy et al. 2008) 
• an expert panel’s assessment of the impacts associated with drought 
(Kenny et al. 2008). 
This report draws on the results of these two studies, together with the 
Commission’s own analysis of the material presented to it, to provide a 
comprehensive assessment of the economic, social and environmental dimensions 
of rural self-reliance and preparedness.  
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What the Commission is tasked with 
In relation to farmers, farm businesses and farm dependent rural small businesses, 
the terms of reference request the Commission to: 
• report on the appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of governments’ 
business and income support measures to help manage drought 
• identify impediments to improving self-reliance and preparedness for periods of 
financial difficulty 
• identify the most appropriate, effective and efficient responses by governments 
to build self-reliance and preparedness to manage drought. 
In undertaking the inquiry the Commission is to: 
• report on the impact that the provision of drought support has on performance 
and productivity at the individual, business, industry, regional and state levels 
• draw lessons from the range of support measures that are broadly available to the 
Australian community 
• take into consideration the objectives of the NDP and the Commonwealth 
Government’s Expenditure Review Principles. 
The terms of reference (TOR) are at the front of this report. 
1.3 Contextual matters 
The TOR refer to three classes of recipients (farmers, farm businesses and farm 
dependent rural small businesses), at least eight policy measures (EC relief 
payments, EC interest rate subsidies, exit assistance, farm management deposits, 
professional advice and planning grants, irrigation management grants and rate 
rebate schemes) and three assessment criteria (appropriateness, effectiveness and 
efficiency). Further, the TOR request the Commission to report on the impact of 
drought support on ‘performance and productivity’ at five levels (individual, 
business, industry, region and state). 
A systematic matrix-based approach to the TOR would involve 72 permutations for 
the five levels. Such a formalised analysis would be infeasible in the allotted time 
and unnecessarily complex in presentation. Accordingly, while the Commission has 
examined all of the identified matters throughout this report, it has focused 
primarily on:  
• drought support measures in relation to their: 
– welfare impacts on farmers and farm households 
– economic impacts on farm (and farm-related) businesses 
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• impediments to the rural sector improving self-reliance and preparedness for 
times of financial difficulty  
• the role that governments should play in facilitating that improvement. 
This focus is also consistent with the Commission’s economy-wide remit as 
specified in its enabling legislation. Among other matters, the Commission must 
have regard to improving the overall performance of the economy in order to 
achieve higher living standards for all members of the Australian community. 
The following sub-sections discuss key terms and concepts specified in the TOR. 
Appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency  
Appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency appear in the TOR in relation to 
current and future drought support measures. 
In simple terms, policy measures and initiatives should be: 
• appropriate — based on sound economic and/or social rationales 
• effective — achieve the government’s (ideally, appropriate) objectives without 
unintended consequences  
• efficient — provide targeted support that achieves the greatest positive net 
benefit. 
It is self-evident that policy objectives should be appropriate, albeit that an 
inappropriate objective could still be met effectively. However, appropriate 
objectives will not be met if the measures chosen to pursue them are ineffective, or 
will be met at a higher cost than necessary if the measures are inefficient. 
Self-reliance and preparedness  
Governments place a high priority on farmers and their communities achieving 
self-reliance over the long term and preparedness for periods of financial difficulty. 
These terms are often used interchangeably. For example, having sources of 
off-farm income as a diversification strategy could be regarded as: increasing 
self-reliance; increasing preparedness for drought; a risk-management strategy; or 
even a reactive response once a drought event has commenced. While the latter 
response may not constitute ex ante preparedness, it could reflect a management 
approach of devoting resources to on-farm activities until it is necessary to do 
otherwise.  
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An expression of self-reliance was presented in the 1990 drought policy review 
which emphasised the respective roles for agricultural producers and governments:  
… self-reliance recognises the primary responsibility of individual producers for the 
commercial performance of their enterprises and for ensuring agricultural activity is 
carried out in an economically and environmentally responsible manner. 
This concept also recognises that governments should not intervene to distort market 
prices or outputs. Government policy must work within the confines of the 
marketplace, by removing distortions or disincentives to appropriate activities, and by 
providing positive incentives where markets fail to provide sufficient inducements to 
act in the community interest. (McInnes et. al. 1990, vol. 1, p. 9)  
Typically, preparedness is understood as the ability of farmers and farm businesses 
to develop strategies to enable them to prepare for, manage, and recover from, 
drought. This includes building a strong capital base in terms of the farm’s natural 
resources and infrastructure, and the business’ balance sheet in good years, to be 
able to withstand poor years, as well as enhancing the farmer’s skills. 
A common element of both self-reliance and preparedness is risk management. 
Business risks can arise on several fronts — shifts in farmers’ terms of trade, 
changes by competitors, climate variability and natural disasters. Such risks are 
fundamental aspects of the business of farming. Risk management is a systematic 
process of identifying and evaluating risks, what can be done to prevent them 
eventuating and how to deal with them if they arise.  
As noted by the McColl review: 
A range of mechanisms are available to handle many aspects of risk. These include 
on-farm practices such as changing production mixes and the use of meteorological 
forecasting instruments, and off-farm measures such as price hedging, fixing, capping 
or collaring interest rates, use of insurance and employing instruments to smooth 
income …  
There are impediments to the uptake of some of these approaches both on- and 
off-farm. Many of them add to the complexity of the management task. Furthermore, 
government intervention in the past, particularly in marketing and adjustment, has 
limited the development of risk management instruments and raised expectations that 
assistance would be available from governments in times of difficulty. 
(McColl et al. 1997, p. 12) 
Improved risk management strategies can enhance the capability of farm businesses 
to withstand adverse shocks, thereby increasing self-reliance. 
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Expenditure review principles 
The terms of reference require the Commission to take into consideration the 
Commonwealth Government’s Expenditure Review Principles. There is no public 
enunciation of those principles. 
Policy interfaces 
Several participants in this inquiry have raised concerns about the multiple and 
sometimes uncoordinated impacts of government policy ‘silos’. Irrigators, in 
particular, stressed the need to be cognisant of the interactions and potential 
tensions between water policy and drought policy.  
There are several policy areas that interact with drought policy, including: 
• water reform — for example, rules governing water allocation and trading, or 
investment in infrastructure improvement  
• climate change — for example, adaptation and mitigation (such as the proposed 
carbon pollution reduction scheme) 
• natural resource management — for example, land clearing, soil erosion, 
salinity, native vegetation and feral pest control 
• taxation — for example, fuel excise, income tax averaging, and managed 
investment schemes  
• innovation — for example, the provision of public funding for research and 
development and extension services  
• animal welfare — for example, the condition of livestock when water and feed 
are scarce and during transport 
• social policies — for example, the provision of mental health resources 
• regional development — for example, population distribution, horizontal fiscal 
equalisation and the provision of services in regional areas. 
Many of these policy interfaces are raised throughout this report, but it would be 
inappropriate to attempt to redefine any of the above policies solely on the findings 
of this review. 
1.4 The draft report process 
The Commission released its draft report into Government Drought Support 
(PC 2008a) for public comment on 30 October 2008. To prepare the draft report, the 
Commission consulted widely with government departments, agricultural producer 
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organisations, individual farmers, regional councils, agribusinesses, small business 
owners, and social and community groups (appendix A). Roundtables were held 
throughout rural Australia and visits and consultations covered cropping, sheep, 
beef, dairy, pork, horticulture, viticulture and mixed farming operations spanning 
reliable and marginal regions (rainfall dependent and irrigated) operating on both 
freehold and leasehold land. The scale of operations ranges from vast pastoral 
properties to extensive broadacre operations in the Western Australian wheatbelt 
and down to smaller scale ‘blockies’ in the Riverland. In all, the Commission held 
meetings in 31 towns and cities around Australia and received 107 submissions 
prior to releasing the draft report.  
In the draft report, the Commission found that, when measured against policy 
objectives relating to self-reliance, preparedness and climate change management, 
current government-funded drought support programs have many shortcomings. To 
address these shortcomings, the Commission made many proposals. The two key 
directions proposed were that: 
• governments should refocus their farm business support programs to help 
farmers through research, development, extension, professional advice and 
business management training, all of which can help build self-reliance and 
preparedness 
• all farm families facing hardship, not just those in EC areas, should have access 
to temporary income support through a scheme designed for farming 
circumstances.  
Responses to the draft report 
Ministers with responsibility for primary industries met in Canberra on 
12 November 2008 to discuss options for improving drought policy. They 
considered the BoM-CSIRO climate outlook, the Expert Panel’s report on the social 
impacts of drought and the Commission’s draft report.  
The Ministers noted that all three assessments indicated that governments need to 
refocus drought programs to support early investment in preparing for the social, 
environmental and economic impacts of drought and climate change. Accordingly, 
the Ministers agreed to the following principles for the further development of 
drought reforms: 
• There should no longer be Exceptional Circumstances (EC) declarations or ‘lines 
on maps’. Instead, governments should focus on addressing the specific needs of 
farming families, farming businesses and farming communities. 
• Future farm family welfare assistance should require a level of mutual 
responsibility. 
   
 INTRODUCTION 11
 
• Government farm business support should assist farming businesses plan and 
prepare for the future. Farm business support will be based on a willingness by 
those businesses to prepare for the impacts of drought and climate change. 
• For access to the income support system, farming families should have a temporary 
period of exemption from the normal assets tests for farm assets but otherwise 
receive the same access rights as the wider community. 
• Government policies and programs should support farming communities to prepare 
for drought and enhance their long term sustainability and resilience. 
• Acknowledgement that drought is just one of a number of hardships that can 
adversely impact farmers.  
• Recognition of the important role of farmers as the nation’s food producers. 
(PIMF 2008b) 
At that meeting, Ministers also reaffirmed that the EC rules will not change for 
those producers currently receiving assistance in existing EC-declared areas.  
The Commission sought public input on all aspects of its draft report. To this end, it 
conducted an extensive range of regional roundtables and public hearings to directly 
elicit individual and organisational responses to its draft proposals (appendix A). In 
addition to the 107 submissions received prior releasing the draft report, a further 81 
submissions responded to the draft report (appendix A). 
All of the evidence taken at the public hearings and regional roundtables, together 
with the submissions, have been taken into account in the preparation of this final 
report. 
1.5 Outline of the report  
This report comprises three parts: the background (chapters 1–3); the Commission’s 
analysis of current drought support programs (chapters 4–6); and the future policy 
direction (chapters 7–11). 
Background 
To evaluate drought support measures, it is necessary to understand drought policy 
against the backdrop of longer term influences impacting on rural and regional 
Australia. Changes to the agricultural sector, the composition of rural and regional 
Australia and non-policy related influences on farmers’ self-reliance and 
preparedness are discussed in chapter 2. What constitutes drought is addressed in 
chapter 3, which explores how the economic and social implications of drought are 
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manifested. Environmental aspects of drought and the implications of the prognosis 
for climate change are also considered. 
Analysis of current drought support policies and programs  
The evolution of drought policy and the respective roles of the Commonwealth and 
state and territory governments is described in chapter 4. The chapter also outlines 
the suite of assistance measures — from EC-triggered programs to Farm 
Management Deposits and other government programs. Chapter 5 analyses EC 
declarations, considering issues such as the inequities that arise from placing ‘lines 
on maps’ and process matters — criteria, timeliness and costs. Chapter 6 evaluates 
current drought support measures individually, as well as addressing many 
cross-program issues. 
Self-reliance and preparedness  
How the current system can be improved is explored in chapter 7. Chapter 8 focuses 
on a policy framework for encouraging farmers’ and farm businesses’ capacity to 
prepare for and manage drought. The role of government in providing a social 
safety net for all Australian households, including farm households in hardship, is 
then discussed in chapter 9. That chapter explores appropriate income support 
measures and their implications for ongoing rural adjustment. Chapter 10 discusses 
policy areas related to drought, such as water, natural resource management and 
climate policy, and considers the influence of these policies on drought-related 
outcomes. The final chapter addresses transitional and implementation issues 
(chapter 11). It concludes with the outlook for agriculture and rural communities 
under the Commission’s recommendations. 
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2 Agriculture and adjustment 
 
Key points 
• The agricultural sector is continually adjusting to the many forces of change.  
– Agricultural output is increasing, but the sector’s share of GDP has declined.  
– Approximately 60 per cent of agricultural output is exported. 
– Agriculture remains important to much of rural and regional Australia. 
– Farmers’ terms of trade have been declining, but agriculture continues to exhibit 
strong long-term productivity growth. 
– The contribution to output of wool activity has declined, while other activities, 
such as beef, sheep meat and horticulture, have expanded. 
• Farm numbers and land used in agricultural production have fallen, but there has 
been an increase in average farm size.  
– In 2005-06, the largest 30 per cent of farms generated 82 per cent of the total 
value of agricultural operations, while the smallest 50 per cent of farms 
generated 7 per cent. 
– As a group, the bottom 25 per cent of broadacre farms have not made a profit in 
any year from 1988-89 to 2007-08. 
• The most vulnerable farmers are not necessarily those facing the greatest climate 
variability. 
– Factors such as small farm scale, land degradation, low liquidity, and lack of 
diversified income sources are more likely to increase the vulnerability of farms to 
adverse shocks. 
• Many larger inland centres (‘sponge cities’) are growing at the expense of smaller 
outlying towns. This process has been underway since at least the early 1900s. 
– Governments can, at the margin, influence the demographic, economic and 
social patterns of activity and settlement across Australia. This, however, is not 
best achieved by way of temporary payments to farmers for drought relief.   
 
2.1 Introduction 
To evaluate drought support measures, it is necessary to appreciate the changes that 
have occurred in the agricultural sector and its links to rural communities. The 
extent of change — on farms, in regional communities and at the sectoral level — 
from long and short term influences has been marked.  
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Farm adjustments can manifest as simply changing the mix of crops in response to 
shifts in commodity prices, taking up outside employment to supplement farm 
income or enlarging a farm by buying out a neighbour. Musgrave (1990, p. 249) 
noted ‘structural change is the aggregate response, at the regional, industry and 
national levels, to the myriad of adjustment decisions made at the firm and 
individual level.’ 
This mainly descriptive chapter canvasses: 
• agriculture’s place within the Australian economy — its share of output, its 
export orientation and prominence in state, territory and regional economies 
• how the sector has adjusted over time — for example, changes in the area of 
land used, numbers of farms, and composition of output 
• the non-policy impediments to farmers’ self-reliance and preparedness 
• the importance of agriculture to rural and regional communities. 
The chapter addresses how the changing profiles of agriculture and rural and 
regional Australia might bear on farmers’ capacity to build up their capital base and 
thereby achieve greater self-reliance and preparedness (box 2.1). The chapter 
concludes with commentary on whether drought policy should (or can) play a role 
in maintaining the fabric of rural and regional communities. 
 
Box 2.1 Forms of capital and their implications for self-reliance 
A taxonomy of the capital bases that condition how farm businesses adapt to shocks 
— such as drought or sudden shifts in farmers’ terms of trade — can be drawn from 
Ellis (2000). The forms of capital are:  
• natural: the natural resource base on which farm production depends 
• physical: the infrastructure on farms that is used in production 
• financial: farm profitability, cash reserves, investments and non-farm income 
• human: levels of education, skills and experience of individuals 
• social: the ties between households within a community that affect support and 
information sharing — a focus of the Expert Social Panel (Kenny et al. 2008).  
Governments can play a role in addressing policy-relevant impediments to the 
accumulation of capital. This is discussed in chapter 7.  
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2.2 Profile of agriculture in the Australian economy 
The output of the agricultural sector has increased over time. By 2007-08, (real) 
output was almost double its 1974-75 level (figure 2.1). Several major droughts, 
indicated by shaded years, have caused only temporary downturns, indicating a high 
level of resilience at the broad sectoral level. 
Figure 2.1 Agricultural output, 1974-75 to 2007-08a 
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a Throughout this publication, shaded years on graphs indicate major droughts. 
Data source: ABS (Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product, Cat. no. 5206.0). 
Despite this growth in output, agriculture’s importance to the national economy has 
waned. In the mid 1970s, its share of industry gross value added was approximately 
4 per cent, falling to less than 3 per cent today (figure 2.2). Such trends are evident 
in all developed nations and reflect the relative growth of the services sector.  
Agriculture’s significance to exports of goods and services has also declined. In 
1974-75, agriculture accounted for around 24 per cent of all exports, but by 
2007-08, this had fallen to around 13 per cent (figure 2.3). Manufacturing and other 
merchandise goods, resources and services increased their share of exports over the 
period. Nevertheless, agriculture is a highly export-oriented industry, with around 
61 per cent of all agricultural output exported. Wool production in particular, is 
highly export-oriented, as are, albeit to a lesser extent, wheat, beef, wine grapes and 
dairy products (table 2.1). 
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Figure 2.2 Share of industry production, 1974-75 to 2007-08 
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  Gross value added is defined as gross domestic product minus statistical discrepancy and minus taxes less 
subsidies on production. b Excluding dwellings owned by persons.  
Data source: ABS (Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product, Cat. no. 5206.0). 
Figure 2.3 Composition of exports, 1974-75 to 2007-08 
Industry share of total exportsa (chain volume) 
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a
 Manufacturing includes other (assorted) merchandise goods. 
Data source: ABARE (2008a). 
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Table 2.1 Share of agricultural production exporteda 
Per cent, average over 2004-05 to 2006-07 
Commodity group Production share exported
Wool 95
Wheat 73
Beef 64
Wine grapes 60
Dairy products 51
Fruit 9
Vegetables 7
Total agriculture 61
a
 Proportion of gross value of production, 2007-08 dollars. 
Source: ABARE (2008b). 
Agriculture’s contribution to state and territory output has followed the national 
trend. In each state and territory, with the exception of South Australia and 
Tasmania, the sector accounts for less than 4 per cent of total industry gross value 
added. Between 1997-98 and 2007-08, agriculture’s share of output increased only 
in South Australia (figure 2.4). 
Figure 2.4 Share of agriculture by state and territory, 1997-98 and 2007-08a 
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a Excluding dwellings owned by persons. 
Data source: ABS (Australian National Accounts, State Accounts, Cat. no. 5220.0). 
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The number of people directly employed in the agriculture sector has also declined 
from about 430 000 in 1966-67 to about 360 000 in 2007-08 (figure 2.5). This 
represented around 9 per cent of total employment in the economy in 1966-67 and 
approximately 3 per cent in 2007-08. Agricultural employment is highly variable in 
response to short-term factors (for example, drought conditions), while longer-term 
factors (for example, a rising real price of labour and the associated capital 
substitution for on-farm labour) are responsible for the downward trend. There was 
a significant decline in employment following the 2002-03 drought, in contrast to 
the droughts in 1982-83 and 1994-95, and this has become entrenched in response 
to the prolonged nature of the current drought event, and the competition for labour 
elsewhere in the economy. 
Figure 2.5 Employment in agriculture, 1966-67 to 2007-08a 
Thousands of persons 
300
320
340
360
380
400
420
440
460
19
66
-6
7
19
69
-7
0
19
72
-7
3
19
75
-7
6
19
78
-7
9
19
81
-8
2
19
84
-8
5
19
87
-8
8
19
90
-9
1
19
93
-9
4
19
96
-9
7
19
99
-2
00
0
20
02
-0
3
20
05
-0
6
Data source: ABS (Labour Force, Australia, Quarterly; Cat. no. 6291.0.55.003); RBA from Econdata. 
Being somewhat location-specific, agriculture’s importance to rural and regional 
areas remains high (box 2.2). Drought conditions have coexisted with labour 
shortages in many regional areas, often reflecting the strong performance of the 
resources sector. Farming families in Western Australia and Queensland in 
particular have been able to avail themselves of ‘fly in fly out’ employment 
opportunities in mining areas. In some cases, mining companies have worked with 
rural communities to obtain labour outside peak periods in the farming calendar. 
The resulting diversification of farmers’ income has enhanced their self-reliance 
and capacity to withstand drought. 
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Box 2.2 Agricultural employment and rural Australia 
Agriculture’s importance to rural and regional areas is borne out by employment data 
showing sectoral employment by varying degrees of remoteness.  
Employment by industry and remoteness class (per cent of total employment, 2006) 
 Major cities Inner regional Outer regional Remote Very remote Australia
Agriculture 1 6 14 18 14 3
Mining 1 1 3 9 10 1
Manufacturing 12 11 9 5 5 11
Othera  87 81 74 68 73 84
a Other includes: infrastructure, government and defence, health and education, and private services. 
Between 2001 and 2006, agricultural jobs were lost in all rural and regional areas, 
particularly in the outer regional and remote areas. In very remote areas, the relative 
importance of manufacturing (mainly mineral processing) and health and education 
increased. 
Change in the share of employment by industry and remoteness class, 2001–2006 
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Source: BITRE (2008).  
 
There has been a long-term trend of input prices for farmers rising more rapidly 
than output prices. This is reflected in the ‘farmers’ terms of trade’ (figure 2.6), 
defined as the ratio of the index of prices received by farmers, to the index of prices 
paid by farmers. While the terms of trade can have large short-term movements (for 
example, a year of high commodity prices, or of rapidly escalating fertiliser prices) 
the long-term trend is evident and is expected to continue. 
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Figure 2.6 Australian farmers’ terms of trade, 1966-67 to 2007-08a 
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a
 Index base 1997–98 = 100. 
Data Source: ABARE (2008a). 
The farm sector as a whole has managed declining terms of trade through a 
combination of increases in farm size (including through farm amalgamations), 
improvements in productivity and by redirecting resources to take advantage of 
changing relative prices within agriculture.  
Average multifactor productivity growth1 for the agricultural sector (figure 2.7) 
grew at 2.1 per cent a year from 1974-75 to 2007-08. By comparison, the average 
multifactor productivity growth rate for the market sector2 over the same period was 
around half of that for agriculture, at just 1.1 per cent a year. 
These data suggest that, despite the challenges facing agriculture, the sector has 
been able to respond and adapt to changing conditions. The correlation between 
dips in productivity growth and drought is apparent, as is the relatively rapid 
recovery following drought (with the exception of 2007-08). 
                                                 
1  Multifactor productivity is a measure of the efficiency with which inputs are used to produce 
output. An increase in multifactor productivity allows more output to be produced with a given 
quantity of inputs, and vice-versa. 
2  Includes: agriculture, fisheries and forestry, mining, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water 
supply, construction, wholesale trade, retail trade, accommodation, cafes and restaurants, 
transport and storage, communication services, finance and insurance and cultural and 
recreational services. The estimate of average multifactor productivity for the market sector has 
been modified by removing the agriculture, fisheries and forestry category. 
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Figure 2.7 Productivity in agriculture, 1974-75 to 2007-08a 
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a
 Index base: 2006-07 = 100. 
Data Source: Productivity Commission estimates. 
2.3 Adjustment in agriculture 
The composition of output is changing 
Traditionally, Australian agriculture was dominated by extensive pastoral and 
cropping activities, including wheat, beef cattle and sheep (for wool and meat 
products). However, over time, the contribution of wool to agricultural output has 
decreased, while that of wheat has remained roughly unchanged (table 2.2). There 
has been a marked increase in the significance of the production of other crops 
(such as fruit and nuts and vegetables) to agricultural output, with their contribution 
rising from approximately 25 per cent in 1960-61 to 44 per cent by 2007-08. The 
relative significance of beef and sheep production has also increased over time. 
Intensive livestock (pigs and poultry) contributed around 3 per cent to the value of 
agricultural output in 1960-61, rising to nearly 6 per cent by 2007-08 (ABS 2009).  
Although cotton and rice production have increased since the 1960s, production of 
these crops in recent years has been relatively low compared to levels achieved in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, reflecting the scarcity of irrigation water. 
Accordingly, their share in the value of agricultural production in recent years 
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(0.7 per cent and close to 0.02 per cent respectively in 2007-083 (ABS 2009)) has 
been lower than the levels achieved in the mid and late 1990s. 
Table 2.2 Contribution of agricultural activities to the value of agricultural 
outputa 
Per cent 
Commodity group 1960-61 2007-08
Wool 25 5
Wheat 14 12
Beef and sheep 16 22
Dairy 12 10
Other crops 25 44
Other 8 7
a 2007-08 data are preliminary and may be subject to change. 
Source: ABS (Value of Primary Production, 1971-72, Ref. no. 10.27); (Value of Agricultural Commodities 
Produced, Australia, Preliminary 2007-08, Cat. no. 7501.0). 
Farm numbers are declining, but farms are getting bigger 
There has been a long-term decline in the number of farm businesses, falling from 
about 196 000 in 1968-69 to about 130 000 in 2004-05 (figure 2.8). Since 2004-05, 
ABS data on farm numbers have been based on a register of agricultural businesses 
sourced from the ATO’s Australian Business Register. This created a discontinuity 
in the series, and led to a large increase in the number of farm businesses recorded 
in 2005-06 and 2006-07 (approximately 154 000 and 150 000 respectively; not 
shown in figure 2.8). 
The area of land used for agricultural production has also declined in recent 
decades, and is now at around 1950s levels. Over the 1968-69 to 2006-07 period, 
the total area of land devoted to agricultural uses peaked at around 500 million 
hectares in 1975-76, but subsequently fell to around 425 million hectares in 
2006-07. 
Farm numbers have fallen at a faster rate than the reductions in the area of 
agricultural land, as average farm size has increased. In 1968-69, the average farm 
size was around 2500 hectares and this increased to about 3400 hectares in 2004-05. 
These national averages however, do not reveal the large differences in farm size 
between farming industries and regions (for example, horticultural farms typically 
operate on much smaller plots than broadacre farms). 
                                                 
3  These estimates have a relatively high standard error and should be used with caution. 
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Figure 2.8 Farm numbers and area of agricultural land 1968-69 to 
2006-07ab 
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
19
68
-6
9
19
72
-7
3
19
76
-7
7
19
80
-8
1
19
84
-8
5
19
88
-8
9
19
92
-9
3
19
96
-9
7
20
00
-0
1
20
04
-0
5
M
ill
io
n 
he
ct
ar
es
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
Thousands
Area of agricultural land (left axis) Number of farms (right axis)
a
 Farm numbers refer to business establishments in productive agricultural activities, typically at one physical 
location. b Until 1985-86, farm numbers included agricultural establishments with an estimated value of 
agricultural operations (EVAO) of $2500 or more. In 1986-87, the EVAO threshold was raised to $20 000, and 
was raised again in 1991-92 to $22 500, before being reduced to $5000 from 1993-94 onwards. Therefore, 
estimates of the number of farm establishments are not strictly comparable between periods with differing 
EVAO thresholds. 
Data Source: ABARE (2008a). 
Output concentration 
Farm output in Australia is highly concentrated, with the largest farms (in terms of 
the estimated value of operations, or EVAO) accounting for large shares of 
agricultural output. Analysis of the distribution of farms by EVAO over time 
reveals a general trend towards a greater degree of output concentration by farms 
with a high EVAO. For example, the Productivity Commission (PC 2005b) found 
that, while only 3 per cent of farms had an EVAO greater than $500 000 in 
1982-834, by 2002-03, this proportion had risen to 11 per cent. Similarly, 
13 per cent of farms had an EVAO of $200 000 to $500 000 in 1982-83, but by 
2002-03, this had risen to 22 per cent. 
More recent data also show that a small, but significant, proportion of farms have a 
relatively high EVAO. In 2005-06, approximately 11 per cent of farms had an 
EVAO over $500 0005, representing approximately 17 000 farms, while 18 per cent 
(approximately 28 000 farms) had an EVAO between $200 000 and $500 000. 
                                                 
4 In constant 2004 prices. 
5 In 2005-06 prices. 
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Conversely, approximately 38 per cent of farms (around 59 000 farms) had an 
EVAO below $50 000 in 2005-06 (figure 2.9). 
Figure 2.9 Distribution of farms by EVAO, 2005-06 
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Data source: ABS (Agricultural Commodities, Australia, 2005-06, Cat. no. 7121.0). 
The degree of output concentration differs among agricultural industries. Those 
industries that had a relatively high proportion of farms with an EVAO over 
$1 000 000 in 2005-06 included: cotton growing (53 per cent of farms), mushroom 
growing (37 per cent of farms), and poultry farming for meat (29 per cent of farms) 
(ABS 2008a). 
At the other end of the spectrum, those industries with a relatively high proportion 
of farms with an EVAO of under $50 000 were: grape growing (51 per cent of 
farms), beef cattle farming (42 per cent), and sheep farming (38 per cent) (ABS 
2008a). Farms with an EVAO of this magnitude are likely to include many whose 
owners live and work in town but farm on weekends or who live on a farm and have 
some occasional work in town but are not engaged in full-time farming activity. By 
choice or necessity, many owners of farms of this scale earn off-farm income. 
As further evidence of the extent of output concentration across agriculture, it is 
estimated that the largest farms (in terms of EVAO) generate the bulk of 
agricultural output, while those with smaller EVAO levels generate only a small 
share of total output (table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3 Output concentration in agriculturea 
Per cent, share of total value of agricultural operations 
 1996-97 2005-06
Largest 30 per cent 76.5 82.0
Smallest 50 per cent 9.8 7.2
a Farms with an EVAO greater than $5000 (in 2007-08 dollars). 
Source: ABARE (2008 unpublished). 
This picture is replicated for specific types of agricultural activities. For instance, 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics and Productivity Commission (ABS and 
PC 2006) examined the gross value of irrigated production (GVIP) in 2003-04, 
finding: 
• for irrigated horticulture — 73 per cent of GVIP was attributable to the largest 
20 per cent of farms, with the smallest 20 per cent contributing 1 per cent 
• for irrigated broadacre crops — 69 per cent of GVIP was generated by the 
largest 20 per cent of farms, while the smallest 20 per cent of farms generated 
2 per cent  
• for irrigated pastures — 57 per cent of GVIP was attributable to the largest 20 
per cent of farms, and the smallest 20 per cent produced about 2 per cent. 
Other agricultural activities also display a concentration of output amongst larger 
farms (table 2.4). For example, in the beef industry in 2003–04, the top 30 per cent 
of farms (in terms of the value of output) produced more than 80 per cent of 
industry output, while in the dairy industry, the top 30 per cent produced about 60 
per cent of industry output. The consistent trend over the 20 years for all of the 
sectors is one of increasing concentration of output. 
Table 2.4 Share of industry output by the largest 30 per cent of 
producersab 
Per cent 
 1983-84 2003-04
Beef specialists 77 81
Sheep specialists 67 70
Grain businesses 59 62
Dairy specialists 54 59
a Ranked by value of output. b Sheep specialists includes both sheep meat and wool specialists. 
Source: DAFF (2005). 
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In addition to changes in the distribution of the value of agricultural output, there 
have been gradual changes in farm ownership. Large agribusinesses with corporate 
structures have emerged that are integrated across supply chains — including 
farming, seed supply, agrichemicals, farm machinery, wholesale and distribution, 
processing, marketing and retail sales.  
Some of the recent growth in corporate investment has been encouraged by 
managed investment schemes (MIS). According to the Australian Agribusiness 
Group, non-forestry MIS contributions almost tripled between 2004 and 2007 
(Department of the Treasury 2008, p. 1). Traditionally, olives and wine grapes were 
the preferred crops of MIS but, as noted by the Department of the Treasury (2008), 
almonds and livestock have also become popular in recent years. The growth in 
non-forestry MIS contributions may, in part, have been driven by the ability of 
investors to claim upfront deductions for amounts contributed to such schemes. 
At the other end of the spectrum, there has been growth in ‘hobby farming’, 
typically on small lots. The typical characteristics of ‘hobby farmers’ were 
described earlier in this section. 
Despite changes in the composition of farm ownership, farming families6, continue 
to play a prominent role in the agricultural sector. In 1986, there were 
approximately 145 000 farming families in Australia, although there was a 
significant decline by 1991, when the number of farming families fell to around 
120 000 (a decline of approximately 17 per cent) (ABS 2003). Throughout the 
1990s, the decline in the number of farming families was less marked, with numbers 
falling to 115 000 by 1996 and approximately 113 000 in 2001. There was however, 
a larger decline between 2001 and 2006, when the number of farming families fell 
by around 10 000, to 102 616 in 2006 (ABS 2008c). The exit of some families from 
agriculture has provided those remaining with greater opportunities to expand their 
operations and increase their viability. 
Farm entries and exits 
Understanding farm entries and exits is important for developing policies to build 
capacity for self-reliance and preparedness, and to assist less viable farmers to either 
improve viability or leave the industry. For example, exit assistance may not 
necessarily achieve its desired outcomes if new entrants purchase sub-economic 
farms. Information on entries and exits for 2003-04 to 2006-07 — a period 
corresponding with drought conditions in most rural and regional areas — is 
provided in table 2.5. 
                                                 
6  Defined as a family where the reference person and/or spouse/partner reported that their main 
occupation was a farmer/farm manager. 
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Table 2.5 Business entries and exits 
  
Agriculture 
entries 
Agriculture 
exits 
Agriculture 
entry rate 
Agriculture 
exit rate 
Industry 
average 
entry ratea 
Industry 
average exit 
ratea
 No. No. % % % %
2003-04 23 024 22 364 10.9 10.6 19.4 16.8
2004-05 23 552 22 985 11.1 10.8 18.6 17.0
2005-06 30 029 28 400 14.1 13.3 17.8 16.2
2006-07 24 532 24 616 11.4 11.5 18.0 15.7
a Computed as the average yearly entry/exit rate for the following industries: mining, manufacturing, 
electricity, gas and water supply, construction, wholesale trade, retail trade, accommodation, cafes and 
restaurants, transport and storage, communication services, finance and insurance, property and business 
services, education, health and community services, cultural and recreational services, and personal and 
other services. 
Source: ABS (Counts of Australian Businesses, Including Entries and Exits, June 2003 to June 2007, 
Cat. no. 8165.0). 
Entry and exit rates from 2003-04 to 2006-07 were generally constant, with the 
exception of 2005-06, when there was a surge in new entries. A view expressed to 
this inquiry is that many seeking to leave farming intend to wait until the condition 
of properties improves after rains arrive or after a year of high production. For 
example, the Rural Financial Counselling Service New South Wales-Central West 
submitted: 
Many farmers live in hope – like gamblers – for the ‘big year’ and believe that if only 
one good year, we might be able to make enough to be able to get out with more. 
(sub. 73, p. 10) 
If, as the above view suggests, farmers wait until better conditions occur to leave 
farming, exit rates may not necessarily increase sharply during drought periods. 
Notably, exit and entry rates in agriculture in each year from 2003-04 to 2006-07 
were lower than the corresponding exit and entry rates across other industries in the 
same years (table 2.5). Regardless of seasonal conditions, exit and entry rates in 
agriculture seem to be lower than in many other industries. 
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Managing farm income and returns in a variable climate 
Farm income and profit have always been volatile in Australia. As illustrative 
examples, data on farm cash income and farm business profit7 are provided for 
dairy farms (figure 2.10) and for broadacre farms8 (figures 2.11 and 2.12). 
Fluctuations in broadacre and dairy farm income and profits share some common 
elements. Both peaked in 2001-02, to very high levels, followed by declines during 
the 2002-03 and 2006-07 droughts. Recovery after those droughts occurred 
relatively quickly, implying strong sectoral level resilience. 
Figure 2.10 Dairy farm performance, 1978-79 to 2007-08 
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Data source: ABARE (2008e). 
The top 25 per cent of broadacre farms demonstrate a consistently robust financial 
performance (figures 2.11 and 2.12), generating positive farm cash incomes and 
farm business profits in all years since 1988-89.9 During the 2006-07 drought, the 
farm cash incomes of this group were flat, but strongly rebounded in 2007-08, to be 
around $9000 higher in real terms than the previous peak in 2001-02. However, the 
                                                 
7  Farm cash income is defined as total revenues received by the farm during the financial year, 
less payments made by the farm business for materials and services and for permanent and 
casual hired labour (excluding owner, manager, partner, and family labour). Farm business 
profit is defined as farm cash income plus changes in trading stock, less depreciation and 
imputed labour costs. Capital gains on land are excluded. 
8  Classified on the basis of rate of return (excluding capital appreciation) to total capital. 
9  The identity of farms in each performance class can change from year to year. 
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bottom 25 per cent of farms have not recorded a positive farm cash income since 
1994-95 and have not achieved a positive profit in any year in the period 1988-89 to 
2007-08. 
Figure 2.11 Broadacre farm cash income, 1988-89 to 2007-08 
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Data source: ABARE (2009 unpublished). 
Figure 2.12 Broadacre farm business profit, 1988-89 to 2007-08 
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Data source: ABARE (2009 unpublished). 
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Despite prolonged drought, the rates of return10 to total farm capital (including 
capital appreciation) have been high since 2000-01 (figure 2.13). Strong demand for 
rural land has resulted in a sharp increase in land values in many regions (discussed 
further in chapter 3), underpinning these high rates of return. 
If capital appreciation is excluded however, farm rates of return are much lower, 
reflecting, in part, several years of poor profitability from below average seasonal 
conditions, including negative average levels of profitability during the droughts of 
2002-03 and 2006-07. 
Figure 2.13 Farm rate of return, 1995-96 to 2006-07 
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Source: ABARE (2008e). 
It should be noted that the taxation treatment of agriculture is also a relevant 
consideration to aspects of this inquiry (box 2.3). More detail on agricultural 
taxation, including the tax-linked financial tool, Farm Management Deposits 
(FMDs), can be found in chapter 4, chapter 8 and appendix D. 
                                                 
10  Measures the return to all capital used, computed by expressing farm business profit at full 
equity as a percentage of the total opening capital (at the beginning of the financial year) of the 
business. 
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Box 2.3 Agricultural activities and taxation 
Agricultural interests in Australia tend to pay relatively low levels of tax. Almost 54 000 
individuals in the agriculture, forestry and fishing sector declared business losses on 
their tax return in 2005-06 — the highest number for any industry. This represented 
about 12 per cent of the total number of individuals that declared losses. Individuals in 
agriculture, forestry and fishing comprised around 1 per cent of all individual taxpayers 
in 2005-06 (ATO 2008b).  
In addition, there were about 11 000 non-taxed companies in the sector in 2005-06 
(that is, those with net tax less than or equal to $0). This represented about 64 per cent 
of companies in the sector that filed a tax return for that year (ATO 2008b). 
Furthermore, the Department of the Treasury (2006) estimated that, in 2005-06, about 
$475 million in tax expenditures (defined as concessions, benefits, and incentives 
delivered to taxpayers via the taxation system) was afforded to agriculture, forestry and 
fishing.  
 
Off-farm income diversification 
Off-farm incomes — including off-farm wages and salaries, investment dividends, 
rents and other business income, and government social support payments — assist 
farmers to manage the numerous risks they may face. 
Off-farm income11, primarily in the form of off-farm wage and salary income and 
investment income, but also including government sourced payments, has increased 
in real terms (in 2007-08 dollars) since the late 1970s for both dairy and broadacre 
farmers (figures 2.14 and 2.15). Although the trend is less pronounced for dairy 
farmers than broadacre farmers, the increase in off-farm income suggests that a 
movement towards a greater degree of income diversification has occurred. 
While the level of off-farm income received by dairy farmers has risen since 
1979-80 (figure 2.14), most of this increase has taken place since 2000-01. The 
peak amount of wage and salary income received by dairy farmers (in terms of the 
average amount per farm operator-manager’s household) was $5300 in the three 
years to 1981-82, $10 300 in 2003-04 and 2004-05, and approximately $8400 in the 
three years to 2007-08. Hence, there has been a movement towards higher receipt of 
wage and salary income by dairy farmers over time. There has not however, been a 
movement of a similar magnitude in the receipt of investment income, with an 
average of $5600 received in the three years to 2007-08, compared with $4900 in 
                                                 
11 Collected from ABARE surveys and referring to the farm operator-manager’s household. That 
is, the off-farm income of the principal operator and their spouse. 
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the three years to 1981-82. The level of government sourced payments received by 
dairy farmers has increased markedly over time. Dairy farm households have been 
significant recipients of the Exceptional Circumstances Relief Payment in the past 
few years — the average dairy farm operator-manager’s household received $7100 
in 2006-07 and $5000 in 2007-08. 
Figure 2.14 Off-farm income sources of dairy farmers, 1979-80 to 2007-08a 
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a
 Government sourced payments includes payments to families, allowances and pensions, and taxable 
payments considered to be part of farm business income, but excludes fuel rebates and dairy structural 
adjustment payments. 
Data source: ABARE (2009 unpublished). 
The amount of wage and salary income received by broadacre farmers has increased 
over time (figure 2.15). For instance, the average amount (per farm 
operator-manager’s household) of wage and salary income in the three years to 
2007-08 was $20 000, compared with around $6200 in the three years to 1979-80. 
Although investment income is a significant source of off-farm income for 
broadacre farmers, the amount received has changed very little over time, with an 
average of approximately $12 000 received per annum over the period 1977-78 to 
2007-08. Government sourced payments however, have increased steadily since the 
early 2000s, reaching relatively high levels in 2006-07 and 2007-08. 
The data generally indicate that a trend in broadacre farming, and to a lesser extent, 
dairy farming, has emerged, whereby fewer farmers are wholly reliant on the farm 
business to generate all of their income. This is demonstrated by the fact that the 
percentage of broadacre farmers with off-farm wages increased from 25 per cent in 
1977-78 to 45 per cent in 2007-08) (see figure 9.3). For dairy farmers, wage and 
salary income has become more important since the late 1990s, and the percentage 
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of dairy farmers receiving off-farm wages has also increased moderately, from 
26 per cent in 1977-78 to 35 per cent in 2007-08. While some view the receipt of 
off-farm income as an indictment of Australian agriculture, it is in fact a rational 
response by many to the risks of farming, including Australia’s highly variable 
climate — it is thus a sound risk management strategy, where it can be readily 
undertaken. 
Figure 2.15 Off-farm income sources of broadacre farmers 1977-78 to 
2007-08a 
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a
 Government sourced payments includes payments to families, allowances and pensions, and taxable 
payments considered to be part of farm business income, but excludes fuel rebates. 
Data source: ABARE (2009 unpublished). 
Capital accumulation 
The quantity of capital utilised by the agricultural sector as an input into production 
has continually increased over time. The net capital stock12 (in real terms) in 
agriculture rose from around $70 billion in 1994-95 to $85 billion in 2007-08, 
representing an increase of approximately 21 per cent over that period for an 
average annual growth rate of 1.4 per cent per annum (figure 2.16). 
Despite the upward trend of agriculture’s capital stock, gross fixed capital formation 
(the value of acquisitions less disposals of fixed assets) displays a degree of 
variability during the droughts of 2002–03 and 2006–07 (discussed further in 
chapter 3). 
                                                 
12  The net capital stock represents the net present value of the future capital services provided by 
assets.  
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Figure 2.16 Net capital stock and gross fixed capital formation, 1994-95 to 
2007-08 
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Data source: ABS (Australian System of National Accounts, Cat. no. 5204.0). 
Water availability 
In 2004-05, about 65 per cent — or approximately 12 200 gigalitres (GL) — of 
Australian water consumption was used for agriculture.13 However, agricultural 
water use has fallen in recent years, to 11 689 GL in 2005-06 and to 8 521 GL in 
2006-07. Approximately 90 per cent of this water was used for the irrigation of 
pastures and crops, with the remainder used for purposes such as stock watering and 
cleaning livestock facilities14 (ABS 2008f). 
Most agricultural businesses that irrigated in 2006-07, used water on pastures for 
grazing. This group also irrigated the largest area in addition to having the greatest 
water use (table 2.6). Sugar cane, cotton, cereal crops and pasture for hay also used 
significant amounts of water in 2006-07. Although cotton and rice used significant 
quantities of water in 2005-06, their use declined markedly in 2006-07. 
                                                 
13  It is estimated that about 11 per cent of water consumption in 2004-05 was used by households 
and about 12 per cent by industrial users, with the remainder being used by water supply 
services, for example, for the purposes of sewerage and drainage services (ABS 2006b). 
14  These data pertain to water sources on or under the ground. This includes water sourced from 
government and irrigation schemes and surface water, mainly sourced from rainfall and run-off, 
or from bores tapping groundwater. 
   
 AGRICULTURE AND 
ADJUSTMENT 
35
 
Table 2.6 Pastures and crops irrigated, 2005-06 and 2006-07 
 Businesses irrigating 
(no.) 
Area irrigated 
(‘000 hectares) 
Volume applied 
(GL) 
 2005-06 2006-07 2005-06 2006-07 2005-06 2006-07
Pasture for grazing 14 229 12 818 814 567 2 888 2 008
Sugar cane 2 145 1 991 210 202 1 057 978
Cotton 715 555 270 134 1 735 868
Cereal crops 4 488 3 887 375 311 894 825
Pasture harvested for 
hay 
7 116 5 791 256 200 939 795
Fruit and nut trees, 
plantation or berry 
fruits 
7 823 8 080 139 141 630 648
Grapevines 8 277 7 736 183 178 633 639
Vegetables 6 439 6 355 114 105 431 414
Rice  1 056 311 102 20 1 253 239
Other broadacre crops 901 588 55 37 167 109
Nurseries, cutflowers, 
cultivated turf 
3 645 3 198 15 15 82 72
Source: ABS (Water use on Australian farms, Cat. no. 4618.0). 
The largest amount of agricultural water use in 2006-07 occurred in New South 
Wales, which accounted for approximately 32 per cent of total national usage. 
Victoria and Queensland were also significant users, accounting for around 
25 per cent and 20 per cent of total usage respectively. Irrigated agriculture in the 
Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) in 2006-07, accounted for around 58 per cent 
(4458 GL) of all water used for irrigation nationally. Nevertheless, between 
2005-06 and 2006-07, the area of land irrigated in the MDB fell by 553 000 
hectares (a decline of around 33 per cent) and was associated with a decline in 
irrigation water volumes of nearly 40 per cent (ABS 2008f). 
Policies relating to water access entitlements and water allocations have significant 
effects on agricultural water use (box 2.4). The National Water Initiative, signed by 
all governments, aims to facilitate the operation of water markets and the trading of 
water between and within jurisdictions. The ability to trade annual allocations and 
permanent entitlements has led to premiums for water which are above utility 
charges. As a consequence of trading, prices vary in response to supply and 
demand, so that water is typically more expensive during dry conditions. 
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Box 2.4 Water reforms 
Water access entitlements give users exclusive access to a share of water from a 
specified consumptive pool. Water allocations reflect the specific volume of water 
allocated to entitlements in a given season. Historically, while water rights differed 
between states, they generally provided a right to take and use water, rather than a 
property right over water per se. These arrangements led to many overallocated 
systems with potential extractions by entitlement holders exceeding sustainable levels. 
This prompted reforms including a cap on diversions from the MDB in 1995, the 
separation of the water right from land title and the ability to trade annual water 
allocations and the underlying long-term entitlement. 
In 2004-05, the total allocated volumes of water in New South Wales and Victoria were 
substantially less than the nominal entitlement (see table), and have continued to be 
less than 100 per cent in many areas of these states in more recent years. For 
example, Goulburn-Murray Water in Victoria had all of its systems on less than full 
seasonal allocations in 2006-07 and 2007-08 (see chapter 3). 
Water access entitlements and allocations, 2004-05 
 Entitlements Entitlement volume Allocated volume 
 No. GL GL 
NSW 118 110 13 302 9 799 
VIC 25 514 6 680 4 734 
QLD 48 591 4 397 na 
WA 17 513 2 547 2 547 
SA 10 399 1 661 1 661 
TAS 3 110 1 038 1 038 
ACT 153 66 66 
NT 166 140 140  
na Not available. 
Sources: ABS (2006b); Roberts et al. (2006) and NWC (2008a). 
 
 
The ability of irrigators to trade allocations has important ramifications across 
agriculture. For instance, in a dry year, farmers involved in cropping who hold 
water entitlements may sell their water allocation, rather than use it for cropping, if 
they believe the net benefit of doing so exceeds the net benefit of producing a crop. 
The ability to sell entitlements provides more adjustment options, including 
opportunities for farm exit. 
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Education and training 
Education and training build human capital which enables people to adjust to 
changing circumstances and take advantage of new opportunities. In terms of 
post-secondary education, rural and regional areas generally had higher proportions 
of people with vocational education certificates compared with major cities 
(figure 2.17). Conversely, about 27 per cent of working age people in major cities 
had a bachelor degree or higher qualification, compared to 15 per cent in inner 
regional areas and even lower rates in more remote rural areas. 
Figure 2.17 Level of highest non-school qualification among people aged 
25-64 years, by remoteness class 2006ab 
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a
 Above bachelor degree category includes people with postgraduate degrees or graduate 
diplomas/certificates. b Includes those in migratory Australia and those who had no usual address. Migratory 
Australia comprises Collection Districts, which contain people who are enumerated on an overnight journey by 
train or bus. 
Source: ABS (Australian Social Trends, 2008, Cat. no. 4102.0). 
In all age categories, certificates are the most prevalent form of non-school 
qualifications possessed by farmers. However, the relative significance of advanced 
diplomas and diplomas versus bachelor degrees and above varies slightly by age 
class (table 2.7). Among younger farmers (those aged 20-29 and 30-39), bachelor 
degrees and above are more prevalent than advanced diplomas and diplomas as 
forms of non-school education. However, among the middle-aged groups and older 
groups (those aged 40-49, 50-59 and 60-69), advanced diplomas and diplomas are 
marginally more prevalent than bachelor degrees and above. 
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Table 2.7 Highest level of non-school qualification of farmers in farming 
families by age group, 2006a 
Per cent 
Qualification level 15-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80 and over
Certificate 100 63 55 56 47 42 40 40
Advanced diploma/diploma 0 16 20 21 25 27 25 26
Bachelor degree or above 0 19 23 19 24 26 29 26
a Persons who inadequately described their non-school education were included in the calculation of 
percentages, which may not sum to 100. 
Source: ABS (Agriculture in Focus: Farming Families, Australia, 2006, Cat. no. 7104.0.55.001). 
While experience is important, the age structure of the farming population also has 
implications for the future of farm adjustments (box 2.5). (Chapter 9 examines the 
inordinately large number of farmers of pension age who are still working.)  
 
Box 2.5 The age of farmers 
Ageing of the farm population has been evident over the past two decades (Barr 2004) 
and has implications for the number of exits and retirements from farming that occur, in 
addition to succession and entry into farming by younger persons. In 1981, the median 
age of farmers was 44, rising to 51 by 2001, and increasing marginally in 2006 to 52 
(ABS 2008c). This reflects, in part, a decline in the rate of entry of young people into 
farming. Barr et al. observed: 
The declining entry of young persons into agriculture is both a response to pressures for 
agricultural restructuring that encourage some young persons not to begin a career in 
farming, and the attraction of competing opportunities available for the young elsewhere in 
society and the economy. (Barr et al. 2005, p. 1) 
Associated with this trend is a deferral of retirement, possibly because farmers are 
continuing on in the absence of a family successor (Barr 2004). The ageing of the farm 
population tends to be more evident in regions where small farms dominate, such as 
the high rainfall grazing districts along the Great Dividing Range and along the coastal 
fringe. Their location in high amenity regions and high land prices can limit options for 
increasing scale and for younger people to enter agriculture (Barr 2004).  
 
2.4 Building a secure capital base 
The vulnerability of farm businesses to shocks, such as drought is in part dependent 
on the size and composition of the capital base that has been built (outlined in 
box 2.1). 
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The stock of natural capital built up on a farm is an important contribution to 
preparedness for droughts. Further, the earlier that measures are taken to maintain 
the natural resource base during a drought (such as early destocking), the lower the 
damage to the environment and the better the position a farm is in for the recovery 
phase. 
Self-reliance can be enhanced by building and maintaining financial reserves and by 
diversifying income sources (for example, by obtaining off-farm income). 
Vulnerability to shocks may also be reduced by improving the stock of physical 
capital; by diversifying farm enterprises and by adopting new technologies. The 
Rangelands Drought Taskforce observed: 
Those businesses that prior to the drought were able to implement diversification 
strategies as part of their business plans appear to be in a much better position to 
survive the drought … Diversification of businesses is the key to pastoral businesses 
surviving drought. (sub. 60, pp. 2–5) 
The data presented in the previous section suggests there is scope for the level of 
human capital in rural and regional areas to be developed further. By enhancing 
their skills and knowledge, farmers have the potential to increase the efficiency with 
which they operate their farms, expand their range of employment opportunities and 
increase their lifetime earning potential. 
Social capital, as a measure of the quality of relationships within a community, can 
be built up via means such as strengthened family, school, and club relationships, 
and by organisations, such as businesses, church-based groups and other voluntary 
bodies. Social capital ensures that a degree of social support is available to 
individuals affected by adverse circumstances, thus strengthening community 
self-reliance. 
There is no uniform optimal combination of the various types of capital that should 
be developed and held by all farmers and farm businesses. The relative importance 
of each varies — for example, a limited amount of physical farm capital may be 
offset by a greater store of financial capital. 
Nelson et al. (2005) constructed a composite index combining the five types of 
capital in order to assess the vulnerability of farm households to external events. 
Selected indicators were used to represent each of the five types of capital, and 
weighted evenly to determine a composite index.  
These index results were mapped to illustrate areas where farmers were most 
vulnerable to stress events such as drought (figure 2.18a). Results indicate that 
farmers in areas such as western New South Wales, central Queensland, and parts of 
the east coast were more likely to be vulnerable than farmers in other areas. The key 
variables leading to greater vulnerability varied by regions. However, land 
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degradation, a small area scale of operations, low average incomes and lack of 
off-farm income were important indicators of vulnerability (Nelson et al. 2005). 
Figure 2.18 Vulnerability to risks ab 
Figure a: Vulnerability of Australian broadacre farms using combined index 
Figure b: Exposure of Australian broadacre farms to climate risk 
a
 Climate risk represented in terms of extreme pasture growth. b Variables used in the index include: average 
income, income risk and off-farm income (financial capital), diversity of income sources and area operated 
(physical capital), degradation and Pasture Growth Index extreme (natural capital), operator education and 
spouse education (human capital), partnerships, internet use, and landcare membership (social capital). 
Data source: Nelson et al. (2005). 
Climate risk, as modelled by an extreme pasture growth index, was not a substantial 
driver of overall vulnerability (figure 2.18b). Although some areas, such as central 
Australia, are exposed to climate risk, overall farm vulnerability does not 
necessarily coincide with the areas of greatest climate variability. 
Nelson et al. (2005) concluded that the risks of operating in areas of low and 
variable rainfall could be offset by other factors, such as scale, and that biophysical 
indicators of vulnerability (such as rainfall and soil type) are poor indicators of the 
vulnerability of farm households. 
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2.5 Rural-urban drift, sponge cities and small towns  
Many participants to this inquiry consider that drought assistance has a role to play 
in retaining resources in inland Australia. For example, a local Wimmera grain 
company owner stated:  
The government does need to acknowledge the need to keep regional Australia well 
populated. We cannot have a country where 90 per cent of our population is along the 
coastal strip. (Grimble 2008, p. 5)  
In assessing the role of drought policy in this context, it is important to first 
understand that forces, often beyond the influence of governments, have shaped and 
will continue to drive the settlement patterns of rural Australia. 
Australia has steadily become more urbanised over time. In 1906, around 63 per 
cent of the population lived outside the capital cities, falling to about 36 per cent in 
the 1970s. Contrary to common perception, this feature of rural-urban drift has 
since stabilised at that level (figure 2.19), but there is still change within this overall 
metro-rural split. Between 2001 and 2006, for example, capital cities, some coastal 
regions, provincial centres and mining towns experienced population growth, 
whereas the population in many remote areas declined (figure 2.20). 
Figure 2.19 Proportion of population living outside capital cities, 1906-2006a 
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a
 Excludes the Northern Territory and  ACT in 1906 and 1916, and the Northern Territory from 1926 to 1946. 
Source: ABS (Australian Historical Population Statistics, Cat. no. 3105.0.65.001). 
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Figure 2.20 Population change, 2001 to 2006 
 
 Note: SLAs refer to Statistical Local Areas. 
Source: ABS (Regional Population Growth, Australia, 1996 to 2006, Cat. no. 3218.0). 
The ABS (2006a) noted that, in 2004-05, the largest population growth outside 
capital cities occurred in coastal areas, most of which resulted from internal 
migration, as people from inland areas and cities moved towards the coast — a 
reflection of the so-called ‘sea-change’ phenomenon. Some of the coastal areas with 
high rates of population growth during the period 2000-05 included Hervey Bay, the 
Sunshine Coast, and the Gold Coast-Tweed region (ABS 2006a, p. 80). Some 
inland regional areas, including major provincial centres and towns around the 
periphery of capital cities have also experienced significant population growth, as 
have ‘tree change’ areas. For example, between 2001 and 2006, inland regional 
areas such as Maitland in New South Wales, Greater Bendigo in Victoria, and 
Mount Barker in South Australia, all experienced strong population growth 
(ABS 2007). These population movements are likely to reflect factors such as the 
relocation of retirees, individuals seeking a change of lifestyle, high city house 
prices, and the development of technologies that enable people to ‘telecommute’. 
A number of regional towns have had strong population growth because of the 
growing demand for labour by the mining industry. The population in high growth 
mining towns expanded by between 2.2 per cent per annum (Roxby Downs) and 
8 per cent per annum (Dysart) between 2001 and 2006 (ABS 2008e). 
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Some small towns have benefited from the inflows of people to selected coastal and 
inland areas, while others have declined due, in part, to the greater availability of 
commercial and other services in the larger towns and to the long-term decline of 
some rural industries. Prolonged drought may have exacerbated these trends. Over 
the 1996–2006 period, although remote and very remote areas experienced negative 
population growth rates, the population growth rate for inner regional areas (as well 
as major cities) was positive (table 2.8). 
Table 2.8 Population change by area 
Per cent, average annual growth rate 
 1996–2001 2001–2006 1996–2006
Major cities 1.8 1.4 1.6
Inner regional 0.3 1.4 0.8
Outer regional -0.7 0.8 0.0
Remote -0.7 0.0 -0.4
Very remote -0.5 -0.2 -0.3
Australia 1.2 1.3 1.2
Source: ABS (Australian Social Trends, 2008, Cat. no. 4102.0). 
A notable feature of these data is that the population growth rate for remote areas 
was negative in the 1996–2001 period (a non-drought period), but was zero in the 
2001–2006 period (which included the 2002-03 drought). Additionally, the rate of 
population decline for very remote areas was faster over 1996–2001 than that over 
2001–2006. Overall, the data suggest that major cities and inner regional areas have 
grown at the expense of remote and very remote areas, but that this phenomenon is 
a broad trend, and that drought is only one of the many factors at play. Indeed, the 
New South Wales Farmers Association observed: 
 … Tamworth and Orange and Wagga, those centres are doing particularly well. They 
are sort of the sponge centres, they’re dragging and sucking the lifeblood out of a lot of 
smaller towns, we know that. But the second-tier towns are all towns that have very, 
very strong, vibrant communities; probably won’t expand much but they are strong, 
vibrant communities. What the drought has done to those communities is it is dragging 
them down to the level where whether they can be sustained or not is a problem … 
those towns that have been struggling even in the good times are probably going to 
continue and the government needs to make a decision about how they’re going to 
address those issues. (trans., pp. 592-3) 
The agglomeration benefits of urbanisation are attractive to people and businesses 
alike (Bradley and Gans 1998). Larger centres have greater product variety, higher 
order health services, a greater range of leisure activities and economies of scale. 
They offer better access to a skilled workforce, transport cost savings and inter-firm 
knowledge spillovers. Improved roads and cars make it is easier for farmers and 
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other local residents to travel to these centres. This, in turn, adds to the adjustment 
pressures felt by many small towns, as noted by Budge: 
Agricultural production levels, which were once an indicator of the performance of an 
area, are now not necessarily an indicator of growth. Financially successful farmers 
may reside in areas with population loss, declining labour markets and loss of services 
in the towns and rural areas in which they operate. The reality is that the functions of 
many country towns that once performed the role of rural service centres may no longer 
have much economic and social relationship with those people and properties 
comprising the agricultural base of the area … (Budge 2005, p. 6) 
The changing distribution of non-metropolitan populations can have consequences 
regarding the impact of drought on regional areas, which is explored further in 
chapter 3. 
Regional policy and drought support 
The Expert Social Panel (Kenny et al. 2008) observed that drought can hit rural 
communities particularly hard. Inquiry participants made similar observations to the 
Commission. For example, Centroc (Central New South Wales Councils) pointed to 
the impact of drought on less resilient regional economies:  
The decimating of communities will only lead to less and less services within rural 
communities including medical services having a multiplying downward spiralling 
impact for rural and regional Australia. (sub. 105, p. 1) 
Similarly, the Victorian Farmers Federation argued: 
… it is a lot easier for urban communities to weather business shocks that can cause 
impacts similar to the impact of drought on regional economies. (sub. 74, p. 5) 
The view that drought assistance is needed to underpin rural economies is typically 
supported by two arguments: 
• the circulation of support payments through farmers to businesses is said to keep 
local agriculture-dependent communities ‘ticking over’, thereby offsetting the 
incentive for town residents to seek (often permanently) alternative employment 
elsewhere 
• drought policy — and any other injection of funds or differential treatment that 
favours regional areas — is necessary to retain a critical mass of population and 
preserve the social fabric of local communities. 
The first argument reflects an incidental outcome from providing cash to farmers 
who, by nature of occupation, generally reside, and make some of their purchases, 
in non-metropolitan locations. The second implicitly promotes drought assistance as 
a tool of regional development policy. The efficacy of using temporary drought 
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relief as a regional development tool is highly questionable given that it would, at 
best, be an intermittent and partial palliative for the broader long-term forces 
identified in this chapter. 
Specific regional development policies have been implemented by governments 
over time. One example is soldier settlement schemes (box 2.6). 
 
Box 2.6 Soldier settlement farms 
Following both world wars, governments introduced soldier settlement schemes which 
encouraged returned servicemen to take up plots of agricultural land as a form of 
repatriation and compensation.  
After World War I, more than 37 000 returned servicemen settled on small blocks of 
land provided by the states, with low interest loans sponsored by the Australian 
Government. The small blocks, many of them irrigation farms, were often situated on 
land not well suited to agriculture (Shaw 1982), which, when coupled with the lack of 
agricultural experience of many returned servicemen, made successful farming difficult. 
Consequently, many settlers left their blocks during the 1920s and 1930s. 
Another, smaller, soldier settlement scheme (the War Service Land Settlement 
Scheme) was introduced at the end of World War II. Unlike its predecessor scheme, 
application criteria were more stringent, requiring, for example, that returned 
servicemen demonstrate their eligibility, suitability and qualifications for settlement and 
detail their prior agricultural experience. The size of holdings offered to returned 
servicemen were also larger than in the previous scheme, and adequate guidance and 
technical advice were made available via extension services. Based on its objectives, 
this scheme was more successful than its predecessor. However, part of this may be 
attributable to the improvement in commodity prices that occurred during its early years 
of operation (Campbell 1982). Australia’s soldier settlement initiatives are still seen as 
a source of structural adjustment problems (Stephens and McGuckian 1995, Watson 
2008).  
 
The experience of soldier settlement farming suggests there are lessons that can be 
drawn from some earlier policies that aimed to influence the regional distribution of 
population. The merits or otherwise of broader, longer term approaches to regional 
development — whether through decentralisation, infrastructure investment, greater 
provision of services, horizontal fiscal equalisation, taxation zone rebates or payroll 
tax concessions — however, is outside the scope of this inquiry. As discussed in 
chapter 11, there are a number of state and territory policies that mix the objective 
of regional development with drought assistance — such overlaps need to be 
considered and addressed when devising future policies. 
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3 Climate variability and drought 
 
Key points 
• Droughts are a recurrent and frequent feature of Australia’s climate. 
– Severe droughts bring sharp reductions in agricultural output and farm incomes. 
– Drought tends to exacerbate social problems. 
• There have been three particularly severe and prolonged dry periods in Australia 
since 1900, including the period 2002 to 2007 (through to 2008 in some regions). 
• Although the period 2002 to 2007 is regarded by many as one long drought, it 
includes three of the four highest ever years for Australia’s overall agricultural 
output. 
• Expert projections for Australia’s climate make it clear that farmers and other 
Australians should be prepared for a hotter future. The outlook for rainfall is for 
continued variability, and for some regions, more frequent periods of extremely low 
rainfall. There is, however, large uncertainty surrounding the rainfall projections.  
• Inflows to the Murray-Darling Basin in recent years have been the lowest on record, 
contributing to dramatic declines in annual allocations to irrigators. 
– In future there is likely to be substantially less water available for irrigation and its 
supply may become more variable. The consequences for irrigators, however, 
depend not only on the climate but, to a large extent, on water policy.  
 
3.1 Drought and climate variability in Australia 
This chapter discusses Australia’s experience of climate variability and drought 
from meteorological, economic, social and environmental perspectives. In doing so 
it draws on the reports by the Bureau of Meteorology–CSIRO and the Expert Social 
Panel that form part of the review of drought policy.  
Australia’s climate 
Average annual rainfall is relatively high along the eastern coastal fringe (from 
northern Queensland to Victoria and western Tasmania), parts of northern Australia 
and a small part of the southwest of Western Australia. Large areas of Australia’s 
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interior have an average annual rainfall of less then 300 mm (figure 3.1). There is a 
general gradient from warmer conditions in the tropical north to cooler conditions in 
the south, although topography also influences temperature. 
Figure 3.1 Average annual rainfalla 
a
 Averaged over the period 1900 to 2007. 
Source: BoM (2008 unpublished). 
There is some degree of seasonality of rainfall almost everywhere in Australia 
(Lindesay 2005). There is a bias towards summer rainfall in northern Australia. This 
is most extreme in tropical areas that experience monsoonal rain. There is generally 
a winter bias in rainfall for more southerly latitudes. 
Climate, including rainfall, varies from year to year. Indeed, Australia has one of 
the most variable climates in the world (Hennessy et al. 2008). Various factors, such 
as the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and the Indian Ocean Dipole, drive 
this variability on a range of timescales. These relate to interannual fluctuations in 
the ocean-atmosphere system. For example, during the El Niño extreme of ENSO, 
tropical convection and moist easterly onshore airflow diminishes over Australia, 
and parts of eastern Australia become generally sunnier, drier and warmer. El Niño 
events recur on average every three to six years, but this varies. The other extreme, 
La Niña, typically brings wetter than average conditions in eastern Australia. 
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Defining drought 
Drought is a part of Australia’s climate variability. Drawing on international 
meteorological literature, Hennessy et al. (2008) refer to four types of drought. 
• Meteorological drought: a period of months to years when atmospheric 
conditions result in low rainfall. This can be exacerbated by high temperatures 
and high evaporation, low humidity and desiccating winds. 
• Agricultural drought: short-term dryness in the surface soil layers (root-zone) at 
a critical time in the growing season. The start and end may lag that of a 
meteorological drought, depending on the preceding soil moisture status. 
• Hydrological drought: prolonged moisture deficits that affect surface or 
subsurface water supply, thereby reducing streamflow, groundwater, dam and 
lake levels. This may persist long after a meteorological drought has ended. 
• Socioeconomic drought: the effect of elements of the above droughts on supply 
and demand of economic goods and human wellbeing. 
Meteorological drought and agricultural drought are of primary importance to 
dryland agriculture. Hydrological drought is of particular relevance to irrigated 
agriculture. In relation to ‘socioeconomic drought’, it should be understood that 
neighbouring wheat farms that receive the same low rainfall have experienced the 
same severity of drought, even if the socioeconomic effects of this are much more 
pronounced on one farm than the other due to factors such as relative management 
skills or capital bases. As argued by the Australian Land Management Group, there 
is a need to ‘distinguish between cause (a meteorological event) and effect (stress of 
various forms)’ (sub. 24, p. 3). 
For simplicity, this report uses the term ‘drought’ to refer to the first three types 
above. When hydrological drought is being specifically discussed, reference is 
made to its: 
• primary cause — low inflows to water bodies 
• main consequence for agriculture — low water allocations to irrigators. 
History of major droughts 
Droughts are a natural, recurrent and frequent feature of Australia’s climate. 
Droughts vary in their intensity, duration, geographic extent and proximity to the 
preceding drought. Box 3.1 briefly describes the major periods of drought since the 
mid 1800s.  
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Box 3.1 Major periods of drought and their effects 
1864-66  All states affected except Tasmania.  
1880-86   Southern and eastern states affected.  
1895-1903 The Federation Drought. Several years of generally below-average 
rainfall were followed immediately by one or two years of exceptionally 
low rainfall. Sheep numbers halved and more than 40 per cent of cattle 
were lost. Most devastating drought in terms of stock losses.  
1911-16 Loss of 19 million sheep and 2 million cattle. The national wheat crop 
failed completely in 1914. 
1918-20  Only parts of Western Australia free from drought.  
1939-45 The Forties Drought. Loss of nearly 30 million sheep between 1942 and 
1945. 1940 was one of the driest years on record across southern 
Australia. 
1963-68 Widespread drought, the last two years of which saw a 40 per cent drop 
in wheat harvest, a loss of 20 million sheep, and a decrease in farm 
income of $300-500 million. 
1972-73  Mainly in eastern Australia. 
1982-83 One of the most intense and widespread droughts on record. Total loss 
estimated in excess of $3 billion. 
1991-95 Particularly dry in parts of Queensland, northern New South Wales and 
parts of central Australia. Average production by rural industries fell 
about 10 per cent, resulting in possible $5 billion cost to the Australian 
economy. There was particularly low rainfall across large parts of 
Australia in 1994. 
2002-07 Winter crop production declined sharply in 2002-03 and, after recovering, 
declined again in 2006-07. Inflows to the Murray-Darling Basin were the 
lowest on record, severely impacting irrigated agriculture. 
Sources: BoM (nd); Lindesay (2005).  
 
Many participants regard the period from 2002 to at least 2007 as being one long 
drought (Macquarie River Food and Fibre, sub. 36; Queensland Farmers’ 
Federation, sub. 82; NSW Farmers’ Association, sub. 98). The National Farmers’ 
Federation stated: 
The last seven years have been a challenging period for Australian farmers with 
widespread and prolonged drought leading to a severe reduction in farm production … 
(sub. DR176, p. 17) 
The final section of this chapter places this recent period in the context of the 
historic record and likely future climate. 
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3.2 Effects on agricultural systems 
Drought is but one of the climatic risks farmers face. Too much rain, very heavy 
rain, or rain at the wrong time of year, can damage crops and hamper harvesting. 
Floods can kill livestock and cause damage to farm infrastructure. Frosts, hail and 
extreme winds can also affect farm production and income.  
Drought, however, differs from these other climate risks in at least two important 
ways. First, drought can affect a much greater proportion of farms at any one time. 
Second, drought usually has a slow onset, can last for several years, and its end can 
be highly uncertain. Other climate risks are usually discrete events. 
The effects of drought on different types of agricultural systems are outlined below. 
These effects can be reduced or ameliorated through farm management practices, as 
discussed later. 
Broadacre grazing 
Drought generally reduces pasture growth, which translates to lower meat or wool 
production. In addition, the carrying capacity of the land decreases and so either 
some livestock must be sold, feed bought in, or animals agisted where feed is 
available. If livestock are sold early due to drought, the farmer’s income will be 
reduced and brought forward. Providing supplementary feed drives up costs, and so 
reduces farm profit, but can assist in retaining core breeding stock. Drought can also 
make it more difficult and expensive to provide water for livestock. 
Dryland cropping 
Dryland cropping yields are highly dependent on the quantity and timing of rain 
prior to and during the growing season. Much of Australia’s cropping is on land that 
receives insufficient rain to yield a profitable crop fairly frequently, with some 
crops failing altogether. There are, however, some higher rainfall areas, particularly 
in Western Australia, that tend to produce higher wheat yields in relatively dry 
years (Land and Water Australia 2006).  
Meteorological conditions are often judged in terms of the number of good seasons 
experienced over a five or ten year period. The likelihood of poor seasons occurring 
influences land prices and this can mean that some land is profitable for 
opportunistic cropping even if very good seasons only occur once or twice in five 
years. 
   
52 GOVERNMENT 
DROUGHT SUPPORT 
 
 
Irrigated cropping 
The availability and price of water to an irrigated property depends on water policy 
and water markets, as well as on the inflows to rivers and groundwater sources. 
Irrigators generally experience relatively little disruption during a short drought. 
However, when inflows have been low for an extended period, holders of water 
entitlements may only receive a small proportion of their usual annual allocation 
and sometimes zero allocations occur. Farmers can maintain production by buying 
water on the temporary market, but prices tend to increase substantially during dry 
periods. When water prices are high, some irrigators choose not to plant and so have 
no crop to sell at the end of the season (although they may have some income from 
selling that year’s water allocation). Others temporarily switch to dryland forms of 
agriculture, while the remainder buy water to grow an irrigated crop. For those who 
do put in an irrigated crop, the quantity of rainfall on the property can also be 
important as this influences how much water needs to be purchased. 
Horticulture 
Horticulture in Australia is intensive and generally irrigated. In many cases, 
horticulture involves perennial plantings such as fruit trees and grape vines. Trees 
and vines generally require some irrigation water to survive and even more if they 
are to produce a good harvest. During periods with low inflows, when water 
allocations are low and water prices high, the choice can be between allowing 
plantings to die (which can lead to expensive reestablishment followed by a period 
of several years before full production is restored) or facing a water bill that is so 
high as to make the farm unprofitable in that year. Severe pruning to minimise 
water use is another strategy that is sometimes adopted and this can also be costly. 
Dairy farming 
About half of Australian dairy farms are irrigated to some degree (Australian Dairy 
Industry Council, sub. 58), which largely explains why ‘pasture for grazing’ is the 
single largest use of irrigation water in Australia (table 2.6). These farms can 
experience problems associated with the low water allocations and high water prices 
described above. Often, irrigated and dryland dairy farms buy in feed during 
droughts. As explained by the Australian Dairy Industry Council: 
… income production from milking cows is tied to fixed infrastructure (the milking 
shed), meaning feed has to be brought to a milking herd. Buying, transporting and 
feeding out large quantities of high quality feed is an expensive operation. To be 
agisted elsewhere, milking cows would have to be dried off and consequently do not 
produce income. (sub. 58, p. 2) 
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Intensive livestock 
Intensive livestock production, such as that undertaken by pork, chicken and some 
beef producers, relies on purchasing feed all of the time, not just during drought. 
The main impact of drought on these producers is that it tends to increase their 
delivered feed costs. Australian Pork Ltd reported: 
… in general feed cost amounts to almost 60 per cent of cost of production for a pig, 
and approximately 80 per cent of total feed costs are related to the costs of grains. 
(sub. 95, p. 13) 
While drought in Australian grain growing areas tends to push up feed costs, other 
factors, such as international grain prices, can also be important.  
3.3 Market impacts 
Drought has varying effects on the agricultural sector, regional economies, and the 
national economy.  
Impacts on agriculture 
Agricultural output 
As noted in chapter 2 (figure 2.1), the four most recent widespread drought years 
(1982-83, 1994-95, 2002-03 and 2006-07) have all been associated with a sharp 
reduction in agricultural output. For example, agricultural output decreased by 
approximately 19 per cent between 2005-06 and 2006-07. Despite recurring 
droughts, agricultural output has continued to increase over the longer-term. Indeed, 
three of the four highest output years in Australia’s history occurred in the three 
years between 2002-03 and 2006-07. 
Drought has different effects on the various types of agricultural operations 
(figure 3.2). The output of cereal and non-cereal crops declines sharply in drought 
years, but tends to rebound strongly in the following year.1 Drought generally 
causes a reduction in livestock production and this impact may be spread over a 
number of years. 
                                                 
1 It is common for above average rainfall years to follow drought years and this often contributes 
to the increases in crop production. 
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Figure 3.2 Agricultural output by industry, 1976-77 to 2007-08a 
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Data sources: ABS Australian National Accounts; Agricultural Production (2008 unpublished). 
Farm incomes 
Drought generally decreases farm incomes because it reduces output and can 
increase costs. However, as discussed in the previous section, drought has differing 
effects on various types of agricultural activities. 
Other economic variables, and decisions that farmers make in response to them, 
also affect farm incomes. For example, in recent years many dairy farmers have 
purchased fodder to maintain production during drought and this has increased their 
costs. However, the prices received by farmers for milk increased between 2002-03 
and 2007-08, with a large increase of approximately 50 per cent between 2006-07 
and 2007-08 (ABARE 2008c, p. 744). Although the farm cash income and farm 
business profit of dairy farms was adversely affected by 2006-07 drought, its impact 
was at least partially offset by higher milk prices. More recently, world milk prices 
have declined, and consequently Australian farm-gate milk prices were forecast (in 
December 2008) to fall by approximately 5 per cent in 2008-09 compared to 
2007-08 levels (ABARE 2008c). 
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The drought preparedness strategies undertaken by farmers will also influence the 
extent to which a drought event affects their output and incomes. For example, a 
livestock producer who has stored substantial quantities of fodder to feed stock is 
likely to suffer a less severe drought-induced decline in output and income than one 
who has taken fewer such measures. 
The data presented in chapter 2 generally show that each of the major droughts that 
have occurred in the past 25 years has been associated with a reduction in the cash 
incomes of broadacre and dairy farms. Incomes for both have recovered after 
droughts, although the magnitude of recovery differs with each drought episode. 
In contrast with the volume of agricultural output, which as noted, continues to 
increase despite periodic droughts, farm incomes do not display a similar upward 
trend. This is because of the confluence of factors affecting farm incomes, most 
notably the long-term decline in the farm terms of trade. 
Asset values 
Land is the main asset for most farm businesses2. A major influence on the value of 
farm land is the future return expected from owning it. Often this relates to future 
agricultural production, but may also relate to the conversion of the land to other 
uses, such as residential use. The occurrence of drought in a particular year does not 
generally lower expectations about returns for future seasons and so would not be 
expected to have a major influence on the value of farming land. An exception to 
this might occur if the drought resulted in a sharp increase in the number of 
properties coming on to the market in a region where there are few potential buyers. 
The evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. Rates of return to farming have 
been relatively high (see chapter 2), including during the 2002 to 2007 period, in 
large part due to continued increases in farm land values (figure 3.3). 
ABARE (2008e) stated that the phenomenon of continually increasing farm land 
values reflected factors such as changes in population growth, urban and peri-urban 
development and economic growth in regions strongly influenced by mining. 
Further reasons for the continued increase in farm land values may include: 
• the positive attitude of banks towards agriculture 
• new and more intensive farming systems 
• competition for limited land with neighbours and new managed investment 
schemes (O’Callaghan 2006). 
                                                 
2 Extensive pastoral leases across northern Australia are a significant exception. 
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The Australian Bankers’ Association argued that increases in land values reflected 
expectations that future commodity prices would be strong: 
That phenomenon of increasing land prices during this drought has been an 
extraordinary event … prices are reflecting the expected demand for soft commodities, 
going forward … those prices are now looking a little bit high, but over the long-term, 
the expectations are there that there will be pressure on commodity prices that are 
expected to enable those property prices to be sustained. (trans., pp. 470-1) 
Another possible reason why farm land values have increased in recent years is due 
to investment interests from abroad. Compared to other countries (especially those 
where land is much more expensive and those with weaker systems of property 
rights and institutional structures) investment in agricultural land in Australia seems 
to represent a quite attractive investment opportunity.  
It is also possible that the provision of government drought support, particularly 
interest rate subsidies, has been capitalised into farm land values, making land 
prices higher than they would otherwise be. The National Farmers’ Federation 
submitted: 
It is important to note that farm land value has been intrinsically tied to drought policy 
in the recent decade. Interest-rate subsidies, EC support, and other assistance measures 
have buffeted and placed a ‘floor’ under land value. (sub. DR176, p. 21) 
Figure 3.3 Broadacre land values per hectare, 1977-78 to 2006-07 
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Data source: ABARE (2008 unpublished). 
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There appears to be little evidence of a clear relationship between land values and 
drought for various types of broadacre land. Indeed, over the period 2002-03 to 
2006-07, (real) average land values per hectare for broadacre farms in exceptional 
circumstances (EC) declared areas (as of 30 June 2007) increased at a faster rate 
than those for non-EC declared areas (ABARE 2008 unpublished). 
Investment in other farm assets, such as machinery and equipment, may be affected 
by drought. Constrained cash flows caused by drought can reduce the ability of 
farmers to invest in new assets and undertake the maintenance of existing assets, 
reducing their productive value. Figure 2.16 shows that gross fixed capital 
formation decreased during the 2002-03 and 2006-07 droughts. After the 2002-03 
drought, gross fixed capital formation recovered, suggesting that drought may 
postpone investment decisions taken by farmers rather than prevent new investment 
altogether. 
Farm debt 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, average (broadacre and dairy) farm debt 
increased (figure 3.4), primarily as a result of the financing of new investments 
associated with a rising proportion of farms purchasing additional farm land 
(ABARE 2008e). Since the 2002-03 drought however, there has been an increase in 
farm working capital debt. High land prices have allowed many farmers to maintain 
high equity positions despite increases in their debt. As noted by the Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE), farmers with low 
equity tend to have greater difficulty accessing working capital debt facilities, and 
therefore need to rely more heavily on surplus cash flows generated by their farm 
businesses to provide funds for working capital and drought recovery (ABARE 
2008e, p. 12). 
Agricultural adjustment 
Drought can exacerbate existing adjustment pressures facing farmers. The 
combination of factors such as declining farm terms of trade, technological change, 
and the trend towards larger farm sizes are all long-term adjustment issues in 
agriculture, and are more likely to induce changes in farm numbers than the 
recurrent phenomenon of drought. Nevertheless, the occurrence of drought may 
induce some farmers facing adjustment pressures to leave the industry, though often 
not until after the drought has ended. However, young farmers who have bought 
their properties, or farmers who have made large investments (such as buying more 
land to become more viable), just before drought may suffer particularly adverse 
financial effects due to unfortunate timing. 
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Figure 3.4 Broadacre and dairy farm business debt, 1988-89 to 2007-08 
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Data source: ABARE (2008 unpublished). 
Regional impacts 
The direct decline in agricultural activity that arises from drought can also have 
effects on agriculture-dependent businesses, such as farm machinery and equipment 
suppliers, fertiliser and seed suppliers and harvesting contractors. During drought, 
farmers are less likely to require the goods and services of such firms, leading to a 
decline in their production levels. The decrease in output of agriculture and 
agriculture-dependent business also reduces the output of other regional industries 
due to reduced final expenditures on the goods and services they produce.  
With lower levels of production, primary producers and agriculture-dependent 
businesses often reduce the number of hours worked by existing workers and/or 
reduce the number of workers they employ. This also applies to other regional 
industries affected by reduced expenditure on the goods and services they produce. 
The financial and employment effects of drought on a particular region are 
dependent on a range of factors. This includes the severity and duration of drought, 
the types of agricultural output produced in the region and their linkages with 
downstream industries, and the relative importance of agriculture to the region 
(Stayner 1996). 
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As an example of how drought severity may differ between regions, 
Adams et al. (2002) observed that, during the 2002-03 drought, some grain growers 
around Adelaide, south east South Australia and south-western Victoria realised 
near average harvests. However, other areas, such as the eastern Eyre Peninsula (in 
South Australia), north-western Victoria and northern New South Wales, suffered 
extreme or total crop failure. On a state basis, New South Wales suffered the largest 
decline in agricultural output in 2002-03 (32 per cent), while large falls also 
occurred in Western Australia (28 per cent), South Australia (26 per cent) and 
Victoria (21 per cent) (ABS 2008d). 
The extent to which a region is affected by drought is in part dependent on the types 
of agriculture practised. Regions with a high proportion of broadacre cropping may 
be more vulnerable to a rainfall drought than a region that has a high proportion of 
irrigated dairy farming. In broadacre livestock areas affected by drought, farmers 
can agist stock, which can increase activity in regional transport industries, or 
reduce stock numbers, potentially increasing activity in local abattoirs and 
associated industries. 
The effects of drought on a given region may also be ameliorated if there is a 
significant increase in the proportion of farm household members who obtain 
off-farm income, especially if it is not agriculture related or weather-dependent. 
Expenditure of such income in the region can partially offset drought-related 
reductions in final expenditures, regional output and employment. There may, 
however, be some changes in the composition of regional output, as income 
obtained is likely to be spent on maintaining consumption levels, rather than 
on-farm inputs. Furthermore, nonfarm businesses can reduce the flow-on effects of 
drought they experience by reducing their inventories, and depending on their 
degree of mobility, seeking productive opportunities in other localities 
(Stayner 1996). 
As discussed in chapter 2, the relative significance of agriculture has declined over 
time, and a number of factors have favoured the growth of larger regional centres 
over smaller rural towns. For example, Stayner observed: 
Farmers now have more reasons for visiting town, and it is efficient to tend to them all 
in the same place. Because it is now necessary to go to town to do the banking, buy 
chemicals, and pick up a replacement part, and since the increasing complexity of these 
inputs makes it desirable to shop around for price, service and information, there are 
‘agglomeration’ economies which favour the larger places offering such services and 
choice. (Stayner 1996, p. 4) 
Moreover, with better and cheaper transport, the relative costs of going further, to a 
larger town, have declined while the benefits have increased.  
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Levantis (2001) found that, although the economies of many small towns (defined 
as those with less than 1000 people) were highly dependent on (broadacre) farm 
expenditure, most farm expenditure took place in larger towns. However, in larger 
towns, farm household expenditure per town resident (used as an indication of the 
relative importance of agriculture to the local economy) was lower than in small 
towns. Therefore, although small towns are still highly dependent upon expenditure 
from agriculture, larger towns are less so. Indeed, chapter 2 (box 2.2) showed that 
agriculture accounts for only a relatively small share of inner regional employment. 
Agriculture is more important to employment in outer regional, remote and very 
remote areas. However, private services are more important than agriculture in all 
of these areas, and other industries, such as health and education, and infrastructure, 
also account for a large share of total employment (BITRE 2008). 
The growth of regional centres and declining significance of agriculture in these 
centres also means that alternative employment opportunities available to 
individuals outside agriculture are changing. Given the industrial diversification of 
regional centres, they typically provide a fairly wide range of employment options. 
However, as activity has moved away from smaller rural towns, the employment 
options they offer have generally reduced. Nevertheless, the wider the range of 
alternative employment choices available to individuals, the less severe the impacts 
of drought on employment are likely to be. For example, in its submission to this 
inquiry, the Rangelands Drought Taskforce South Australia stated: 
The mining boom and high demand for employment in the region has masked many of 
the negative impacts of the drought (sub. 60, p. 2). 
In summary, while droughts have negative effects on economic activity and 
employment at the regional level, the growth of regional centres and the declining 
significance of agriculture in these centres means that these effects have gradually 
become less pronounced than in the past. 
National impacts 
Although agriculture now accounts for only a small share of Australia’s national 
economic output, drought can still have a significant influence on measured gross 
domestic product (GDP). For example, the ABS estimated that the 2002-03 drought 
reduced farm GDP by around 28.5 per cent, which subtracted around 1 percentage 
point from Australia’s aggregate GDP growth (ABS 2004). The latter estimate 
reflects only the direct effects of drought (that is, those that result only from the 
direct decline in farm GDP). 
Droughts also have flow-on effects, which occur due to reductions in the output of 
agriculture-dependent industries and decreased final expenditures in other 
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industries. These effects are more difficult to quantify than the direct effects of 
drought, but one way to do so is to use a Computable General Equilibrium model. 
Horridge et al. (2005) used such a model to analyse the effects of the 2002-03 
drought on a range of economic variables. They estimated that the 2002-03 drought 
led to a reduction in Australia’s GDP growth of 1.6 percentage points. Of this, 
1 percentage point reflected the direct decline in agricultural production, and the 
remaining 0.6 of a percentage point reflected negative flow-on effects. More 
recently, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) forecast that the fall in farm output 
in 2006-07 would reduce GDP growth by around one half of a percentage point 
(RBA 2006). 
In Australia, droughts have reduced GDP growth in the years in which they occur, 
but have not slowed growth in the long run. When the agricultural sector recovers 
from drought, farm GDP increases, and this causes aggregate GDP to rise. For 
example, the RBA estimated that: 
• the 1982-83 drought reduced Australia’s GDP growth by around 
1-1.5 percentage points, but the subsequent recovery added approximately the 
same amount to GDP growth 
• the 1991-95 drought period also subtracted around 1-1.5 percentage points from 
GDP growth, while the recovery added approximately 0.75 percentage points to 
GDP growth (RBA 2002).  
The effect of drought on the GDP growth rate is essentially transitory because in the 
long-run, GDP growth depends on the growth rates of labour and capital 
accumulation and total factor productivity growth (that is, increases in output that 
occur for a given quantity of inputs), not temporary movements in the level of farm 
GDP. 
Although drought can have significant ramifications for farm and other regional 
employment, it does not necessarily have the same effect on aggregate (nationwide) 
employment: 
Whilst the [2002–03] drought had a devastating impact on agricultural employment, the 
strength of the broader domestic economy saw above trend growth in total 
employment. … at an aggregate level, employment declines related to drought were 
offset by the strong growth in other sectors. (Lu and Hedley 2004, p. 34) 
Despite the decline in agricultural employment arising from the 2002–03 drought 
(see figure 2.5), total economywide employment increased in that year. Therefore, 
although drought may result in a decline in employment in rural areas, it does not 
necessarily mean that aggregate levels of employment will decline. Growth in 
non-agriculture industries provides individuals with the opportunity to find 
alternative sources of employment, although not always in the same region. 
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The effect of droughts on inflation are generally relatively small, although there can 
be significant price effects on certain food items in the short term. For example, the 
prices of foods that rely on wheat as an input typically rise after the onset of 
drought, whereas meat prices initially fall as slaughter rates increase. The RBA 
(2008) made the observation that, during the droughts which occurred in 1982-83, 
1994-95 and 2002-03, average food prices increased at approximately the same rate 
as the overall Consumer Price Index. The RBA stated that the reasons for the 
historically muted effects of drought on consumer prices are because: 
• the contribution of commodity prices to final retail food prices is often small 
• the contribution of drought-affected food prices to the Consumer Price Index is 
relatively small 
• the increase in cereal prices is partially offset by lower meat prices 
• many food items can be imported if shortfalls in domestic production occur 
• some food manufacturers who use drought-affected inputs have some scope to 
use substitute ingredients. 
In contrast to previous droughts, the 2006-07 drought did result in food prices 
increasing at a faster rate than the overall Consumer Price Index. The reason for 
this, according to the RBA, was because a broader range of food items were 
affected than in previous droughts. In particular, the RBA noted that because the 
decline in stored water levels led to reductions in dairy and vegetable production, 
the prices of these items rose more markedly than in previous droughts 
(RBA 2008, p. 11). 
3.4 Social impacts 
As stated by the Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association: 
Drought is … not just about the mechanics and business of farming, but about people, 
about health and wellbeing, about education, community welfare, social cohesion, rural 
living, and about all the aspects of life that humans are involved in. (sub. 69, p. 7). 
The Expert Social Panel’s report on the social dimensions of drought was presented 
to the Commonwealth Government at the end of September 2008. The Commission 
is in broad agreement with the panel on many of their conclusions on the social 
impacts of drought. For example, the following quote from the panel’s report is 
consistent with the Commission’s assessment: 
At times the Panel found it difficult to separate the social impacts of dryness from the 
longer term socio-demographic trends contributing to a decline of some rural 
populations. However, it was clear from the Panel’s assessment that drought has an 
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impact on the wellbeing of farm families, rural businesses and communities. (Kenny et 
al. 2008, p. 1) 
The intention here is not to cover in detail all of the social impacts discussed in the 
Expert Social Panel’s report, but rather to outline the Commission’s understanding 
of some of the main issues. This understanding informs the policy recommendations 
made later in this report. This section also makes use of the results of the Australian 
Institute of Family Studies’ Rural and Regional Families Survey, as this appears to 
be the largest and most comprehensive survey of the impacts of drought on people 
living in regional and rural Australia (box 3.2).  
 
Box 3.2 Australian Institute of Family Studies’ Rural and Regional 
Families Survey — methodology 
The Rural and Regional Families Survey is a population-based study of 8000 people 
living in areas of Australia in which at least 10 per cent of the population were 
employed in agriculture or a related service industry. The interviews were conducted 
over September to December 2007 with people living in over 400 postcodes. Four 
groups of 2000 people were interviewed. The groups (based on rainfall deficits in the 
area in the last three years compared to the last 100 years) were: 
• severe drought (0 to 5th percentile) 
• drought (6 to 10th percentile) 
• below-average rainfall (11 to 49th percentile) 
• above-average rainfall (50 to 100th percentile). 
Data on respondents’ perceptions of drought were also obtained. The categories 
derived according to this social definition of drought were: 
• currently in drought 
• in drought in the last year but not currently in drought 
• in drought in the last 3 years but not in the last year 
• not in drought in the last 3 years. 
The effects of drought were estimated using multivariate statistical modelling 
(regression analysis), which allows for the effects of drought after taking into account 
other differences between families and geographic areas.  
Source: AIFS (sub. 92).  
 
Financial hardship 
Often the market impacts of drought, discussed in the previous section, have social 
consequences. For example, reduced farm incomes can lead to financial hardship 
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for households that are unable to adequately supplement their income through 
off-farm employment, or through drawing down savings, extending their borrowing, 
or accessing drought assistance or other government income support payments. An 
applicant for drought assistance in Tasmania reported: 
We have had to sell three-quarters of our stock and also hand feeding grain to the rest 
so there is no money left for living expenses which puts a lot of strain on the family. 
(cited in Country Women’s Association in Tasmania, sub. 17, p. 3).  
Financial hardship affects people in a range of ways. Some farmers told the 
Commission and the Expert Social Panel that difficulty in finding money to meet 
the educational needs of their children because of drought was something they felt 
particularly keenly. The Expert Social Panel reported hearing that ‘some children 
and young adults are being denied educational … opportunities because of 
household financial limitations’ (Kenny et al. 2008, p. 7). However, this could be 
said of any household facing financial difficulties anywhere in Australia — it is not 
a problem unique to drought-affected farmers. 
The Australian Institute of Family Studies (AIFS) survey quantified the reduction in 
income arising from drought. It found that (using a rainfall definition of drought) 
farmers in severely drought-affected areas had, on average, annual household 
incomes of around $34 600 compared to $38 600 for their counterparts in above 
average rainfall areas (sub. 92). This is a surprisingly small differential — the 
average income for those with above average rainfall was only 12 per cent higher 
than that of farmers in severely drought-affected areas. 
The survey provides additional data on financial hardship. As explained by the 
AIFS: 
Respondents were asked, ‘In the last 12 months, did any of the following happen to 
your family because of a shortage of money? Could not pay electricity or the telephone 
bills on time; could not pay the mortgage or rent on time; pawned or sold something; 
went without meals; asked for financial help from friends or family; asked for help 
from welfare/community organisations’. The experience of one or more of these events 
was considered to be indicative of financial hardship. (sub. 92, p. 13) 
Table 3.1 shows that the proportion of farmers experiencing financial hardship was 
high relative to farm workers and other people employed in rural areas. This may be 
related to the risks, capital exposure and infrequency of income faced by farmers. 
The table also shows that 35 per cent of farmers in areas with above average rainfall 
experienced financial hardship and this rose to 45 per cent in areas affected by 
drought. This suggests that in a drought-affected area, the drought results in a 
further one in ten farmers experiencing financial hardship. In other words, most 
cases of financial hardship suffered by farmers were due to factors other than 
drought. 
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The increase in financial hardship in drought-affected areas was more pronounced 
for farm workers than for farmers, and there was a marked difference, for those 
workers, between drought and severe drought. For people living in rural areas and 
employed outside agriculture, the prevalence of financial hardship was essentially 
the same irrespective of drought status (table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 Experience of financial hardship, by drought status (rainfall 
definition) and type of employment a 
Per cent of each employment group 
 Drought status 
Employment group Severe drought Drought Below average 
rainfall 
Above average
rainfall
Farmer 45 45 41 35
Farm worker 36 25 28 23
Employed but not in 
agriculture 
23 24 22 22
a Estimates derived from logistic regression. 
Source: AIFS (sub. 92, p. 15). 
The AIFS also presented data based on a social definition of drought. These data 
show a larger increase in financial hardship for those in drought compared to those 
not in drought, relative to the data based on the rainfall definition (although the 
drought status categories are somewhat different) (AIFS, sub. 92). Asking people 
about the drought status of their area would seem to be less reliable than using 
rainfall records to make this assessment and so this report focuses on the results 
based on the rainfall definition. 
Family relationships 
Financial difficulties, concerns over the future of the farm, and other concerns 
caused or exacerbated by drought can put a strain on family relationships. The 
Expert Social Panel report on the impact of drought on families found: 
… the present dryness has had an impact on the functioning of rural families, through 
enforced long-term separation of family members, psychological impacts on toddlers 
and school age children, an increased burden of responsibility on women and the 
divisive issue of succession planning in tightened economic circumstances.  
The Panel formed the view that while many farmers will say they are coping, their 
coping mechanisms are creating greater pressure on their families. (Kenny et al. 2008, 
p. 34) 
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The Expert Social Panel noted that its findings were contrary to that of the AIFS. 
From its survey the AIFS found: 
… no evidence that drought had a negative impact upon family relationships, as 
measured by separation, quality of the couple relationship, family functioning and 
family conflict. (sub. 92, p. 5) 
Whereas the AIFS survey did not find empirical evidence to support the relationship 
between drought and deteriorating family relationships, the Expert Social Panel 
drew on a wider range of qualitative evidence.  
Mental health 
The Expert Social Panel reported: 
It is clear to the Panel that extended dryness has a significant negative impact on the 
mental health of farm families and others within rural communities. In particular, the 
Panel heard repeatedly during the public forums and in written submissions that the 
pressures of drought were leading to an increase in the incidence of depression, anxiety 
and stress in rural and remote areas. (Kenny et al. 2008, p. 60) 
The AIFS survey also found considerably higher rates of mental health problems 
among people who regarded their area as being in drought (sub. 92). The survey, 
however, showed very little difference in the prevalence of mental health problems 
between areas with different drought status, as defined by rainfall (table 3.2). The 
main exception to this was that a greater proportion of farm workers in severely 
drought-affected areas had a mental health problem compared to other farm 
workers, although the AIFS reported that this was not a statistically significant 
result. 
Table 3.2 Reports of mental health problems, by drought status (rainfall 
definition) and type of employmenta 
Per cent of each employment group 
 Drought status 
Employment group Severe drought Drought Below average 
rainfall 
Above average 
rainfall
Farmer 16 17 14 17
Farm worker 13 5 9 8
Employed but not in 
agriculture 
9 9 7 10
a Estimates derived from logistic regression. 
Source: AIFS (sub. 92, p. 25). 
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A smaller study commissioned by the Birchip Cropping Group involving interviews 
with farm families in northwest Victoria during drought conditions found: 
Serious depression is not common but is present and many reported a loss of enjoyment 
and confidence in farming. (Rickards 2007, p. 4) 
The Expert Social Panel identified a link between suicide and drought: 
Recent studies examining trends in Australian suicide rates have consistently 
demonstrated male rates are higher in rural and remote areas than in major cities. 
Further, there is evidence linking suicide to drought in New South Wales, with an 8 per 
cent rise in the long-term mean suicide rate being associated with a decrease in 
precipitation of about 300 millimetres. (Kenny et al. 2008, p. 59) 
Community stability and cohesion 
As discussed in chapter 2, a range of factors has led to the long-term decline of 
many small towns in Australia as people and economic activity move to larger 
centres. Many people living in or close to these small towns are negatively affected 
by these changes, which can be exacerbated by drought, particularly where they 
result in a loss of local services or social interaction. 
The Expert Social Panel found: 
When family farms are struggling with events such as dryness, the communities in 
which people normally spend their money and participate also suffer. Dryness 
negatively impacts on the ability of members of a rural community to work together for 
the benefit of the whole community, eroding the capacity of people to engage in 
community projects or do the voluntary work that keeps rural communities alive. 
(Kenny et al. 2008, p. 3) 
Based on survey results the AIFS concluded: 
Drought was … associated with a higher rate of closure of key services and more 
people reporting low levels of community social cohesion. However, drought was also 
associated with higher rates of membership of community organisations. … 
The effects of drought on residential mobility are quite hard to estimate. However, our 
analysis seems to indicate that households were adjusting to adverse circumstances in 
drought-affected areas, with some members of households probably moving 
(temporarily or otherwise) towards areas with greater economic opportunity. 
(sub. 92, p. 5) 
The Birchip Cropping Group study found: 
Besides accelerating rural decline, the drought has had positive and negative social 
effects on communities. (Rickards, 2007, p. 5)  
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Overall, the evidence suggests that when it comes to matters such as financial 
hardship, mental health and community cohesion, drought is a factor but is not the 
dominant influence. The evidence also suggests that there is a higher prevalence of 
some social problems among farmers compared to the general population, 
regardless of drought status. 
3.5 Environmental impacts 
The Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts reported: 
… the recent drought has impacted on environmental issues including impact on soil 
condition, damage to exclusion areas, protection of fragile areas such as remnant 
vegetation and erodible creek lines and irreparable damage to groundwater. 
(sub. 107, p. 4) 
Some of the environmental impacts of drought, such as pasture and soil 
degradation, threaten the natural asset base of the farm. As a consequence, farmers 
have an incentive to ameliorate these impacts by changing management practices, 
such as adopting single or no-till cultivation systems or destocking to retain 
vegetation cover. Other on-farm impacts, such as damage to remnant native 
vegetation, can threaten environmental values that are important to the wider 
community as well as to the farmer. 
The environmental consequences of drought are influenced by farm management 
practices. One inquiry participant argued: 
Reducing bare ground will always reduce environmental damage during droughts, and 
the most crucial part of the recovery is when plant populations are attempting to 
re-establish themselves. (P. Morris, sub. 23, p. 4) 
Wind erosion and dust storms tend to be more prevalent during droughts. 
Measurements of airborne dust indicate that there was a generally high level of dust 
storm activity during the 1960s, with peaks in the drier years (Australian State of 
the Environment Committee 2006). Since then dust storms have become generally 
less prevalent, with drought years, such as 1994, 2002 and 2003, being exceptions 
to this. The general lessening in dust storms since the 1960s may be at least partly 
due to improved farm management practices. 
Drought can also lead to a greater spread of weeds from one farm to other farms or 
into public land. This can occur either because the bio-physical conditions resulting 
from drought allow weeds to spread more easily, or because drought-affected 
farmers do not have the time or resources to undertake normal weed control work. 
While regulations and collective interests among farmers exert pressure for weed 
and pest control activities to continue, these may be less effective during drought. 
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A major environmental impact of hydrological drought is that it reduces flows in 
water courses, which can threaten the health of valley and river systems. The 
Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts stated: 
… a recent assessment of the ecosystem health of the 23 valley systems in the 
Murray-Darling Basin showed that 13 were in very poor condition, seven were in poor 
condition, two were assessed as moderate and just one was in good condition. 
(sub. 107, p. 4) 
The Wentworth Group reported on the state of the Coorong, near the mouth of the 
Murray River: 
Salinity levels in the southern Coorong now exceed the maximum levels tolerated by 
the plants and animals that underpin the international status of these wetlands, and acid 
sulphate soils lie ready to be exposed and release acid into the water if lake levels were 
to continue to fall. (Wentworth Group 2008, p. ii) 
The ecosystem health of valley systems is influenced at least as much by water 
policy as it is by variations in climate, and in particular, decisions on how much of 
the available water is allocated to environmental flows. These allocation decisions 
can become particularly contentious during droughts because of the increased 
scarcity of water for irrigation, industry, domestic use and the environment. 
Projections (discussed later in this chapter) for increased temperature and, for some 
areas more frequent periods of extremely low rainfall, have implications for future 
environmental impacts. The Australian Conservation Foundation stated: 
Many Australian plant and animal communities are already substantially degraded as a 
result of habitat conversion, overallocation of water for human use, overgrazing, 
invasive species, salinisation and so on … Increasing drought frequency, intensity and 
extent are likely to have dire consequences for Australia’s biodiversity conservation 
efforts. While many Australian native species are adapted to high climate variability, 
the marked speed and depth of climate change underway is likely to cause a further 
contraction in the range of many plants and animals, and, ultimately, many extinctions, 
local and global. (sub. 106, p. 11) 
As noted earlier, one of the objectives of the National Drought Policy (NDP) relates 
to maintaining and protecting Australia’s environmental resource base (chapter 1). 
The Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts reported that 
there are ‘no measures within the current suite of drought support initiatives that 
explicitly address’ this objective (sub. 107, p. 2). Indeed, the department was 
concerned that NDP measures may actually make environmental outcomes worse: 
There is potential … for the existing drought support policy to have unintended, or 
perverse, consequences that encourage land managers to manage terrestrial and aquatic 
resources unsustainably. (sub. 107, p. 2) 
Later chapters and appendices analyse this issue further. 
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3.6 Recent experience and future outlook 
This section explores recent climate variability and droughts, and the future outlook, 
drawing heavily on projections made by the Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO 
(Hennessy et al. 2008). Three periods are examined: 
• 1993 to 2008, which equates roughly to the period that EC declarations have 
been made. 
• 2002 to 2007, which is widely regarded as one long drought for large parts of 
Australia. 
• 2010 to 2040, which is the period for which the projections were made. 
There is no universally accepted way of comparing droughts, or climate more 
generally, for different periods. The main measures used here are the prevalence of 
exceptionally low rainfall, average rainfall over a given period, the prevalence of 
exceptionally low soil moisture and inflows to water bodies that supply water for 
irrigation (box 3.3). Data are presented for seven regions (figure 3.5). 
 
Box 3.3 Indicators of the severity of drought 
The following indicators of drought severity are used in this report. The first three relate 
to meteorological and agricultural drought, the fourth relates to hydrological drought.  
Exceptionally low rainfall 
Hennessy et al. (2008) define exceptional events as occurring, on average, once every 
20 years. The dataset they used for rainfall was for the period 1900 to 2007 and, for 
any one area, the six lowest rainfall years in this period were classified as having 
exceptionally low rainfall. They determined the percentage area of each region that 
had exceptionally low rainfall in each year and then averaged these percentages over 
various periods. 
The prevalence of exceptionally low rainfall years is a useful, but not perfect, indicator 
of the severity of meteorological drought. Perhaps its main imperfection is that it can be 
misleading in comparing multi-year periods. For example, a five year period that 
included one exceptionally low rainfall year and four years of very much below average 
rainfall would probably be considered more severely drought affected than a five year 
period that included two exceptionally low rainfall years and three average years. 
Average annual rainfall 
Data on average annual rainfall is used to complement the data on exceptionally low 
rainfall. If, for a particular region, a period has both a higher prevalence of 
exceptionally low rainfall years and lower average annual rainfall than another period it 
can be said to be ‘drier’, and highly likely to be more severely drought affected. 
(Continued on next page)  
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Box 3.3 (continued) 
Examination of the historic record also reveals the combination of exceptionally low 
rainfall years and average annual rainfall to be a good proxy for agricultural drought. 
For example, there is generally close concordance between these measures and the 
major drought periods identified in box 3.1.  
Exceptionally low soil moisture 
Hennessy et al. (2008) generated data on exceptionally low soil moisture in a similar 
way as for exceptionally low rainfall. The differences are that the soil moisture data was 
generated using a computer model (the model was driven by daily rainfall and potential 
evaporation data) and that only the period 1957 to 2006 could be covered due to data 
constraints. 
Soil moisture is potentially a better indicator of drought than rainfall alone as it 
incorporates the influence of temperature and other factors on evaporation (and 
therefore on the moisture available for uptake by plants). Hennessy et al. (2008) used 
data on soil moisture in preference to other possible indicators, such as the Palmer 
Drought Severity Index. Exceptionally low soil moisture is, however, limited in its 
usefulness in making historical comparisons because data are only available from 
1957. 
None of the indicators used in this report fully capture the severity of agricultural 
drought as they are not sensitive to within year variations in rainfall such as at the time 
of seed germination or other crucial periods of the growing cycle.  
Inflows to water sources used for irrigation 
The annual volume of inflows to water sources used for irrigation is used as an 
indicator of the severity of hydrological drought in this report. As the Murray-Darling 
Basin supplies most of Australia’s irrigation water, most attention is given to inflows to 
this system.   
 
How does recent rainfall and soil moisture compare to the historic 
record? 
Overall rainfall and incidence of exceptionally low rainfall varies considerably 
between decades: 
In Australia, the twentieth century was characterised by frequent droughts around 1900 
and again in the 1930s and 1940s, with wet conditions becoming widespread in the 
1950s and 1970s. (Hennessy et al. 2008, p. 8) 
Because of this variability, comparisons of recent periods to longer term averages 
can be sensitive to how far back the longer term averages go. This report compares 
more recent years to the period 1900 to 2008. 
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Figure 3.5 Regions used for climate comparisons 
 
Source: Hennessy et al. (2008). 
From 1993 to 2008 
For most regions, the last 16 years had either a fairly average or below average 
occurrence of severe drought. For Queensland, Northwest Australia and Southwest 
Australia exceptionally low rainfall years were less prevalent for the period 1993 to 
2008 than for 1900 to 2008, and average rainfall was higher. For New South Wales 
and the Murray-Darling Basin exceptionally low rainfall years were also less 
prevalent for the period 1993 to 2008 than for 1900 to 2008, but average rainfall 
was slightly lower (by 2.1 and 1.9 per cent respectively) (tables 3.3 and 3.4). 
For many people in these regions the idea that rainfall over the last 16 years was 
about average may conflict with their perceptions. There are at least three possible 
reasons for this. First, some people’s perception of average rainfall may relate more 
closely to the last 40 years (‘living memory’ for many people) than the longer 
historic record that includes the Federation Drought and the Forties Drought. 
Second, the Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO data cited above are averages for 
what are mostly very large geographic regions and trends for smaller areas within 
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them can be quite different. Data in the annex for this chapter shows that some 
districts in these regions had significantly below average rainfall over the last 
16 years. Third, the most recent period, since the very dry year of 2002 may register 
most strongly in people’s memory — this period is examined later. 
In contrast to the above, the Victoria and Tasmania region and southwest Western 
Australia had more prevalent exceptionally low rainfall years for the period 1993 to 
2008 than for 1900 to 2008, and average rainfall was lower (by 4.9 per cent and 
7.9 per cent respectively) (tables 3.3 and 3.4). The extended dry period being 
experienced in these regions (and parts of South Australia) was commented on by 
the Bureau of Meteorology: 
In the south-west of Western Australia, and in parts of south-eastern Australia 
(principally central and western Victoria and south-eastern South Australia, together 
with northern and eastern Tasmania), long-term rainfall deficits extend back beyond 
2000. In both regions, the most recent year in which there was widespread above-
average rain was 1996. At some locations, such as Melbourne, there have been eleven 
consecutive years with below-average rainfall from 1997 to 2007, with 2008 highly 
likely to become the twelfth. (BoM 2008, p. 2) 
Table 3.3 Average percentage area having exceptionally low rainfall, 
selected periods by region 
Per cent of total area in region 
 1900-2008 1993-2008 2002-2007
Queensland 5.5 3.9 7.5 
New South Wales 5.5 5.0 10.7 
Victoria & Tasmania 5.5 7.0 14.1 
Southwest Australia 5.5 3.4 5.4 
Northwest Australiaa 5.6 2.4 5.6 
Murray-Darling Basin 5.5 4.8 11.4 
Southwest WA 5.5 9.0 10.6 
Australia 5.5 3.1 5.1 
a Based on financial rather than calendar years, so as to capture the complete wet season. 
Sources: Hennessy et al. (2008); BoM (2009 unpublished). 
From 2002 to 2007 
The period 2002 to 2007 was chosen for analysis because, for large parts of 
Australia, it included two very low rainfall years and there was a general absence of 
wet years. For most parts of Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia, 2008 was also 
a low rainfall year, but the majority of Queensland, northern New South Wales and 
Western Australia’s agricultural land received close to average or above average 
rainfall. This brought relief from rainfall drought, although the timing of rainfall 
adversely affected grain quality in some areas.  
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It can be seen from tables 3.3 and 3.4 that the period 2002 to 2007 had a higher 
prevalence of severe drought than the historic record for all regions except for 
Northwest Australia3 and Southwest Australia. A relevant question to ask is: How 
exceptional is the dry period from 2002 to 2007 in the context of Australia’s 
agricultural history? 
Table 3.4 Average annual rainfall, selected periods by region 
Millimetres 
 1900-2008 1993-2008 2002-2007
Queensland 615 618 552 
New South Wales 523 512 452 
Victoria & Tasmania 741 705 672 
Southwest Australia 261 281 252 
Northwest Australia 458 572 536 
Murray-Darling Basin 476 467 406 
Southwest WA 658 606 591 
Australia 457 500 457 
Sources: Hennessy et al. (2008); BoM (2009 unpublished). 
Table 3.5 shows that there have been previous six year periods that have a higher 
prevalence of exceptionally low rainfall years and lower average rainfall than 2002 
to 2007 for all regions except southwest Western Australia. For example, on 
average 19.2 per cent of New South Wales experienced exceptionally low rainfall 
each year during the period 1940 to 1945, compared to 10.7 per cent for 2002 to 
2007. Also in this state, average annual rainfall was 417 mm for 1940 to 1945, 
compared to 451 mm for 2002 to 2007. While the period 2002 to 2007 was not the 
driest six year period since 1900 in Victoria and Tasmania, it was close to being so.  
Data for soil moisture were only available for the period 1957 to 2006, meaning that 
it was not possible to make the same comparisons for this measure. However, the 
limited comparisons able to be made show a higher prevalence of exceptionally low 
soil moisture in earlier periods than for 2002 to 2006 for all regions except 
southwest Western Australia (table 3.5). 
                                                 
3 The Bureau of Meteorology (2008, p. 1) report ‘much of northern Australia continues to 
experience well above average rainfall, with record high rainfall widespread about the Top End, 
Kimberly and parts of Cape York Peninsula over the 3 to 10 year timeframe’.  
   
 CLIMATE 
VARIABILITY AND 
DROUGHT 
75
 
Table 3.5 Period 2002–2007 compared to driest six year period since 1900 
  
Exceptionally low rainfall 
 
Average annual rainfall 
Exceptionally low soil 
moisture 
 2002-
2007 Highest since 1900 
2002-
2007 Lowest since 1900 
2002-
2006 Highest since 1957
 % area Period % area mm Period mm % area Period % area
Qld 7.5 1900-05 24.7 552 1900-05 483 9.0 1966-70 18.7
NSW 10.7 1940-45 19.2 452 1940-45 417 11.4 1966-70 15.7
Vic&Tas 14.1 1967-72 15.7 672 1940-45 643 6.2 1966-70 12.0
SW 5.4 1940-45 15.1 252 1935-40 213 6.6 1977-81 13.8
NW 5.6 1961-66 13.5 536 1933-38 372 1.6 1991-95 10.4
MDB 11.4 1940-45 16.5 406 1940-45 387 10.9 1966-70 16.1
SW WA 10.6 1967-72 25.8 591 2001-06 577 11.7 2002-06 11.7
Australia 5.1 1924-29 13.0 457 1935-40 396 na na na
na Not available. 
Sources: Hennessy et al. (2008); BoM (2009 unpublished). 
As mentioned above, the Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO data cited above are 
averages for large regions and as such are likely to mask trends for smaller areas. 
The annex to this chapter shows that this is indeed the case. For example, there are 
rainfall districts in Queensland and elsewhere, that have experienced their driest six 
year period since 1900 within the last decade. 
Another issue in comparing recent years with past drought periods is that in some 
areas drought is continuing: 
In south-eastern Australia (especially Victoria and Tasmania) the situation has 
worsened during 2008, with three-year rainfalls now at record low levels in numerous 
locations, including many areas critical for inflows into the Murray-Darling system. 
(BoM 2008, p. 1) 
Overall, the data presented in this report confirm that the period from 2002 to 2007 
ranks with the Federation Drought and the Forties Drought as one of the three most 
severe, widespread and prolonged dry periods since 1900. 
How does the current hydrological drought compare to the past? 
Rainfall over the Murray-Darling Basin from 2002 is close to the lowest on record: 
Averaged over the Murray-Darling Basin as a whole, seven-year rainfalls [October 
2001 to September 2008] are slightly higher than the driest seven year totals recorded 
during the 1937-46 period. When comparing rainfall deficits in the Murray-Darling 
Basin on timescales of five-to-ten years, the post-2001 period, the 1937-46 period and 
the 1895-1903 period (the ‘Federation Drought’) are essentially indistinguishable in 
broad terms. (BoM 2008, p. 2) 
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The run-off and inflows over this period are, however, easily the lowest on record. 
Inflows to the Murray system for the period 2002 to 2007 averaged 3986 gigalitres 
per year. The previous lowest six year average inflows were 5501 for 1940 to 1945 
and 5707 for 1897 to 1902 (figure 3.6). 
Figure 3.6 Murray system inflows (including Darling), 1892 to 2008 
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 Excludes any Snowy Scheme releases into the Murray. The data is generally modelled on current 
conditions, produced from tributary models running at the current level of development. The models are 
steady state (with no increased regulation or extraction through time). Where modelled data are unavailable 
(post 2000) observed data are used. 
Data source: Murray Darling Basin Commission (2008 unpublished). 
With respect to the last ten years, Manton states: 
In the southern part of the Murray-Darling Basin, a mean rainfall reduction of 
13 per cent over the last decade has led to a mean runoff reduction of 39 per cent. 
During the similar drought period of 1937-1946, a rainfall reduction of 14 per cent was 
associated with only a 22 per cent runoff reduction. (Manton 2008, p. 11) 
It is normal for a given reduction in rainfall to cause a greater reduction in run-off 
and inflows into rivers, due to evaporation and retention of water in the soil. It is 
apparent, however, that the quantity of inflows resulting from a given amount of 
rainfall has been particularly low over the last ten years. Manton (2008) identifies 
changes in the seasonality of rainfall and increased temperatures as contributors to 
this change. Changes in land-use and agricultural practices may also have 
contributed to the very low inflows of recent years.  
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While much of Australia’s agricultural land received close to average or above 
average rainfall in 2008, the hydrological drought in the Murray-Darling Basin has 
become worse. Murray system inflows in the autumn of 2008 were not much higher 
than the record lows seen in 2007 (MDBC 2008).  
For dryland cropping, farmers rely solely on rainfall. For irrigated agriculture, 
however, there is not such a direct relationship between inflows to water systems 
and water used. What matters most to irrigation farmers is the annual allocation 
they receive on their entitlement, together with the price of traded water 
(particularly when allocations are low).  
Water entitlements vary in their degree of security — irrigators most commonly 
hold either ‘general security’ or ‘high security’ entitlements. The NSW Irrigators 
Council reported: 
In current circumstances, irrigators on the NSW Murray River with General Security 
entitlement are facing a third consecutive year of zero allocations. (sub. 62, p. 4) 
Table 3.6 shows that allocations for high security entitlements have also declined 
dramatically in recent years for irrigators serviced by Goulburn-Murray Water in 
Victoria. 
Table 3.7 shows a different pattern for major irrigation schemes in Queensland 
(many of which are not in the Murray-Darling Basin), with less severe shortfalls in 
the availability of irrigation water in the last two years, but a somewhat greater 
prevalence of shortfalls in the earlier years of this decade. It should be noted that 
irrigators in Queensland do not generally hold high security entitlements. 
Horticulture Australia Council stated: 
In the past one/two seasons, significant numbers of growers have been struggling — for 
the first time ever — with insufficient water to produce a crop. (sub. 66, p. 1) 
This and other evidence demonstrates the unprecedented severity of the 
hydrological drought in the Murray-Darling Basin in recent years and that this has 
translated to record low allocations to irrigators. This outcome for irrigators is a 
result of both low rainfall and inflows, and deficiencies in water policy, as discussed 
in chapter 10. 
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Table 3.6 Goulburn-Murray Water, Victoria: announced allocations by 
river system, 1992-93 to 2007-08 
Per cent of entitlementsa 
  
Murray Broken Goulburn Campaspe 
 
Loddon 
Bullarook 
Creek
1992-93 200+ – 200+ 200+ – –
1993-94 200+ – 200+ 200+ – –
1994-95 220 – 200 180 – –
1995-96 200 – 150 200 – –
1996-97 200 – 200 220 – –
1997-98 130 170 120 190 – 190
1998-99 200 170 100 100 – 190
1999-00 190 170 100 100 – 190
2000-01 200 170 100 220 – 190
2001-02 200 170 100 180 – 190
2002-03 129 100 57 100 – 170
2003-04 100 170 100 100 67 177
2004-05 100 170 100 39 100 190
2005-06 144 170 100 31 100 190
2006-07 95 77 29 0 0 36
2007-08 43 71 57 18 5 0
a Percentage of water right until 2006-07, then percentage of high-reliability water shares. 
Source: Goulburn-Murray Water (2008). 
Table 3.7 SunWater, Queensland: announced allocations by scheme, 
2000-01 to 2007-08ab 
Per cent of irrigation customer allocationsc 
 Burdekin-
Haughton 
 
Bundabergd 
Nogoa-
Mackenzie 
Mareeba-
Dimbulah St George 
Dawson Valleye
Upper            Lower 
2000-01 98 76 100 100 114 80 80
2001-02 100 37 100 100 100 100 100
2002-03 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
2003-04 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
2004-05 100 100 100 100 80 88 100
2005-06 100 100 100 100 85 86 100
2006-07 100 46 80 100 89 48 49
2007-08 100 81 100 100 96 100 82
a The six largest SunWater schemes (based on customer allocations) are included and these are listed from 
largest to smallest. b The data for 2000-01 and 2001-02 are as reported in SunWater annual reports. The data 
for later years are the highest announced allocations for each year, as reported on SunWater’s website. c The 
term ‘customer allocation’ as used in Queensland is equivalent to the term ‘entitlement’ as used in Victoria. 
d Excludes ‘Burnett Water’. e Separate data for the Upper and Lower sub-schemes were not available for 
2000-01 and 2001-02 and so the overall scheme allocation percentages have been used for these years. 
Sources: SunWater (2001, 2002 and 2009). 
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What is projected for the future? 
Hennessy et al. (2008) used climate models that incorporate the influence of 
emissions of greenhouse gases to project likely changes in exceptional climatic 
events through to 2040. Figure 3.7 shows that even their ‘low’ projections would 
see exceptionally hot years occurring far more frequently over the period 2010 to 
2040, than has been experienced in the past. They concluded: 
… the analysis clearly shows that the areal extent and frequency of exceptionally hot 
years have been increasing rapidly over recent decades and this trend is expected to 
continue in future. (Hennessy et al. 2008, p. 13) 
Figure 3.7 Simulated percentage area having exceptionally hot yearsa 
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a
 The tops and bottoms of the error bars shown for the 2010–40 projections represent the highest and lowest 
ten per cent of the model results respectively. 
Data sources: Hennessy et al. (2008); BoM (2009 unpublished). 
The projections for exceptionally low rainfall show a much less clear difference 
between what has been experienced in the past and what can be expected in the 
future (figure 3.8). The mean projections are for exceptionally low rainfall years to 
occur with roughly the same frequency for 2010–40 as for 1900–2008 in 
Queensland, New South Wales, Northwest Australia and the Murray-Darling Basin 
but with substantially greater frequency in Victoria and Tasmania, Southwest 
Australia and the southwest of Western Australia. The difference between the ‘high’ 
and ‘low’ projections are, however, very large. For most regions the available 
science leaves open the possibility that severe drought over the next thirty years 
could either be more prevalent or less prevalent than in the past. 
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Figure 3.8 Simulated percentage area having exceptionally low annual 
rainfalla 
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a
 The tops and bottoms of the error bars shown for the 2010–40 projections represent the highest and lowest 
ten per cent of the model results respectively. 
Data sources: Hennessy et al. (2008); BoM (2009 unpublished). 
The projections for exceptionally low soil moisture are fairly similar to those for 
exceptionally low rainfall, except that on the soil moisture measure the chance that 
the future will be drier than the past is generally somewhat higher (figure 3.9). The 
reason for this is that both rainfall and evaporation influence soil moisture and 
projected temperature increases are expected to increase evaporation. 
The projections for Australia’s climate through to 2040 make it clear that farmers 
and other Australians should be prepared for a hotter future. The outlook for rainfall 
is less certain, but for some areas there is a likelihood of lower rainfall. 
Accordingly, whether a dryland farm business is prepared for, and able to be 
self-reliant through the droughts that have occurred in Australia’s past remains a 
relevant minimum benchmark. As discussed in chapter 8, resources should be (and 
are being) devoted to climate science and modelling to try to give greater clarity to 
the outlook for regional climate futures. 
The outlook for inflows to the Murray-Darling system, and other water systems 
used for irrigation, is more negative than the outlook for rainfall. This is because of 
a range of factors that may lead to a continuation of the trend toward lower 
proportions of rainfall ending up as inflows. These factors include: 
• higher temperatures due to climate change leading to increased evaporation 
• increased use of farm dams that intercept water that would otherwise have 
become inflows 
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Figure 3.9 Percentage area having exceptionally low annual average soil 
moisture, historic and simulated futurea 
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a
 The tops and bottoms of the error bars shown for the 2010–40 projections represent the highest and lowest 
ten per cent of the model results respectively. 
Data sources: Hennessy et al. (2008); BoM (2009 unpublished). 
• conversion of grazing land to plantation forests that generally use more water 
• increasing water use by native forests that regenerated following recent 
bushfires4 
• increasing on-farm physical water-use efficiency, which reduces the volume of 
water that leaves the farm in the form of surface flows or groundwater recharge 
(van Dijk et al. 2006; PC 2006). 
In addition, community expectations and government policy support an increase in 
the proportion of water resources allocated to environmental flows, further reducing 
the amount of water for irrigation.  
The outlook for the future, therefore, is that there is likely to be substantially less 
water available for irrigation and its supply may become more variable. The 
consequences for irrigators depends in large part on water policy, as discussed in 
chapter 10.  
The expected impacts of climate change on agriculture extend beyond changes in 
the severity and frequency of drought. These other impacts are in some cases likely 
to increase agricultural output (for example, higher atmospheric carbon dioxide 
concentrations). A paper commissioned for the Garnaut Climate Review estimated 
                                                 
4 Very young forests use relatively little water, but as they grow, water use increases substantially. 
Water use declines somewhat as forests reach maturity. 
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that wheat yields in many parts of Australia were likely to increase as a result of 
climate change through to 2030, despite some of the regions concerned being 
expected to have reduced rainfall (box 3.4).  
 
Box 3.4 Impacts of climate change on agriculture 
A considerable amount of research is being conducted in Australia on the likely 
impacts of climate change on agriculture. The following examples illustrate that 
changes in the frequency and severity of droughts is only one of a number of expected 
changes to the climate that may impact on agriculture over the next few decades. 
Wheat yields 
The Garnaut Climate Change Review presented estimates of changes to wheat yields 
resulting from human-induced climate change for ten sites across Australia’s wheat 
growing areas (Garnaut 2008). The estimates, which draw on Crimp et al. (2008), take 
into account likely changes in temperature, rainfall and carbon dioxide concentrations. 
It is assumed that farmers will adapt to the changing climate, for example, by changing 
planting times and wheat cultivars to make use of longer growing seasons. 
The estimates suggest that climate change up to the year 2030 is likely to be a net 
positive for wheat yields for at least nine of the ten sites examined, regardless of 
whether global mitigation action is taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The 
estimates are for increases ranging from 1.6 per cent to 20.6 per cent, relative to 1990 
yields. For the tenth site, Minnipa in South Australia, the estimates are for a 0.8 per 
cent increase with no mitigation and a decrease of up to 7.4 per cent with mitigation. 
Value of irrigated agricultural production 
The Garnaut Review also presented estimates of changes in the value of irrigated 
agricultural production in the Murray-Darling Basin resulting from human-induced 
climate change, based on Quiggin et al. (2008). The estimates take into account likely 
changes in river system inflows, but not yield responses to increases in temperature or 
carbon dioxide concentrations. It is assumed that farmers optimally adapt to changing 
conditions but that existing institutional arrangements are retained. 
It is estimated that the value of irrigated agricultural production in the Murray-Darling 
Basin will decline relative to a world with no human-induced climate change. In 2030 
declines of between 3 and 12 per cent are estimated, depending on the strength of 
global mitigation. With no mitigation the value of agricultural production declines 
sharply after 2030. 
(Continued on next page)  
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Box 3.4 (continued) 
Overall assessment 
ABARE has used general equilibrium models to analyse the impacts of climate change 
on Australian agriculture (Gunasekera et al. 2007 and 2008). Its approach takes into 
account both the impacts of climate change on the productivity of Australian agriculture 
and international impacts that influence demand for Australia’s agricultural exports 
(such as the global impacts of climate change on agricultural production and economic 
activity). Assumptions include no mitigation and no planned adaptation to climate 
change. 
ABARE’s illustrative modelling results are that Australian agricultural output will be 
around 38 per cent higher in 2030 than in 2006, whereas it would be around 48 per 
cent higher in 2030 in a world without climate change. In other words, a decline of 
6.8 per cent (((1.48-1.38)/1.48)*100 = 6.8) relative to what would have occurred without 
climate change (rising to 11.5 per cent in 2050) (Gunasekera et al. 2008).  
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Annex: Rainfall by district 
Rainfall averages for large regions, such as those reported on in Hennessy et al. 
(2008) and in the body of this chapter, are likely to mask trends for smaller areas. 
To explore this, a range of rainfall statistics was compiled for 33 of the 110 
Australian Rainfall Districts used by the Bureau of Meteorology (table 3.8). The 
selections were made such that each of ABARE’s 33 regions are at least partially 
represented. ABARE’s regions tend to be smaller in areas of Australia that are most 
important for agriculture and so selecting rainfall districts in this way gives greater 
representation to important agricultural areas. 
Table 3.8 shows there are areas that have experienced trends in the severity of 
drought that are quite different to those for the larger region that they are part of. 
For example, while for Queensland as a whole rainfall for the period 2002 to 2007 
was 14 per cent higher than for 1900 to 1905 (table 3.5), for the Central Highlands 
district, 2002 to 2007 had the lowest rainfall for any six year period since 1900. 
Table 3.8 Rainfall statistics for selected Australian Rainfall Districtsa  
 Exceptionally low rainfall 
(% incidence) 
Average annual rainfall 
(mm) 
Rainfall district 
(name and number) 
1900-
2008 
1993-
2008 
2002-
2007 
1900-
2008 
1993-
2008 
 2002-
2007
Queensland      
  North Peninsula (27) 5.5 – – 1344 1465 1378
  Upper Carpentaria (30) 5.5 – – 634 640 597
  Barron North Coast (31) 5.5 6.3 16.7 1455 1545 1399
  Central Highlands (35)d 5.5 6.3 16.7 612 559 506
  Central Lowlands (36) 5.5 6.3 16.7 480 465 406
  Lower Western (37) 5.5 6.3 16.7 228 234 189
  Moreton (40)d 5.5 6.3 16.7 957 856 788
  East Darling Downs (41) 5.5 – – 650 618 562
New South Wales (including ACT)    
  Western (Far NW) (46)b 5.5 12.5 16.7 231 222 185
  Central Western Plains (50) 5.5 6.3 16.7 480 469 401
  Northwest Plains (E) (53) 5.5 6.3 16.7 609 641 578
  Central Tablelands (S) (63) 5.5 6.3 16.7 805 749 694
  Illawarra (68) 5.5 – – 1077 930 918
  Goulburn-Monaro (70) 5.5 6.3 16.7 702 640 594
  Riverina (E) (74) 5.5 6.3 16.7 466 439 388
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 3.8 (continued) 
 Exceptionally low rainfall 
(% incidence) 
Average annual rainfall 
(mm) 
Rainfall district 
(name and number) 
1900-
2008 
1993-
2008 
2002-
2007 
1900-
2008 
1993-
2008 
 2002-
2007
Victoria      
  South Mallee (77)b 5.5 6.3 16.7 370 344 320
  South Wimmera (79)c 5.5 6.3 16.7 548 488 463
  Upper North (80)b 5.5 6.3 16.7 535 493 438
  West Gippsland (85) 5.5 12.5 16.7 847 785 761
Tasmania      
  Midlands (93)be 5.5 12.5 16.7 611 541 518
South Australia      
  Western Agricultural (18) 5.5 6.3 – 278 276 269
  Far North (17) 5.5 6.3 – 160 164 127
  Lower Murray Valley (24B) 5.5 – – 391 380 374
  Lower Southeast (25B) 5.5 6.3 16.7 620 562 552
Western Australia      
  East Kimberley (2) 5.5 – – 575 759 708
  Fortescue (5) 5.5 – – 313 385 316
  North Coast (8)c 5.5 6.3 16.7 379 356 304
  South Coast (9A)d 5.5 12.5 16.7 774 725 710
  South Central (10A) 6.4 12.5 16.7 425 400 384
Northern Territory      
  Darwin-Daly (14GA) 5.5 – – 1183 1386 1351
  Victoria (14F) 5.5 – – 571 726 702
  Barkly (15A) 5.5 – – 428 506 493
  Alice Springs (15B) 6.4 6.3 – 278 315 275
a Annual rainfall data averaged across each district was used for this table. Accordingly, each year either is, or 
is not, an exceptionally low rainfall year. Therefore, the incidence of exceptionally low rainfall (that is, the 
proportion of years within the period that fit this criteria) is reported, in contrast to the earlier tables, which 
report the areal extent of exceptionally low rainfall (the percentage of the region that fits this criteria each year, 
averaged over the period). b Incidence of exceptionally low rainfall for 2002-07 is matched but not exceeded 
by other six year periods since 1900. c Average annual rainfall for 2002-07 is the lowest for any six year 
period since 1900. d Average annual rainfall for 2001-06 is the lowest for any six year period since 1900. 
e Average annual rainfall for 2003-08 is the lowest for any six year period since 1900. 
– Nil or rounded to zero. 
Data source: BoM (2009 unpublished). 
Seven of the 33 districts (18 per cent) experienced the six year period with the 
lowest rainfall since 1900 sometime during the period 1998 to 2008. This is 
exceeded only by the period 1935 to 1945, during which nine of these districts 
experienced the six year period with the lowest rainfall. 
The locations of the selected rainfall districts are shown in figure 3.10. 
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Figure 3.10 Australian rainfall districtsa 
a Shaded districts are those included in table 3.8. 
Source: Bureau of Meteorology (2004). 
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4 Drought policy in Australia 
 
Key points 
• The 1990 Drought Policy Review Task Force concluded that any attempt to classify 
drought by severity would be completely arbitrary and inappropriate. 
• Australia’s current National Drought Policy (NDP) was introduced in 1992. It 
established the exceptional circumstances (EC) approach to triggering interest rate 
subsidies for businesses and income support for households. 
• The four significant reviews that covered the NDP have all recommended the 
abolition of interest rate and transport subsidies. Despite this, the subsidies have 
been retained and expanded. 
• Current measures aimed at improving preparedness, such as farm management 
deposits and training grants, were recommended by the earlier reviews. 
• Income support during hardship has been a consistent feature of the NDP and the 
recommendations of its reviews.  
• Other programs delivered under the NDP include planning and support measures. 
– This includes rural financial counselling, which, while not drought specific, is 
utilised by farmers suffering from the effects of drought.  
 
4.1 The evolution of drought policy 
The provision of drought assistance by government has a long history. In 1866, 
Henry Parkes, the then Colonial Secretary of New South Wales, offered loans of 
seed wheat to farmers affected by drought (Burdon 1995). Early drought policy 
focused on attempts to ‘drought proof’ agriculture through building dams and 
encouraging the adoption of irrigation. For example, between 1939 and 1945, 
during one of the most severe and prolonged droughts in a century, the total area of 
irrigated land in Australia increased from 814 000 to 1 406 000 acres, and by 1967, 
had reached 3 200 000 acres (Davidson 1969). The current National Drought Policy 
(NDP) has evolved as a consequence of a series of reviews held in 1989-90, 1997, 
2004 and 2006 (see table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1 Drought policy reviews 
Review Key Recommendations/Findings 
1990 — Drought 
Policy Review Task 
Force Final Report  
• Drought separate from natural disaster relief  
• Governments should implement a National Drought Policy 
• Against the use of transaction-based subsidies/rebates 
• State/territory assistance for drought purposes be provided through 
general concessional loans 
• Provision of grants or interest free loans be limited to extreme situations 
1997 — Drought 
Policy Task Force 
Review of the National 
Drought Policy  
• Transaction-based subsidies and interest rate subsidies be phased out  
• Improve farm financial and land resource planning via education and 
training programs 
• Encourage farmers to build cash reserves during good seasons to 
prepare for downturns 
• Research and development on the effects of prolonged drought 
• Introduce a Farm Family Re-Start Scheme, targeted at farmers unable 
to access payments from other sources 
• Counselling services be managed by state governments and provided 
at an early stage of drought 
• Amend and combine Income Equalisation Deposits and Farm 
Management Bonds 
1997 — McColl et al. 
Mid-term review of the 
1992 Rural 
Adjustment Scheme 
(RAS 92) 
• Remove interest rate subsidies and grants to farm businesses for 
productivity improvement or for EC support 
• Replace RAS 92 with an improved scheme addressing the issues of 
management skills, farmer re-establishment, and savings and welfare 
• Introduce FarmBIS and the Farm Re-establishment Scheme  
• Introduce a single instrument combining IEDs and FMBs 
• Higher priority should be accorded to research on climate change, 
climate variability and climate prediction 
2004 — Drought 
Review Panel 
Consultations on 
National Drought 
Policy  
• Most stakeholders would support a shift in government focus towards 
drought preparedness measures at the expense of business support 
• ECRP was valued highly and regarded as being necessary during 
drought 
• Stakeholders less in favour of business support (ECIRS and 
fodder/transport subsidies) — overall, stakeholders thought such 
assistance encouraged debt and supported the less prepared 
• Transaction-based fodder and freight subsidies seen to have a 
detrimental effect on farmers in other states (most stakeholders 
considered these subsidies should cease) 
• EC process as a whole seen as too demanding, complex and confusing 
• Off-farm income and assets limits for accessing EC assistance seen as 
restrictive 
• Criticism by stakeholders about perceived differences in administration 
of ECIRS between states 
• FMD and FarmBis schemes strongly supported 
• Rural Financial Counselling service regarded highly  
2006 — Agriculture 
and Food Policy 
Reference Group 
Creating our Future  
• Phasing out of interest and other transaction-based subsidies by the 
end of 2010 
• Maintain FMDs 
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Drought policy arrangements prior to 1989 
Between 1971 and 1989, drought was treated as a natural disaster, with drought 
support delivered as part of the Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements (NDRA). 
Because of constitutional responsibilities, state governments had primary 
responsibility for disaster relief — including drought — under the NDRA and were 
required to contribute a base amount of assistance funding which then triggered a 
Commonwealth Government contribution.  
Under these arrangements, the Commonwealth Government generally did not 
provide financial assistance specifically for drought, the exception being in 1982-83 
(McInnes et al. 1990). During this drought, fodder, interest, and agistment subsidies 
were provided.  
In addition to the NDRA, throughout this period, state and territory governments 
also implemented their own drought assistance policies. Policies included 
concessional interest loans for carry-on purposes (such as for harvesting crops and 
for the purchase of fodder), along with a range of subsidies and rebates (such as 
transport subsidies for stock, fodder and water cartage). 
The 1990 drought policy review 
In April 1989, the Commonwealth Government decided to remove drought from the 
NDRA, driven by concerns that temporary relief during drought was not 
appropriate. As stated by the then Minister for Primary Industries and Energy: 
There is widespread recognition that drought policy needs to be considered in a wider 
context than that of temporary relief. (Kerin, cited in McInnes et al. 1989, p. 73) 
There were also concerns that drought declarations were being made too hastily and 
that funds were being misused for political purposes (Botterill 2003). In response, 
the Commonwealth Government established an independent Drought Policy 
Review Task Force to: 
• identify policy options to encourage primary producers and other segments of 
rural Australia to adopt self-reliant approaches to the management of drought 
• consider the integration of drought policy with other relevant policies including 
structural adjustment, social welfare, land management, conservation of 
breeding stock and animal welfare. 
The Task Force handed down its final report in May 1990. It proposed a national 
drought policy that focused on the roles of producers and governments in 
implementing self-reliant risk management approaches to drought (table 4.1). 
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The basis of its recommendations rested on the view that drought risks were ‘on a 
par with the other main risks of farming’ (McInnes et al. 1990, vol. 1, p. 3). Drought 
was considered a recurring, natural condition and not a rare climatic aberration. The 
Task Force concluded that it was not possible to develop an objective, scientific, 
and universally accepted definition of drought and rejected the notion of being able 
to identify the severity of a drought. It concluded that: 
Any distinction between lesser and extreme droughts in this context would be 
completely arbitrary and inappropriate. (McInnes et al. 1990, vol. 2, p. 20) 
Furthermore, the Task Force perceived that drought represented instances where 
existing agricultural production was in disequilibrium with prevailing seasonal 
conditions. The implication of this is that agriculture needs to alter its production 
systems when drought occurs, rather than producers and governments seeking to 
maintain standard agricultural practices at all times, irrespective of prevailing 
weather conditions. 
If assistance was to be provided, the Task Force supported the use of general 
concessional loans, and suggested that transaction-based and other specific 
subsidies be removed (McInnes et al. 1990). It considered such subsidies to be: 
… inappropriate, misdirected, inequitable and, as an incentive measure, too late in any 
case. (McInnes et al. 1990, vol. 2, p. 163) 
Where subsidies were provided, the Task Force suggested they contain specific 
performance criteria. In addition, it recommended support be limited to the 
provision of grants or interest-free loans and that any assistance be based on the 
prospects of each individual farmer, to ensure that the onus for managing drought 
remained on that farmer. Overall, it concluded that the existence of certain climatic 
or production conditions did not provide sufficient justification for government 
assistance (McInnes et al. 1990).  
Government responses to the 1990 review 
In November 1991, the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs 
was requested to report on the Task Force’s recommendations. That Committee 
reiterated the importance of introducing a national drought policy based on the 
principles of self-reliance and risk management, but drew a distinction between 
severe droughts and lesser droughts — against the recommendations of the review. 
The Committee argued that there were limits to the self-reliance of farmers in 
relation to severe drought and that even a farmer with sound management and 
planning would find it difficult to cope with the effects of the most severe drought. 
While not providing a definition of severe droughts, the Committee proposed that 
the Commonwealth Government provide additional assistance during such times, to 
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be activated by an appropriate trigger mechanism which would include (Senate 
Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs 1992): 
• an application for severe drought status, presumably emanating from the shire 
concerned 
• use of an objective measure of severe drought 
• an overriding subjective assessment by a tripartite drought committee or 
structure involving the Commonwealth, states and producers, and drawing upon 
local knowledge and expertise. 
National drought policy 1992 
In response to the 1990 review and Senate response, the NDP was announced in 
July 1992. The policy was based on the principles of self-reliance and risk 
management, recognising that drought is one of a number of sources of uncertainty 
facing farmers and a part of their normal operating environment. As recommended 
by the Drought Policy Review Task Force, the explicit objectives of the NDP are to: 
• encourage primary producers and other sections of rural Australia to adopt 
self-reliant approaches to managing for climatic variability 
• maintain and protect Australia’s agricultural and environmental resource base 
during periods of extreme climate stress 
• ensure early recovery of agricultural and rural industries, consistent with 
long-term sustainable levels. 
The NDP states that the responsibility for managing drought risk lies with farmers, 
with the role of government being limited to creating an environment conducive to 
risk-management. However, the NDP also makes provision for assistance to be 
provided in times of ‘exceptional downturn’ to those with sound prospects who are 
temporarily facing financial difficulty. 
In legislation, the concept of ‘exceptional drought’ was incorporated under 
‘exceptional circumstances’ (EC) provisions added to the existing rural adjustment 
scheme (RAS 92). The triggering of EC provisions allowed for a maximum subsidy 
of 100 per cent of the interest payable on new and existing loans when received 
alongside the interest rate subsidy paid for productivity improvements under the 
RAS 92. Eligible farm enterprises were those that were considered to be temporarily 
in severe financial difficulties due to the event, but remained viable in the 
long-term. 
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Under the NDP, state governments could provide additional drought assistance 
programs. However, where offered, they are not supposed to compromise the 
overall direction of the NDP. Accordingly, transaction-based and other similar 
subsidies should be provided by the states only as a transitional measure, to be 
phased out as soon as practicable (Burdon 1995). 
Also in 1992, the Farm Household Support Scheme was established (coming into 
operation in March 1993). This scheme was directed at non viable farmers, and 
provided household support at a rate equivalent to the Jobsearch allowance. To be 
considered eligible, farmers had to be unable to obtain commercial finance and have 
difficulty in meeting living expenses. In addition, the Drought Relief Payment was 
introduced in October 1994 to provide income support to both viable and non-viable 
farmers in EC areas (paid at a rate equivalent to the Jobsearch allowance). Payments 
continued for six months afterwards, to recognise that farm recovery may be slow. 
Those eligible for the payment were also given access to the Health Care Card and 
Youth Allowance and Austudy means test concessions.  
The Farm Management Bond (FMB) scheme was also introduced, to be 
incorporated into the Income Equalisation Deposits (IED) scheme — an income 
smoothing scheme that allowed farmers to deposit pre-tax income for use in later 
years. In addition to the IED provisions, the FMB scheme allowed farmers earning 
non-farm income (up to $50 000) to use the scheme. 
The evolution of the exceptional circumstances approach 
The first enactments of the EC provisions relating to drought were based on 
subjective assessments (Botterill 2003). As these assessments lacked objective 
criteria, the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Resource Management (in 
October 1994) determined six core criteria to be taken into consideration by the 
Commonwealth Government and the state and territory governments. These 
included an assessment of the scale of meteorological, agronomic and stock effects, 
water supplies and other environmental impacts, and the impact on farm incomes. 
The meteorological assessment was given the most weight in the determination of 
an EC declaration. 
The role assigned to the states was to make initial assessments in accordance with 
the six criteria. In this way, the states determined whether an EC event existed, and 
if so, they applied to the Commonwealth Government for declaration. The 
application for assistance would then be considered by the Rural Adjustment 
Scheme Advisory Council, and if deemed valid, it would be referred to the 
Commonwealth Government. Finally, an area would be EC declared once approved 
by Cabinet and an announcement and public explanation of the decision with clear 
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reference to the six criteria would be made (Burdon 1995). EC events were defined 
as those that occurred on average, once every 20 to 25 years. This criterion was 
based on the notion that such an event was something for which not even the most 
prudent farm manager could be expected to manage. 
In March 1999, the Agriculture and Resource Management Council of Australia and 
New Zealand decided on a new set of EC criteria. The criteria stated that the event: 
• must be rare, in that it must not have occurred more than once on average every 
20 to 25 years 
• must result in a rare and severe downturn in farm income over a prolonged 
period of time (for example, greater than 12 months) 
• cannot be planned for or managed as part of farmers’ normal risk management 
strategies 
• must be a discrete event that is not part of a long-term structural adjustment 
process or of normal fluctuations in commodity prices. 
The meteorological criterion was downgraded in its primacy, and replaced by 
income, which became the key measure to determine the impact of an EC event, 
and whether assistance should be provided. These criteria are still in place. 
The policy reviews of 1997 
Two relevant policy reviews reported their findings in 1997: the review of the NDP 
by the Drought Policy Task Force; and the mid-term review of RAS 92. The latter 
dealt with rural adjustment in a broader context, but nevertheless made significant 
mention of drought policy. 
Drought Policy Task Force Review 
The Drought Policy Task Force (Matthews et al. 1997) was asked to examine the 
impact and appropriateness of existing drought programs in meeting the NDP 
objectives. In short, the Task Force concluded that the objectives of the NDP were 
appropriate, but that government drought programs were not consistent with the 
objective of self-reliance objective. The Task Force recommended that the NDP 
objectives be broadened to: 
• encourage primary producers and other sections of rural Australia to adopt 
self-reliant approaches to managing for climatic variability 
• maintain and protect Australia’s agricultural and environmental resource base 
during periods of extreme climatic stress 
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• ensure farm families are provided with adequate welfare support commensurate 
with that available to other Australians 
• ensure that the elements of the NDP do not impede structural adjustment 
• have a high level of awareness and understanding of drought and drought policy.  
The Task Force recommended the removal of transaction-based subsidies (as had 
past reviews) and interest rate subsidies. Rather, funding should be directed to 
preparedness measures. They also noted that if resources were redirected towards 
drought preparedness measures, the need for exceptional circumstances declaration 
and revocation processes would be eliminated.  
The two income smoothing schemes, IEDs and FMBs, were perceived to be too 
complex, with unnecessarily restrictive deposit requirements. The Task Force 
believed that one of the reasons for the under-utilisation of IEDs and FMBs was due 
to farmers not generally accepting the self-reliance principle of the NDP. This, the 
Task Force argued, was based on expectations of support in times of difficulty, as 
had occurred in previous droughts, which decreased the attractiveness of 
accumulating financial reserves. The Task Force recommended combining IEDs 
and FMBs, setting a higher maximum deposit limit for the scheme and embarking 
on a publicity campaign to promote the benefits. 
Although the Task Force believed that access to welfare payments for farmers 
should be equitable with all other groups in the community, it did not regard the 
Drought Relief Payment as being entirely effective for this purpose. The Task Force 
argued that farmers with a high level of net assets would have access to commercial 
finance which would support their businesses and provide funds for personal 
drawings. For those farmers that had low levels of net assets and difficulty in 
maintaining income levels during drought and other downturns, the Task Force 
recommended they leave farming or seek off-farm employment, thus enabling them 
to access generally available welfare arrangements.  
Despite this, the Task Force considered that a rationale for providing income 
support on an interim basis existed. The proposed Farm Family Restart Scheme was 
to be targeted at farmers who were unable to access finance from any other sources, 
and would not be restricted to specific geographic areas or industry-wide criteria. 
Important features of the proposed scheme included: 
• after nine months receipt of benefits, a decision would be triggered as to whether 
the individual wished to remain in farming, or exit 
• for those unable to return to viability, an enhanced re-establishment package 
would be available 
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• for those choosing to remain in farming, payments would cease, as would the 
opportunity to access the enhanced re-establishment grant 
• recipients would be required to participate in financial counselling. 
Mid-term Review of the Rural Adjustment Scheme 
RAS 92 was intended to be reviewed after four years, and to cease after eight years. 
The Mid-term review of RAS 92 reported in May 1997. It recommended that RAS 
92 be abolished and replaced with an improved program that addressed the issues of 
management skills, farmer re-establishment, and savings and welfare. The rationale 
for this recommendation was that RAS 92 had:  
… not had a significant positive impact on the adjustment process and has not met the 
goal of fostering the development of a profitable and competitive farm sector. (McColl 
et al 1997, p. xi)  
One of the main criticisms made was the use of interest rate subsidies, including 
their inconsistency with the NDP objectives and debt being a poor indicator of farm 
performance and profitability and thus not a sound basis for targeting assistance. 
As a result, the review recommended that:  
… future government programs to address rural adjustment should no longer use 
interest rate subsidies or grants to farm businesses for productivity improvement or for 
exceptional circumstances support. (McColl et al. 1997, p. 119)  
Instead, a new package of policies was suggested, including a Farm Business 
Improvement Scheme (FarmBIS), a Farm Re-establishment Scheme (to promote 
structural adjustment), improved farm savings mechanisms (combining IEDs and 
FMBs), and more responsive welfare arrangements (McColl et al. 1997). 
FarmBIS was to operate through grants to farmers and farm groups for training, 
business advice, planning, benchmarking, and analysis. No viability test would be 
required and any funds provided under the scheme could not be used for normal and 
ongoing business advice. The focus of FarmBIS was to be on fostering continuous 
skills improvements, for the purpose of promoting a more profitable and sustainable 
farm sector (McColl et al. 1997). 
Government responses to the 1997 reviews 
As a response to the Drought Policy Task Force review of the NDP and the 
Mid-term Review of the RAS 92, the Commonwealth Government introduced 
Agriculture — Advancing Australia (AAA), replacing the RAS 92.  
   
96 GOVERNMENT 
DROUGHT SUPPORT 
 
 
For the NDP, the Commonwealth Government decided to retain the EC system and 
EC Interest Rate Subsidies (ECIRS) (of 50 per cent) against the recommendations 
of the review. It also established the EC Relief Payment (ECRP), adapted from the 
former Drought Relief Payment. Interest rate subsidies offered for the purpose of 
productivity improvements were terminated, reducing the potential interest rate 
subsidy in times of drought to 50 per cent. The NSW government also announced it 
would remove its transport-based subsidies.  
The advice of both reviews to combine elements of the existing IEDs and FMBs 
into a single scheme was adopted. The two existing schemes were merged into the 
Farm Management Deposits (FMDs) scheme, which was established in April 1999. 
FMDs retained the income-smoothing intention of the two predecessor schemes, 
and are part of a broad rural assistance framework. 
A FarmBis program was also introduced to: 
• increase farmer participation in learning activities with the objective of 
enhancing the profitability, sustainability and competitiveness of their business 
• develop greater acceptance of the benefits of continuous learning and skills 
development, and its relevance to changing management needs of a competitive 
farm sector 
• enhance farmers capacity to identify and access appropriate learning activities. 
FarmBis was jointly administered by the Commonwealth Government and the state 
and territory governments. FarmBis covered a range of topics relevant to the 
management of farm businesses such as techniques to improve on-farm production, 
tax and financial management, and succession planning. 
The Farm Family Restart Scheme was also established and replaced the Farm 
Household Support Scheme. But in contrast to the Farm Household Support 
Scheme, payments made under the Farm Family Restart Scheme were in the form 
of a grant, rather than a loan. 
Policy changes between 1997 and 2004 
A number of policy changes occurred between 1997 and 2004, despite there being 
no formal reviews.  
In November 2001, the Farm Family Restart Scheme was replaced by Farm Help. 
Farm Help retained the intention of the preceding scheme — to provide short-term 
income support to farmers experiencing difficulties meeting living expenses who 
could not obtain access to commercial sources of finance. Farm Help offered a 
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combination of income support, an advice and training grant, and a re-establishment 
grant for those farmers wishing to exit the industry. Applicants were required to 
attend an initial advice session, which would assist in determining how the financial 
prospects of the farm could be improved, or what options were available to the 
farmer in terms of off-farm sources of employment (DAFF 2008g). 
The drought in 2002 and subsequent EC declarations raised concerns over ‘lines on 
maps’, leading to the development of EC ‘buffer zones’ (DAFF 2008b). These 
zones allowed farmers located on the periphery of EC areas to apply for assistance 
provided they could demonstrate that they had also been affected by the EC event. 
To increase the expediency of payments, those who qualified for household support 
could access payment prior to a full declaration (if a prima facie case for declaration 
was found) — termed interim income support (DAFF 2008b). Interim income 
support did not have to be repaid if the EC application was subsequently declined. 
In December 2002, the Commonwealth Government further expanded the range of 
programs delivered under the NDP. Again, the focus of the programs was on 
interest rate subsidies. An interest rate subsidy on commercial loans for stock 
support and drought recovery was made available to farmers receiving drought 
income support, which was provided in addition to EC business support (Howard 
2002). Another notable additional assistance measure was the Small Business 
Interest Rate Relief Program. This program provided interest rate subsidies on new 
and existing loans to small businesses in EC areas. However, only a small number 
of applications for the program were received (despite the eligibility criteria being 
relaxed in July 2003), and a relatively low proportion of those were approved 
(Australian National Audit Office 2005). Consequently, the program was terminated 
in August 2004.  
The 2004 Drought Review Panel 
In October 2003, the Commonwealth Government formed an independent panel to 
conduct another review of Australia’s drought policy. The Panel reported in March 
2004. The review’s objectives were to canvass the views of stakeholders on the 
appropriateness of drought assistance measures provided by all levels of 
government, the key elements of future drought policy, and the adequacy of 
research on climate variability and its effects on agriculture.  
The overall appropriateness of the EC system was criticised by producers. Most 
found the EC declaration process:  
… inequitable, untimely, complex, and subject to political point scoring and different 
treatment in different jurisdictions. (Drought Review Panel 2004, p. 29) 
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The Panel found that a majority of producers preferred gearing assistance towards 
encouraging greater drought preparedness, rather than providing relief during a 
drought: 
Most stakeholders consider that proactive policies should decrease the reliance on 
Government ad hoc measures and short-term assistance for rural communities and the 
agricultural sector, such as that provided under the EC policy. (Drought Review Panel 
2004, p. 29) 
The Panel also noted farmers’ views that the use of ‘lines on maps’ to deliver 
assistance fostered divisiveness within communities and created confusion.  
The Panel received a number of suggestions for reforming the system. One of these 
entailed relaxing, or removing completely, the regional assessment and declaration. 
Provision of assistance would then be dependent on individuals demonstrating their 
need for assistance. Other suggestions for improving the EC system related to 
streamlining the process, for example, by reducing the number of organisations 
involved in the application and declaration process. 
While the Panel supported ECRP, it received differing views on the appropriateness 
of ECIRS as a drought assistance mechanism. On balance, the Panel believed that it 
was analogous to low interest loans and stated that: 
… there is no strong case for the provision of such assistance [long-term low interest 
loans] by Government. The Panel considers that any involvement of the Australian and 
State/Territory Governments in providing long-term low interest loans would require 
consideration of whether there is a problem in the commercial finance sector, of 
possible effects on the future operation of commercial finance sources, and the possible 
distortion of markets by such measures. (Drought Review Panel 2004, p. 69) 
Again, other input subsidies provided by the states (such as transport subsidies) 
were criticised, with the Panel suggesting these be abolished as originally intended. 
On the other hand, a significant number of stakeholders regarded FarmBis as a 
valuable program (Drought Review Panel 2004). Criticisms revolved around some 
courses offered not being appropriate for the needs of the sector and the program’s 
lack of funding, and uncertainty over future funding. Given these concerns, the 
Panel recommended that governments maintain, if not increase, their commitment 
to FarmBis. 
The 2006 review of agriculture and food policy 
Drought assistance was revamped in 2005, which included an increase in the ECIRS 
from 50 per cent to 80 per cent in the second and subsequent years of an EC event 
and an expanded role for rural financial counsellors (Howard 2005). A reference 
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group (the Agriculture and Food Policy Reference Group) was subsequently 
commissioned to report on future government policies and programs affecting the 
agriculture and food sector (the ‘Corish Report’). It was tasked with developing 
recommendations to ‘improve the profitability, competitiveness and sustainability 
of the Australian agricultural and food sector.’ (Agriculture and Food Policy 
Reference Group 2006, p. 198).  
The Reference Group’s comments on drought policy were generally consistent with 
those of the previous reviews. It was critical of ECIRS and transaction-based 
subsidies, and recommended that these be phased out by 2010, on the basis that 
such measures were not effective or appropriate. The Reference Group noted that 
many farmers saw ECIRS as rewarding poor management and propping up farmers 
who take imprudent risks, in addition to keeping otherwise unviable farms in 
production. The Reference Group also found that interest rate subsidies were 
contrary to the objectives of the NDP: 
This form of government assistance should be phased out and replaced with more 
positive initiatives that encourage greater self-reliance and preparedness. (Agriculture 
and Food Policy Reference Group 2006, p. 30) 
The Reference Group suggested improved training and education and greater use of 
FMDs to encourage risk management and self-reliance. 
Government responses and subsequent changes in programs 
Despite the recommendations of this and other reviews, ECIRS (and ECRP) was not 
only retained, but extended to small businesses deemed to be affected by EC events. 
In addition, transactions-based subsidies remained in place in New South Wales, 
Queensland and the Northern Territory. 
Further changes to EC programs were made in September 2007. Criteria applicable 
to small business were modified, to incorporate two distinct categories of 
drought-affected small business, and a drought assistance program for schools was 
introduced. In addition, an exit package was announced, comprising an exit grant, 
an advice and retraining grant, and a relocation grant. 
Although unrelated to the 2006 review, significant changes to drought policy 
occurred in 2008. In particular, the AAA program, including its FarmBis and Farm 
Help components was terminated. However, some elements, including the Rural 
Financial Counselling Service program and FMDs were continued as stand-alone 
policies. To replace the AAA program, the Commonwealth Government 
commenced a staged roll-out, beginning on 1 July 2008, of various components of 
Australia’s Farming Future (AFF), a package primarily focused on assisting the 
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agricultural sector adjust to climate change. It consists of three distinct elements — 
a Climate Change Research program, FarmReady, and a Climate Change 
Adjustment program (DAFF 2008a). 
4.2 Current programs 
There is a broad range of government programs currently available to farmers in 
drought, and these are provided on an ongoing basis. These programs were 
introduced under a number of policy frameworks, including the NDP, the AAA 
program and its successor, the new climate change focused AFF (table 4.2).  
Table 4.2 Current drought and ongoing support programs 
Policy framework Household programs Business programs 
NDP EC relief payments EC interest rate subsidies - farmers 
 Interim income support for farmers & 
small businesses 
EC interest rate subsidies - small 
businesses 
 Small business income support Professional advice and planning 
grant 
  EC exit grants 
   
AAA Farm Help income support FarmBis (concluded program) 
  Farm help re-development grant 
  Farm help advice and training grant 
  Farm management deposits 
   
AFF Transitional income support Climate change adjustment program 
advice and training grants 
  FarmReady 
  Re-establishment grants 
   
Other CWA emergency drought aid 
(concluded program) 
Transport subsidies 
 
  MDB Irrigation management grant 
  Rural financial counselling service 
  Small block irrigators exit package 
While there are many drought support programs, most government expenditure is 
on just two — ECRP and ECIRS. Expenditure on these programs increased 
substantially in recent years and in 2007-08, the Commonwealth Government spent 
just over $1 billion on EC support through the two programs (figure 4.1). These 
programs, together with the other key drought-specific and ongoing support 
programs are briefly described below and are discussed in more detail in chapter 6 
and appendices B, C, D, and E. 
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Figure 4.1 EC support payments, 1994-95 to 2007-08 
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Data source: DAFF (2008 unpublished). 
Social support 
ECRP is an income support measure available to farmers affected by drought in EC 
declared areas and is paid at a rate equivalent to the Newstart Allowance. Health 
Care Cards and Youth Allowance and Austudy are also offered to recipients on a 
means tested basis. In 2007-08, $377 million was paid to 28 887 recipients, an 
average of around $13 000 each. By early 2009, the number of recipients of ECRP 
was around 20 000. 
Interim Income Support, which is similar to ECRP, is available in areas that have 
established a prima facie case for EC or are declared as interim assistance areas. In 
2007-08, a total of $7.6 million in interim income support was paid to around 1900 
farmers. 
Small business income support was introduced in late 2006. It is available to farm 
dependent businesses and other small businesses within small towns of less than 
10 000 people, who are based within an EC area, or who source the majority of their 
income from an EC area. Around 1500 businesses have accessed a total of $27 
million in small business income support since its inception. 
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There is also a range of other social support programs including: 
• measures aimed at assisting the unemployed in rural areas, including: Drought 
Force, Early Access to Intensive Support, and access to Job Search Support for 
redundant rural workers in drought affected areas 
• community-level drought assistance programs such as assistance for schools in 
communities affected by drought 
• family welfare and mental health programs including a Family Relationship 
Services Program, as well as a mental health telephone service and mental health 
printed material  
• ad hoc income support payments provided by some states beyond that provided 
by the Commonwealth Government 
• the Commonwealth Government also provided funding to the Country Women’s 
Association to establish an emergency drought aid fund. Under the program, 
rural families could apply for up to $2000 for one-off emergency payments 
covering non-farm expenses (ceased June 2008). 
There have also been income support payments available to farm families in need 
that have not been specifically drought related. The most significant of these are the 
Farm Help program (for which applications have now closed) and its successor, the 
Transitional Income Support (TIS) program. TIS assists farm families to manage 
the impacts of climate change on their farm business, by providing short term 
income support, as well as advice and training opportunities. As at December 2008, 
there were 96 farmers in receipt of the payment.  
Business support 
The most substantial farm and small business drought support measure is ECIRS. 
ECIRS is provided to support farm and farm dependent small businesses that are 
viable in the long term, but are currently experiencing financial difficultly due to an 
EC event. In 2007-08, total payments of $604.1 million were made to about 16 000 
recipients. Eligible farms and other businesses can receive up to $500 000 over a 
five year period. 
Other assistance measures are also available: 
• EC Exit Package — this consists of an Exit Grant of up to $150 000, as well as 
an Advice and Retraining Grant and a Relocation Grant. To receive the full 
amount, recipients can only hold $350 000 in net assets after the sale of the farm. 
As of December 2008, only 98 applicants had received the EC exit package. 
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• Transaction-based subsidies — transport subsidies are provided for various 
activities in New South Wales, Queensland and the Northern Territory. In 
2007-08, almost $30 million was paid out in transport subsidies. 
• Declared Drought Area Incentives — payments to primary producers in EC 
areas to offer skills development and employment to apprentices.  
• Taxation concessions — assistance for those affected by drought including 
allowing more time for the lodging of tax documents and provisions for forced 
livestock disposal. 
• Concessional loans and additional interest rate subsidies are also offered in some 
states. 
Risk management and preparedness measures 
While most risk management and preparedness assistance measures are not drought 
specific, their use is affected by drought. Some of those measures are listed below: 
• Farm Management Deposits (FMDs) — one of the primary risk management 
measures, which allow farmers to deposit primary production income into a bank 
account during good years for use during poor years. When the funds are 
deposited, they are not included in that year’s taxable income, but rather are 
included when the money is withdrawn. In June 2008, there were around 41 000 
deposit holders, with an average balance of almost $70 000. 
• Professional Advice and Planning Grants — grants of up to $5500 to allow farm 
businesses affected by drought to obtain professional advice for drought 
management and recovery. 
• Rural Financial Counselling Service — this service is heavily used in times of 
drought, including for assistance in accessing EC support payments. In 2007-08, 
over 14 000 people used this service. 
• Irrigation Management Grants — provide sums of up to $20 000 for 
Murray-Darling Basin irrigators to implement water management strategies. As 
at December 2008, 9497 irrigators had accessed this grant. 
There are also a number of stated-based research programs (see appendix E). For 
instance, Queensland has a Drought Preparedness program, which provides 
research, planning and development information to farmers and South Australia has 
research-based programs focused on activities such as enhancing the drought 
resistance of permanent horticulture. 
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5 Exceptional Circumstances 
declarations 
 
Key points 
• The Exceptional Circumstances (EC) declaration, which is used to trigger the 
availability of assistance for drought, relies on both climatic and economic factors.  
• The application of EC criteria has failed to distinguish between droughts defined as 
those that would be expected to be managed, and those which are beyond the 
ability of even the most prudent farmer to manage.  
• To the extent that climate becomes more variable over time and between regions in 
the future, any definition of EC areas will be of little relevance in scoping the 
extreme nature of drought impacts. 
• The EC declaration process lacks transparency and accountability. 
Recommendations about declarations are not made public and farmers and 
organisations involved in preparing applications receive no feedback other than the 
final decision. 
• Placing lines on maps for EC boundaries is divisive within and between 
communities and can result in farmers in similar circumstances being treated 
differently in terms of eligibility for assistance. 
• While EC declarations are generally made in a reasonably timely manner, 
determining the end of declarations is problematic.  
 
5.1 Introduction 
When the 1992 NDP was developed, Commonwealth, state and territory 
governments agreed that drought should be viewed in the context of a risk that 
could be managed by primary producers. The focus of drought policy was intended 
to be on how governments could aid producers to be prepared for and become self 
reliant during drought events. The NDP states: 
The role of government is … to assist farmers enhance their skills in key areas of risk 
management, business planning and natural resource management. (DAFF 2008e, p. 5) 
As noted in Chapter 4, the 1990 Drought Policy Review Task Force recommended 
that farmers should manage all forms of drought as it was not possible to make an 
adequate distinction between severe and lesser drought.  
   
106 GOVERNMENT 
DROUGHT SUPPORT 
 
 
But despite the recommendation of the Drought Policy Review Task Force, policy 
makers sought to make a distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘severe’ droughts. The 
Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs, when asked to assess 
appropriate government responses to the recommendations of the Drought Policy 
Review Taskforce initially stated that:  
The Committee is of the view that individual landholders within rural industries should 
be responsible for preparing and managing variable climatic and seasonal conditions. 
However, it considers that there are limits to the self-reliance of farmers to cope with 
severe drought. Invariably, as drought worsens, self-reliance will diminish. Therefore, 
even with sound management and planning, it may be difficult for a primary producer 
to withstand the effects of the most severe drought. 
The Committee considers that the Commonwealth Government has a responsibility to 
provide additional assistance in severe drought, as it is in the national interest for the 
Commonwealth Government to protect and maintain Australia’s agricultural base and 
productive capacity, particularly Australia’s breeding herd and flock. (Senate Standing 
Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs 1992, pp. xv-xvi) 
This led to a distinction between manageable normal and unmanageable severe 
drought events within Australia’s drought policy. Severe droughts were initially 
thought of as those years in which rainfall over three months or more was in the 
lowest 5 per cent of historical records. Such droughts are thought to have occurred 
approximately every 18 years. However, the time between these events over the 
past 150 years has varied from 4 to 38 years (BoM 2003). 
The distinction between normal droughts and severe droughts meant there was a 
need to assess drought events against a criterion that would allow for severe 
droughts to be recognised. The rationale behind declaring an area as experiencing 
an EC event is to recognise circumstances which ‘are rare and severe and beyond 
the ability of even the most prudent farmer to manage’. If a severe drought was 
declared, it would then represent a trigger for assistance. In recognition that no one 
standard definition of drought was appropriate, the criteria used to evaluate drought 
events incorporated both climatic and economic factors. EC events are characterised 
by the NDP as events which: 
• are rare, in the sense that they do not occur more than once on average over a 20 
to 25 year period 
• result in a rare and severe downturn in farm income over a prolonged period of 
time (12 months or more) 
• cannot be planned for or managed as part of a farmer’s normal risk management 
strategies.  
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Further to this, the economic effects of an EC event must be discrete and not form 
part of any long term structural adjustment processes or normal fluctuations in 
commodity prices (DAFF 2008e). Also, events that are insurable, covered under the 
National Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements, or by existing 
Commonwealth, state or territory measures, are excluded from consideration.  
Applying the EC criteria 
The process for applying for an area to be declared as experiencing an EC event 
involves community and industry organisations, state and territory governments and 
the Commonwealth. Community and industry organisations and state and territory 
governments are required to put together a ‘justifiable application’ (box 5.1).  
There are two key steps: 
• concerns by community or industry bodies about an event are to be raised 
initially with the relevant state or territory government  
• following the notification of concerns, and provided that the relevant state or 
territory government believes an application is justifiable, it will work in 
conjunction with the community or industry body to develop an application to 
the Commonwealth Government (declarations can be regional and/or industry 
based). 
The onus is on the community or industry body, along with the relevant state or 
territory government, to provide the necessary objective evidence to support an EC 
application and to set appropriate boundaries for the application area (DAFF 2008e 
— see box 5.2 for examples of recent applications).  
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Box 5.1 Criteria for a justifiable application 
State and territory governments are required to assess local conditions based on the 
EC criteria. Applications must demonstrate that the event is rare and severe, has 
resulted in a rare and severe downturn in farm income over a prolonged period, and 
that the event was not predictable or part of a process of structural adjustment. 
Applications are then assessed by the Commonwealth Government using data from 
the National Agricultural Monitoring System (NAMS), the Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) and through on-ground inspections by 
the National Rural Advisory Council (NRAC).  
Rare and severe event 
A rare event is one which is believed to occur only once on average every 20 to 25 
years. A rare event is believed to be severe if it is of a significant scale — affects a 
significant proportion of farm businesses in the application area. Applications for EC 
must demonstrate that multiple factors combined to form the event being assessed (for 
example, drought combined with severe or abnormal frosts).  
Applications put forward by state and territory governments must include information 
supporting the event being classified as rare and severe (meteorological, agronomic 
and environmental), the location of the affected area, the timing and duration, the 
occurrence of a sustained adverse impact on incomes of producers, and the impact on 
crop and livestock production and farm viability across different industries.  
Rare and severe downturn in farm income 
For an event to have a rare and severe impact on farm incomes the event must 
adversely affect incomes over a period longer than 12 months. Evidence in support of 
this should include information to provide an historical comparison (production and 
yield levels along with average cash incomes), actual and forecast effects of the event 
on production and yield levels along with average cash incomes and average debt 
levels.  
Not predicable or part of a process of structural adjustment 
The provision of EC support is not intended to interfere with the process of structural 
adjustment brought about by current pressures (such as declining terms of trade) or 
any foreseeable changes (such as policy changes that may have been known about 
for some time). Applications must provide information to provide evidence that the 
current downturn in farm incomes is due to the discrete event under consideration.  
Source: DAFF (2008e).  
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Box 5.2 Recent EC declarations 
Some recent examples of successful EC area applications are the Western Australian 
application for the Northern Wheatbelt and Northern Areas of the Eastern Wheatbelt 
and the South Australian Yorke Peninsula application.  
Northern Wheatbelt and Northern Areas of the Eastern Wheatbelt, Western Australia 
The EC application was based on climatic events during 2006 and 2007. These two 
years represented the two driest successive years on record within the region, and as 
a result led to 50 per cent fall in crop production. Characteristics of these years that 
were reported as exceptional were: 
• in 2006, late summer rainfalls meant significant costs were incurred by producers to 
control summer weeds and, due to rainfall timing, left little residual soil moisture for 
the growing season. During the growing season rainfall was significantly below 
average for the entire region 
• in 2007, with low summer rainfall and little stored soil moisture, the growing season 
that followed had similar rainfall patterns and amounts to 2006. Low rainfall was 
exacerbated by high temperatures and strong wind events during autumn and 
winter. There was also a reported low prospect for spring rain. 
Yorke Peninsula South Australia 
This EC application was based on climatic and production conditions over the five year 
period between 2002 and 2006. The events which led to the declaration were: 
• in 2002 there was significantly below average rainfall, poor yields, high fodder 
prices. 
• in 2003 there was average to below average rainfall, poor yields, poor grain quality, 
with producers unable to replenish fodder reserves due to high prices in 2002. 
• in 2004 there was a late break to the growing season and good winter rains. But hot 
October winds impacted yields, grain quality and available fodder. The pasture 
growing season was significantly shortened requiring producers to feed livestock. 
• in 2005 there was average to above average seasonal conditions and good yields 
but poor commodity prices. Pests such as black tip were a problem, with hay 
spoilage and snail impact experienced in some areas due to late season rains. 
Some farmers had to supplementary feed livestock for third consecutive season. 
• in 2006 there was good start to the grain and pasture season but many areas 
finished with decile one rainfall resulting in poor yields and little or no feed. Frosts 
and snails were also experienced by some which affected germination of crops and 
pastures. 
Source: DAFF (2008 unpublished).  
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Once an application is received by the Commonwealth Government a prima facie 
assessment is conducted by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. 
This process involves a desk-based assessment of the application supported by 
information from the Bureau of Rural Sciences (BRS) through the National 
Agricultural Monitoring System (NAMS) (box 5.3) and economic data supplied by 
ABARE. If a prima facie case for declaration is established, access to the EC 
support payments is available (through the interim support payments) and the 
application is forwarded to the National Rural Advisory Council (NRAC) for formal 
assessment.  
 
Box 5.3 National Agricultural Monitoring System 
NAMS is a web based tool that was designed to streamline the EC application process 
for producer and community groups and for state and territory governments. NAMS 
has been in place since July 2006 and provides historical data and predictions on both 
broadacre dryland and irrigated agricultural industries. Data are available at a spatial 
scale allowing for individual regions to be analysed.  
Development of NAMS was instigated by Primary Industries Ministerial Council, and 
the project is funded by the Commonwealth, state and territory governments. The 
objectives of the project are to:  
• provide relevant and comprehensive data from a system that is user friendly and 
client focused 
• provide a centralised access point for those data 
• provide quicker and cheaper access to data than pre-existing sources 
• enhance the timely identification of an emerging EC event 
• allow users to apply data to areas equivalent to local government areas 
• identify other uses, for example more objective state drought declarations and 
improved approaches to risk management. 
An independent review of the system concluded that NAMS had successfully met its 
objectives and found NAMS to be a highly valued information system. It has reduced 
the time and resources required in preparing applications. For assessors, NAMS has 
ensured standardised content that is consistent for all users. An internal assessment 
by BRS also found that NAMS led to a significant productivity improvement with 
staffing levels considerably reduced despite the volume of reports and the amount of 
information provided to NRAC increasing four-fold. 
Sources: Wickles and Windle (2007); BRS (2008 unpublished); NAMS (2008)   
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NRAC comprises representatives of the Commonwealth, state and territory 
governments along with a representative from the National Farmers’ Federation and 
experts in the areas of economics, financial administration, banking, sustainable 
agriculture and farm management. (NRAC has a number of roles outside the EC 
process, including providing information to government on rural adjustment, 
regional issues and education and training, but in recent years the majority of their 
workload has been EC related (NRAC 2006).) NRAC tours an affected area 
consulting with local producers and businesses. Assisted by information provided 
by BRS and ABARE it then makes a recommendation to the Minister for 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry in relation to the EC application. Drawing on 
this advice, the Minister decides whether or not an area should be declared an EC 
region.  
Once an area has been declared, farmers, farm businesses and farm dependent rural 
small businesses can apply to access the EC support programs. To be eligible for 
income support, farmers and farm dependent rural small businesses owners must 
first acquire an EC certificate from Centrelink, which identifies them as being 
located within an EC area.  
There is no set duration for EC assistance once an EC event is declared. Each event 
is assessed separately and therefore the length of time assistance is available varies. 
Despite this, the duration of available assistance is generally based on one year of 
experiencing the event and one year of recovery. Timelines may be altered with 
respect to the production systems affected (for example, expiry of an EC declaration 
might be altered from two years to the time when producers receive incomes from 
crops harvested in the recovery year). If the event is believed to have not ended on 
expiry of the declaration period, the EC declaration will only be extended if a new 
application is received from state or territory governments.  
5.2 Assessing the EC declaration system 
This section assesses issues relating to the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
process of identifying exceptional circumstances.  
Frequency of EC declarations 
The EC criteria are not solely based on climatic conditions. For an area to be 
considered to have experienced an exceptional event, a climate based event must 
occur in combination with another event (need not be climate related), and must be 
rare in the sense that it occurs on average only once every 20 to 25 years. Despite 
this, many areas have been declared as experiencing exceptional circumstances with 
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a significantly greater frequency, even after allowing for the period given for 
recovery (figure 5.1). Indeed, over the 17 year history of the NDP some areas have 
been EC declared for 14 years. Many of Australia’s agricultural producing regions 
in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria have been under an EC declaration 
for at least 8 years during this period.  
Figure 5.1 Duration of EC declarations, 1992–2008a 
a Includes only declarations based on a drought event (irrespective of industry).  
Data source: BRS (2009 unpublished).  
Between 2003 and 2008, there was a significant increase in the proportion of 
agricultural land declared as experiencing an EC event (figure 5.2). Over this period 
close to 50 per cent of all agricultural land was under an EC declaration compared 
with an average of close to 30 per cent for the early years of the NDP (1992 to 
1997) and close to 5 per cent between 1998 and 2002.  
EC duration – years 
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There are a number of reasons why declarations may have occurred more frequently 
than expected (in addition to the latest drought’s severe and prolonged nature 
progressively exacerbating regional conditions) including: 
• inappropriate criteria used for evaluation and too broad a focus for the definition 
of a rare and severe event — the combination of two or more random events 
• poor implementation 
• incentives within the system which lead to a bias in favour of declaration.  
Figure 5.2 Percentage of agricultural land EC declared, 1992–2008 
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Data source: BRS (2008 unpublished). 
The EC criteria 
An EC declaration is based on the occurrence of two or more events in combination, 
at least one of which must be related to climate. Given the relatively short history of 
climate records, the potential for two or more events to have occurred in 
combination over the historical record is low, making such events more likely to be 
viewed as a 1 in 20 to 25 year occurrence (and thus declarations more probable). 
Indeed, declarations have been made in more than 5 per cent of the 17 year 
operation period in many areas. Further, in declared areas the majority of producers 
have managed without EC support, and there has been no evidence of a significant 
increase in departures from farming (chapter 2). This suggests that, while the policy 
was designed to delineate between severe droughts that not even the most prudent 
farmer could manage and lesser droughts, the criteria as applied have been unable to 
do so.  
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Rainfall and soil moisture data for Australia highlight the inability of the EC 
process to effectively identify exceptional droughts (it should be noted that such 
data do not directly reflect hydrological drought conditions). Measured as rainfall 
and soil moisture levels that are in the bottom 5th percentile based on historical 
records, around 3 per cent of Australia on average experienced exceptionally low 
rainfall over the NDP period 1993-2008, rising to just over 5 per cent for the period 
2002-2007. On average, up to 12 per cent of some regions experienced 
exceptionally low soil moisture levels over the drought period 2002-2006 (table 5.1 
— for regions see chapter 3). 
Table 5.1 Average area experiencing exceptionally low rainfall and soil 
moisture 
Selected years 
 Exceptionally low rainfall Exceptionally low soil moisture
Region 1993–2008 2002–2007 1993–2006 2002–2006
 % % % %
Queensland 3.9 7.5 6.5 9.0
New South Wales 5.0 10.7 5.7 11.4
Victoria & Tasmania 7.0 14.1 4.5 6.2
Southwest Australia 3.4 5.4 3.3 6.6
Northwest Australia 2.4 5.6 3.4 1.6
Murray-Darling Basin 4.8 11.4 5.2 10.9
Southwest WA 9.0 10.6 4.6 11.7
Australia 3.1 5.1 – –
Source: Hennessy et al. (2008).  
Despite this, over the same period, vastly more of Australia’s agricultural land has 
been declared as experiencing an EC event (table 5.2). Average agricultural area 
declared as experiencing an EC event from 1993 to 2008 was 29 per cent, well 
above the average area experiencing exceptionally low soil moisture and rainfall. 
New South Wales, for example, had an average agricultural area of 50 per cent 
under an EC declaration for the 15 year period, rising to 88 per cent for the period 
2002-2007. Yet only an average of 11 per cent of the state had exceptionally low 
rainfall for the same period, with 11 per cent also experiencing exceptionally low 
soil moisture (2002-2006).  
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Table 5.2 Average agricultural area EC declared 
Selected years  
State 1993–2008 2002–2007
 % %
New South Wales 50 88
Victoria 29 51
Queensland 49 48
South Australia 20 38
Western Australia 11 25
Tasmania 11 8
Northern Territory 3 4
Australian Capital Territory 31 67
Australia 29 41
Source: BRS (2008 unpublished).  
Given predictions of a changing climate, the use of an historical record to measure 
rare events is problematic and creates a risk that any trigger based on this record 
could be activated more often than intended within the policy framework (Hennessy 
et al. 2008). With rising temperatures and mixed forecasts for rainfall, the risk of 
rare drought alone (defined where rainfall is in the lowest 5th percentile on the 
historical record) is likely to increase. According to BoM-CSIRO, attempts to 
incorporate climate trends are believed to provide no useful improvement. As stated 
by BoM-CSIRO: 
… this approach has already been modelled (based on 20, 30 and 40 year moving 
‘training windows’) and shown to result in no useful improvement. This is partly due to 
the lags in responses, since operationally the ‘training windows’ have to be historic. 
(Hennessy et al. 2008, p. 19) 
Such an approach has the added disadvantage of arbitrarily specifying what time 
horizon should be used in the record — for example, should it include the wet 
decade of the 1950s and extend further back to the drought of the 1940s. Also, 
alternatives to using historical data, such as analysis on the basis of future 
predictions, are open to significant uncertainty over the accuracy of predictions and 
the need for continual updating of the record as new modelling techniques and 
climate predictions become available.  
Implementation 
The EC declaration process has a number of checks which aim to support the 
integrity of the process. Data on climatic conditions within drought affected regions 
are supplied by BRS through NAMS, with economic information supplied by 
ABARE. However, due to the coarse scale of much of the information (for example, 
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in some regions rainfall data are only available from somewhat scattered weather 
stations that may not provide a good representation of local conditions), NRAC 
undertakes tours of affected areas to ‘ground truth’ the information provided. This 
involves committee members holding consultations with a wide range of local 
producers.  
Despite this consultative process, recommendations made by NRAC regarding the 
appropriateness of a declaration are not made public. Instead, the recommendations 
are provided directly to the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, who 
then makes the declaration decision. In addition, the applications for EC declaration 
by state and territory governments in conjunction with local groups are not made 
available for public scrutiny, and little feedback is provided to these groups apart 
from the final decision (NSW Farmers’ Association, sub. DR182).  
This lack of transparency in the declaration process provides scope for all parties to 
act strategically.  
Incentives within the system 
Farmers, their lobby groups and local communities along with state, territory and 
Commonwealth governments face different payoffs from an EC declaration and 
thus have differing incentives to bring about a declaration. Combined with the lack 
of transparency, these strategic behaviours have the potential to create a number of 
inefficiencies.  
The participants in the EC declaration process act sequentially. Farmers and their 
lobby groups are the first to engage in the process by alerting state and territory 
governments to the perceived severity of the drought they are experiencing. After 
contact from these groups, state and territory governments decide whether to work 
with them and submit an application to the Commonwealth.  
For farmers (along with some small businesses), a declaration provides the trigger 
to be able to apply for EC payments along with other support payments made 
available from state and territory governments (although some states have their own 
drought triggers). Given this, there is likely to be little incentive for farmers, their 
lobby groups and local communities to not proceed with an application when they 
believe there is some chance of a declaration. However, this is likely to be tempered 
as some farmers may not wish to be involved in the declaration process if they feel 
a reluctance to be seen to be asking for government support (Wahlquist 2003). 
There are also costs incurred in preparing applications. 
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For state and territory governments, declarations enable farmers and related 
businesses to access support programs for which the costs are mainly incurred by 
the Commonwealth. State and territory governments are also seen to be responding 
to the needs of their electorate. By supporting an application, they avoid any 
political costs associated with a lack of action. As suggested by the Murray Lands 
Regional Development Board Inc: 
It would be reasonable to claim that [the] State Government would support applications 
for EC declaration as it assists them in shifting a part of the financial burden that falls 
upon the state. (sub. 68, p. 3) 
In addition, Botterill and Chapman proposed that: 
… the funding arrangements have reduced incentives for State governments to act as 
effective gatekeepers for dubious applications for EC declarations. (sub. 52, p. 3) 
For the Commonwealth, a declaration also allows the government and individual 
ministers to be seen as responding to the needs of the community. In 2007 the 
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry extended the expiry date of 38 EC 
areas, stating: 
The extension of 38 EC areas to September 2008, will give farmers greater security as 
they continue to battle through this cruel drought. (McGauran 2007a, p. 1) 
Another example of the Commonwealth Government’s response, when faced with 
groups under stress, is that a number of interim assistance areas were declared by 
the government in September 2007. None of the communities subsequently 
attempted to build a case for EC status. The Tasmanian Minister for Primary 
Industries and Water, D. Llewellyn, indicated that: 
The Tasmanian Government does not support an extension of the interim declaration. 
The North West Coast, King Island, parts of the North East and other regions not in full 
EC declaration simply do not meet the criteria … But the ending of the interim 
declaration next month does not affect relief to the drought-afflicted full EC regions of 
Tasmania. These are distinct matters. One was an election stunt. The other is a proper 
evidence-based relief arrangement. (Llewellyn 2008, p. 1) 
The absence of a transparent assessment process together with uniform end dates 
(which suggests that individual regional characteristics and production cycles were 
not taken into account) and the lack of subsequent EC applications provides some 
indication of how governments react to potential pressure.  
Given the incentives facing each of the participants in the declaration process, it is 
probable that an EC event would be declared more often than would be expected 
given the stated criteria. It can also create an expectation of government support, 
altering the behaviour of some farmers who may see the availability of EC 
declaration as a form of fallback insurance against drought (Ha et al. 2007).   
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Placing lines on the map 
A regularly reported criticism of the EC declaration process is the need to define 
boundaries around affected regions. Such boundaries necessitate lines being placed 
on maps in order to delineate those who can and those who cannot receive 
assistance.  
Placing lines on maps allows for assistance to be limited to those who have been 
affected by a declared drought event. It also excludes those in other areas who may 
meet the specific eligibility criteria for relief payments or interest rate subsidies, but 
as a result of factors such as falling commodity prices rather than drought. Such 
targeting places limits on the overall cost of support to governments. This cost 
saving, however, is diminished by the fact that assistance measures still require 
individual assessments to determine eligibility.  
Lines on the map that fully encompass those affected and exclude those not affected 
by a drought are difficult to develop. In practice, lines on maps are developed 
around arbitrary boundaries such as roads, shire boundaries and rural lands 
protection board areas. In this respect, boundaries have the potential to be divisive, 
as stated by the NSW Government: 
Eligibility is determined by ‘lines on a map’ rather than by the individual needs of farm 
businesses or households. This creates equity issues as those outside the line can be in 
similar circumstances to those who are eligible. (sub. 90, p. 4) 
This was also reported by the Expert Social Panel: 
EC policy was reported as having created feelings of division and resentment, 
particularly by farmers who have successfully managed and adapted to prolonged 
dryness towards those farmers eligible for EC assistance. (Kenny et al. 2008, p. 14) 
Further, the coarseness and availability of the data used in assessing areas makes 
defining drought areas difficult. Data on climatic conditions within drought affected 
regions are typically available for the EC declaration process on a 25 square 
kilometre grid. In some parts of Australia, this is sufficient to describe drought 
conditions, but in others (for example, parts of South Australia and Queensland) this 
scale is either considered too coarse, with  rainfall data at this level considered an 
unsatisfactory representation of local conditions, or not available. The Rangelands 
Drought Taskforce noted that: 
The current EC declaration requires good regional weather data to support the regional 
application, in the Outback regions of South Australia the data was not available due to 
the sparseness of weather stations and delayed the application submission by 6 to 8 
months. (sub. 60, p. 5) 
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The creation of a buffer area around the EC declaration lines was an attempt to 
reduce the arbitrary nature of EC boundaries. Buffer areas are used where 
conditions and their impact have been highly variable along boundary lines, and 
whilst varying for different EC areas, have commonly taken the form of a 7 km area 
around the existing boundary. However, buffer areas equate to a widening of the 
existing boundaries and thus shift existing lines without avoiding potential 
inequalities of having lines on the map in the first instance. As put by the South 
Australian Country Women’s Association Incorporated: 
Geographical boundaries do cause a problem in that adjacent areas are excluded 
because, on the whole, that adjoining region is not experiencing severe drought 
conditions. Example: a farm situated on the southern boundary of a region is EC 
declared whilst the neighbouring farm, located outside of the EC declared area, is 
excluded. Buffer zones can be just as discriminatory. (sub. 72, p. 5) 
The addition of buffer zones has added to the confusion over whether some farmers 
are eligible for assistance. It is also questionable whether suitable buffer areas could 
be established if initial lines were difficult to develop.  
Recognition of tough times 
Throughout consultations to this inquiry, many producers stated that EC 
declarations also provided an important public recognition from governments that 
producers were facing difficult circumstances outside their control — a sentiment 
also expressed in earlier reviews (Drought Review Panel 2004). For example, as 
stated by AgForce: 
In many cases the simple approval of EC to Farmers who would never qualify [for 
assistance] has provided great psychological comfort to them in that the wider suburban 
community recognises how tough things are. (sub. DR185, p. 2) 
On the other hand, there can be detrimental consequences for communities of using 
EC declarations to indicate that circumstances are ‘tough’. For example, one South 
Australian farmer suggested that: 
The process of EC declaration focuses the community away from confidence in the 
future to examining victim status and the community mindset then changes to rights. 
This polarises an outlook of self help and focuses people on a mental search for 
eligibility. (J. Berger, sub. DR138, p. 2) 
To the extent that EC declarations entrench a perception that there is little that could 
be done to mitigate drought impacts, the process has the potential to work against 
the NDP objective of encouraging greater self-reliance.  
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Timeliness of declarations 
The process of assessing applications for EC necessarily requires investigations of 
the rarity of climatic conditions and claims of drought impact. The ANAO (2005) 
found that during 2002-03 and 2003-04, while most applications for EC declaration 
were processed by NRAC in 7 weeks, some took up to 23 weeks. In other years, 
average processing times have varied considerably (table 5.3).  
With the introduction of NAMS in July 2006, processing time has reduced 
compared with the previous two years. Despite this, compared to assessment times 
over the 2001 to 2003 period when a similarly high number of applications were 
received, there has been little improvement. However, for those areas with limited 
available data and the need for NRAC to ‘ground truth’ conditions, it would be 
reasonable to expect assessments to take several months explaining, in part, the 
variability seen in processing times.  
Table 5.3 NRAC processing time for EC applications, 2001 to 2007 
Year Applications Average weeks
 No. No.
2001 2 13
2002 15 9
2003 45 10
2004 9 19
2005 3 18
2006 9 11
2007 14 14
Source: DAFF (2008 unpublished). 
Declarations for EC are, by their nature, ex post and thus producers suffer a degree 
of hardship prior to support becoming available. The subsequent lack of 
responsiveness in assistance measures was believed by some to be a failure of the 
EC system. For example, the Coonamble Shire Council stated: 
EC legislation needs to be changed or removed to enable a more responsive 
intervention. The process by which EC status is determined and the requirement for EC 
zones to have a certain minimum size or minimum number of producers is problematic 
as it delays an effective response and creates unsupportable inequities. Drought support 
should be based on area and level of need with support provided on the basis of 
individual need.  
Drought assistance should be focused on being responsive in times of severe drought. 
Other programs of assistance should be utilised to ensure farmers and regional small 
business are able to adapt to a changing climate. (sub. 63, p. 5) 
   
 EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
DECLARATIONS 
121
 
The transition out of an EC declaration also carries concern. Some inquiry 
participants expressed a view that movements out of declarations are too sudden 
and do not allow sufficient time for businesses to recover. Many participants 
considered that while the usual process of allowing one year for recovery was 
suitable for one-off drought events, with prolonged conditions it did not allow for 
enough time for recovery. It was suggested that recipients of assistance were 
unprepared for survival post-EC without government support. As put by the 
Queensland Farmers’ Federation (QFF): 
… what is relevant to this Review is that the current operation of the EC policy offers 
no clear steps to transition farmers still needing assistance. QFF finds it incongruous 
that some 3,400 farm families and small businesses can be in receipt of assistance for 
an “Exceptional” event one day, and the next day a third of them are cut off.  
For the record this followed the Advisory Council’s inspections for “agricultural 
recovery” in Queensland and its failure to adequately assess the hydrological issues and 
low water allocations. As a consequence some of the 13 Queensland EC regions had 
assistance abruptly ended 15 June 2008 when a wider assessment would have 
suggested otherwise. QFF estimates this immediately impacted up to 1,200 farmers 
with no suitable transition arrangements for many of them. (sub. 82, p. 8) 
Again, the lack of transparency in the revocation process is likely to have 
contributed to the concerns expressed over decisions made to end declarations — 
particularly given differences in post drought recovery speeds between agricultural 
industries and between regions. Further, in cases where the process has failed to 
identify exceptional events, the need for extended transitions is questionable.  
Cost of the declaration process 
There are extensive costs involved in preparing an EC application. The EC 
declaration process broadly includes the costs of: preparing applications for EC 
status consideration; assessing applications for EC status and extensions of that 
status; providing recommendations to the Commonwealth Government Minister for 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry; and implementing EC declaration decisions. 
These costs are likely to vary considerably between drought years and may be 
higher in those years for which more applications for EC status are made. 
Despite the presence of NAMS, the application process is data intensive. As put by 
the South Australian Government: 
The process has … highlighted a range of issues including the cost of the process, both 
in time and in dollars … Given that applicants for EC support were, quite 
appropriately, still required to go through the ‘second gate’ of eligibility assessment 
once a region had been declared, the cost-benefit of the current application process for 
EC declaration is debatable. (sub. 91, pp. 2-3) 
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The South Australian Government suggested that the cost of individual EC 
applications equated to close to $65 000 (sub. 91). This was made up of costs 
relating to state government support to develop applications including case studies 
of the affected regions, along with in-kind support and contributions provided by 
local stakeholders.  
At the Commonwealth level, in 2007-08, NRAC, the main organisation involved in 
the assessment of EC applications, incurred expenditure of around $440 000 — 
approximately $275 000 of this was for travel and the remainder was remuneration 
to council members. However, this does not include the cost of staff within the 
Commonwealth Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry who are directly 
or indirectly involved in the NRAC processes. 
In addition, approximately $1.2 million was set aside in the 2007-08 budget (on a 
50 per cent cost sharing arrangement between the Commonwealth and state 
governments), for the maintenance and extension of NAMS. The Commission has 
only limited information on these costs for other years or for other agencies 
involved in the EC declaration process (including the Commonwealth agencies BRS 
and ABARE and the numerous state agencies and industry organisations which are 
involved in preparing applications). 
Overall, the Commission considers that any process that attempts to declare areas 
according to the severity of drought is inappropriate, ineffective and inequitable.  
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6 Program evaluation 
 
Key points 
• The programs provided under NDP are overwhelmingly targeted at maintaining 
farming operations during a drought, regardless of its severity. Transitory drought 
triggered assistance does little to encourage preparedness or provide incentives for 
longer term self-reliance. 
• The cost of government assistance has escalated over recent years, particularly for 
EC interest rate subsidies. The focus of support has markedly shifted away from 
farm households and towards farm businesses. There has been very little 
accountability in the use of funds or the evaluation of program outcomes. 
• There is widespread acceptance of the need for income support for farm families 
who are experiencing temporary financial hardship. However, provision of income 
support based on geographical boundaries or events such as drought is inequitable. 
• Interest rate subsidies are inappropriate and inefficient. They tend to focus support 
on farms and businesses that are the least financially prepared for drought. 
• While transport subsidies may benefit producers of grain and fodder, they also have 
adverse consequences both on farms and between farms. They are not an 
appropriate or efficient use of government support. 
• Exit packages are largely inaccessible and have generally failed to address the non-
monetary reasons why farmers prefer to remain on their farms. They are not an 
effective means of assisting drought affected farmers to exit the industry. 
• Farm Management Deposits have encouraged some farmers to save during periods 
of higher income. While mainly used for tax management purposes, they appear to 
also offer a means for increased self-reliance. 
• Grants for training that are well targeted, area appropriate and have an educational 
outcome can provide community wide benefits and be worthwhile. 
• The Rural Financial Counselling Service program enables financial counselling 
services in rural areas to facilitate a flow of information and act as referral points for 
other services.  
• There appears to be no failure in rural finance markets that would warrant 
government support through irrigation management grants. The off-farm 
environmental consequences of these grants may be more harmful than beneficial.  
• Drought policy is not the appropriate vehicle to sustain rural communities and small 
businesses in the face of underlying and ongoing changes.  
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6.1 Introduction 
In addition to the key NDP programs offered to farmers and rural businesses during 
times of drought, other farm assistance programs operate under the Commonwealth 
Government’s broader agricultural policy frameworks such as Agriculture 
Advancing Australia (AAA) and its successor, Australia’s Farming Future (AFF) 
and run parallel with the NDP. Each state and territory also offers a range of 
assistance schemes either on an ongoing basis or in times of drought. These 
Commonwealth ‘non–drought’ related and state level farm assistance programs can 
potentially influence the eligibility for, and the take up and effectiveness of, the 
NDP programs. Hence, and in line with the terms of reference for this inquiry, other 
key programs available to farmers are evaluated alongside the NDP programs. The 
key programs considered in this report and evaluated in this chapter were outlined 
in chapter 4.  
The aim of the evaluation is to determine which aspects of the programs, if any, 
might be suitable to retain as either income support to farm families in hardship or 
to facilitate the longer term goal of a self-reliant agricultural sector in the face of a 
variable and changing climate.  
In the first part of this chapter, the underlying rationales for government 
intervention embodied in each of the three NDP objectives are examined and the 
desired outcomes are explored. Some issues that have arisen across the suite of 
programs offered to farmers and rural small businesses are discussed in section 6.3. 
The following three sections 6.4 to 6.6 then consider and evaluate, in turn, the key 
programs offered to farmers. For ease of discussion, these programs are grouped 
into those that support rural families, those that provide drought-triggered support 
for farm and rural businesses, and those programs that are targeted at preparedness 
and advice. The program evaluation draws on analyses set out in appendixes B 
through to E and on submissions to the inquiry.  
6.2 Assessing the appropriateness, effectiveness and 
efficiency of drought support programs 
The Commission has been asked to assess the appropriateness, effectiveness and 
efficiency of the current drought support and related programs with respect to the 
three NDP objectives (as outlined in chapter 1) and the Expenditure Review 
Principles. In addition, the principles and general policy guidelines of the 
Productivity Commission Act 1998 require the Commission to take a community 
wide perspective when evaluating policy.  
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In order to assess drought support and related programs against the NDP objectives, 
it is necessary to understand: 
• the underlying market failure and social equity rationales for government 
support that are embodied in the objectives (to assess appropriateness) 
• what desired outcomes are embodied in the objectives, the degree to which they 
are achieved and the extent to which there may be unintended consequences (to 
assess program effectiveness) 
• how programs are delivered and targeted (to assess efficiency).  
The broader question of whether the NDP objectives are, of themselves, the most 
appropriate objectives that governments should pursue in times of drought and in 
intervening periods, is revisited in chapter 7, in the context of developing a policy 
framework to support self-reliance and preparedness to manage drought among 
farmers, farm businesses and farm dependent rural small businesses.  
In evaluating programs against the NDP objectives, it is useful to consider that the 
objectives encompass three sequential stages of farm response to climatic variability 
— self-reliance and preparation for drought (objective one), maintenance and 
protection during drought (objective two) and recovery after drought (objective 
three). 
NDP objective one: self-reliance in management 
Underpinning this first NDP objective is an assumption that there is not just a 
failure by farmers to adopt self-reliant strategies to manage drought and other 
climate risks, but that there is a case for government intervention. As stated in the 
1990 review of drought policy which proposed this objective: 
The Taskforce has found that most of the alleged instances of market failure in times of 
climate stress represent an unwillingness or inability on the part of individual producers 
to manage for the risks involved. (McInnes et al. 1990, vol. 2, p. 86) 
Cultural and market failures which could impede farmers from adopting risk 
management strategies and provide a rationale for government intervention include: 
policy and regulatory failure; community wide benefit from research, development 
and extension; incomplete information available to improve the adoption of risk 
management strategies or new technologies; and an absence of insurance markets. 
In terms of regulatory failure, for example, some past and current government 
policies have impeded farmers from becoming self-reliant for drought events. Steps 
to correct these failures have included governments providing compensation for the 
historical distribution of small unviable parcels of land through the soldier 
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settlement schemes in order to facilitate amalgamation (Industry Commission 
1996), and intervention to correct, and compensate for, past water policies which 
saw an over allocation of water entitlements in some states. Drought assistance has 
also been largely a second best policy approach, with additional programs 
developed and delivered on a somewhat ad hoc basis during drought periods due to 
significant lobbying pressure.  
However, even where policy or regulatory failure can be identified, compensatory 
assistance may not always lead to an improvement in the allocation of society’s 
resources (Freebairn 1983). Generally where economic efficiency is being impeded 
through government action, the direct removal of the impediment is the best 
approach (Industry Commission 1996). 
Another justification sometimes put forward for government intervention is the 
absence of drought insurance. Although theoretically possible, drought insurance 
markets have not developed as there are limited possibilities to offset the drought 
risk in one area through insuring producers in another. In the absence of market 
provided insurance, producers make ‘self-insurance’ production and investment 
decisions which, despite being potentially more costly than theoretical market 
insurance premiums, remain a rational response by producers in the face of drought 
risks and can generate efficient outcomes. Given this, if support is provided in lieu 
of insurance, which transfers the downside risks of drought onto governments (such 
as subsidies or grants during drought), then producers are less likely to take these 
risks into account, thus resulting in less efficient production decisions.  
In evaluating programs against the first NDP objective, programs can be analysed 
on the basis of whether or not they overcome impediments to primary producers 
adopting risk management strategies that subsequently improve their self-reliance 
during droughts. Such actions are usually undertaken prior to drought occurring. 
Farmers are generally unable to prepare for drought (or increased climate 
variability) when in the middle of it — at that point, drought is already impacting on 
funds, livestock, land condition, water resources, labour time and motivation 
(Victorian farmers, W. and S. Rogerson, sub. 53). It is notable that, of the current 
suite of major NDP programs, none directly target the issue of self-reliance. In light 
of this, it would be fortuitous if these programs led to greater preparedness or 
facilitated a recovery process that is consistent with the desired self-reliant long 
term position for the industry. 
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NDP objective two: maintaining and protecting the resource base 
The programs and assistance provided under the NDP are overwhelmingly targeted 
at maintaining farming operations during drought, regardless of the severity of 
drought (ostensibly under the second objective).  
In order to assess whether the drought support programs achieve this objective, 
however, it is necessary to consider what constitutes Australia’s agricultural and 
environmental resource base. In this regard, the 1990 review of drought policy 
suggested that the NDP should: ensure adequate protection of national livestock 
resources; minimise livestock stress; and ensure adequate protection of land, water 
and vegetation resources, and of native plant and animal species (McInnes et al. 
1990). 
In terms of agricultural resources, it could be argued that government intervention is 
warranted in times of drought when industry wide resources are at risk — such as 
the national cattle herd. However, it is in the interests of viable farmers within an 
industry to protect core genetic stock and there is no apparent failure in markets 
(such as for stock or capital) that would necessitate government intervention.  
For environmental resources, the NDP objective implies a presumption that actions 
of farmers may have unintended adverse outcomes. Droughts represent a time of 
environmental stress, and thus the natural resource base of a property can be 
particularly vulnerable and easily damaged. Examples of adverse production 
decisions include overstocking and a lack of management of environmental 
resources (McInnes et al. 1990). One way this could occur is if a drought that 
farmers think will be short, turns out to be prolonged and severe. Appropriate 
government interventions in response to environmental concerns would target these 
impacts.  
In terms of animal welfare outcomes, some programs are targeted at farmers to 
provide their businesses with food and water in order to maintain stock health. But 
there is a possible conflict between maintaining and protecting agricultural and 
environmental resources. Policies that target the maintenance of herds, for example, 
may create adverse environmental outcomes such as increased soil erosion through 
farmers maintaining stock on land longer than the resource base can sustain. Given 
the potential for conflicting outcomes, such programs are not likely to be the most 
efficient overall response to animal welfare concerns.  
While the initial intention of the second NDP objective was to target agricultural 
resources at the industry level (McInnes et al. 1990), Commonwealth and State 
Ministers have also indicated that ‘during severe downturns, Governments will act 
to preserve the social and physical resource base of rural Australia…’ (Agricultural 
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Council of Australia and New Zealand 1992). Accordingly, the household support 
and interest rate subsidy programs emphasise the maintenance of current farm 
families and businesses as part of the resource base. There are also arguments put 
forward that assistance to farming families and farm businesses are a means of 
maintaining resources within rural communities either directly (funding small 
businesses within towns) or indirectly (increasing the spending capacity of farmers 
in those communities). As concluded later, the Commission does not find this to be 
a convincing rationale for drought programs. 
NDP objective three: early recovery consistent with long term 
sustainability  
The third NDP objective, ensuring early recovery of the agricultural sector 
consistent with long term sustainable levels, suggests that policy should not create 
barriers to the recovery of agricultural and rural industries, nor maintain resources 
within agriculture that are otherwise unviable without government support. This can 
be interpreted as not creating (or removing) barriers to adjustment which would 
slow the recovery of agricultural and rural industries post-drought. Importantly, the 
recovery is not intended to be to pre-drought levels, but to a level which is 
sustainable in the longer term.  
As stated in the 1990 review by the Drought Policy Review Task Force: 
Adjustment assistance differs from other forms of industry assistance as the onus for 
responding to changing market and climatic conditions always rests with the individual 
producer. Its purpose is to provide producers with the opportunity to respond to 
changing conditions, without detracting from the need for adjustments to be made. 
Those producers not capable of responding to longer-term market pressures or who 
have lost prospects in the industry should be encouraged to leave. (McInnes et al. 1990, 
vol. 2, p. 86) 
To facilitate industry adjustment, governments have provided support to households 
and farm businesses — such as through training, counselling and exit packages. 
These programs aim to address information barriers to alternative uses of farm 
assets or potential alternative job opportunities, or various barriers to farmers 
leaving their industry or region. While there may be information and social 
impediments that justify some training or guidance to farmers, there is no indication 
that industry adjustments would not occur just as readily in the absence of large 
grants to farmers who are exiting their industry. Such payments distort markets and 
raise inequities with other groups in the community.  
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6.3 Issues across programs 
In evaluating the NDP and other packages on offer to farmers, there are issues with 
delivery, implementation and outcomes that cut across the suite of programs and 
have implications for the effectiveness and efficiency with which these programs 
operate. 
Program provision and delivery issues 
The provision of government assistance to farmers and rural small businesses is 
split mainly between Centrelink and agricultural departments. Broadly, the 
household support programs and some ‘preparedness’ measures are delivered by 
Centrelink, according to guidelines and funding provided by the Commonwealth 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF). These include EC 
Relief Payments, Small Business Income Support, Interim Income Support, 
Transitional Income Support, Farm Help, Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) Irrigation 
Management Grants and the Professional Advice and Planning Grant. Business 
support programs, such as EC interest rate subsidies and the EC exit package are 
delivered by state rural adjustment bodies with funding from the relevant state and 
Commonwealth governments.  
There are some within the rural community who believe that the manner in which 
income support is delivered to farmers should somehow be different to that 
delivered to other families in financial hardship because of a perception that farmers 
are more independent and ‘proud’, and therefore less able to approach Centrelink 
offices. For example, the Rural Financial Counselling Service in Gippsland argued 
that: 
Farmers and those connected to rural Australia are understandably very proud people 
and are not at ease asking for help and some have a particular reluctance to seek 
assistance from Centrelink. (sub. 34, p. 6) 
There is no evidence that, in general, the attitudes of farmers to receiving financial 
support are different to others in the community who are experiencing hardship and 
who need to apply for assistance. While farmers may have become accustomed to 
having their financial assistance provided through agricultural departments rather 
than recognised as welfare support, the way in which assistance is delivered has 
changed during the latest drought, with a substantial increase in the number of 
programs now administered through Centrelink.  
The Commission has been presented with considerable evidence that agricultural 
departments and Centrelink have actively engaged with those rural areas 
experiencing drought. This has been undertaken through Centrelink’s ‘drought 
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buses’, the creation of Rural Support Officers and greater funding, by states and the 
Commonwealth, for Rural Financial Counsellors and health workers (appendixes B 
and D). Inquiry participants generally indicated that governments have been largely 
successful with this form of assistance delivery. For example, Lexo Pty Ltd, a 
merino wool, meat and breeding enterprise, indicated that: 
Centrelink and the RAA [Rural Assistance Authority] have been very efficient and 
friendly when dealing with support issues … The rural councillors have been of 
immense help to those of us who find the task too onerous … We have found NRAC 
[National Rural Advisory Council] personnel to be very efficient and knowledgeable 
about conditions. (sub. 54, p. 4) 
Anglicare similarly conveyed a positive response to government service delivery:  
Centrelink staff have been very responsive and supportive to the rural sector and have 
learned new methods of engaging with farmers and rural businesses as well as 
maximising partnerships with other funded and unfunded service providers … Rural 
Financial Counselling services have made significant inroads to building confidence 
with the rural sector and providing support services they are willing to accept. 
(sub. 57, pp. 1, 2) 
Some important benefits of delivering rural assistance through Centrelink rather 
than via agricultural departments are the potential for greater consistency in 
program delivery and the scope to make transparent the programs provided to 
farmers, compared with those provided to other groups in the community. While 
some differences in the current programs are deliberately favourable to farmers, 
Centrelink advises that others are likely to be unintended and are simply a 
consequence of being instigated under legislation other than the Social Security Act 
1991 (Centrelink, pers. comm. 2008).  
The Commission considers that it would be appropriate for income support to rural 
families to be provided under the Social Security Act 1991 via Centrelink, in a 
manner that is transparent and, as far as practicable, consistent and equitable with 
that provided to other groups in the community. To the extent that delivery of the 
government’s ‘preparedness’ programs, such as training and advice grants, is more 
efficiently achieved by utilising Centrelink expertise and resources, it is appropriate 
for these programs to also be provided via this agency.  
Timeliness 
Once an area is declared to be in EC, the time involved in applying and being 
considered for EC assistance is similar to other forms of government support. For 
the programs that Centrelink administers, there is an objective of processing 80 per 
cent of claims within 42 days. In 2007-08, Centrelink processed 91 per cent of 
claims within this time frame (Centrelink, pers. comm. 2008). All up, this 
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potentially means that once an application for EC is submitted, assistance is 
available to farmers, at best within about 10 weeks, at worst, up to 26 weeks later 
(given an average of 9 to 19 weeks taken by the National Rural Advisory Council 
(NRAC) to consider applications for EC declaration — chapter 5). 
The timeliness of household income support is less of an issue than business support 
because of the potential availability of support prior to an EC declaration. Interim 
income support provides short term financial support to eligible farmers and small 
businesses in selected areas for which a case for EC assistance has not yet been 
established. Interim income support therefore potentially enables the provision of 
government support in a timely manner, which could prevent financial problems 
from escalating.  
Burden of application processes 
Most government support to farmers requires recipients to provide detailed 
information on their financial status. This is to ensure that the eligibility criteria are 
met and are consistently applied. Farmers within areas applying for EC declaration 
often have to provide considerable climatic, production and financial information to 
support their application. The Australian Dairy Industry Council noted that: 
The tiered process of declaring EC regions and accessing EC assistance by individuals 
has often been difficult, resource-intensive and time-consuming, with different 
processes in each state, and the burden often falling on industry associations to provide 
members with support and guidance to complete the process. (sub. 58, p. 6) 
Applicants for household income support need to demonstrate financial need for 
assistance. Similarly, for those business programs (such as EC interest rate 
subsidies) that are only made available to farmers who are viable in the long term, 
there is a requirement for applicants to provide information that demonstrates 
viability. Some inquiry participants recognised the appropriateness of, and necessity 
for, providing such evidence, but still saw the process as unnecessarily resource 
intensive. For example, the Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association noted an 
additional burden from potentially having different processes and organisations for 
each assistance program: 
Each of these support payments involves different application processes, different 
eligibility criteria, and different funding and administrative bodies. This is a very 
arduous process for many farmers and their families … (sub. 69, p. 5) 
In its review of regulatory burdens in the primary sector, the Productivity 
Commission (2007a) endorsed the need to avoid duplication and reduce 
unnecessary burdens in the application process for assistance. Specifically, it was 
advised that Centrelink and state and territory government rural adjustment bodies 
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should be able to provide applications for both EC relief payments and EC interest 
rates subsidies; applicant information should be able to be used across different 
Centrelink administered programs; and a single application form for EC interest 
rates subsidies should be adopted by state and territory governments. 
To assist with some reporting requirements, governments have provided grants to 
the Rural Financial Counselling Service and run extensive advertising campaigns to 
encourage farmers to not self assess but instead seek professional advice. This 
means that, to some extent, one government drought program (financial 
counsellors) is, in part, targeted at helping farmers to access another program 
(interest rate subsidies) and necessitates skilled professional advice that may not be 
readily available in all parts of Australia. It can also mean that assistance is not 
necessarily being directed to its best end use — which would be to assist farmers to 
understand their financial situation and improve their viability or plan for exit.  
Long term use of assistance and dependence on support 
It could be expected that the longer a farmer is receiving government assistance, the 
less capacity and/or motivation there might be to take action which would lead the 
farm or household to become self-reliant. In addition, there is a risk of some farmers 
restructuring their business decisions at the margin to improve their eligibility for 
drought support.  
For most government assistance programs, payments are either one-off — such as 
exit grants, training and advice grants and the MDB Irrigation Management Grant 
— or there are time limits (such as the duration of an EC declaration) for the receipt 
of assistance. Nevertheless, there is evidence that some farmers have become 
dependent on government support, particularly in (but not limited to) times of 
drought (see appendix B discussion on long term recipients of EC relief payments).  
The Queensland Government reported that: 
Surveys relating to government support during drought have indicated that there is an 
expectation among primary producers and the community that some form of 
government intervention will automatically occur in a drought. (sub. 77, p. 3) 
G. Schmidt, a farmer in Queensland, similarly claimed that: 
The same producers are queuing every time assistance is offered which proves there is 
no adapting to seasonal variability. (sub. 4, p. 1) 
The Rural Financial Counselling Service in Gippsland reported that: 
… in some instances they [EC programs] are a disincentive to self reliance as some 
recipients become reliant on the payments and don’t make the necessary changes. 
(sub. 34, p. 4) 
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The outcome of farmers becoming dependent on government support in the long 
term is not only that the agricultural sector is less productive overall, but also that 
there is concern within communities at the apparent inequities within their industry. 
K. Calder, a grazier, indicated that: 
Unfair distribution of assistance is highly stressful for those farmers who are excluded 
while neighbours who, by managing their affairs to fit drought criteria, can receive help 
from all programmes. (sub. 29, p. 3) 
Overall, there is some evidence of dependence on government support, which can 
make it more difficult to achieve self-reliance across the farming sector. 
Perverse incentives and consequences 
Some government programs for drought assistance have had consequences that are 
perverse to the objectives of the NDP and inconsistent with the outcomes of other 
programs. This can limit the effectiveness of NDP and broader agricultural policies.  
Business assistance programs, including EC interest rate subsidies and subsidies for 
other business inputs such as transport, water or irrigation infrastructure, can 
support some farmers and small businesses who may not have made wise 
management decisions and are consequently not self-reliant during droughts. Such 
programs provide an incentive for some farms to structure their expenditure and 
debt to maximise their receipt of government subsidies for business costs. Kenny 
et al. (2008) reported that there is considerable angst within some communities at 
the provision of assistance to farms which have undertaken ‘creative accounting’ in 
order to meet the eligibility criteria for support. Furthermore, these programs can 
discourage drought preparedness actions such as early destocking or diversification 
of income sources and distort production decisions by leading farms to use the 
subsidised input in excess of what would otherwise be the case.  
The way in which eligibility for EC interest rate subsidies is determined can also 
mean that despite program requirements, not all recipients may be viable in the 
absence of the subsidy. The requirement for recipients of the interest subsidies to 
demonstrate viability through an independent assessment is typically not exercised 
until $300 000 has been paid in support. This means it is possible for unviable farms 
to receive support, unchecked, for several years. 
In the longer term, these business assistance programs are an impediment to (and 
increase the costs of) farm adjustments that need to occur through exits and 
amalgamations, and potentially increase the costs for viable farms that want to 
expand. 
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In contrast to these policies, exit grants and the (Murray Darling Basin) water buy-
back scheme are aimed at adjustment in agriculture through facilitating departure 
from farming — although in some areas these two programs can be partially in 
conflict with each other as farms that are in irrigation areas, but no longer have a 
water entitlement, become difficult to sell. As Horticulture Australia Council noted: 
… there is a lack of synergy in implementation of the Government’s water buy-back 
program and it’s interaction with the Exceptional Circumstances criteria – specifically, 
the Exit package. (sub. 66, p. 2) 
Some states also provide other types of business support that are additional to 
Commonwealth programs and inconsistent with broader policy objectives 
(appendix E). For example, the Queensland Government offers a drought loan 
scheme to farmers. However, the scheme has not been widely taken up and one 
reason for this may be the more attractive provision of non-repayable funds by the 
Commonwealth under the EC interest rate subsidy program.  
The fungibility of assistance money and a lack of distinction between farm and 
family expenses can also create perverse program outcomes. Assistance provided 
under one program may be used by the recipient for a quite different purpose to the 
intention of the program. The Queensland Government indicated that: 
The distinction between farm and family expenses is very blurred in a family farm. For 
example, with the money a farm saves on interest rates when accessing interest 
subsidies they may spend that money on family related expenses. Conversely, it is not 
unusual for producers to indicate that ECRP has been used to feed livestock. (sub. 77, 
p.19) 
To the extent that household income support is being used to subsidise farm 
businesses, the risk management message of the NDP may be undermined. 
Implications for the environment 
A lack of measures within the current suite of drought support initiatives that 
explicitly address the NDP’s stated objective ‘to maintain and protect Australia's 
environmental resource base during periods of extreme climatic stress’ may 
increase the scope for adverse outcomes for the environment. The Commonwealth 
Government Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts (DEWHA) 
noted that: 
The current initiatives may in fact be exacerbating environmental degradation as a 
result of farm businesses delaying necessary structural adjustment. (sub. 107, p. 9) 
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During periods of drought, land use and human pressures on natural resources may 
impose significant damage on farm biodiversity and increase the likelihood and 
severity of impacts downstream and in surrounding areas. The immediacy of 
focusing on drought impacts may also prevent adequate planning and adaptation for 
the long term impacts of climate variability. The Queensland Murray Darling 
Committee noted for example, that:  
Subsidies for movement of livestock for agistment purposes does not require the 
assessment of the property they are being moved to or moved from at any point in the 
transaction. Processes to safeguard agistment to or from drought affected areas or 
where the land has not adequately recovered from drought conditions appears to be not 
well facilitated in current policy. (sub. 41, p. 5) 
Some drought assistance programs — particularly transport subsidies — have been 
shown in the past to provide incentives to keep stock on the land longer, through, 
for example, supplementary feeding. As discussed earlier, transport subsidies are 
still offered in New South Wales, Queensland and the Northern Territory, despite 
previous agreement to cease such subsidies (for example, Agricultural Council of 
Australia and New Zealand 1992), and conflict with the NDP objective for 
environmental management during drought. The Australian Landcare Management 
Group argued that: 
… the impact of drought on land condition can be prolonged or increased through 
assistance that allows for extended grazing impact or re-stocking before recovery. 
(sub. 24, p. 7) 
The impact of drought on the environment is expected to vary with the type of 
farming activities undertaken (crops or livestock for example) and in different 
regions (chapter 3). It would be expected that livestock numbers for farms in EC 
would be lower than for farms not in EC. During the latest drought, sheep and beef 
cattle numbers were, in general, slightly lower or not significantly higher on farms 
of EC recipients than non recipients, but dairy cattle numbers were considerably 
higher (appendixes B and C).  
Evidence from farm surveys by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (ABARE) is that overall, the number of animals per hectare and fodder 
expenditure per animal were higher, on average, on farms of EC relief payment 
(ECRP) and EC interest rate subsidy (ECIRS) recipients than non recipients (figure 
6.1). While there may be economies of scale reasons for this in dairy operations and 
a greater proportion of dairy specialists amongst ECRP recipients, higher fodder 
expenditure per animal may nevertheless be indicative of lower yielding pastures on 
farms of recipients and higher stocking rates may have implications for the ongoing 
condition of land and water resources in dairy regions. 
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Figure 6.1 Stocking rates and fodder expenditure by EC recipients and 
non recipients 
Average annual data for 2002-03 to 2007-08 
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Data source: ABARE (2008 unpublished). 
There is evidence from inquiry participants that some pastoralists may have selected 
stock management approaches for environmental reasons during this drought. One 
grazier, K. Calder, noted that stock containment areas have been a particularly 
beneficial tool during droughts — if used early enough, they can prevent loss of 
topsoil to wind erosion (sub. 29, p. 2). Another New South Wales farmer, P. Morris, 
described the link between pasture condition and use of government support: 
A degraded pasture may be unable to absorb a tiny fall, but a dynamic pasture may 
absorb a lot of rain very fast. As a rule of thumb the owner of the property which 
cannot effectively utilise rain is more likely to be seeking government assistance … 
During any drought, one can see adjacent properties that have been subjected to very 
different land management regimes, one with many starving cattle picking at round 
bales brought in by subsidised freight, next door to a few fat unsubsidised cattle. 
(sub. 23, pp. 1 and 9) 
However, Crocker Farming Co. in Queensland pointed out that even when it 
destocks to protect the land, this is no guarantee that pastures will have an 
opportunity to recover: 
Spelling paddocks is good management and is common practice but the kangaroos 
come in and destroy paddocks of good feed if the surrounding area is getting eaten out. 
(sub. 45, p. 1) 
There are likely to be substantial differences in the natural capital bases of farms 
even before drought, with respect to factors such as biodiversity, soil fertility, and 
capacity of soil to absorb moisture. All other factors being equal, it could be 
expected that these differences would become more pronounced during drought. 
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The Commission considers that there is no strong program setting to support the 
NDP objective to ‘maintain or protect’ the environmental resource base. 
Long-term dependence on government assistance, inconsistency in key messages 
between programs and the creation of perverse incentives have reduced program 
effectiveness and been an impediment to the development of self-reliant 
management approaches.  
Costs of assistance and program provision 
Costs to government of program provision  
Government expenditure on drought has increased dramatically in recent years with 
drought conditions having persisted in many regions and with existing EC 
assistance measures extended (in 2006) to all forms of agriculture in regions and to 
farm dependent small businesses (chapter 4). In addition, further assistance 
programs have been added. The Queensland Farmers Federation noted that: 
… governments tend to ‘add programs’ as droughts worsen. This may be a practical 
political reality but it has a significant downside for farmers … there is potential burden 
of ‘program overload’ from a primary producer’s point of view … (sub. 82, p. 6) 
From July 2001 to June 2008, the Commonwealth Government provided around 
$1.2 billion in drought related household support, predominantly through EC Relief 
Payments to farm families, but also through programs such as Small Business 
Income Support and the Country Women’s Association (CWA) emergency relief 
fund (figure 6.2a). A further $140 million was provided to rural households in the 
first half of 2008-09. 
Also over the period from July 2001 to June 2008, $1.8 billion in drought assistance 
was provided by the Commonwealth Government to farm businesses and rural 
small businesses. Most of this support was via EC interest rate subsidies (figure 
6.2b). An additional $230 million was provided to farm businesses and rural small 
businesses in the first half of 2008-09. The sharp growth in EC expenditure in 
recent years corresponds with the introduction of more generous eligibility criteria 
for EC interest rate subsidies in 2006 and 2007, and is reflected by an increase in 
both the number of recipients and also the amount received by each, on average 
(appendix C).  
With the large increase in EC interest rate subsidy expenditure, the focus of 
government EC assistance has shifted markedly from household programs to 
business programs. Over the period since 2001-02, the share of EC expenditure that 
is directed to farm households has dropped from around 80 per cent of all EC 
expenditure to less than 40 per cent.  
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Figure 6.2 Program payments to farmers and small businesses,  
2001-02 to 2007-08a 
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a
 Program payments to farmers differ marginally from total funds for a program because of timing differences 
in funds paid to agencies administering the relevant program compared with funds received by farmers. 
b EC related household income support includes EC Relief Payments, Small Business Income Support and 
Interim Income Support and Commonwealth Government contributions to the CWA emergency drought relief 
fund. Non EC household income support is provided through the Farm Help Income Support program. 
Estimates exclude payments to households funded through from other Commonwealth Government 
departments, New South Wales Government Drought Household Payments and state government 
contributions to other programs. c EC related business support includes the Commonwealth contribution to 
EC interest rate subsidies to farmers and rural small businesses, Professional Advice and Planning Grants, 
and EC exit grants. Non EC business support includes the forgone tax cost of FMD deposits, FarmBis, Farm 
Help redevelopment grant, Farm Help training grant, Murray Darling Basin Irrigation Management Grant, 
Irrigated Agriculture Workshops, and Rural Financial Counselling Service. Excludes industry specific 
payments (such as sugar and dairy industry restructuring programs) to farmers and payments made under 
state assistance measures.  
Data source: DAFF (2008 unpublished). 
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Supplementing these drought related measures, a further $1.5 billion was provided, 
mostly in the form of business assistance, to farmers who were not necessarily in 
EC areas. The share of non drought measures in total Commonwealth Government 
assistance to farms has, in aggregate, declined in recent years. In earlier years, non 
drought expenditure was dominated by FarmBis and the forgone tax cost to the 
community associated with the Farm Management Deposits (FMD) scheme. In 
2007-08, the largest non drought expenditure programs were the MDB Irrigation 
Management Grants, the Rural Financial Counselling Service (RFCS) and (the 
forgone tax cost of) FMDs. The general upward trend in FMDs, both in terms of the 
number of holders and the value of holdings, suggests that the scheme is yet to 
reach maturity (appendix D). While the cost of the scheme is likely to vary with 
marginal tax rates, if the scheme were to be maintained in its present form, it is 
likely that it will continue to form a significant part of government assistance to 
farmers in the future.  
In addition to the Commonwealth programs, there are state level programs aimed at 
assisting farmers in EC and other drought affected areas (appendix E). For 
New South Wales, Queensland and Northern Territory, transport subsidies were one 
of the most significant forms of state program expenditure to assist farmers. Over 
the period from 2002-03 to 2007-08, almost $190 million was provided by states to 
farmers (mostly New South Wales) in the form of transport subsidies. While this is 
much less than the main EC programs provided by the Commonwealth, it is 
nevertheless significant compared with other non EC programs for farmers.  
There has also been significant expenditure on farmers and regional communities in 
some other states. For example, the Victorian Government announced a 
$115 million drought relief package in October 2008, bringing to their drought 
support for farmers and rural communities to over $500 million since 2002-03 (sub. 
110). In Western Australia, $4.3 million was approved in 2007-08 to support 
farmers and regional communities under the 2007 Dry Season Assistance Scheme. 
In 2007-08, the states supplemented Commonwealth expenditure on the Rural 
Financial Counselling Service by approximately $2.8 million (appendix E). 
The extent to which program funds are available as payments to program 
participants varies with the nature of assistance provided (table 6.1). It would be 
expected that those programs which provide one-on-one support to participants or 
which require extensive assessment of eligibility, would have higher administration 
costs. In recent years, Farm Help programs and the EC exit package have had the 
highest relative administration costs (50 per cent and 44 per cent of total program 
expenditure, respectively). In contrast, the administration costs of programs such as  
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the MDB irrigation management grant are very low as there is very little assessment 
required to determine either eligibility or use of funds. On average across all 
programs considered, around 4 per cent of total expenditure is attributable to 
administration costs. 
Table 6.1 Cost of providing key Commonwealth Government programs, 
2001-02 to 2007-08a 
Payments to program 
recipients 
 
2001-02
to 2007-08 
2007-08 
Administration costs as 
% total program funds
2007-08 
 $ million $ million %
Business programs    
EC interest rate subsidies: farmers 1 703 604 3 
EC interest rate subsidies: small business 53 30 4 
Professional advice & planning grant 7 7 6 
EC exits package 4 4 44 
Total EC business 1 768 645 3 
MDB irrigation management grant 142 142 1 
MDB irrigated agriculture workshops 7 7 na 
Farm Help training & redevelopment grants b 33 2 50 
FarmBis 87 11 12 
Farm management deposits c 1 175 85 na 
Rural financial counselling d 52 14 14 
Total other business 1 497 260 3 
Total business 3 265 906 3 
Household programs    
EC relief payments 1 163 379 6 
Interim income support 45 8 6 
Small business income support 20 16 6 
CWA emergency drought aid 16 0 na 
Total EC household 1 244 402 6 
Farm Help Income Support b 50 1 50 
Total household 1 294 403 6 
Total business and household 4 559 1 309 4 
na Not available.  a Program payments differ marginally from total funds for a program because of timing 
differences in payments to agencies administering the relevant program and payments to support recipients. 
Administration costs represent only costs reimbursed by DAFF but exclude DAFF staff costs. For some 
programs, there are additional costs incurred by state governments and other Commonwealth Government 
departments.  b For Farm Help, ECRP, PAPG, Interim Income support and Small Business Income Support, 
administration costs are not available for separate programs in any year. The administration costs for the 
group of programs have been assigned in equal proportion to each component program.  c ‘Payments to 
program recipients’ under the Farm Management Deposits scheme refers to the reduction in tax paid by 
holders of deposits, less the additional tax paid by those withdrawing deposits in the period.  d Rural financial 
counselling service administration costs are unavailable prior to 2004-05 so the administration cost 
percentage is calculated for expenditure over the period 2004-05 to 2007-08.  
Source: DAFF (2008 unpublished). 
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In commenting on the large array of programs provided to farmers, the Queensland 
Farmers Federation argue that there are also likely to be administration costs arising 
from the need to manage so many separate programs with different criteria and 
application processes: 
… it is also questionable whether the benefits in the community match the 
administrative costs of managing many of those 93 programs identified in the [this 
inquiry’s] Issues Paper. (sub. 82, p. 6) 
The Commission’s experience in this inquiry bears testament to this. It was 
inordinately difficult to obtain consistent information over recent years on the 
features of each of the Commonwealth Government programs, the number of 
farmers who benefited from the programs, the amount that they received and the 
cost to the Australian community of providing these programs. 
State government departments also incur costs associated with provision of many of 
the Commonwealth and state programs, but for the most part, this information is not 
reported separately by program (appendix E).  
Costs to the broader community/economy 
Although assistance generally benefits the firms or industries that receive it (subject 
to the distortions that it may create), it typically comes at a cost to other sectors of 
the economy. For example, direct business subsidies increase returns to recipient 
farms and industries, but to fund subsidies governments must increase taxes and 
charges, cut back on spending for other programs in communities, or borrow 
additional funds. This can result in higher input costs for other businesses and/or 
lower disposable income for consumers to spend on goods and services. 
In some cases, particular types of industry assistance — most notably research, 
development and extension funding — can deliver net community benefits. As 
noted by the Western Australia Department of Agriculture and Food: 
Collectively, the money spent over the past decade on Exceptional Circumstances (EC) 
and other dry season initiatives could have, arguably, been better spent on bolstering 
public sector research and development, and building farm business and financial 
management capacity to lift agriculture’s declining productivity rate and to assist 
farmers to better manage risk. (sub. DR 186, p. 1) 
Similarly, some policies that have industry assistance effects may be justified on 
other grounds, such as the achievement of social or environmental objectives. 
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To the extent that funds are directed to programs that have been assessed as 
providing benefits to the community, those benefits may be reduced if program 
funds are not used to meet program objectives. Funds provided under the main 
drought programs are highly fungible with few, if any, requirements that they be 
spent on measures that will enhance self-reliance and preparedness. There is little 
accountability in use of funds by service providers or recipients.  
The cost of government assistance to farmers has escalated over recent years. With 
increases in expenditure on EC interest rate subsidies, the focus of support has 
markedly shifted away from farm households and towards businesses. Some 
programs have high administration costs relative to funds distributed. There has 
been very little accountability in the use of funds or the evaluation of program 
outcomes. 
6.4 Evaluation of programs that support rural families 
Australia’s social security system is designed to provide a basic welfare safety net 
for all Australians through the provision of income support to those experiencing 
genuine financial difficulty. It is therefore appropriate that rural households in 
financial hardship similarly have access to basic income support.  
This requirement is recognised by inquiry participants. For example, the Australian 
Dairy Industry Council stated that: 
The government has a role to provide access for farmers and rural businesses to the 
basic social safety net available to all other Australians. (sub. 58, p. 4) 
Similarly, the South Australian Country Women’s Association contended that: 
Government must ensure a minimum level of individual wellbeing for farm families at 
all times, not only in times of severe drought. (sub. 72, p. 2) 
However, extensive farm assets and ongoing farm management obligations can 
mean that, even when in financial difficulty, farm families do not meet the income, 
asset and job search criteria necessary to access the community wide Newstart 
support or pension programs. The Commonwealth Government response to this has 
been to develop specific programs targeted at groups of farmers – such as those in 
EC areas. There are concerns as to whether this is the most effective and efficient 
way to support the rural community. Details on the programs for household income 
support are provided in appendix B. 
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EC Relief Payments 
Accessibility of support 
The EC Relief Payment (ECRP) program appears to be reaching those farms that it 
is targeting — farm families in EC areas that are experiencing financial hardship. 
ECRP recipients, on average, earned lower farm net cash income and had lower 
levels of off-farm income from employment or investments, than either non 
recipients within EC areas or those not in EC areas (figure 6.3). As the off-farm 
income position of farm families who are similarly experiencing EC but not 
receiving EC support is more akin to the position of farms not in EC areas, it seems 
that off-farm income is an important factor in improving the self-reliance of farm 
families during drought.  
Figure 6.3 Income levels of EC recipients and non recipientsa 
Average annual data for 2002-03 to 2007-08 
   20 000
   40 000
   60 000
   80 000
   100 000
ECRP recipients ECIRS recipients Non recipients in EC
areas
Farms not in EC
areas
$
Off-farm investment income Off-farm wage and salary income Farm net cash income
a Excludes government payments to farm businesses or households.  
Data source: ABARE (2008 unpublished). 
Despite reaching those that it is targeting, the accessibility of the ECRP program 
was criticised by inquiry participants. These criticisms tend to focus on the income 
threshold levels in the eligibility tests. In particular, the farm income and off-farm 
income threshold levels are considered by some farming groups to be too low and 
result in some drought affected farmers not receiving income support. For example, 
the Coonamble Shire Council suggested that: 
The level of combined farm and off-farm income that is used by Centrelink to limit 
eligibility for relief payments is too low … Gross incomes only are used. (sub. 63, 
p. 10) 
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However, even after allowing for key farm assets to be exempt, the eligibility tests 
for ECRP are considerably more generous than Newstart and average household 
income levels of recipients are potentially much higher already than those of 
Newstart recipients (appendix B). Those farmers who are not eligible for assistance 
under the current ECRP criteria could reasonably be considered to have the 
resources to support themselves.  
For instance, the $20 000 off-farm income threshold for farm household income 
support is up to 12 times that applicable in the eligibility tests for other income 
support such as Newstart or disability allowances (appendix B). While generous 
eligibility criteria may enable some farmers with off-farm income to access support, 
in the longer term such criteria may discourage some farmers from diversifying 
farm income or maintaining the off-farm assets or income sources necessary for the 
farm family to become financially self-reliant. As suggested by the South Australian 
Advisory Board of Agriculture: 
… it is possible that the criteria is too generous and so farmers may see EC as their 
drought proofing rather than actively adding it to their own risk management planning. 
(sub. 71, p. 4) 
The absence of a regular reconciliation of income to determine ECRP eligibility and 
payments, places additional importance on the accuracy of applicants’ initial 
income estimates. 
While ECRP is not intended to be a broader income support program for other 
farmers in financial hardship, there are equity concerns with providing preferential 
access to income support for some groups of farmers and not others. The ‘lines on 
map’ issues (discussed in chapter 5) mean that there are likely to be some drought 
affected farmers who are in financial difficulty but are not eligible to apply for 
income support because they are not in an EC area. There are also families who are 
in temporary financial hardship for reasons other than drought but are outside of EC 
areas and not eligible for EC support (but may be eligible for other programs such 
as Transitional Income Support). 
Another criticism of ECRP is that the application process is overly burdensome. 
The Rural Financial Counselling Service in Gippsland detailed that: 
The income support applications through Centrelink are in most cases relatively 
straightforward taking as little time as an hour. Nevertheless, for a farmer to complete 
an application and be confident that it is correct can be daunting. Assistance is often 
required from either an accountant or a Rural Financial Counsellor. For farmers that 
operate their business as a Trust or Company there are extra forms to complete further 
complicating the application. (sub. 34, p. 7) 
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The Commission considers it appropriate that those who are applying for public 
funds for income support provide evidence to demonstrate their need of that 
support. That said, the application process should be as streamlined as possible, 
with minimal duplication in information provision and, for those with less complex 
business structures, generally not necessitate external professional assistance to 
complete the application forms.  
In terms of timeliness, the delivery of ECRP to farmers appears to be reasonably 
prompt once an area is declared to be in EC (appendix B), and as an alternative, 
eligible farmers in EC areas also have immediate access to income support under 
Newstart hardship provisions. 
Dependence on support 
While almost half of the current recipients of ECRP have received assistance 
continuously for 1 to 2 years, around half have been supported for longer, with 
almost 10 per cent of current recipients having received ECRP assistance 
continuously since 2003 (figure 6.4).  
Figure 6.4 Length of time in continuous receipt of ECRPa 
Recipients current at 9 January 2009 
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a
 The number of families receiving ECRP for 1-2 years may include some who ceased to receive assistance 
for a short period and then recommenced receipt.  
Data source: Centrelink (2009 unpublished). 
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From a survey of the 100 longest term recipients of ECRP, Centrelink reported that 
while nearly all intended to continue farming, only 60 per cent considered that they 
will be ‘self sufficient’ post EC and the remainder considered that they will require 
further support (Centrelink 2008c). Some current measures available that could 
further enhance self sufficiency are not widely adopted by long term ECRP 
recipients — only 4 per cent have FMDs and just over half have a business plan.  
Farmers who received ECRP were also more likely to also have received assistance 
under other government support programs including ECIRS, FarmBis and the Rural 
Financial Counselling Service (SACES 2008a). Centrelink (2008c) reported that 
over half of the longest term ECRP recipients are currently accessing assistance in 
addition to ECRP. This may indicate a continued reliance on government assistance 
over a number of years, rather than temporary use of assistance to improve 
preparedness for long term self-reliance. For example, Macquarie River Food and 
Fibre indicated that: 
There is a concern that those farming families not prepared to earn income off farm and 
maintain a low income, may be developing a security net of dependency, rather than 
this being a safety net for those families, working hard to develop long term self-reliant 
strategies. (sub. 36, p. 11) 
The Department of Transport and Regional Services (DoTRS) noted that the 
perception that recipients have only qualified for government support because they 
have made no attempt to become self-reliant has caused considerable tension within 
communities: 
The income test for ECRP has caused divisions in communities as farmers who ‘do the 
right thing’, diversifying the business base of their farms and households, are ineligible, 
and resent seeing neighbours who have ‘done nothing’ sit back and access government 
assistance. This has been described as an incentive to not diversify, which if true would 
exacerbate drought impacts in communities. (DoTRS 2005) 
One way that other social support programs, such as Newstart, attempt to limit long 
term dependence is through a set of mutual requirements that accompanies receipt 
of assistance. There is no such requirement with ECRP receipt and the 
responsibilities that come with other farm household support measures (such as the 
need to develop plans with a financial counsellor) could not be considered a 
deterrent to long term use of assistance. That said, any design of conditions needs to 
recognise that even in drought, farmers need to manage their land and stock and 
attempt to maintain the underlying viability of their farms, even if alternative 
employment is nearby. 
A lack of mutual responsibilities for ECRP receipt and evidence of some long term 
dependence on government support suggests that the program is distorting 
incentives for some families, may be delaying necessary farm adjustments in some 
areas and is unlikely to be efficient, in a whole of economy sense, in the long term.  
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The effectiveness of the ECRP program is limited by: its dependence on claimants 
being within an EC declaration area; the lack of mutual responsibilities on receipt 
of support; and the absence of a regular reconciliation with income earned. The 
farm specific assets and income criteria are very generous relative to Newstart 
criteria. 
Exceptional Circumstances relief payments should be replaced, subject to 
transition arrangements. 
Interim Income Support 
Interim Income Support (IIS) aims to provide short term financial support to 
farmers and small businesses that are in regions not yet EC declared, but are 
experiencing financial difficulties as a result of drought. As such, IIS enables 
income support to be provided to farmers and rural small businesses in a timely 
manner, which could minimise the cost to recipients of ‘red tape’ associated with 
delays in the EC declaration process, ensure early access to other training and 
community support programs and prevent family financial problems from 
escalating.  
However, the provision of IIS could reinforce an impression that recipients are 
‘entitled’ to support or create the expectation within the recipient communities that 
EC status will ultimately be confirmed. Such a view could be further supported by 
the continued availability of IIS for 6 months, even if the region is rejected for EC 
status. IIS increases the scope for lobbying for income support in particular regions 
as assistance can be provided without due consideration of eligibility through the 
EC process. IIS also comes with a significant efficiency cost to Centrelink 
(Centerlink sub. 104).  
Farm Help and Transitional Income Support 
There are two key income support programs for farmers that are not triggered by 
drought — Farm Help Income Support (FHIS) under the AAA policy framework 
and Transitional Income Support (TIS) under the follow-on policy framework, AFF. 
These programs aim to provide short term income support and adjustment 
assistance to farmers in financial difficulty for reasons not necessarily related to 
drought. That is, they target the most vulnerable farm families that are in financial 
difficulty, regardless of the cause.  
Given the characteristics of its recipients, the Farm Help Income Support program is 
effective at getting income assistance to the most vulnerable farm households 
RECOMMENDATION 6.1 
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(appendix B). SACES (2007) report that Farm Help recipients increased their off-
farm income after participation in the program. A particular concern to this inquiry 
though, is that the program specifically targets those who are unable to borrow 
against their assets from commercial lenders. This could mean that the government 
is supporting the owners of farms which are commercially unviable in the long 
term, thereby making farm and industry adjustments more costly to achieve. This 
factor, in combination with the accessibility of rural finance to viable farms in times 
of drought, even with recent adjustments to risk premiums (Australian Banker’s 
Association sub. 76), suggests that Farm Help Income Support is not likely to be an 
efficient use of government funds in rural communities. 
Transitional Income Support is similarly aimed at families on marginal farms in 
financial hardship, particularly those coming out of EC. While the objectives of the 
program are linked to management of climate change effects, provision of short 
term financial support to the owners of Australia’s most marginal farms is not 
necessarily an appropriate means to achieve such a long term objective. As for Farm 
Help Income Support, TIS does not ensure that recipients operate farms which are 
commercially viable. However, and in contrast to Farm Help, the financial 
assessment in TIS does at least attempt to limit income support to those farm 
households which have insufficient liquid resources to support themselves or meet 
their immediate expenses. As for other income support programs for farmers, the 
absence of a regular reconciliation of income to determine eligibility and payments, 
places additional importance on the accuracy of applicant’s initial income estimates. 
There has been widespread criticism of the limited accessibility of TIS 
(appendix B). Of most focus is the $1.5 million threshold level for total farm 
business (and non-farm) net assets. While Paton (2008) speculated that ‘as few as 
1000 farmers will qualify for the new payments because the value of their land and 
farm assets is too high’, ABARE data (2009 unpublished) indicates that there were 
around 10 000 broadacre and dairy farms and a further 2300 vegetable and sugar 
farms across Australia that had less than $1.5 million in farm net assets and less 
than $20 000 in liquid assets in 2007-08 (and this does not include farms in other 
agricultural industries). Further, the program has a higher asset threshold than 
Newstart, recognising farming circumstances.  
Income support to farmers under Farm Help and TIS is due to end on 30 June 2009. 
There is widespread acceptance of the need for income support for farm families 
that are experiencing financial hardship, while not facilitating long term 
dependence. However, provision of income support based on particular events, such 
as drought, is inequitable and ignores difficulties that farm families not in EC 
declared areas have in accessing broader social security programs. Income support 
for those in hardship should not be tied to broader policies such as climate change. 
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Small Business Income Support 
Small Business Income Support (SBIS) was introduced by the Commonwealth 
Government, with little consultation or justification, in November 2006. The 
program is due to end on 30 June 2009 but may continue to be available beyond that 
date for current recipients in areas that remain EC declared (Primary Industries 
Ministerial Forum 2008b). In general, SBIS appears to be meeting its objectives of 
supporting the families of those small business operations that are most dependent 
on farm expenditure, such as contractors and suppliers (appendix B). In this sense, 
SBIS is operating effectively, but whether it is an appropriate program is 
questionable. 
Families of small business operators typically do not face the same constraints that 
farmers do in accessing the broader income support measures available to the rest of 
the community. That is, they generally do not have such lumpy non divisible assets 
as do farmers (although there are exceptions to this — for example, Mengels Heli 
Services, sub. 3), do not face the same difficulties in diversifying income sources, 
and are usually located in towns and so would be more able to meet program 
obligations, such as those that are required of Newstart recipients.  
There are also equity issues within and between communities in providing 
differential access arrangements for income support between different businesses. 
There are many factors other than drought which have significant negative impacts 
on the family income levels of small businesses operators. However, it is not 
government policy to provide special support for the myriad of small businesses 
that risk their capital and, in some cases, fail. 
It is difficult to justify, on equity grounds, the preferential access to income support 
for some small businesses’ families over all others who similarly take risks in 
setting up a business. 
Exceptional Circumstances small business income support should be terminated, 
subject to transition arrangements. 
6.5 Evaluation of drought triggered business programs 
The primary form of drought triggered business support is interest rate subsidies. 
These are aimed at supporting farm and rural dependent small businesses which are 
viable in the long term but are currently experiencing financial difficulty due to an 
EC event (DAFF 2008d). The Commonwealth Government provides exit packages 
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for those farms which are not viable in the long term, and several state governments 
offer business assistance in the form of transport subsidies. The effectiveness and 
efficiency of these programs is evaluated in the context of the NDP objectives. 
Further details on the programs for drought-triggered related business support are 
provided in appendixes C and E.  
EC interest rate subsidies 
Accessibility and appropriateness of support 
The EC interest rate subsidy (ECIRS) program appears to be reaching those farms 
in EC areas that are most likely to have difficulty in meeting interest repayments on 
debt. ECIRS recipients not only have lower liquidity levels than non recipients, but 
have also incurred higher debt levels such that the interest payments absorb what 
little cash they do earn (figure 6.5). For those receiving EC assistance, the ratio of 
farm debt to farm receipts (which does not include government payments) is around 
146 per cent on average, compared with around 90 per cent for non recipients. 
Further, ECIRS recipients may have less capacity to increase their farm receipts in 
the short term as they also have lower average crop productivity levels than non 
recipients (appendix C).  
Figure 6.5 Liquidity and debt of EC recipients and non recipients 
Average annual data for 2002-03 to 2007-08 
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Data source: ABARE (2008 unpublished). 
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However, as the liquidity and debt position of farms that are similarly experiencing 
EC but not receiving EC support is more akin to the position of farms not in EC 
areas, it seems likely that drought is only one of the factors contributing to the 
financial difficulties of ECIRS recipients.  
The main criticisms from inquiry participants on the accessibility of ECIRS relate to 
the viability (or otherwise) of applicants. A number claimed that despite the 
eligibility criteria for ECIRS, many viable farms in EC areas in need of carry-on 
finance are unable to access business support under ECIRS, while some non-viable 
farms receive support (appendix C). Carrigan and Co. Pty. Ltd., a Narrabri 
accounting firm, noted that: 
While the program states that part of the eligibility criteria is that the farm must be 
viable in the long term, the reality is that a significant portion of the successful 
applicants are unviable and many viable farmers are having their applications rejected 
because they are ‘not considered to be at financial risk’ … among the reasons why 
unviable farmers are being granted subsidies is the reviewer’s reluctance to ‘make the 
call’ that the applicant is unviable and hence being responsible for ‘forcing’ the 
applicant farmer to leave his/her farm. (sub. 32, p. 2) 
This claim has some validity as an independent viability test is typically not 
required until the level of interest subsidy provided to a farm reaches $300 000. To 
the extent that non viable farms are receiving support, ECIRS is ineffectively 
provided and may be increasing the costs of industry adjustment in the longer term. 
However, ECIRS also potentially supports those who suffer from poor timing, such 
as a younger generation who have bought a property just prior to drought, or 
farmers who expanded their properties in the expectation of becoming more viable.  
The asset thresholds used in ECIRS eligibility tests have also been criticised as 
insufficient, particularly for larger operations. However, there is no limit on the 
value of farm assets (including FMD balances and the family home) and the 
$750 000 threshold level for off-farm assets is about three times the residence asset 
threshold that is applicable to a Newstart couple. 
Some inquiry participants noted differences between states in the way in which 
eligibility for ECIRS was assessed. In Victoria, for example, access to assistance 
was based on the financial need of the applicant and not only on having met the 
eligibility criteria. In contrast, it was indicated that in New South Wales, if a 
producer was eligible for the program, then the full payment amount could be 
accessed. While all states reject applications on the basis of ‘not in need’, there was 
evidence that rejections on this basis were disproportionately higher in Victoria 
(appendix C). Such differences in the interpretation of the ECIRS eligibility 
arrangements mean that the policy is not uniformly applied across the country. 
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These differences generate inequalities and lessen the scope for policy to meet its 
objectives.  
There was also some commentary from inquiry participants on the resources 
required to apply for ECIRS. The Rural Financial Counselling Service in Gippsland 
detailed that: 
Interest Rate Subsidy applications generally take much longer [than ECRP] to 
complete; two hours at best plus time to collect information and Lender’s Certificates – 
but may take 6 to 8 hours if complicated. Our RFCs report that if they are completed by 
an accountant the cost is generally $250 to $500, however we have knowledge of one 
instance of a fee in excess of $15,000. (sub. 34, p. 7) 
It can be difficult for companies and trusts to meet the eligibility criteria for ECIRS 
as all directors’ assets are summed for the asset test. Several farmers noted that 
access to ECIRS is difficult for farms which have set up their management structure 
as a corporation or family trust and that this is problematic and inconsistent with 
many succession plans: 
Farms that trade as Corporations or Family Trusts find it very difficult to separate 
assets between different generations. The younger generation is therefore ineligible for 
any form of support. (Highview, sub. 37, p. 2) 
Growers who have formed partnerships with neighbours or who have remained farming 
in a large business structure with family members, for the benefits of economies of 
scale, have been unable to access any form of financial assistance (L. Mann, sub. 42, 
p. 2) 
However, the business structure under which farms operate is a management choice 
which should take into consideration the overall comparative advantages and 
disadvantages of operating as a sole trader, partnership, trust or company. While 
some management structures may afford greater access to government drought 
assistance, others may provide advantages more generally, such as through the tax 
system.  
Unintended consequences of support 
ECIRS creates a number of perverse incentives and unintended outcomes which are 
likely to reduce the effectiveness of the program. In particular: 
• As the program provides the most assistance to those with the largest debt, there 
is an incentive for some to build debt and/or not reduce debt when faced with 
drought risk as governments have a history of stepping in and subsidising its cost 
(having financial reserves and a lower debt to equity ratio can be an important 
hedge against drought risks). Rural Directions claimed that: 
[The EC declaration] can cause debt to be held in place for longer than normal to 
‘position’ for potential assistance. (sub. 35, p. 3) 
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• Recipients may be less responsive to drought conditions as financial assistance 
increases the potential to spend money on additional variable inputs (such as 
fodder) to maintain production levels. The total cash costs of ECIRS recipients 
are greater than non-recipients, on average, during the latest drought, in 
particular for fodder costs (appendix C). This may have unintended 
consequences for the long term condition of natural resources. A group of 
farmers, the M. and D. Geldard and T. Reid, submitted that:  
[ECIRS] promotes ‘worst practice’ farming ie. to overgraze and overspend in the good 
times, knowing the criteria for subsidy will be met in the drought. (sub. 46, p. 1) 
• There may be a disincentive to diversify income sources off-farm. 
S. and A. Boardman, farmers in Northern New South Wales who did attempt to 
earn off-farm income, considered this a less profitable outcome than receiving 
government assistance:  
If we had not carried out farm contracting during the 2007 year it is quite possible we 
would have received the maximum interest subsidy of $100,000. So therefore, other 
farmers who had a reduced workload due to the drought, made more money from 
receiving interest subsidy than we netted from farm contracting. How unfair is this? 
(sub. 43, p. 2) 
• As with any subsidy on production, interest subsidies can become capitalised 
into asset values and thereby penalise non-assisted farmers and new farmers who 
wish to purchase capital inputs. For example, J. Cooper, a grazier, noted that:  
The drought assistance being provided to unviable and ‘poor’ managers is helping to 
sustain land prices, and reducing the opportunity for more productive and viable farm 
businesses to expand. Without the interest subsidies more land would be on the market 
and the normal market driven by supply and demand would not be distorted. (sub. 10, 
pp. 1–2) 
• Interest subsidies represent a windfall gain to farms receiving the subsidy and 
provide an unjustifiable competitive advantage to recipient farmers over non-
recipient farmers (Milham and Davenport 1997). 
Having farmers dependent on government support for their businesses not only has 
implications for the way in which they operate, but also results in a less productive 
agricultural sector in the longer term. The J. and P. Dampney, graziers in northern 
New South Wales, similarly argued that: 
… we felt very concerned that continually handing out interest subsidies was having a 
depreciating effect on the whole rural community eg., increasing the price of land 
values, farmers becoming reliant on the subsidy, farmers organising their finance so 
they remain eligible, so not being as productive as they could be. (sub. 16, p. 1) 
Overall, the incentives inadvertently created by ECIRS may mean farm businesses 
adopt less self-reliant strategies prior to droughts in the belief that governments will 
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help to maintain the business during droughts. Ultimately, the appropriateness of 
ECIRS assistance rests on whether it is tied to a valid rationale for government 
intervention (section 6.1). However, the program does not meet any of the valid 
rationales for government intervention that underpin the NDP. The directing of 
ECIRS payments to those with liquidity problems during drought events would 
suggest there is some impediment to farmers accessing carry-on finance during 
these periods, which could be considered a basis for government intervention. 
However, recipients have high equity levels — an average equity ratio of over 
80 per cent. Further, the Australian Banker’s Association (sub. 76) indicate that 
viable businesses in the rural sector have been able to obtain credit in recent years, 
even with recent adjustments in risk premiums faced by farmers. Accordingly, the 
rationale for provision of this type of business support is not sound.  
Interest rate subsidies are inappropriate, ineffective and inefficient. They focus 
support onto those farms and businesses in EC areas that, on average, have high 
levels of debt, low levels of liquid assets and low off-farm income.  
Exceptional Circumstances interest rate subsidies should be terminated, subject to 
transition arrangements. 
Exit packages 
Exit packages are often supported as a tool to encourage unviable farmers to leave 
the industry and to enable expansion by other more efficient producers (chapter 5). 
They may include an asset-contingent exit grant and support to help the farmer with 
retraining or transitioning to other employment.  
The EC exit package primarily targets smaller farmers with very low asset levels. 
Consequently, by the end of 2008 there had been a low uptake with only 98 farms 
(21 per cent of applicants) receiving assistance under the package.  
Despite the availability of an exit package to farmers that goes well beyond any 
support provided to other small businesses who wish to cease trading, the EC exit 
package for farmers has been almost universally criticised by inquiry participants 
for its lack of generosity (appendix C). Horticulture Australia Council argues that: 
The Exit Grant package has been a fiasco from its inception. There are far too many 
hurdles and the ‘rewards’ for getting over them minimal. $150 000 would appear to be 
a pittance when it is expected that the recipient must relinquish their income, their 
ambition, their home and sometimes their life’s work … The grant is taxable. Tenure is 
a problem. Even though the property owner may be severely affected by the 
exceptional circumstances, he/she must have owned the property for five years to be 
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eligible. Those who have sought off-farm work to ride out the current crisis may be 
found ineligible because they are not contributing significantly to the enterprise. 
(sub. 66, p. 14) 
Similarly, Murraylands Regional Development Board suggests that the program is 
largely inaccessible: 
That farmers need to be almost close to fore-closure before being considered is a 
perverse approach. (sub. 68, p. 4) 
The South Australian Country Women’s Association indicated that the number of 
farmers who wish to leave farming is considerable in some regions: 
A recent survey in the Riverland showed up to 60% wish to exit and see no future in 
irrigated horticulture. (sub. 72, p. 2) 
As only 5 farms along the South Australian part of the Murray have received the 
exit grant (out of 33 applicants), this could support a view that the exit grant is not 
accessible to those who wish to leave farming and has done little to facilitate 
adjustment within the industry in times of drought.  
To some extent, the effectiveness and uptake of the package may have been reduced 
by the provision of other forms of business assistance (such as ECIRS, MDB 
Irrigation Management Grants and Farm Help) which helps to maintain these farms 
both during drought and more generally. Of those who had received exit assistance 
by end June 2008, 65 per cent had also received other EC assistance (ECIRS and/or 
EC relief payment) for an average of 17 months prior to leaving the industry. 
However, the effectiveness of the EC exit package is also limited by its failure to 
address the non-monetary reasons to remain on the farm – the knowledge of 
farming as an occupation and lack of knowledge of alternatives, lack of formal 
recognition of skills that are in demand in non-farming occupations, a reluctance to 
move away from the family home, lifestyle and the community in which the farmer 
and family have lived. These factors are believed to be major impediments to the 
effectiveness of exit schemes and mean that financial incentives alone are unlikely 
to encourage a significant number to leave farming (Botterill 2001).  
While there may be some information and social impediments that justify the 
inclusion of assistance in retraining in exit packages, there is little evidence to 
suggest that a transition out of farming would not occur just as readily in the 
absence of exit grants as they are currently structured. There is no clear rationale for 
why exit grants should be available to the farming sector over other businesses. 
There are several other exit packages also currently on offer to farmers. The exit 
package included in the AFF policy framework includes a Re-establishment Grant 
   
156 GOVERNMENT 
DROUGHT SUPPORT 
 
 
and is very similar to the EC exit package. Its effectiveness is similarly likely to be 
limited by the current availability of other business and household support that 
keeps farmers on their farms and its failure to address the non-monetary reasons that 
delay people from exiting the industry.  
To some extent, the non-monetary issues with leaving farming may have been 
addressed in the new exit grant package for small scale irrigators in Murray Darling 
Basin — the Small Block Irrigator Exit Grant package, introduced in November 
2008. Under this package, the Australian Government will purchase the water 
entitlements of irrigators on very small blocks of land and in return, the farming 
family is able to remain on the land in their house, receive an exit grant, and 
assistance to remediate their land and undertake training (appendix C). As each state 
in the Murray Darling Basin has now agreed to pre-requisite water reforms, the 
program is available to all MDB irrigators until 30 June 2009. 
While there may be information and social impediments that justify some 
adjustment assistance to exiting farmers, there is no indication that transition out of 
farming would not occur just as readily in the absence of exit grants, as currently 
structured. Provision of special grants to farmers exiting their industry distorts 
markets and raises inequities with other groups in the community.  
The Exceptional Circumstances exit package should be terminated, subject to 
transition arrangements. The Re-establishment grants that are provided under the 
Australia’s Farming Future initiative should similarly end.  
The appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of the Small Block Irrigators 
Exit Grant package should be evaluated following its conclusion. 
Assistance to rural dependent small businesses 
A number of inquiry participants considered that assistance should be provided to 
small businesses impacted by drought. However, the limited evidence available on 
the uptake of small business assistance programs suggests that they have not been 
particularly useful in helping small businesses to manage the effects of drought. For 
example, a study into the effects of drought on small businesses in the New South 
Wales town of Wee Waa by Spanswick et al. (2008), found that for those who 
accessed drought support: 
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… over 50% of businesses who accessed this service did not find it useful … One 
business commented that drought relief seemed to offer no benefit to well run 
businesses that were doing it tough. (Spanswick et al. 2008, p. 3) 
Most of the reasoning provided by inquiry participants regarding small business 
assistance is based on the notion that governments should provide support to rural 
communities in order to maintain their functioning and social fabric and to resist 
external factors inducing change. While it is likely that droughts or other 
exceptional circumstances exacerbate the effects of other broader changes in 
communities, such objectives rightfully lie outside the focus of the current NDP. 
Temporary drought assistance is not the appropriate means to address these 
underlying long term issues. Indeed, there are many other programs provided by all 
levels of governments to assist with the development and functioning of rural 
communities (appendixes B and E) and it is not for this inquiry to assess their 
effectiveness.  
There are also efficiency concerns with providing government assistance to 
businesses. Unless there is a sound rationale, poorly targeted assistance can distort 
production and supply decisions and make recipients less responsive to drought 
conditions. 
Arguments for assistance to drought affected small businesses are largely based on 
a desire to sustain rural communities in the face of underlying and ongoing 
changes. Drought programs are not the appropriate vehicle to address this issue.   
Transport subsidies 
Transport subsidies for stock, fodder and water were introduced in a number of 
states to maintain stock levels and promote animal welfare outcomes (appendix E). 
Some inquiry participants strongly supported the payments, considering them to be 
useful in providing farmers with greater flexibility in managing their business in 
times of drought. For example, as argued by the NSW Farmers Association: 
The transport subsidy has been very beneficial to farmers providing valuable assistance 
to mitigate effects of drought on livestock … it is felt that the subsidy is assisting 
farmers to make decisions and supporting the welfare objectives of the subsidy. 
(sub. 98, p. 20) 
However, the effectiveness of these provisions has been questioned by previous 
reviews of drought policy (chapter 4) and also by those governments that provide 
this assistance. The Queensland Government (sub. 77) suggested that transaction 
based subsidies have the potential to alter decision-making by: 
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• encouraging producers to maintain higher stocking levels during drought 
(potentially to the detriment of the environment and those farmers who might 
otherwise purchase stock or provide agistment) 
• encouraging the maintenance of stock through agistment whereas it may have 
been better to dispose of stock 
• encouraging the purchase of fodder and other inputs during drought rather than 
building fodder storages 
• increasing the demand for fodder during droughts which provides benefits to 
fodder producers and those who supply fodder transport, but has a detrimental 
effect on other industries and producers in other states that do not receive the 
subsidies  
In addition, the New South Wales Government suggested that such payments could 
have a longer term impact on sustainable production through creating permanent 
changes to production decisions (sub. 90). These comments were also echoed by the 
South Australian Government (sub. 91). Further, whether such payments provide 
material gains to those farmers who take advantage of them is also questionable. 
The New South Wales Government suggested that it is likely that such payments 
are capitalised into the cost of transport services and fodder (sub. 90).  
The views of the state governments were also supported by the Australian Dairy 
Industry Council: 
… transport subsidies in EC areas – the result was increased feed and transport costs in 
areas that were not EC declared but still drought affected. (sub. 58, p. 6) 
Australian Pork Limited similarly stated that: 
Certain forms of state assistance such as transport subsidies create perverse outcomes 
for pork producers. Current fodder and feed grain freight subsidies only serve to 
increase the price of grain to the extent of the freight subsidy conferring little or no 
benefit to pork producers in drought areas. (sub. DR155, p. 9) 
Rural Directions further argued that: 
Where these [transport subsidies] are provided, they lead to all sorts of rorts:  
• Hay or grain prices increase to the level of the freight or fodder subsidies  
• Hay or grain may be ‘resold’ with extra freight paid  
• Hay and grain are sold interstate because prices are higher. This either pushes up 
prices in the state of origin or leads to an artificial shortage. (sub. 35, p. 4) 
In terms of the NDP objectives, these subsidies do not encourage producers to 
become more self-reliant. Rather, payments may encourage producers to be less 
reactive to changes in climatic conditions and thereby be more exposed to climate 
risks. Transport subsidies are also likely to work against the objective of 
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maintaining and protecting the environmental resource base during droughts. By 
encouraging producers to hold onto stock there is an increased potential for 
environmental degradation through effects such as increased soil erosion. 
Despite criticism amongst farming groups and by state government departments, 
and previous agreements by governments to remove transport subsidies (for 
example, Agricultural Council of Australia and New Zealand 1992), the subsidies 
continue to be available to farmers in New South Wales, Queensland and the 
Northern Territory. 
Transport subsidies encourage producers to maintain higher stocking levels during 
drought and potentially lead to environmental degradation. They reduce incentives 
to store fodder in preparation for drought and thereby increase its demand during 
droughts. While this benefits fodder producers, it has detrimental effects on other 
industries and producers in other states who do not receive the subsidies.  
States and territories should, as previously agreed, terminate transactions-based 
subsidies. 
6.6 Evaluation of preparedness and advice programs 
Farm business assistance measures that are not triggered by drought exist for a 
range of purposes including to encourage greater self-reliance, to build up the skills 
and knowledge of farm owners and workers to prepare them to deal with factors 
such as income volatility, and to facilitate long term productivity improvements and 
structural adjustment. The extent to which these purposes are met is considered in 
the evaluation of these programs, along with the effectiveness and efficiency of 
each program. Details on the programs for business support are provided in 
appendix D.  
Farm management deposits 
The Farm Management Deposit (FMD) scheme is a relatively effective form of 
assistance for primary producers that potentially assists in building a self-reliant 
platform for drought preparedness through incentives to maintain financial reserves. 
This assessment is consistent with earlier reviews of FMDs. The FMD scheme was 
found to be meeting its objectives as a risk management tool when reviewed in 
2006 (DAFF 2006) and the Corish Report considered that FMDs are a vital risk 
management tool available to farmers and recommended that they be retained 
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subject to assessment that they were meeting objectives (Agriculture and Food 
Policy Reference Group 2006). 
The scheme is effectively provided, largely through the commercial sector, with 
minimal input from governments. Importantly, availability of the scheme is not 
dependent on drought declaration, location or farm type. Of course, FMDs are not 
useful to farmers who are unviable, nor to new farmers who are impacted by 
drought before they are able to generate a cash surplus.  
One of the main criticisms of the current FMD scheme by inquiry participants was 
its inaccessibility to those with farms operating under a company or trust structure. 
However Rodriguez, Watson and Mues (2006) reported that the eligibility 
restrictions on business structure and off-farm income levels prevented only a small 
number of farmers using FMDs. The Commission considers that the business 
structure under which farms operate is a management choice which should take into 
consideration the overall comparative advantages and disadvantages of operating as 
a sole trader, partnership, trust or company. While some of these possible structures 
afford greater ease of access to the tax deferral and tax saving advantages of FMDs, 
other business structures may offer the potential for lower business tax rates more 
generally. 
Although a major reason for using FMDs appears to be for tax management 
purposes, the scheme has also been an effective risk management tool for farmers 
during the latest drought (Rodriguez, Watson and Mues 2006). For livestock 
enterprises, a pattern of increasing FMD deposits during a drought is likely to be 
driven by destocking and is indicative of the scheme being used for risk 
management purposes. For grain farmers, it appears that FMDs have been drawn 
down in recent years, coincident with poor or failed crops and higher input prices 
for fuel and fertilizer. It is likely that in the absence of competing forms of 
assistance, reliance on FMDs to manage for risks such as drought would be higher. 
Rodriguez, Watson and Mues (2006) reports that farms with FMDs, on average, 
received significantly less other government assistance. 
The FMD scheme may make it rational for farmers to simultaneously borrow funds 
and place business income in FMDs (in effect, achieving an arbitrage). While this 
may be a somewhat perverse incentive, FMDs generally do not generate the 
distortionary outcomes for production decisions that are characteristic of other 
government business assistance (such as interest rate and transport subsidies). They 
are also unlikely to involve high administration costs and do not require the 
government to make assessments of farm viability or performance. FMDs are 
therefore likely to be a more efficient means of encouraging financial self-reliance 
than some other measures.  
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FMDs have encouraged some farmers to save during periods of higher income. 
While they are mainly used for tax management purposes, they appear to also offer 
a means for achieving increased self-reliance. 
Grants for training and advice 
Grants for training and advice are a common form of government assistance 
provided to farmers, both during drought and at other times (chapter 8 and 
appendix D). At the Commonwealth Government level, training and advice have 
been facilitated through: 
• FarmBis — offered a partial subsidy for approved training activities. This 
program has now concluded but further discussion on its features is included in 
chapter 8. 
• FarmReady — provides grants for training with approved providers to help 
farmers deal with the effects of climate change. Receipt of the grant is not 
related to income or farm financial position. The program was announced in July 
2008 but was not fully operational until early 2009. 
• Farm Help Advice and Training Grants — available to obtain advice, undertake 
training and purchase appropriate computer software to diversify and improve 
management. Receipt of a grant requires an initial advice session and 
development of a plan to improve financial position. This program ends on 
30 April 2009 and will not be evaluated here. 
• Climate Change Adjustment Program Advice and Training Grants — followed 
on from Farm Help to enable farmers to receive advice and training from 
recognised professional advisers and registered training organisations. Receipt of 
the grant requires an assessment of farm financial position. The program is 
available up until December 2011, but there is little information on recipients of 
these grants in this, the program’s first year of operation. 
• Professional Advice and Planning Grants (PAPG) — available from October 
2006 to June 2009 to enable farm businesses affected by drought to obtain 
professional advice to aid in drought management and recovery. Receipt of the 
grant requires an assessment of farm viability. 
Grants which are aimed at a training or educational outcome, such as those under 
FarmBis and FarmReady, may be appropriate for governments to fund, to the extent 
that they are well targeted and provide ongoing benefits to the broader community. 
Grants for training that are well targeted, area appropriate and have an 
educational outcome may provide social benefits and be worthwhile.  
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The rationale for government intervention through planning and advice style grants 
is more limited. The benefits from advice provided by consultants are largely 
private in nature, with few community wide benefits, so a farmer should invest 
optimally in consultancy services on the basis of the return that these will generate 
for their business. That said, it is possible that there is a lack of awareness of advice 
available, a dearth of independent and objective sources for advice, or limited 
understanding of the benefits that such advice can provide.  
PAPG is broadly consistent with the objectives of the NDP and is likely to have 
been effective in helping some farmers undertake private planning activities, such 
as developing a drought management plan, or gaining advice on income 
diversification into revenue producing off-farm assets. However, the effectiveness 
of the scheme may have been limited by: a requirement that applicants must be in 
an EC area to be eligible for the grants; the need for a farm viability assessment; 
increases in consultant fees to the level of the grant; and the availability of more 
generous and fungible assistance measures (EC interest rate subsidies). Further, it is 
not clear that funding of this type of advice by government to individual farmers has 
generated community wide benefits. While initial use of PAPG was quite low, there 
has been a considerable increase in its use more recently, with over half of the total 
funds under the scheme distributed in the second half of 2008 (appendix D). In line 
with other EC programs, PAPG may continue beyond 30 June 2009 for current 
recipients in areas that remain EC declared (Primary Industries Ministerial Forum 
2008b).  
Government provision of support for financial or farming advice to farmers is only 
appropriate in those areas for which there are community wide benefits.  
Exceptional Circumstances professional advice and planning grants should be 
terminated, subject to transition arrangements. 
Grants for the provision of counselling services 
The Rural Financial Counselling Service (RFCS) program provides grants to state 
and regional organisations who offer free and impartial financial guidance for 
farmers and rural small businesses in financial difficulty. Commonwealth and State 
Governments have committed funding for the service until 30 June 2011.  
While not a drought specific program, the objectives of the RFCS are not 
inconsistent with the NDP objectives. Counsellors funded under the program can 
assist farmers to adopt self-reliant approaches, facilitate access to advice from other 
agencies and help farmers to understand their financial position and long term 
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options for viability. In recognition of this, the TIS program uses rural financial 
counsellors to case manage those farmers who have uncertain prospects for viability 
in the future. 
The RFCS is a popular scheme and the counselling services funded under the 
program were considered to be effective by many participants in this inquiry. For 
instance, AgForce submitted: 
Continuation of Rural financial counsellors is imperative. These counsellors provide 
significant services to clients and can in the future place further emphasis on climate 
variability planning to help producers become more proactive in this area. (sub. 80, 
p. 9) 
Similarly, the New South Wales Government considered the RFCS to be effective: 
NSW considers the program to be equitable, needs driven and cost effective. It is very 
highly regarded in the community and achieves significant penetration of the farm 
sector. This Program is considered to be an effective means of facilitating improved 
farm businesses risk management and adjustment across rural NSW. (sub. 90, p. 6) 
The Coonamble Shire Council reported that 
During drought, RFCs provide an easily accessible, independent source of information, 
support and referral for people experiencing high levels of stress. They have a thorough 
understanding of financial and personal options, other specialist sources of support, and 
are the ‘frontline’ in drought assistance. (sub. 63, p. 8) 
However, there are potential issues that can reduce the effectiveness of the program. 
Many such issues were identified in the 2003 audit and 2004 review and subsequent 
changes to the program appear to have addressed many of these (appendix D). But it 
appears some issues remain. With only 120 counsellors, gaps in coverage remain. 
There also appears to be a relatively high retention rate of existing clients, although 
in some cases this may be due to a previous client seeking assistance for a new issue 
some years later. Expansion of the service in the last two years has also resulted in 
substantial numbers of new clients. It is likely that the effectiveness of the service 
diminishes over time for regular clients. The effectiveness of the scheme is also 
affected by cross-over and duplication between the RFCS and other services that are 
available.  
As with grants for advice, the largely private benefits from financial counselling 
services mean that the rationale for government intervention is relatively weak. 
However, it appears from inquiry submissions that the RFCS program potentially 
has a useful, objective role in facilitating the provision of financial guidance in 
communities.  
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Financial counselling services also facilitate a flow of information in communities 
and should act as a referral point for other services. To the extent that these benefits 
eventuate, government funding of the RFCS could provide net social benefits, 
including greater social cohesion. However, to maximise the effectiveness of the 
RFCS program, the financial counselling services need to be responsive and 
educational for farmers, and clients should be referred on to other services as soon 
as needs are identified.  
The RFCS program enables financial counselling services in rural areas to 
facilitate a flow of information and act as referral points for other services.  
Murray-Darling Basin Irrigation Management Grant 
The Irrigation Management Grant is a popular program with irrigators as it is 
relatively generous, and is largely unrestricted in its eligibility and use. It is not, 
however, an appropriate or efficient use of public funds.  
In contrast to investments in human capital (through education and training), there 
would seem to be no information or rural financial market constraints that prevent 
irrigators (or any other farmer) from undertaking financially worthwhile 
infrastructure improvements.  
There could be community wide issues with respect to water use efficiency that 
justify government intervention. However, the grant does not address these. Rather, 
the primary focus of the grant is to assist in improving on-farm water use efficiency 
— that is, it may assist farmers in maintaining productivity in the face of lower 
water availability and in increasing the commercial returns from their water 
allocation. The benefits of this will be largely captured by individual farmers; any 
broader regional consequences would be affected by the location of a particular 
irrigator. However, these regional consequences could be negative — for example, 
where increased on-farm efficiency reduces ground water recharge and the return 
flows into rivers (Productivity Commission 2006).  
As for most other forms of business assistance, the Irrigation Management Grant 
has the effect of keeping businesses operating in their current location, rewarding 
those irrigators who have not acted early to update their infrastructure, and may 
delay long term decisions such as exit from the industry or sale of water 
entitlements, and thereby increase the costs of eventual adjustment in the industry. 
In particular, public investment in irrigation infrastructure which precedes the 
implementation of a water buy-back scheme could be expected to increase the cost 
of purchased water. The Irrigation Management Grant is also contrary to 
government water policy for greater use of water markets to bring about 
   
 PROGRAM 
EVALUATION 
165
 
adjustments in the location of water use. Payments under the grant are due to 
conclude on 30 June 2009. 
There is no indication that farmers are impeded in undertaking financially 
worthwhile irrigation infrastructure projects, nor is it clear that the off-farm 
environmental consequences from such investments are more beneficial than 
harmful. Government support to farmers in the form of Irrigation Management 
Grants is therefore not considered appropriate. 
The Murray-Darling Basin Irrigation Management Grants program should 
conclude, as scheduled, on 30 June 2009. 
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7 A new policy framework 
 
Key points 
• The National Drought Policy should be replaced by an extension of the objectives of 
the Australia’s Farming Future initiative, to clearly place the responsibility for 
managing climate variability and other risks with farmers and farm-dependent 
businesses. 
– The agricultural policies of state and territory governments should also embody 
this principle. 
• Governments should play a supporting role that addresses impediments to effective 
risk management and assists individuals and communities cope with change. 
• There is a need for a program designed for farming circumstances that provides 
temporary income support. This program should respond to the needs of farm 
families, rather than to the occurrence of drought.  
 
7.1 A revised national drought policy? 
While the National Drought Policy’s (NDP’s) focus on self-reliance and 
preparedness is sound, analysis of the programs constructed in its name reveals 
serious deficiencies. These deficiencies were recognised by a broad range of inquiry 
participants. Limited improvements could be pursued through changes to the NDP; 
however, it would be preferable to have drought dealt with in the various policies 
that impact on agriculture. There are several reasons why this would be the best 
approach, as outlined below. 
First, as explained in chapter 3, drought is only one of a number of risks faced by 
farmers. Other climate-related events (for example, unseasonal storms, hail and 
frost), changes in input costs and changes in output prices are also significant 
sources of risk. To the extent that management of risk by farmers is impeded by 
market failures that warrant government action, an approach that encompasses all 
types of risk is preferable to one that focuses on one particular type, such as 
drought. 
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Second, where climate-related agricultural programs are needed, these may be 
better targeted at climate variability and climate change generally, rather than 
specifically at drought. The Commonwealth, state and territory governments are 
developing climate change adaptation policies under the National Agriculture and 
Climate Change Action Plan. There is the potential for considerable overlap if these 
policies were pursued in parallel with a NDP, as they are all concerned with the 
challenges of managing climate risk. 
Third, various net-beneficial interventions by governments that assist farmers in 
managing drought can also promote change that improves farmers’ productivity and 
income during average and better seasons. There is a danger that having a separate 
NDP could result in an overemphasis on drought-related programs at the expense of 
other programs that may have a greater potential for producing benefits for farmers 
and the wider community. 
Fourth, programs under the NDP provide for income support to farmers and others 
during severe drought. However, it is not clear that needs that arise during drought 
are more deserving than those that arise through other circumstances. Accordingly, 
it is preferable to have income support policy that responds to the needs of farm 
families, rather than to the occurrence of drought. Taking this approach also has the 
practical advantage of not tying eligibility for income support to declarations of 
exceptional drought. As chapter 5 demonstrates, all attempts to define the start, end 
and geographic extent of exceptionally severe droughts have proved to be 
inappropriate, ineffective and inequitable. 
Finally, chapter 6 details the ways in which current programs under the NDP 
impede efficiency-enhancing rural adjustment. While it might be possible to make 
changes that reduce these problems, discontinuing the NDP altogether could 
potentially lead to greater recognition that long-term structural issues, rather than 
droughts, are often the root cause of financial difficulties faced by farm businesses. 
Policies that address barriers to adjustment and deal with any equity issues arising 
out of structural change may be more appropriate. 
For these reasons the NDP should be replaced by a new approach that clearly places 
the responsibility for managing drought, and most other risks, with farmers and 
farm-dependent businesses. Governments should play a supporting role that 
addresses impediments to effective risk management and assists individuals and 
communities cope with change, including those who suffer hardship. This approach 
is similar to that advocated in the Corish report: 
Governments’ main role in the agriculture and food sector is to secure the best 
environment for markets to operate. Policies should encourage self-reliance and 
international competitiveness and minimise intervention and regulation. This can have 
long term benefits for the sector, but can mean short term problems for affected 
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farmers, industries or communities. Governments sometimes take a role in helping 
these parties through their short term difficulties. (Agriculture and Food Policy 
Reference Group 2006, p. 29) 
It is also consistent with the Expert Social Panel’s argument that: 
… future policy should seek to move people towards an acceptance that future dryness 
will occur and is not a crisis, and that planning for dryness should be about personal, 
family, farm and community wellbeing. 
The challenge is to design policy to address the social wellbeing needs of farm families, 
rural businesses and communities in ways which do not inhibit the efficiency of 
agricultural industries. (Kenny et al. 2008, p. 3) 
The elements of the approach advocated by the Commission are outlined in 
figure 7.1 and described in detail in the remainder of this report. Chapters 8 and 9 
deal with aspects of agriculture policy relating to climate variability and climate 
change, which is the main focus of this inquiry. The role for other policies, 
including those relating to water, natural resource management, climate and human 
services, is considered in chapter 10. 
Figure 7.1 Policy elements of a new approach 
Non-agricultural policies that influence farmers’ 
ability to manage climate variability and change
Agricultural policy measures that 
can assist farmers to manage 
climate variability and change:
- research and development
- preparedness measures
- adjustment measures
- extension and other information provision
- farmer-specific income support
Water policy
Land-based natural resource 
management policy
Climate 
policy
coordination coordination
coordination
Other policies that influence agricultural performance and the 
wellbeing of people in rural and regional areas more generally
Health 
services
Transport 
and other 
infrastructure
Regional development
Trade policy
Industrial relations
Education 
and training 
services
Social security safety net
Tax/transfer
Macroeconomic 
policies
coordination
Land use planning
Animal welfare 
policy
Occupational 
health and 
safety
The objectives that should guide the agricultural policy measures shown in the inner 
ring of figure 7.1 are set out in the following section. These measures should not 
focus entirely on drought, but the impact of climate variability and change on the 
ongoing viability of farm businesses and other agricultural enterprises should be 
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considered in their design. For example, government support for agricultural 
research and development should encompass projects to improve options for 
drought management as well as projects that aim to improve profitability in good 
years.  
7.2 Objectives for agriculture policy 
At the federal level, the new policy framework should be pursued primarily through 
expanding the objectives of the existing Australia’s Farming Future (AFF) 
initiative. The current objective of this initiative is to equip primary producers to 
adapt and adjust to the impacts of climate change and to manage their emissions. 
The Commission considers that the broader issues of climate variability, 
self-reliance and a farm-based social security safety net should be included in an 
extended AFF set of objectives. It is envisaged that funding for the initiative would 
need to be increased in order for these objectives to be achieved. Chapters 8 and 9 
provide analysis that is relevant to assessing resource needs, but the appropriate 
level of funding is ultimately an issue for the Commonwealth Government to 
decide. 
The objectives of the Australia’s Farming Future initiative should be revised and 
extended to the following: 
• assist primary producers to adapt and adjust to the impacts of climate 
variability and climate change 
• encourage primary producers to adopt self-reliant approaches to managing 
risks 
• assist primary producers to manage greenhouse gas emissions and other 
adverse impacts on the environment 
• ensure that farming families in hardship have temporary access to an income 
support scheme that recognises the special circumstances of farmers. 
State and territory governments should embed the first two of the above objectives, 
and, to the extent relevant at a sub-national level, the third, within their agricultural 
policy frameworks. National coordination of policy, and the possible role of an 
intergovernmental agreement, are discussed in chapter 11.  
The objectives above refer to primary producers and farm families but not to 
farm-dependent businesses. It is the case, however, that some of the measures 
discussed in later chapters have the potential to directly and indirectly benefit 
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farm-dependent businesses. Where appropriate, these chapters consider whether 
farm-dependent businesses should have access to particular measures. 
Adapting and adjusting to climate variability and climate change 
The first objective above expands on a current objective of the AFF initiative to 
include climate variability as well as climate change. The reasoning for this is that: 
• it is currently very difficult to distinguish (except in hindsight) between climate 
variability and climate change, especially with respect to rainfall 
• the impacts of climate change on agriculture are, at least initially, largely felt 
through the effects on climate variability (Bureau of Meteorology, sub. 33; 
Department of Climate Change, sub. 109) 
• some farmers experience difficulties in adapting or adjusting to conditions that 
are within the range of known past climate variability — in many cases these 
difficulties would be expected to increase if conditions were to move outside this 
range due to climate change. 
As B. White argued: 
… the need now [is] … to consider research on climate variability and climate change 
adaptation as simply parts of adaptive climate risk management. Farmers don’t make 
the same compartmentalisations that scientists do. (sub. 94, p. 9) 
Some inquiry participants expressed concern that long-term climate change tended 
to capture the attention of governments and that this could be at the expense of 
addressing immediate needs for better tools to manage climate variability (Crocker 
Farming Co, sub. 45). It would appear that many hold similar views to Paul 
Ziebarth (Queensland farmer and chair of the Managing Climate Variability 
Program Management Committee): 
We’ve always had climate variability but climate change appears to be magnifying it. 
We need to get on top of that and understand the relationship between the two. It’s 
important that climate variability research not get lost in the sea of climate change. I 
want to help keep that balance and keep the focus on variability. (Land and Water 
Australia 2008, p. 2) 
Farmers themselves are generally best placed to adapt and adjust. For some, 
adjusting to the impacts of climate variability and climate change may involve 
recognising that their best course of action would be to leave farming, or to remain 
on, or owner of, the farm but to hand management to others through such means as 
leasing or sharefarming. The Commission’s view is that governments should take a 
neutral position on these matters. Governments should not dictate that certain farms 
are too small or in the wrong location to be viable, but nor should they provide 
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ongoing support that has the effect of impeding adjustment from occurring. The role 
for government here is to address informational and other barriers that may prevent 
farmers from fully understanding, and acting in, their own best interests. 
Self-reliant approaches to risk management 
The second objective broadens a current NDP objective, to encompass the wider 
range of risks faced by primary producers, including those associated with 
commodity prices, input costs, climate variability and climate change.  
As stated by Rural Directions Pty Ltd (sub. 35, p. 1) ‘Self-reliance relates to the 
businesses’ view on “who is responsible in bad times?”’. Current policy sends 
mixed signals on this question. What is needed in future is a consistent approach by 
all levels of government that recognises that the responsibility for managing climate 
variability and most other risks should rest with farmers and farm-dependent 
businesses.1 Realising this objective may require government measures that give 
farmers better skills and tools for managing risks, such as schemes that encourage 
savings for difficult financial times. 
One concern with an overemphasis on self-reliance was expressed by the Australian 
Land Management Group: 
The continuing emphasis on the stated need for unqualified self-reliance has the 
potential to further entrench the reluctance of farmers to access personal and social 
support programs. (sub. 24, p. 6) 
In this respect, policy should encourage farmers to seek out advice and support 
when they need it. The Commission’s view is that making considered judgements 
on when to seek professional advice on agronomy or business planning, or on 
accessing personal and social support services demonstrates self-reliance, not its 
absence, and should be actively encouraged. Self-reliance should also be seen as 
being consistent with participation in regional or industry groups that seek to 
achieve goals through collective action. 
                                                 
1 There are some types of agricultural risks for which governments should take a significant level 
of responsibility for managing. Perhaps the most important example is biosecurity. Preventing 
the introduction and spread of pests and diseases provides a ‘public good’ (that is, it benefits all 
farmers and the wider community) and as such, requires government regulation and 
coordination. This contrasts with effectively managing climate risks, which essentially provides 
private benefits to individual farmers and farm-dependent businesses.  
   
 A NEW POLICY 
FRAMEWORK 
173
 
Managing greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental impacts 
The current objective of the AFF initiative refers to managing emissions. It would 
seem from the detail of policy being developed for the initiative that this relates 
mainly to greenhouse gas emissions. The third objective for the AFF proposed by 
the Commission makes it explicit that greenhouse gas emissions and other adverse 
environmental impacts are targeted.  
While objectives relating to environmental outcomes should be pursued primarily 
through natural resource management and other environmental policies, having an 
environmental objective within AFF is considered worthwhile for two main reasons. 
First, it provides a focus for efforts to prepare the agriculture sector for possible 
inclusion in a greenhouse gas emission reduction scheme. Second, it signals the 
need to take into account possible unintended, and adverse, environmental impacts 
arising from AFF policy measures. 
Income support 
In terms of the basic social security safety net, ensuring that farm families in 
hardship have access to income support commensurate with that available to other 
Australians is an appropriate aim. However, there are factors unique to the situation 
of farm families that, in the Commission’s view, warrant temporary support being 
taken up as a separate objective within agriculture policy. These factors include the 
impediments to some farmers or their families seeking off-farm sources of income, 
the need for ongoing environmental stewardship of farming land and the desirability 
of retaining current ownership of valuable farm assets in some situations, even 
when income is temporarily negligible or negative. Having a farmer-specific 
income support program of limited duration also has some synergies with 
addressing barriers to adjustment. The program should be accessible at all times, 
however, not just during exceptional drought. 
What about other objectives? 
The NDP contains two objectives that, in the Commission’s view, need not be 
carried over into the AFF initiative. 
The first of these is ‘maintain and protect Australia’s agricultural and environmental 
resource base during periods of extreme climate stress’. The environmental aspect 
of this is covered by the proposed objective above and by the objectives of natural 
resource management and other environmental policies. Existing animal welfare 
regulations also have a role to play. Maintenance of the agricultural resource base, 
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during periods of climate stress is, in the Commission’s view, largely the 
responsibility of individual farmers and industry groups. Thus, it is unnecessary to 
have this objective embedded in AFF. 
In addition, this objective appears to have been interpreted as seeking to maintain 
each individual farm business as part of the resource base. Not including this 
objective, therefore, has the benefit that it avoids this common misinterpretation. 
The second NDP objective that need not be carried over is ‘ensure early recovery of 
agricultural and rural industries consistent with long-term sustainable levels’. As 
discussed in chapter 6, removing barriers to adjustment promotes early recovery 
from drought. As such, issues relevant to this are covered in the first two expanded 
AFF objectives.  
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8 Promoting self-reliance and 
preparedness 
 
Key points 
• Farmers are in the best position to assess the climate and other risks they face and 
adopt risk management strategies that reflect their individual circumstances. There 
are strong private incentives for farmers to manage their risks well. 
• Governments have a role to play in encouraging farmers’ self-reliance and 
preparedness by: 
– avoiding interventions that encourage dependence on government assistance 
– addressing impediments that lead to the underprovision of research, 
development, extension and training. 
• The Farm Management Deposits scheme should be retained as it is a reasonably 
efficient means of encouraging financial self-reliance. 
• Rationales for government assistance are weaker in relation to subsidising on-farm 
improvements, providing concessional finance and underwriting insurance markets 
for agricultural production risk.  
• Government funding for self-reliance and preparedness measures should be 
sufficient to achieve appropriate, effective and efficient outcomes from justified 
policies. This amount bears no relationship to previous levels of exceptional 
circumstances payments.  
 
8.1 Introduction 
This inquiry originates from the recognition by all governments that current drought 
policies are no longer the most appropriate in the context of a changing climate. The 
Commission’s evaluation establishes that the main drought assistance measures do 
not focus on helping farmers improve self-reliance, preparedness and risk 
management. In fact, they are more likely to hinder these aims. 
The Commission has proposed that the National Drought Policy (NDP) should be 
replaced by an expanded set of objectives integrated within the Australia’s Farming 
Future initiative, with equivalent changes to the agricultural policies of state and 
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territory governments (chapter 7). The first two of these new objectives focus on 
adaptation and adjustment to climate variability and climate change, and adoption 
of self-reliant approaches to managing the full range of risks faced by farmers. This 
chapter considers what policies should be adopted to fulfil these objectives. 
Managing the risks of farming 
Farmers and policy makers need to consider preparedness for drought within the 
broader context of farm risk management. Topp and Shafron (2006) present five 
categories of risks faced by farmers, with drought encompassed within the first 
category: 
• Production risk: relates to uncertainty over the natural growth processes of crops 
and livestock. 
• Price or market risk: uncertainty about the prices that producers will receive for 
commodities and prices they pay for inputs. 
• Institutional risk: result from uncertainties about government actions. 
• Human or personal risk: relate to possible problems with human health or 
personal relationships that can affect farm businesses. 
• Financial risk: uncertainty relating to interest rates on debt and the actions of 
lenders (for example, the possibility that credit availability will be restricted). 
Farm dependent businesses can face similar categories of risk. 
Not all of the above categories of risk are independent. For example, production 
risks are sometimes negatively correlated with price risk. When there is a 
widespread drought, prices of some commodities tend to rise due to shortages. 
The objective of risk management is to maximise expected returns in a way 
consistent with each individual’s attitude to risk. Optimal risk management does not 
usually mean risk minimisation. Regardless of attitudes to risk, all businesses must 
take on some risks to earn profits (Hardaker et al. 2004). 
Risk management for farmers and farm dependent businesses is about identifying 
and evaluating risks, assessing what can be done to prevent them eventuating and 
deciding how to deal with them if they arise. It involves deciding which risks to 
accept (so as to gain the rewards that may follow) and which to avoid (Hardaker 
et al. 2004). There is a wide range of actions that farmers can take to manage 
climate and other risks, as outlined in box 8.1. Some of these are also relevant for 
farm dependent businesses. 
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Box 8.1 Actions that farmers can take in managing risks 
Some actions farmers can take in managing risks are listed below. The actions that are 
appropriate (and possible) vary greatly between farm businesses. 
• Develop, use and periodically update a business plan. 
• Seek professional advice on the financial condition of their business and options for 
the future. 
• Talk through financial issues with financiers, including how risks can be managed. 
• Diversify income through off-farm employment. 
• Diversify assets through off-farm investments. 
• Lease out land so as to obtain a low risk source of income. 
• Lease land or enter into sharefarming arrangements as an alternative to purchasing 
land (for example, as part of a staged entry to farming). 
• Off-load drought and other risk by entering into a sharefarming arrangement (for 
example, Australian Agricultural Contracts Limited’s Grain Co-production) whereby 
investors provide unsecured capital to plant crops in return for a share of the 
proceeds. 
• Spread land holdings geographically to reduce the chance of the entire farm 
business being in drought at once. 
• Build up financial reserves in Farm Management Deposits and other financial 
products for use in low income years. 
• Use financial instruments such as price hedging. 
• Use climate forecasts, decision support tools and information on individual 
paddocks in making decisions, such as the area to crop and what inputs to use. 
• Draw down financial reserves or access carry-on finance to maintain business 
operations and household consumption during periods of low income. 
• Store fodder for use during dry years. 
• Reduce stocking during drought according to a predetermined plan. 
• Invest in increasing water use efficiency so as to be able to better cope with low 
allocations of irrigation water. 
• Move to single or no-till cultivation systems to make better use of available soil 
moisture.  
 
Banks and other financiers also play a role in managing the risks of farming. Risk 
management can involve a measure of self insurance, by saving for future 
contingencies. Banks provide financial products that allow this to occur. By 
providing loans to farm businesses they also take-on some of their risk. 
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Accordingly, they have an incentive to assist businesses to manage risks and remain 
viable. The Australian Bankers Association reported: 
During the drought individual banks have offered: 
• to provide carry-on finance to meet short term needs; 
• to restructure existing loans, to reduce annual payments or defer payments without 
cost; … 
• direct communication with customers about the bank’s view about drought issues; 
• support of specialised advice to industry groups such as dairy farmers; 
• similar support for drought affected small businesses that provide services to 
Agribusiness; 
• targeted courses to assist farmers plan to recover from drought. (sub. 76, pp. 2-3) 
Banks also have an incentive to avoid exposure to bad risks. One way they do this is 
by setting credit limits in line with their assessment of businesses’ capacity to 
service their loans. 
The role for government 
Many inquiry participants saw an important role for governments to support 
improvements in risk management in agriculture. A wide range of areas were put 
forward as being worthy of public funding. 
Several key submissions from governments and farmer groups proposed integrated 
assistance packages. For instance, the National Farmers’ Federation (NFF) — with 
support from most of its state affiliates — contended: 
Within the national agriculture policy framework, climate change adjustment tools such 
as research, development and extension, risk management tools, water management and 
education and training, must be maintained in non-drought years if they are to obtain 
results … 
The NFF proposes a new approach to drought policy based on a partnership between 
primary producers and government. 
• The key platforms of this policy model are that farmers can select the policy option 
best suited to their circumstances, industry/government co-investment is achieved 
and the bulk of government investment will result in tangible on-farm preparedness 
improvements. (sub. 51, p. 3) 
The NFF’s proposal is summarised briefly in box 8.2.  
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Box 8.2 National Farmers’ Federation Strategy 
The National Farmers’ Federation proposed a new approach whereby government 
policy for drought is delivered in conjunction with other aspects of national agricultural 
policy. This approach would provide producers with a choice of the following drought 
policy streams: 
• Stream one: Innovate — utilises Professional Advice and Innovation Grants and 
Risk Management Deposits to assist farmers to improve preparedness. 
• Stream two: Advance — provides Income Contingent Loans for those who need 
short term government support to invest in preparedness strategies. 
• Stream three: Secure — includes Professional Advice Grants, income support 
payments and Farm Exit Grants for those who require a longer consolidation before 
moving to preparedness or who wish to weigh up their future options in the industry. 
Source: NFF, sub. 51. 
 
 
In the Commission’s view, the government’s role in improving risk management 
and drought preparedness is to implement measures that will make the community 
better off overall. Applying this principle entails the following: 
• Setting the level of funding for preparedness measures according to the potential 
level of communitywide benefits. In contrast, some inquiry participants 
suggested that the level of funding for preparedness should offset any decline in 
funding for reactive drought relief (Queensland Farmers’ Federation, 
sub. DR123; NFF, sub. DR176). In this context, the Commission notes that 
expenditure on the exceptional circumstances interest rate subsidy was $604.1 
million in 2007-08, but only $12.8 million in 2001-02. There is no reason to 
suppose that the appropriate level of funding for preparedness measures bears 
any relationship to the widely fluctuating levels of funding for drought relief. 
• Having realistic expectations about the likely outcomes of government policy. 
Persistently low incomes for some farms, for example, are most often due to 
structural problems at the farm or industry level, such as insufficient size or 
inappropriate land use (chapters 2 and 3). Better risk management will do little 
to improve farm income while the underlying problem remains. Governments 
can not make all farm businesses viable by assisting them with drought 
preparedness and nor should they try. 
• Avoiding interventions that promote dependence on government assistance and 
reduce incentives for self-reliance. 
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Drawing on these perspectives and the lessons from the evaluation of current 
programs (chapter 6 and appendixes B–E), this chapter explores the case to expend 
taxpayer resources on: 
• research and development (section 8.2) 
• information and advice (section 8.3) 
• education and training (section 8.4) 
• farm management deposits (section 8.5)  
• accelerated depreciation and grants for investing in preparedness (section 8.6) 
• income contingent loans (section 8.7) 
• assistance to develop insurance markets (section 8.8). 
8.2 Research and development 
Institutionalised agricultural research and development, as well as farmers’ own 
experimentation, have been important factors in achieving productivity 
improvements in Australia and elsewhere (PC 2005b). This section focuses on areas 
that are of particular importance for promoting self-reliance and preparedness — 
seasonal and longer term forecasting and general agricultural research and 
development to manage climate variability. The research agenda relating to climate 
change impacts and adaptation is also relevant, but is broader than the scope of this 
inquiry. 
Seasonal and interannual climate forecasts 
Improved forecasts for the weeks and months ahead would be of enormous value to 
farmers in managing climate variability — for example, to allow cropping decisions 
to be tailored to rainfall probabilities. The Bureau of Meteorology reported that a 
new approach for seasonal forecasts is needed : 
The future of seasonal prediction lies in a move away from statistically-based systems 
towards dynamic climate prediction models – similar to those used for weather 
forecasting. (sub. 33, p. 3) 
Several inquiry participants argued for a greater research effort on seasonal 
forecasting and better understanding of climate variability. The NFF, for example, 
contended: 
Australia, having a variable climate, needs to make a significant investment in better 
understanding and predicting that variability. Our Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) needs 
a massive investment in its basic computer and modelling infrastructure. It requires an 
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investment in a range of measurement and weather tracking tools. It requires an 
investment in its international collaborative data sharing and climate modelling. 
Additionally, the BoM needs to get down to a local level with an expanding emphasis 
on drought preparedness. (sub. DR176, p. 31-2) 
The Department of Agriculture and Food Western Australia identified a lack of 
research as an impediment to self-reliance and preparedness: 
Western Australia does not receive as accurate climate forecasting as the Eastern States 
given the lack of meteorological investment in researching and analysing Indian Ocean 
weather patterns. (sub. 65, p. 3) 
B. White, a consultant and former National Coordinator of the Managing Climate 
Variability Research and Development Program, argued: 
In … recent years climate change science has dominated and attracted resources away 
from climate variability research. (sub. 94, p. 10) 
Due to the public good nature of the information generated, there is a strong case 
for governments to fund basic and applied research into climate variability and 
climate change. Representatives of the agriculture sector should play a role in 
guiding research priorities. Attention should also continue to be given to finding the 
most effective means for clearly conveying forecasts in formats that meet the needs 
of farmers in the various agricultural industries. 
Governments should continue to fund research into climate variability and climate 
change. While there are synergies and overlaps between the two, governments 
should ensure that a high priority is given to research into climate variability in its 
own right. 
General agricultural research and development 
Research and development funded by governments 
The Commonwealth and state and territory governments and the private sector fund 
agricultural research. Governments fund agricultural research through: 
• Rural Research and Development Corporations (RRDCs) and relevant industry 
bodies 
• Cooperative Research Centres (CRCs) 
• public research institutions, such as CSIRO, universities and research divisions 
within state government departments of agriculture 
• tax concessions for private research. 
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The majority of publicly funded agricultural research is managed through RRDCs 
which were first established in 1989. RRDCs are funded through government and 
industry contributions, or through relevant industry bodies such as Horticulture 
Australia Ltd, that have deeds of agreement with the Commonwealth Government 
for research and development funding. RRDCs are responsible for commissioning 
and monitoring research and facilitating the dissemination, adoption and 
commercialisation of research results (PC 2007b).  
In principle, RRDCs have a sound governance model. By requiring industry to 
contribute levies that are then matched by the government, RRDCs aim to reduce 
the ‘free riding’ that can be associated with research. The levy model also gives 
industry a direct incentive to shape research priorities. This, in turn, makes it more 
likely that innovations are relevant to the needs of producers and that new 
technologies are disseminated quickly. However, the extent of industry capture of 
research priorities needs to be monitored to ensure that there remains a strong public 
benefit component that warrants government funding.  
There are emerging concerns that research activities are being focused 
disproportionately on industry-specific, applied research. Research that delivers 
benefits appropriable by industry groups is likely to be promoted by these groups at 
the expense of research that is cross-sectoral, regionally focused and/or with strong 
public good features (Frontier Economics 2006; Agriculture and Food Policy 
Reference Group 2006; Mullen 2007). The Commission has similarly queried 
whether the public benefits from many RRDCs or relevant industry bodies are 
sufficient to justify the levels of funding (PC 2007b). 
Two RRDCs, which are exceptions to the industry model, are Land and Water 
Australia and Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation (RIRDC). 
Land and Water Australia aims to improve the way natural resources are managed 
and improve the profitability of farming systems. It is responsible for several 
programs, including the Managing Climate Variability Program established in 1992 
under the NDP (box 8.3). RIRDC focuses on new and emerging industries and also 
addresses strategic cross-sectoral issues facing the rural sector. This includes 
research into risk management, climate change and climate variability.  
Another tranche of public support for relevant research and development is through 
CRCs, which were introduced in 1990 to encourage public sector agencies and 
private interests to work cooperatively together. In 2005-06, the Commonwealth 
Government directly contributed about 30 per cent of total CRC funds and 
contributed indirectly through its funding of CSIRO and universities. Businesses 
and state and territory governments also help fund CRCs (PC 2007b). There is 
currently one CRC which directly addresses issues of climate variability in 
agriculture — the Future Farm Industries Cooperative Research Centre (box 8.3). 
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Box 8.3 Government funded research into agricultural adaptation and 
climate variability 
Climate Change Research Program — part of the Australia’s Farming Future initiative 
— has funding of $46.2 million over four years. It will fund research projects and 
on-farm demonstration pilots that address: reducing greenhouse pollution, better soil 
management and adapting to a changing climate.  
Managing Climate Variability Research and Development Program — managed 
through Land and Water Australia — has funding to 2010 from various industry-specific 
RRDCs and has in the past received funding from the Commonwealth Government’s 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. The program aims to improve 
climate forecasting, provide tools and services for managing climate risk and increase 
adoption of climate risk management.  
Future Farm Industries Cooperative Research Centre — established in July 2007 — 
has $114 million in funding over 7 years. Contributors include RRDCs, universities, 
government departments and private companies. This centre invests in research and 
development, education and training and commercialisation and adoption. It also aims 
to create new land-use systems which will make agriculture more productive, 
sustainable, diverse and able to adapt to climate variability.  
 
Most inquiry participants supported continued or increased government funding for 
research and development to assist farmers better manage and adapt to climate 
variability and change. The South Australian Government (sub. 91) argued that such 
research will need to focus on the development of new production systems, as well 
as the improvement of existing varieties and management practices. 
The New South Wales Government promoted the contribution that research and 
development has made in assisting farmers to manage their risks through ‘offering 
improvements in areas such as seasonal forecasting, grain breeding, mechanisation, 
reduced tillage and weed control practices’ (sub. 90, p. 2).  
It is appropriate that a significant proportion of Australia’s agricultural research and 
development is funded by governments because private sector agents, unable to 
capture all of the benefits that can spillover to others, tend to underinvest, resulting 
in less than socially desirable levels of research effort. Moreover, research can 
deliver wider third party benefits — for example, the community as a whole can 
benefit when farmers use research results to manage their natural resources more 
sustainably. 
The Commission, therefore, endorses a role for government to provide funding for 
agricultural research and development. The strongest case relates to basic research, 
or where businesses undertake novel research and development activities that have 
spillover benefits to the community, or trigger cycles of innovation by rivals 
   
184 GOVERNMENT 
DROUGHT SUPPORT 
 
 
(PC 2007b). Beyond this, the case for government support for commercialisation 
and deployment activities becomes weaker as the opportunities for the innovator to 
capture the benefits increase.  
As the boundaries between public and private research are not always clear, there 
can be uncertainties about the extent to which support should be provided. The 
challenge for public policy is to elicit investments that: 
• would not otherwise have been made — programs need to be designed to ensure 
that public funds stimulate additional research and development rather than 
simply displace privately funded research and development 
• generate total private and spillover returns that exceed the costs associated with 
the policy measures (including administration and compliance costs and 
efficiency distortions of taxation required to finance the measures). 
It is important to provide balance in the allocation of funding for agricultural 
research and development activities between projects designed to: improve risk 
management for climate variability; develop climate change adaptation technologies 
and strategies; and improve production more generally. 
Improving the effectiveness of government funding 
Inquiry participants offered various suggestions as to how the effectiveness of 
public support for research and development could be improved.  
The NSW Farmers’ Association suggested that improved collaboration between 
researchers and producers was required: 
… to enhance the effectiveness of observation networks, monitoring, prediction, 
information delivery, and applied research and to foster public understanding of and 
preparedness for drought and climate change. (sub. 98, p. 32). 
In the Commission’s view, collaboration and two-way communication between 
researchers and producers should be promoted by integrating research and 
development with extension services. This makes researchers more aware of 
farmers priorities and increases the likelihood that farmers will adopt new practices 
that improve profitability and self-reliance (extension is discussed further in the 
next section). 
The Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association (trans., p. 7) argued that there 
was duplication of research effort that needed to be addressed. To this end, the 
Primary Industries Ministerial Council is developing a National Primary Industries 
Research Development and Extension Framework that, among other things, is 
designed to improve collaboration and reduce fragmentation of research. 
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The NFF also raised the issue of effective coordination of research and avoidance of 
duplication:  
The NFF urges caution to ensure that targeted investment in areas such as climate 
variability and climate change are done through existing RRDC Government agencies. 
These agencies have been established, co-funded, and engage with the farm sector. 
NFF opposes special pools of funding being managed by a Government Department 
rather than one of these RRDC agencies. (sub. DR176, pp. 69–70) 
There would appear to be some merit in this argument, as special pools of funding 
for research can be problematic where they lead to short term funding of research 
providers. Such arrangements can work against the recruitment and retention of 
high quality researchers and the establishment of effective relationships between 
researchers and primary producers. 
One drought-related research and development issue raised during this inquiry is 
that producer levies usually decline during drought and this can disrupt research and 
development activities. The Western Australia Rural Business Development 
Corporation reported: 
During drought years, there are less levy collections, therefore fewer funds available 
for good applied research, development and extension, and many good research 
programs may not recover from these funding cuts or fluctuations in funds provided. 
(sub. 83, p. 5) 
Of those inquiry participants that raised this issue, there was general agreement on 
the desirability of maintaining research and development programs during droughts, 
but differing views on how best to achieve this. The South Australia Advisory 
Board of Agriculture (sub. 71) suggested that exceptional circumstances funding be 
used to compensate for reduced levy revenue. The Birchip Cropping Group, argued 
that the best approach was for governments to encourage research institutions to 
keep money in reserve for use in difficult times (trans., p. 473). The Commission 
concurs with this view. RRDCs should maintain sufficient financial reserves to 
prevent the disruption of their core activities during droughts and other periods 
when their revenue temporarily declines.  
The importance of monitoring and evaluation of research was raised during the 
inquiry and was also addressed in the Corish report. Corish highlighted the need for 
evaluation of research against meaningful criteria and illustrated this by citing 
examples where research had continued well past there being any likelihood of 
success (Agriculture and Food Policy Reference Group 2006). The Commission has 
previously stressed the importance of monitoring and evaluation of agricultural and 
other types of research (PC 2007b). There is a need not only for project evaluations, 
but also for reviews of the objectives for assisting businesses in the forms and levels 
provided. 
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As discussed in chapter 5, the National Agricultural Monitoring System (NAMS) is 
an information system that is used in the exceptional circumstances application and 
assessment process. If the recommendations of this report are followed NAMS will, 
in time, not be needed for this purpose. Some inquiry participants argued that 
NAMS could be further developed to serve other uses, including assisting farmers 
in managing climate risks (South Australian Government, sub. 91). It was also 
suggested that the desired end point was a tool similar to the US National Integrated 
Drought Information System (NFF, sub. DR176). A detailed assessment is needed 
to determine whether NAMS should be phased out or reoriented to serve other 
purposes.  
Given the broad range of organisations involved in climate change and agricultural 
research and development, it is essential that consistent principles are applied. This 
was recommended by the Cutler review of science and innovation (Cutler et al. 
2008). The Commission supports that recommendation. 
The Commission considers that the following principles for public investment in 
agricultural research and development to manage climate variability and climate 
change should be pursued: 
• funds should be expended in areas where there are net public benefits 
• there should be safeguards against funds being directed into areas that deliver 
benefits appropriable by narrow industry groups — where research provides 
clear private benefits, contributions from relevant organisations should be 
required 
• excessive use of short-term funding arrangements should be avoided because 
they can work against the recruitment and retention of high quality researchers 
and the establishment of effective relationships between researchers and 
primary producers 
• there should be integration with extension services to ensure researchers are 
aware of farmers’ priorities and farmers are able to appropriately adopt new 
practices 
• funding should be channelled through a small number of well functioning 
institutions (such as several of the RRDCs and CRCs) rather than multiple 
additional funding pools being set up 
• research should be subject to regular monitoring and evaluation. 
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8.3 Information and advice 
Successfully managing the increasing complexity of farming requires access to 
information and advice on such diverse issues as agronomy, marketing and financial 
and risk management. A common theme brought up by inquiry participants was that 
there is a vast amount of information available and the challenge for farmers is to 
identify the most relevant information and use it effectively in making decisions. 
This section examines the various ways that governments can assist farmers with 
information and advice. Provision of extension services has traditionally been the 
main area of government involvement, but grants for professional services and 
facilitating access to financial information are other possibilities. In all cases it is 
necessary to determine the appropriate roles for government and private services. 
Extension 
The term ‘extension’ is used here to mean public and private sector services that 
enable farmers to change their management practices, including through the 
adoption of new technologies. It includes raising awareness, providing information 
and advice, and addressing misconceptions about particular technologies. Extension 
will commonly involve farmers learning new things and may identify training 
needs. Education and training programs are considered separately in the next 
section. 
There was strong support among inquiry participants for government funding of 
extension services. The NFF (sub. 51) identified extension as one of a suite of key 
areas that affects agriculture’s ability to deal with drought. It emphasised that 
extension efforts, alongside other key areas, must be maintained at all times and not 
just during droughts.  
There was general agreement on the importance of extension as part of an integrated 
policy approach for dealing with climate variability and improving risk 
management (Cotton Australia, sub. 9; Australian Dairy Industry Council, sub. 58; 
Queensland Farmers’ Federation, sub. 82). S. Pearson stated: 
Improved education, research, information provision and, most importantly, adequate 
public and private extension services needs to underpin Australian drought (and other 
extreme event) responses. The human capital on farms and in the advisory sector needs 
urgent investment as it copes with a torrent of new information and complex issues. 
Self-reliance should not be an excuse for isolation from trusted advisory networks. 
Opportunities should be sought to build and maintain such professional networks for 
farmers and advisors. (sub. 28, p. 1) 
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Changes to extension 
Given its importance, some participants were concerned that governments were 
reducing their investment in extension. The Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers stated: 
We have always been of the view that there needs to be an increased emphasis on 
research, development and extension in agriculture. What we have seen historically 
right around the nation is a drawback from state governments and their investment, and 
particularly in the extension area. (trans., p. 7)  
It is certainly the case that state and territory governments have scaled back their 
direct delivery of extension services over the last decade or two. This, however, is 
only one of a number of important changes to extension in recent years. Some of the 
most significant changes are considered below. 
Adoption of a partnership approach  
Historically, governments delivered extension services directly through state 
departments of agriculture. As governments have wound back these services they 
have developed a partnership approach whereby they partly fund extension services 
that are delivered by the private sector. A prominent example is government 
funding of RRDCs to provide extension services. Partnerships have also been 
pursued through CRCs, regional grower groups and others.  
There are a number of positives associated with these changes. A major one is that 
they give farmers and agricultural industries much greater control over the services 
delivered. Growcom argued: 
Then there is … the extension component. That, in my view, is best done by industry, 
because industry people helping other industry people to learn and there's a better 
mechanism of adoption there. (trans., p. 316) 
Inquiry participants put forward many examples of what they regarded as successful 
extension programs that take a partnership approach. A selection of these is outlined 
in box 8.4. 
These extension arrangements involve sharing costs between governments and 
those using the services. For example, RRDCs and relevant industry bodies are now 
major providers of extension services and, as discussed previously, are financed by 
industry levies and government funding. Production-oriented extension provides 
mainly private benefits and so it is appropriate that there is a significant private 
contribution towards their cost. 
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Box 8.4 Examples of extension services 
Birchip Cropping Group (BCG): a farmer-driven not-for-profit organisation operating 
in the Wimmera and Mallee regions of Victoria. BCG conducts applied research and 
extension on all major crops grown in the region. It aims to investigate the critical 
success factors that ensure sustainable and profitable crop production systems and to 
bring together farmers, industry and government representatives so that they may 
cooperate to solve common agricultural problems (BCG 2008). 
Western Australian No-Tillage Farmers Association: a farmer group that aims to 
find sustainable ways of growing high yield crops. It provides information to farmers 
about no-till cropping systems, facilitates the exchange of ideas, encourages no-till 
research, and disseminates no-till information. Funding sources include the Grains 
Research Development Corporation (GRDC), Australian Government Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, National Landcare Program, corporate sponsors, 
and membership fees (WANTFA 2009).  
Masters of the Climate: an initiative of the Managing Climate Variability Research and 
Development Program that aims to improve understanding and increase adoption of 
climate risk management tools and knowledge. One way this is done is through 
publishing interviews with innovative farmers about their management of climate risks, 
including drought (Land and Water Australia nd). 
GRDC Planning Guide for Farmers with Limited Finances: aims to assist farm 
businesses plan a low-risk return to modest profit. A planning cycle for the year it set 
out, which includes steps relating to financial and production decisions (GRDC 2009). 
Rural Water Use Efficiency Initiative: a partnership between the Queensland 
Government and industry groups (such as Cotton Australia and Growcom) that aims to 
assist irrigators improve water-use efficiency and irrigation management. Specific 
activities included: on-farm trials, demonstrations and system assessments, in addition 
to financial incentives for upgrading irrigation and effluent management systems 
(Department of Natural Resources and Water 2009). 
8x5 Wool Profit Program: undertaken by the Tasmanian Institute of Agricultural 
Science and funded by Australian Wool Innovation Ltd as an extension program to 
service their levy payers in Tasmania. The first phase was a mix of research, 
development and extension programs, while the current second phase is entirely 
focused on extension. Extension approaches include grower groups, workshops, 
demonstrations and newsletters (Hunt 2008). 
Dairy Extension Centre: established by the Victorian Government and Dairy Australia 
as a ‘virtual’ centre of extension capability and program delivery. As well as maintaining 
a website, the centre has set up three Regional Extension Committees that are 
responsible for overseeing the delivery of extension services in their region. These 
committees undertake activities such as developing delivery programs for extension, 
delivering extension news to member’s networks and encouraging innovation among 
extension providers (Dairy Extension Centre nd).  
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Some arrangements also appear likely to have made more efficient use of 
government resources, by working with, rather than in competition with private 
providers. For example, the Department of Agriculture and Food Western Australia 
stated: 
My comment to the development officers, as we call them now, is, they're better to talk 
to one farm management consultant and in theory they're talking to 40-odd farmers. 
That's a more efficient way of doing business, rather than trying to talk to 40 farmers. 
(trans., p. 135) 
There have, however, been some negative consequences of the change to a 
partnership approach. The Western Australian Farmers’ Federation reported that the 
resulting increase in the number of providers could cause difficulties: 
Currently, the dissemination of information to farmers is affected by the number of 
research and information providers, which contributes to a perception of information 
overload among clients, and this can contribute to a weakening of the consistency of 
delivery of the [state-based extension] program’s core principles. (sub. DR161, p. 2) 
R. Toms-Morgan reported that the changes were leading to a loss of expertise: 
Agricultural extension expertise is diminishing at a significant rate without defined 
opportunities for the next generation to gain from the decades of experience and 
expertise which is/has retired from the front line of agriculture. (sub. DR126, p. 1) 
It is the Commission’s view that the changes themselves, and the short term nature 
of some government funding, have resulted in some loss of expertise and trust 
between farmers and extension providers. 
Increasing focus on the environment 
The focus of government extension activities has shifted to a significant extent from 
agricultural production to environmental outcomes. Environmentally-oriented 
extension has been delivered in a variety of ways, including through the National 
Landcare Program, the Natural Heritage Trust and the National Action Plan for 
Salinity and Water Quality (these programs have now been replaced by the Caring 
for our Country initiative). 
The rationale for this change is that services which promote more efficient 
agricultural production mainly benefit farmers and agricultural industries and so 
there is only a limited role for government. Services that improve environmental 
outcomes, on the other hand, can produce benefits for the wider community and so 
there is a stronger case for government provision.  
Environmentally-oriented extension can result in benefits for both farmers and the 
wider community, for example, through wider adoption of a cropping practice that 
both increases farm profit and reduces sediment loads in creeks and rivers. Pannell 
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et al. (2006), however, note that this is not always the case as government extension 
agents sometimes promote practices that conflict with the goals of individual 
landowners and which would require broadscale adoption to produce significant 
environmental benefits. Using extension in these circumstances is likely to be 
ineffective and can reduce the credibility of extension agents. Other policy 
instruments may be more appropriate, as discussed in chapter 10.   
Increase in group-based activities 
Government extension was in the past often delivered one-to-one on the farmer’s 
property but this has given way to increasing use of group-based activities. Marsh 
and Pannell (2000, p. 610) report that this is only partly due to agency cutbacks: 
There has been a change in extension ideology away from the ‘linear model’ of ‘top-
down’ technology transfer, to extension methodologies that emphasise information 
flows, adult learning principles and participation by stakeholders. 
Group-based activities have the potential to make effective use of practical 
knowledge held by farmers and focus attention on the issues of most importance to 
them. That is not to say that group-based activities are always the most appropriate. 
Farmers often require one-to-one information and advice when considering or 
implementing changes to their farm management practices. There is, however, only 
a limited role for governments to provide such services.  
Rise in private extension 
The private sector has emerged as a significant provider of extension services to the 
agricultural sector. Private sector extension has taken different forms and is 
provided by farmer organisations, cooperatives and groups, consulting firms and 
input suppliers. Many farmers contract agronomists and other advisors to provide 
them with specific and tailored information for running their farm businesses. As 
stated earlier, RRDCs play a significant role. Marsh and Pannell (2000, p. 623) 
argue: 
The withdrawal of government extension services judged to be predominately private 
goods has revealed that the private sector was indeed being crowded out of these 
markets. 
Inquiry participants reported that the use of private consultants was widespread 
among some, but not all, groups of farmers. The Department of Agriculture and 
Food Western Australia reported: 
There is a consulting profession here that has been long and well established and [has] 
a very high take-up by farmers. Some farmers use three separate consultants. They will 
use a general farm business consultant, they will use an agronomy consultant and then 
they will use a grain marketing consultant. (trans., p. 132) 
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AgForce advised that it was the smaller, not as advanced, producers who were 
likely to be missing out on ‘on-the-ground’ extension services (trans., p. 392). Rural 
Financial Counselling Service Victoria – Murray Mallee  reported that the group of 
farmers who access its services were unable or unwilling to pay for professional 
services (sub. DR151).  
In the Commission’s view, that some farmers are unable or unwilling to pay for 
private extension services is not sufficient justification for governments to attempt 
to provide equivalent services. Rather, governments should be conveying the 
message that paying for private services that will enhance profitability, viability and 
sustainability is a normal part of managing a farm business. 
In some cases farmers can also obtain free information and advice from sellers of 
agricultural inputs. Some inquiry participants said that this could be of value to 
farmers, while others reported instances where the advice was deficient. For 
example, Productive Nutrition contended: 
Stock agencies tend to employ university graduates to utilise their limited knowledge to 
sell products; many of these products have no place during a drought and most are not 
property specific and offer little return on investment for farmers. (sub. DR122, p. 3) 
While sellers of agricultural inputs who also provide information and advice clearly 
have a vested interest in promoting their own products, they also have an incentive 
to protect their credibility and to be seen to add value to their client’s business. 
Accordingly, it would seem likely that farmers would be able to benefit from such 
free advice, provided that do not rely too heavily on it and are able to test it against 
independent sources of information. 
The way forward 
In summary, there has been enormous change in extension over the last twenty 
years. Some changes have been for the better, while others have not. The public 
policy rationale for change has often been sound, but its implementation has 
sometimes been deficient. 
In calling for improvements in extension, many inquiry participants recognised that 
the aim should not be to revert to how extension used to be. For example, AgForce 
stated ‘ … old-style extension has sort of gone, and I'm not saying we go back to 
what it was’ (trans., p. 392). Rather, there is a need to learn from the successes and 
failures of the past. Doing so has considerable potential to promote self-reliance and 
preparedness. 
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It is essential that governments have a sound and clearly stated rationale for their 
role in the extension arena. In the Commission’s view, governments have an 
important supporting role to play in extension for three main reasons. 
First, as discussed in the previous section, there is a clear rationale for government 
funding of research and development in agriculture. To maximise the 
cost-effectiveness of this funding, extension needs to be considered as an integrated 
part of the research and development effort. There need to be strong two-way links 
between research and extension if the needs of farmers are to be well served. 
Second, Australian governments wish to maintain a capacity to influence farm 
management practices in order to produce public benefits, such as improved 
environmental outcomes. Extension services should be used as part of this effort. To 
do this effectively, state agencies need to maintain sufficient agricultural expertise.  
Third, with the large number of information providers available, it can be difficult 
for farmers to access the information they need and assess its credibility. 
Government should continue to address potential information failures by: 
• providing some general agricultural information directly (for example, using fact 
sheets and the like) 
• connecting farmers with extension groups and services that have a greater 
capacity to assess the credibility and relevance of information. 
In fulfilling this supporting role governments should ensure that they:  
• promote continuity of services and strengthen career paths in extension through 
their employment practices and funding arrangements 
• do not add unnecessarily to the number of information sources by spreading 
funding too thinly across extension groups 
• use extension primarily to promote practices that are consistent with the interests 
of farmers (as discussed in chapter 10, other policy instruments, such as financial 
incentives, may be appropriate in other circumstances) 
• seek to support and complement, rather than duplicate, services provided by the 
private sector. 
Significant public funding should be directed to research, development and 
extension to assist farmers prepare for, manage, and recover from the impacts of 
climate variability and change. 
RECOMMENDATION 8.1 
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Grants and subsidies for professional advice and planning 
Examples of current programs that provide grants to farmers to access professional 
advice are the EC Professional Advice and Planning Grants program (PAPG) and 
the Climate Change Adjustment Program (CCAP) Adjustment Advice and Training 
Grants. This section focuses on the provision of incentives for accessing 
professional advice and planning; support for training is discussed in a later section. 
The PAPG program was assessed in chapter 6 and was found to be generally 
effective in helping some farmers undertake planning activities. However, the 
effectiveness of the scheme may have been limited by the requirement for farmers 
to be in an EC declared area, the need for a farm viability assessment and the 
tendency for consultant fees to converge to the level of the grant. Furthermore, the 
appropriateness of the PAPG program was questioned and it was concluded that the 
rationale for government intervention through professional advice and planning 
style grants is limited. 
Some inquiry participants supported government funding of grants for professional 
advice and planning activities (Otto Agribusiness, sub. DR189; D. and T. Allen, 
sub. 20). The NFF recommended funding for a professional advice grant as a key 
element of its proposed drought policy strategy (box 8.2). 
Risk management and business planning advice is generally tailored to a particular 
farm business. Given the significant level of private benefits involved, the 
Commission sees little public benefit in providing grants or subsidies for farmers to 
access professional advice and planning. However, there may be a role for 
government to provide grants for advice and planning in the context of addressing 
informational impediments to rural adjustment, particularly where farmers are 
accessing income support (chapter 9). 
Rural Financial Counselling Service 
The Rural Financial Counselling Service (RFCS) program provides grants to 
organisations who provide counselling services to primary producers, fishers and 
small rural businesses. The program is popular among individuals, producer 
organisations, governments and shire councils. Tasmanian Women in Agriculture 
(sub. DR115), AgForce (sub. 80) and the Coonamble Shire Council (sub. 63) were 
among many inquiry participants who recommended that the RFCS program should 
continue. 
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The RFCS was assessed in chapter 6 and was found to meet a need for objective 
guidance in some communities. However, several possible limitations were 
identified including: gaps in coverage, a relatively high retention rate of existing 
clients (although this may reflect instances where a previous client seeks assistance 
for a new issue some years later) and duplication between the RFCS and other 
services. 
The largely private benefits from financial counselling suggest that the rationale for 
government provision is weak. However, the RFCS appears to have played a useful 
role by facilitating a flow of information, acting as a referral point for other services 
and servicing clients without the ability to pay for their services (Sunraysia RFCS, 
sub. DR151; South Australian RFCS, trans. p. 222). Depending on the magnitude of 
these benefits, government funding of the RFCS program could provide net social 
benefits. 
In the draft report it was recommended that the RFCS program be reviewed. 
However, as the service is currently moving to a new case management approach, 
participants suggested that any review should wait until existing funding 
arrangements run out in 2011 (Department of Primary Industries and Water 
Tasmania, sub. DR179; RFCS Tasmania, sub. DR164; South Australian Rural 
Financial Counselling Service trans. p. 224). Tasmanian Women in Agriculture 
supported such an approach on the grounds that: 
This means that the Government will have at least a two year time frame where it can 
assess the success (or otherwise) of the case management approach and at least one 
year of any new operational requirements under an enhanced Australia’s Farming 
Future package. (sub. DR115, p. 3) 
The Rural Financial Counselling Service program should be reviewed prior to 
the end of its current funding. The review should assess whether the program 
delivers net benefits to the community and, in doing so, examine:  
• the extent to which alternative sources of information are lacking in certain 
areas 
• whether counsellors refer their clients to relevant services in a timely and 
effective manner 
• the future role of the service in view of the wide ranging case management 
options under the Farming Family Income Support scheme. 
RECOMMENDATION 8.2 
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8.4 Education and training 
A range of institutions and organisations make up the education and training system 
that services agriculture. This system comprises a formal sector, which includes 
universities and Technical and Further Education (TAFE), and an informal sector 
such as some extension services provided by government or private providers and 
continuous learning programs, such as FarmBis. The education and training system 
is complex and multifaceted (Synapse Consulting 1998). 
There is some evidence that the formal and informal education and training sectors 
for agriculture have developed largely in isolation and with limited linkages 
(Kilpatrick and Millar 2006). Marsh and Pannell posit that:  
…the current emphasis on farmer ‘education’ appears to be occurring with minimal 
liaison with education institutions and little attention given to the contribution that 
should be made through TAFE and higher education sectors. (2000, p. 619) 
The NFF and the Corish report both identify the need for improvement in the 
quality and responsiveness of the training market to the needs of the agriculture 
sector (NFF 2008; Agriculture and Food Policy Reference Group 2006). The Corish 
report noted the need for ‘both formal and informal learning opportunities, for short 
courses as well as longer training, and for skills development that goes beyond the 
technical or operational to embrace innovation and adaptability to change’ 
(Agriculture and Food Policy Reference Group 2006, p. 107). It advocated effective 
consultation between agriculture and training sectors so that a partnership approach 
is adopted in developing learning activities. 
Continuous learning program 
Continuous learning programs for agricultural producers are part of the broader 
training system that services agriculture and should not be developed in isolation of 
this system. These programs either subsidise, or provide a grant for, farmers to 
attend professional training. 
FarmReady, Farm Help, the Climate Change Adjustment Program (CCAP) 
Adjustment Advice and Training grants and formerly FarmBis provide financial 
assistance to primary producers and rural land managers to undertake a range of 
management training and education activities depending on program focus. 
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Farm Help and the CCAP Adjustment Advice and Training grants provide training 
and advice grants in the context of income support (see appendixes B and D). 
Grants can be accessed through both programs without having to access income 
support, although income and asset eligibility requirements and mutual 
responsibilities are applied. 
Commencing in 1998, FarmBis provided subsidies for a wide range of training 
activities. This scheme was abolished prior to the introduction of FarmReady (see 
appendix D). The mid-term review of FarmBis found that, for the most part, it had 
improved access to training in rural and regional areas and that it had catalysed 
significant levels of repeat participation (Price Waterhouse Coopers 2006). FarmBis 
may also have provided benefits where farmers had inadequate information 
regarding the training opportunities available to them or the benefits that may result. 
The FarmReady program has just commenced. FarmReady has parallels with 
FarmBis, although with a narrower scope of training courses (box 8.5). While the 
available reimbursement under FarmReady is greater than the average grant that 
was provided under FarmBis, the FarmReady allocation of $26.5 million over four 
years equates to significantly lower average annual funding than that expended on 
FarmBis programs. This suggests that in its current form, FarmReady will provide 
training opportunities to a smaller number of farmers than FarmBis. 
 
Box 8.5 FarmReady 
FarmReady aims to boost training opportunities for primary producers and to enable 
industry, farming groups and natural resource management groups to develop 
strategies to adapt and respond to the impacts of climate change. 
While similar to FarmBis, FarmReady has a narrower climate change and adaptation 
focus. The program has two components: 
1. Grants for agricultural producers to undertake accredited training. Reimbursement 
of up to $1500 per year will be available to primary producers. This grant can cover 
course costs, travel, accommodation and childcare costs incurred in attending the 
training. Learning areas for FarmReady training have a climate change and/or farm 
planning focus and funding does not cover courses covering production, technical or 
operational topics unless there is a link to a whole of farm climate change 
adaptation strategy 
2. Grants of up to $80 000 per financial year for farming or natural resource 
management groups to undertake projects that will assist in the development of 
strategies to manage the impacts of climate change. 
Source: DAFF (2008i).  
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Many participants supported government funding for a continuous learning program 
building on the FarmReady platform and incorporating the successful elements of 
FarmBis (NFF, sub. DR176; South Australian Farmers’ Federation, sub. DR144; 
Rural Business Development Corporation, trans. p. 166; Northern Territory 
Department of Regional Development, Primary Industry, Fisheries and Resources, 
sub. DR142; Australian Pork Limited, sub. DR155). The NFF argued: 
While this program [FarmReady] has been altered by the Australian Government as it 
moves to a focus on climate adaptability, there is a significant opportunity to review the 
FarmBis program and expand it into a much wider, broader and more encompassing 
approach to agricultural education and training. (sub. DR176, p. 24) 
However, the Coonamble Shire Council submitted that FarmBis had not been 
successful in their region and that courses were not reflective of regional diversity 
(sub. DR133). One participant in the public hearings, while supportive of a 
continuous learning program, commented on the lack of capacity of the FarmBis 
model for follow-ups and the importance for benchmarking and evaluation 
(Productive Nutrition, trans., p. 260). 
The rationale for government funding of a continuous learning program for farmers 
is stronger where training and education lead to changes in farming management 
practices that provide spillover benefits to the community or where there are 
barriers to farmers accessing information. Moreover, assistance for accessing 
training activities may be appropriate in the context of addressing impediments to 
rural adjustment, especially where farmers are receiving income support. This is 
discussed further in chapter 9. 
Continuous learning programs generally provide a mix of public and private 
benefits. This makes a case for support to be provided in the form of a partial 
subsidy with co-contribution rather than a full grant for costs. One hearing 
participant noted in regards to FarmBis’ co-contribution model: 
I think that it was a two-way street and it wasn’t just, “Here’s a course; you can come 
to it,” that people could actually target things that were specific to them, that it was not 
just a subsidy or a free course, that they actually also had to contribute to that. So I 
guess in that case then they’re taking more on, responsibility for the learning and the 
outcomes that they achieve out of those. (Tasmanian Women in Agriculture, trans., 
p. 46) 
A required contribution means that recipients will have a greater stake in the 
outcomes of education and training activities and will actively ensure that training 
meets their needs. 
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The Commission concludes that grants for training, while providing significant 
private benefits, are consistent with the objective of promoting self-reliance and can 
also provide public benefits. It is important that continuous learning programs have 
sound monitoring and evaluation processes. 
Significant public funding should be directed to a continuous learning program, 
incorporating the successful elements of the former FarmBis within an enhanced 
FarmReady platform. The revised program should encompass advice and training 
for managing climate variability and for farm business management. Funding 
should be provided in the form of a subsidy which covers a proportion of the cost 
of training, with the recipient contributing the balance. 
8.5 Farm management deposits 
Farm Management Deposits (FMDs) were assessed in chapter 6 and found to have 
encouraged some farmers to save during periods of higher income. While they are 
used for tax deferral and tax saving purposes, they also offer a means for achieving 
increased self-reliance. 
Should FMDs be retained? 
By providing a tax linked instrument that enables cash flow smoothing and liquidity 
management, FMDs have the potential to promote better and more timely resource 
allocation decisions. For example, input purchases or capital investments could be 
made when most appropriate rather than in the year that high income is earned:  
Better farm management decisions are entirely consistent with better risk management 
decisions. Timely investments make the farm more financially viable and sustainable to 
cope with downturns due to climate variations or market fluctuations when they occur. 
(DAFF 2006, p. 4). 
There was strong support for FMDs in submissions, with the Victorian Farmers’ 
Federation (sub. DR160), Australian Bankers’ Association (sub. 76), Growcom, 
(sub. 93) and Rural Directions (sub. 35) recommending retention of the scheme. 
The NSW Farmers’ Association submitted that ‘FMDs provide a valuable income 
equalisation scheme that has beneficial financial outcomes in business planning and 
operations’ (sub. 98, p. 4). 
The FMD scheme does not appear to address any market inefficiencies and there are 
no apparent impediments to farmers building up financial reserves. However, on 
balance, providing primary producers with a risk management tool that could 
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reduce calls for assistance during rural downturns is consistent with the 
government’s aim of encouraging primary producers to improve their preparedness 
and become more self-reliant. In addition, the scheme is likely to be a more efficient 
means of encouraging financial self-reliance than many other measures. Recent 
changes to the taxation provisions for superannuation are likely to encourage future 
generations of farmers to establish dedicated superannuation funds bolstering the 
use of FMDs as a risk management tool rather than as a de facto superannuation 
fund. Moreover, FMDs may contribute to removing period inequity for primary 
producers with fluctuating incomes, especially those who do not practise tax 
averaging. Taking all these factors into account, the Commission considers that the 
FMD program should be retained. 
Should the cap be increased? 
Some submissions argued that the FMD cap of $400 000 was too low (Western 
Australian Farmers’ Federation, sub. DR161; Victorian Farmers’ Federation, 
sub. DR160; AgForce, sub. DR185; Growcom, sub. 93). 
The average FMD deposit is $70 000, well below the cap (appendix D) and the 
FMD cap does not limit the amount of reserves a farming business can put aside in 
other accounts. Rather it limits the extent of the favourable tax treatment. There is a 
tax expenditure cost to the provision of FMDs which is likely to increase with 
enhanced use of FMDs and would increase further with any increase in the cap. The 
Commission considers that there is no argument for increasing the FMD cap. 
Should FMDs be more widely available? 
FMDs are available to individual primary producers, but not to companies or trusts. 
There was strong support in submissions for FMDs being made available to all farm 
business structures, in particular trusts and companies (AgForce, sub. DR185; 
Pastoralists and Graziers Association Western Australia, sub. DR121; Australia 
Pork Limited, sub. DR155; Growcom, sub. 93; NSW Farmers’ Association, 
sub. DR182; Australian Bankers’ Association, sub. 76). 
The 2006 Review of FMDs (DAFF 2006) addressed widening the availability of 
FMDs to trusts and companies. It concluded that it may be appropriate to extend the 
use of FMDs to companies, but that further investigation of the feasibility and cost 
of such a move should occur. The review did not support extension of the scheme to 
trusts, arguing that this would increase the likelihood of FMDs being used as a tax 
deferral mechanism for purposes other than risk management (DAFF 2006). 
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The Commission notes that company profits and undistributed income of trusts are 
taxed at a fixed rate. (Generally, however, all the income of trusts is distributed to 
beneficiaries.) Any case that exists on period equity grounds for FMDs as a 
supplement to income tax averaging for individual primary producers therefore does 
not exist for companies or trusts. Moreover, trusts provide flexibility in sharing 
income and the tax burden among beneficiaries, and individual beneficiaries of 
trusts can deposit the income they receive from a trust in FMDs. However, income 
received as dividends from companies engaging in primary production cannot be 
placed in FMDs. 
While some business structures may afford increased incentives for preparedness by 
the provision of FMDs, other business structures may have different advantages or 
features that relate to improved risk management or other priorities of the business. 
The business structure under which farms operate is a management choice that 
should take into consideration the overall comparative advantages and 
disadvantages of operating as a sole trader, partnership, trust or company. 
Companies already have some tax advantages, for example lower marginal tax 
rates, and trusts provide flexibility in income management. Given these existing 
advantages the Commission considers that there is not a strong case to extend the 
tax deferral advantages provided by FMDs to trusts and companies. 
Given that a relatively small number of farmers indicate that they do not use FMDs 
due to their business structure (Boero Rodriquez, Watson and Mues 2006), the 
Commission considers the expansion of FMDs to trusts and companies is unlikely 
to result in net benefits for the community or improve the effectiveness of the 
scheme. 
In addition to calls to make FMDs available to trusts and companies there were also 
representations that access to FMDs could be extended to small agriculture 
dependent businesses (South Australia Farmers’ Federation, sub. DR141; South 
Australian Advisory Board of Agriculture, sub. DR157; Rural Financial 
Counselling Service New South Wales Central-West, sub. DR178). To the extent 
that these businesses are organised as companies or trusts, the arguments advanced 
above against extending FMDs to them apply. It would also raise concerns about 
inconsistencies in the treatment of businesses in different locations, as businesses 
that are not agriculture dependent are also subject to significant risk exposures. 
The Farm Management Deposits scheme should be retained with its current cap 
of $400 000 and no widening of its eligibility criteria. 
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8.6 Accelerated depreciation and grants for investing 
in preparedness 
Accelerated depreciation or infrastructure grants can provide incentives for farmers 
to make certain types of ‘approved’ investments in preparedness to improve their 
physical capital base. There was support in submissions for depreciation incentives 
with the South Australian Farmers’ Federation (sub. DR141), AgForce (sub. 80) 
and NSW Farmers’ Association (sub. 98) recommending such an approach. The 
NFF supported grants for physical preparedness investments and contended that 
yearly grants would encourage self-sufficiency and improve farmers’ ability to 
manage climate variability (sub. 51). 
In the Commission’s view, individual farmers (appropriately supported by 
government funded information and training) are best placed to make their own 
investment decisions. Furthermore, there is no demonstrable failure of capital 
markets to provide funding for these sorts of investments. Investments in 
preparedness would generally yield largely private benefits. Unless investments 
produce wider community benefits, subsidies or grants for preparedness 
investments are likely to generate a poor return for the community. 
The record of governments picking winning technologies in agriculture is mixed. 
Where governments are required to arbitrate on what qualifies as appropriate 
preparedness investments there is a risk that preparedness could be overpromoted or 
inconsistently promoted (with some types of investments receiving support and 
others not). 
For these reasons, the Commission does not accept that governments should 
subsidise investments in drought preparedness. Farmers should choose to invest in 
preparedness and improve their capital base where it is in their interest to do so 
rather than have the community do this on their behalf. The Commission sees little 
role for government in this process. 
There is not a strong rationale for accelerated depreciation provisions or a case for 
infrastructure grants to underpin private on-farm preparedness investments. 
8.7 Income contingent loans 
Income contingent loans (ICLs) are subsidised loans with repayments dependent on 
the future economic circumstances of the recipient. That is, in periods when the 
recipient experiences adverse financial outcomes, required loan repayments would 
be reduced or nil (L. Botterill and B. Chapman, sub. 52). 
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ICLs were initially introduced in Australia to enable an increase in the contribution 
that students made to financing their education (currently under the Higher 
Education Loan Program (HELP)). An ICL was justified on the basis of the 
difficulty that some students face in securing funding for their education (Chapman 
2006). Their appropriateness is more readily apparent for an improvement in human 
capital through higher education, than for situations where loans are taken out for 
more tangible investments. 
Box 8.6 discusses some of the issues in providing ICLs for farmers and identifies 
some of the characteristics of a potential approach. 
 
Box 8.6 Issues in providing ICLs and possible characteristics of an ICL 
scheme for farmers 
• Assessment of viability. To ensure that ICLs are not disproportionately taken up 
by those who are less likely to repay the loan, L. Botterill and B. Chapman propose 
that commercial banks could be involved in determining eligibility for the scheme. 
Finance could be provided as a ‘top up’ on existing loans delivered through private 
financial institutions and a real rate of interest (to be determined with reference to 
long term government bond rates) could be applied. 
• Repayment as a proportion of gross revenue. Given that decisions on the timing 
of sales of livestock and crops and on purchases of farm inputs together with 
decisions on FMDs and the use of various tax provisions can greatly influence 
farmers’ taxable income levels in any given year, L. Botterill and B. Chapman 
propose that repayment of an ICL be made as a small percentage of gross revenue 
as reported on Business Activity Statements. Furthermore, given the variation in 
farm size and revenues, a repayment free threshold would not be included (in 
contrast to the HELP loan). 
• Sale of the farm. To protect against recipients avoiding repayment through selling 
the farm asset (over which the government would have no claim) or changing 
inheritance or partnership arrangements, L. Botterill and B. Chapman propose that 
the ICL could be attached to the farm’s ABN. Furthermore, farm businesses in 
receipt of an ICL would be required to report their activities on a single Business 
Activity Statement. 
Source: L. Botterill and B. Chapman (sub. 52).  
 
There was support for an ICL scheme in some submissions, with the New South 
Wales Government (sub. 90), NSW Farmers’ Association (sub. 98), AgForce 
(sub. 80) and Murray Dairy (sub. 70) recommending such an approach. The NFF 
supported the use of ICLs for ‘primary producers that are looking at growing their 
business but are not yet in a position where they are able to invest with confidence 
in preparedness and growth strategies’ (sub. 51, p. 15). 
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However, the South Australian Farmer’s Federation raised concerns about ICLs, on 
the grounds that ‘those that really need the assistance would struggle to ever pay it 
back on top of all their other liabilities’ (sub. DR141, p. 3). AgForce submitted that 
an ICL scheme would need a tight time frame, such that the loan is due and payable 
after a certain time limit irrespective of whether the farm is generating a profit 
(sub. DR185). 
Is there a market failure rationale for providing ICLs to farmers? 
The rationale for government provision of ICLs rests on limitations in credit 
markets that prevent farmers from obtaining finance. Some participants argued that 
during periods of hardship, such as drought, income streams can fall to zero or 
become negative and this impedes the capacity to service any new, let alone 
existing, loans. 
However, the Australian Bankers’ Association argued that ‘there is no compelling 
case that there is a failure of rural credit financial markets that warrants government 
intervention in the provision of financial services to agribusiness’ (sub. 76, p. 3). It 
submitted that customers who are viable in the long term should not have a problem 
accessing finance in drought conditions. It further contended that in times of 
drought, carry-on finance may be accessed and existing loans restructured to reduce 
annual debt repayments or to defer payment without cost. 
L. Botterill and B. Chapman submitted that there is market failure on the 
demand-side of credit markets: ‘farmers will borrow less than the finance sector is 
willing to provide because of their high level of sensitivity to the possible loss of the 
farm’ (sub. DR139, p. 2). They point to the fact that farmers may enjoy non-
financial benefits in their occupation and as such the value the farmer places on 
their farm is higher than the dollar value placed on the property by the finance 
sector. In addition, they point to the tendency for people to discount upside risk and 
overestimate downside risk. 
The Commission does not support offering concessional finance to a group of 
borrowers to induce them to borrow at a higher level than their own risk preferences 
would allow. A greater sensitivity to a loss of the farm due to the high non-
monetary value placed on farming is rational and does not provide an efficiency 
case for measures to encourage farmers to take on more debt. Accordingly, the 
Commission is of the view that an ICL scheme would run the risk of over-
incentivising borrowings. 
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The use of ICLs for investments in preparedness 
ICLs could be used to provide farmers with finance to invest in preparedness, so as 
to encourage self-reliant approaches to managing risks. Such an approach would 
require some sort of assessment to ensure that potential recipients had businesses 
that were viable in the long term and that the investment was an appropriate way to 
improve that particular business’ preparedness for adverse outcomes. 
However, as discussed previously, the Commission does not see a role for 
government in providing incentives for investment in physical preparedness, nor in 
assessing the appropriateness of different investment options. Inevitably, there 
would be costs involved in determining the viability of businesses (about which 
there is always some uncertainty) and approving different types of investments. The 
Commission considers that such a policy would essentially be an administratively 
complex and costly way of enhancing preparedness and would likely mean ‘picking 
winners’. 
ICLs as a drought relief measure 
An ICL program specifically for farmers has most commonly been advocated as a 
drought relief measure. Thus, where farmers are experiencing low revenue due to 
drought (or other reasons) they could access finance to assist them through a 
difficult period without the concern that they may lose the farm if income does not 
improve in the short term. ICLs provided as drought relief would still require the 
government to determine whether a business was viable, although there would be no 
need to assess what the loan was to be used for. 
As a drought relief measure, ICLs have been presented as an alternative to the 
current interest rate subsidy (L. Botterill and B. Chapman, sub. 52 and sub. DR139). 
Compared to the interest rate subsidy, an ICL scheme would be more likely to 
encourage self-reliance through the imposition of the responsibility to re-pay the 
loan (if and when cash flow recovers). It is also argued that an ICL would also be 
less likely to encourage farmers to take on more risk, and it could be less costly for 
taxpayers (L. Botterill and B. Chapman, sub. 52). 
However, the Commission does not believe that an ICL scheme for drought relief is 
justified. In comparison to tertiary students, drought-affected farmers with sound 
prospects of longer-term viability appear to be reasonably catered for by the 
commercial financial system. 
Furthermore, the Commission has concerns that an ICL scheme could encourage 
farmers to take on more risk. As discussed previously, where there is no efficiency 
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case for an ICL program, such an approach could encourage farmers to increase 
their debt levels. Where banks are responsible for undertaking viability assessments 
of farm businesses, there is a risk that they may consider more marginal farmers, 
who they would otherwise not provide finance, to be eligible for an ICL as the farm 
asset is protected from default. 
Does support for FMDs imply support for ICLs? 
An ICL scheme has been presented as an ‘opposing half’ to FMDs (NFF, 
sub. DR176, p. 73). In their response to the draft report, L. Botterill and 
B. Chapman noted that where ‘the Commission accepts the rationale for the 
provision of FMDs as a risk management tool even though they “do not appear to 
address any market inefficiencies” it should logically see the case for ICLs on the 
same grounds’ (sub. DR139, p. 2).  
However, an ICL is more than a ‘mirror image’ to FMDs. The Commission 
considers that ICLs would be a less effective risk management tool than FMDs, as 
FMDs increase savings in high income years, do not require governments to make 
assessments of business viability, and do not have high administrative costs that 
extend into the future. 
Most proponents of an ICL program for farmers recognise that the case rests on a 
‘second best’ perspective. That is, notwithstanding the absence of a clear rationale, 
if business support is to be given anyway, an ICL scheme would have some 
desirable features relative to the existing interest rate subsidy. This second best 
perspective is only relevant to the extent that the (consistent) recommendations of 
past reviews of drought policy to terminate the interest rate subsidy have been 
ignored. The Commission does not support the provision of ICLs to farmers. 
8.8 Assistance to develop insurance markets 
Apart from insurance for fire and hail damage, there are limited options for 
agricultural producers to insure themselves against production risk in Australia. The 
literature describes some potential insurance arrangements (see box 8.7), but real 
world insurance markets for drought in Australia and elsewhere are scarce. 
From a policy perspective, an inability to insure against production risk from 
drought means that farmers lack a major risk management tool. Several participants 
(NFF, sub. 51; NSW Farmers’ Association, sub. 98; AgForce, sub. 80) contended 
that missing insurance markets provide a powerful rationale for governments to 
make available a range of policies that assist farmers to become self-reliant in other 
ways. 
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Box 8.7 Types of insurance 
Multi peril crop insurance (MPCI): insures farmers against multiple risks including 
drought, flood and disease. As the extent of loss is established after the crop is 
harvested it can be difficult to determine the cause. MPCI involves problems of 
systematic risk, asymmetric information and moral hazard. Studies in Australia 
concluded that MPCI would not be commercially viable without significant government 
assistance (Industries Assistance Commission 1986; MPCI Taskforce 2003; Ernst and 
Young 2000). 
Rainfall insurance: avoids problems of asymmetric information and moral hazard 
through tying indemnities to a measurable and verifiable event, in this case rainfall. 
Consequently, it can be offered at lower premiums. However, for farmers to purchase 
rainfall insurance, rainfall would need to be closely correlated with incomes or yields, 
otherwise it would not sufficiently indemnify farmers against income losses. 
Yield index insurance: attempts to more closely correlate indemnities with variations 
in income due to rainfall, through a non linear model of yields as a function of rainfall. 
However, this product does not fully insure farmers against income losses. Yield losses 
may also be a result of heat and cold, not just rainfall; and yield may be more sensitive 
to the timing of rainfall not just the total rainfall for the growing season (Hertzler 2005). 
The complexity of yield insurance is a deterrent to its widespread use in Australia. 
Weather derivatives: involve payouts derived from an observed event, such as district 
rainfall, temperature or the southern oscillation index. The difference between what the 
derivative is derived from (for example rainfall recorded at a specific station) and a 
farmer’s own set of conditions (yield as a result of rainfall and other environmental 
conditions on-farm) is indicative of how well the derivative will insure the farmer. 
Derivatives need to be fairly generic if they are to be readily tradable, and are generally 
sold at high values. As a result they may not be flexible enough or sufficiently aligned 
with the farmer’s circumstances to be attractive. 
There do not appear to be any significant examples of fully commercial MPCI, rainfall 
or yield index insurance schemes anywhere in the world (MPCI Taskforce 2003; 
Hertzler 2005).  
 
The major reasons for why the private sector does not provide drought insurance 
include: 
• many farmers can be simultaneously affected by a drought which provides 
limited opportunities for insurers to spread risk among a large group of clients 
(systemic risk) 
• insurers and farmers do not have the same information, which can lead to a 
situation where those farmers who face greater risks purchase insurance, as they 
expect to receive more than they pay in premiums (farmers with lower risks do 
not purchase insurance as they expect to receive less than they pay in premiums) 
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— insurers will raise premiums to cover their costs and an increasingly risky 
pool of farmers will purchase insurance (adverse selection) 
• once farmers purchase insurance they can alter their behaviour and make riskier 
decisions than they would otherwise, making it hard for insurers to determine the 
reason for loss (moral hazard). 
In addition, government drought policy may impede the development of a private 
market for insurance. If farmers believe that the government will provide assistance 
during drought — and they would have every reason to do so given historical 
experience — the incentive to purchase private insurance is reduced. The 
Queensland Government suggested: 
… while certainly not the only reason, the fact that the government is prepared to take 
on an element of the climate risk by providing drought assistance measures may crowd 
out this potential [insurance] market. (sub. 77, p. 8)  
The Western Australian Task Force into multi peril crop insurance similarly posited 
that the expectation of on-going assistance may partially explain why there is no 
privately offered multi peril crop insurance schemes in Australia (MPCI Taskforce 
2003). 
There was support in several submissions (Queensland Farmers’ Federation, 
sub. 82; NSW Farmers’ Association, sub. 98) for governments to subsidise or 
provide reinsurance for schemes which insure production income. 
The Western Australian Farmers’ Federation advocated ‘a nation-wide approach, 
implemented at a federal level covering as broad a spectrum of crops and varieties 
as possible to reduce rates’ (sub. DR161, p. 5). They submitted that government 
could underwrite the scheme ‘until such time as a premium bank is created which 
removes the need for substantial government investment’ (sub. DR161, p. 5). 
In the absence of insurance markets, farmers may alter their production decisions in 
order to diversify and limit the possible impacts of future droughts. For example, 
where a farmer diversifies production to decrease their risk exposure, farm income 
may be decreased relative to the previous situation where cropping was specialised 
for maximum expected yield (MPCI Taskforce 2003). This can result in resources 
not being used in the most efficient way. This could be addressed by governments 
providing insurance to farmers. However, such a move would only result in net 
benefits to the community if governments were able to overcome the same 
difficulties that prevent private insurance markets from developing. 
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Governments may not be able to offer drought insurance at a lower cost than private 
firms (Newbery and Stiglitz 1981; Ha et al. 2007). In providing subsidised 
insurance, governments would be exposed to the same risks as the private sector, 
and would be less able to offset systemic risk if they only deal with farmers within 
their borders. 
Historically, loss ratios for government provided insurance have been very high and 
the Commission is not aware of any international examples of a scheme where the 
government has reduced their financial involvement after an initial period of 
support. In the United States, where crop insurance has been subsidised by 
government since 1983, the indemnities paid by the public insurer plus 
administration costs are three times the premiums paid by farmers (loss ratio of 3). 
This is also the case in Canada where government subsidised crop insurance has 
been available in all provinces for the last twenty years. Brazil and Japan have even 
higher loss ratios of up to 4.5 (Hertzler 2005).  
Governments, like private insurance providers, would also face issues of moral 
hazard. The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation scheme in the United States has 
been plagued by such problems — many have argued that the scheme has led to 
farmers in the United States taking on more risk (Skees 1999; Glauber 2004; Young 
et al. 2001). 
The Queensland Farmers’ Federation identified weather derivatives and index-
based yield contracts (box 8.3) as an area where public research may yield 
‘considerable long term benefits for primary producers and the wider community’ 
(sub. 82, p. 12). Research into insurance and derivatives has been undertaken in the 
past and, where appropriate, could continue to be supported through research and 
development efforts on managing climate variability in agriculture. This is relevant 
to section 8.2. 
The Commission considers that it is likely that markets will develop for risk sharing 
products like yield index insurance and weather derivatives in the future with 
technical progresses in global information gathering and processing, improved 
understanding of climate and weather and greater integration of global capital 
markets (Malcolm 2006). For example, the Grain Co-production model offered by 
Australian Agricultural Contracts Limited has grown strongly since its inception 
(see box 8.8) and similar arrangements are evolving elsewhere in Australia. 
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Box 8.8 Australian Agricultural Contracts Limited grain co-production 
Australian Agricultural Contracts Limited (AACL) was founded in Western Australia in 
1997 and has offered a Grain Co-Production product since 1999. This product shares 
agricultural production risk between farmers and investors. 
Essentially, funds of investors (usually urban) are placed with farmers. The advanced 
capital is unsecured. In some cases, up to $4 million is provided to a farmer to plant, 
manage, harvest and deliver a crop. The analogy with bank finance would be that 
AACL advances the funds, the farmer pays off the capital with grain proceeds and the 
‘interest cost’ is the investor return. After that, the farmer retains any remaining upside. 
If the crop fails, however, the farmer pays back nothing as investors ‘wear’ the risk . As 
the AACL Managing Director explained: 
… our model … is … an insurance policy. It’s not supposed to be something that is going to 
make the farmer extra money … It’s not a profit-making instrument; it’s a hedge instrument. 
… it costs the farmer a little bit more in an average or above average year. In a bad year, 
he’s got a little bit of downside but he hasn’t got all the downside; the investor wears that. 
But we have an investor pool. The pool hopefully absorbs those individual losses, because 
hopefully we’ve been good enough to spread our pool across a big enough area …  
I've heard the NFF … talk about: ‘We need a system that the farmer puts a little bit away 
each year so that he's got a pool withdraw fund in drought.’ This is exactly what this model is 
doing. He's giving up a little bit in a good season; in a poor season, he's spread that risk to a 
pool of people spread across potentially the whole country —- we're now into barley and 
canola, as well, and it's with parties who aren't in a poor agricultural season. (trans. pp. 185) 
In 2008 AACL extended their coverage and offered Grain Co-Production to some 
farmers in New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia and also offered a barley 
contract for the first time. From very modest beginnings, the total investment by AACL 
in 2008 was $65 million — contracting approximately 170 farmer clients to grow around 
380 000 tonnes of wheat and barley. 
Source: AACL (sub. DR117).  
 
The Commission does not consider that the higher cost of feasible self-insurance 
compared with hypothetical efficient market insurance provides a rationale for 
government to share producers’ risks. Furthermore, it is unlikely that governments 
can overcome the problems with information and incentives, faced by the private 
sector, in providing insurance products without creating adverse outcomes such as 
encouraging farmers to take on more risk. 
It is the Commission’s view that government subsidised insurance schemes, broad 
ranging drought assistance measures and ad hoc drought assistance will impede the 
development of more efficient private sector arrangements for sharing production 
risk in agriculture. 
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9 Farming family income support and 
adjustment 
 
Key Points 
• All farm households in hardship should have access to income support irrespective 
of whether this hardship is a result of drought. 
– Farmers often face difficulty accessing the social security system due to the level 
of their farm assets and the requirements of working on the farm. 
• There is a case for a targeted income support scheme for farm households that: 
– is equitable 
– recognises issues of farm viability 
– avoids welfare dependence by limiting the duration of support 
– is provided in conjunction with training, professional financial advice and 
counselling to assist farmers to improve their viability or to evaluate their options 
outside of farming.  
 
9.1 Introduction 
Throughout the inquiry there was broad endorsement for income support to be 
provided to all farming families experiencing hardship. In contrast, the Exceptional 
Circumstances Relief Payments (ECRP) scheme does not assist farmers 
experiencing hardship if they reside outside of drought declared areas. This is just 
one of many reasons leading the Commission to propose that the scheme be 
replaced (chapter 6).  
In addition to ECRP, there is another farmer specific income support program — 
the Transitional Income Support Scheme (TIS) — which provides case managed 
income support to all eligible farmers experiencing hardship and simultaneously 
aims to encourage farmers to improve their viability or to leave farming. TIS 
funding is scheduled to conclude in June 2009 (chapter 6). 
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These developments raise questions about farm households’ access to alternative 
forms of income support, particularly as the characteristics of farmers (especially 
their assets) can render them ineligible for general safety net measures.  
Farming in Australia has been subject to significant and on-going changes 
(chapter 2). Where this change is impeded through inappropriate government policy 
settings, assets and human capital can be locked into under-performing activities 
with adverse implications for the wellbeing of farming families, as well as for the 
agricultural sector. Economy-wide performance and the quality of environmental 
management can also suffer. 
It is important, therefore, that any income support provided to farm households does 
not impede farm adjustment or undermine self-reliance (O’Meagher 2005; 
Cockfield and Botterill 2006). The Corish review concluded that ‘propping up 
otherwise unviable farmers can make their eventual departure financially and 
personally more painful. It can also frustrate the growth of other farm businesses 
that are viable’ (Agriculture and Food Policy Reference Group 2006, p. 181). 
Support needs to be targeted and short-term, so that farmers can ‘re-establish viable 
enterprises, obtain off-farm income or leave farming’ (McColl et al. 1997, p. 114). 
This chapter explores the links between income support and adjustment and 
assesses whether these objectives are compatible. It examines the need for a special 
income support program for farming circumstances. It proposes an integrated 
approach to income support and adjustment that seeks to avoid bringing them into 
conflict. 
9.2  Financial hardship and farming families 
There are some differences between the income of farmers and of all Australian 
households on an equivalised basis (figure 9.1). In 2006, the median equivalised 
gross income for farm households ($605 per week) was $44 lower than that for all 
households ($649 per week). Differences are most apparent at the lower and 
mid-point of the income scale, with a larger proportion of farming families 
experiencing negative incomes and incomes between $400 and $999 per week. A 
similar proportion (three to four per cent) of farm households and all households 
experienced high income levels of $1600 or more. 
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The broad similarities in the incomes of farm, and non-farm, households are not 
mirrored in perceptions of hardship. Analysis by the Australian Institute of Family 
Studies (sub. 92) shows that a larger proportion of farmers reported experiencing 
financial hardship in any given year than did farm workers and individuals living in 
rural and regional Australia who were not employed in agriculture (see box 3.2 and 
table 3.1).  
Another study submitted to the Expert Social Panel — using the Household, Income 
and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey — compared people living in rural and 
urban areas. It found that people living in urban areas were more likely to report 
instances of financial hardship than those in rural areas (figure 9.2) (Hogan et al. 
2008). 
Although there is no clear evidence of significant income discrepancies or levels of 
financial hardship being faced by farmers in drought, there is ample evidence of its 
effects on farm incomes. As shown in figures 2.9 and 2.10, each of the major 
droughts that occurred in the past 25 years has been associated with a reduction in 
the cash incomes of broadacre and dairy farms. 
Variability of farm household income 
Farm households are often closely integrated with the farm business, leading to high 
degrees of income variability. This variability, and the need to balance capital 
accumulation against consumption, leads to circumstances where many farming 
families are ‘asset rich and income-poor’ (Botterill 2002, p. 2). Given the variability 
of income, simply looking at periodic farm household income will not necessarily 
indicate the welfare of the family. 
Increasingly farm households are obtaining off-farm income to stabilise income 
flows. As discussed in chapter 2, the (real) level of off-farm income obtained by 
broadacre and dairy farm households has increased (figures 2.14 and 2.15). The 
level of wage and salary income received by broadacre farm households, on 
average, has increased significantly since the late 1970s, as have total government 
sourced payments. 
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Figure 9.1 Average weekly equivalised incomea of farm households and all 
households, 2006 
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a Equivalised income is calculated by adjusting household income by an ‘equivalising factor’ based on the 
number of adults and children in the household (ABS 2008c). Weekly income is determined by asking 
respondents to state their usual gross weekly income, which is the income before tax, superannuation, health 
insurance, or other deductions are made. Family income is calculated by summing the individual incomes 
reported by all family members aged 15 years and over and includes income earned both on and off-farm.  
Data source: ABS (Agriculture in Focus: Farming Families, Australia, 2006, Cat. no. 7104.0.55.001). 
Figure 9.2 Financial stressors, 2001–2005 
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In addition, the proportion of farm households1 with off-farm wages has increased 
(figure 9.3). In 1977-78, the share of broadacre farm households receiving off-farm 
wages was just 25 per cent, but by 2005-06, this had risen to 42 per cent. The 
experience of dairy farm households has been slightly different, as there does not 
appear to be a clear trend in the proportion of dairy farmers in receipt of off-farm 
wages. 
Figure 9.3 Broadacre farm households with off-farm wages, 1977-78 to 
2007-08 
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Data source: ABARE (unpublished data). 
Does cash income understate the welfare of a farm household? 
One complicating factor in determining whether a farm household is experiencing 
hardship is that cash incomes can understate the welfare of a farming family as 
income does not encapsulate the value of non-cash benefits of living on a farm 
(Musgrave 1990). These non-monetary benefits refer to people’s preferences for 
living on the land and also to unmeasured monetary benefits. 
Vincent et al. (1975) presented a sample of farmers with a range of incomes in 
different rural or metropolitan locations and found that farmers were willing to 
accept little more than half of what they would receive in the city, to stay on the 
farm. This was increasingly the case the higher the farm income. However, many 
people who live in cities also value this lifestyle and have access to a range of 
services that are not readily available to rural communities (Musgrave 1990). As 
                                                 
1 Collected from ABARE surveys and referring to the farm operator-manager’s household. That is, 
the off-farm income of the principal operator and their spouse. 
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such, the non-monetary benefits of living on the farm are balanced against such 
factors as higher transport costs and lower levels of services and facilities. 
9.3 An income support scheme for farming families 
The social security system aims to provide a safety net for all Australians through 
income support payments to individuals and families who are without the means of 
self provision (box 9.1). As income is, in itself, an insufficient indicator of need for 
assistance, asset tests are also applied. This recognises that those with substantial 
assets, other than their family home, should apply those assets to support 
themselves before calling on the community for assistance (Senate Rural and 
Regional Affairs and Transport and References Committee 1995). 
It is not the intention of the social security system to provide a guaranteed minimum 
income for all Australians in the occupation of their choice. Further, ‘people who 
have a significant level of assets which could be used for financial support, and 
self-employed people whose businesses are running at a loss, cannot expect to 
receive assistance from Social Security’ (Special Rural Taskforce 1997, p. 4). 
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Box 9.1 Social security system 
Five key principles underpin the design of the social security system: 
• It supports a basic acceptable standard of living, accounting for prevailing 
community standards. Payments are not related to past earnings and do not 
compensate for pain, suffering or loss of amenity. 
• It is equitable. It treats people in similar circumstances similarly. Those with 
additional costs are given greater assistance either through transfer payments or 
services to help them achieve a similar living standard. In some circumstances, 
these additional costs are recognised across a range of income levels. 
• It targets payments to those not able to fully support themselves. Those with their 
own resources and therefore the capacity to support themselves do not have the 
same need for transfers. Income and asset tests are used to reduce payments for 
people with private resources. 
• It promotes participation and self-provision through a combination of: 
– services and assistance to help people deal with disadvantage (including 
disability, caring, improving skills and seeking work) 
– incentives to work to provide for current needs and for retirement — for example, 
through contributions to superannuation 
– obligations to work and to seek suitable work for those who are expected to, and 
the use of private savings to support themselves for those with savings. 
• It is sustainable. The broad community accepts that those who receive social 
security payments are in genuine need and that the overall system is affordable 
across the economic cycle and in the long run, given the ageing of the population. 
Source: Harmer (2008, pp. 4–5).  
 
Impediments to farmers accessing the social security system 
Farm households may face difficulties accessing government income support. The 
NSW Farmers’ Association argued that the social security system does not 
adequately cater for self-employed persons such as farmers (sub. 98). Two key 
barriers to farmers accessing support are the asset tests applied to most Centrelink 
programs and the activity test used for the Newstart unemployment benefit. 
Asset tests 
A key concern of participants was that where eligibility for income support is 
contingent on a farm household meeting a specific asset limit this would force 
farmers to significantly run down their equity before they receive any assistance — 
potentially selling their ‘superannuation’ or endangering the long-term viability of 
   
218 GOVERNMENT 
DROUGHT SUPPORT 
 
 
their farm (NFF, sub. DR176; RFCS Tasmania, sub. DR164). The NSW Farmers’ 
Association submitted that setting too low an asset threshold for income support 
could result in farmers taking ‘much longer to recover from drought or even make 
the farms non-viable’ (sub. 98, p. 24). 
Furthermore, many submissions pointed to perceived inequities between farmers 
and non-farmers in relation to the asset requirements for pensions and allowances 
administered through Centrelink. In particular, the exemption of the family home 
from asset tests was highlighted — ‘people who live in big expensive houses don’t 
have to sell them to get help so why should we have to [sell] our properties. 
Off-farm assets should be included but the farm properties should be exempted 
from assets test’ (H. Clark, sub. 78, p. 10). 
To address certain circumstances where people may be income poor but asset rich, 
the Commonwealth has introduced Hardship Provisions. These enable those with 
assets in excess of the eligibility limits for a Centrelink pension, benefit or 
allowance, but are otherwise experiencing hardship, to access income support. The 
provisions apply where people cannot sell, or borrow against, their assets or are 
trying to sell their assets at a realistic market price and are unable to qualify for 
other Commonwealth Government assistance (Department of Families, Housing, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs 2009, section 11.(12)). 
Hardship Provisions differ depending on the type of assistance sought. In the case 
of the Age Pension, applicants are not required to put their assets on the market to 
access the pension through Hardship Provisions. Rather the test is whether it ‘could 
not reasonably be expected’ that the individual rearrange their financial affairs and 
sell their property (Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs 2009, s.4.6.7.10). In the case of Newstart, the Special Rural Task 
Force recommended changes to lessen the requirement for farmers to sell their 
assets under Hardship Provisions (Special Rural Taskforce 1997). This 
recommendation was not adopted by the government. The Commission agrees with 
the government’s approach, as the theoretical possibility of converting assets into 
income ‘must be distinguished from the practical desires of people to do so’ 
(Vincent et al. 1975, p. 83). 
The Commission considers that the provisions for the Age Pension, to a certain 
extent, adequately address the specific circumstances of farmers. However, this is 
not necessarily the case for Newstart Allowance, where those farmers able to meet 
the Newstart asset tests are likely to have run down their equity to irrecoverable 
levels. 
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Activity test 
Another impediment to farmers accessing Newstart Allowance is the activity test — 
that is, the requirement to actively look for work or undertake other approved 
activities (such as voluntary work or training). The Special Rural Taskforce (1997) 
recommended that alternative criteria be developed for the Newstart activity test so 
as to reflect rural and farming situations for those farmers who fulfil the assets and 
income requirements for Newstart Allowance. 
According to Centrelink ‘mutual obligation is about helping you find and take part 
in an activity that will improve your job prospects and contact with your 
community’ (Centrelink 2008d). The Commission agrees with this and considers 
that mutual responsibility should ideally involve actions which improve recipients’ 
circumstances in the future. For an unemployed person, for example, undertaking 
training or gaining work experience through a volunteer program could achieve this. 
For a farmer, who is not unemployed, mutual responsibility could be better focussed 
at flexible training arrangements, risk management or business planning to either 
increase the capacity of the farm household to earn off-farm income or to improve 
production and on-farm management practices. To this end, the Commission does 
not consider that the Newstart activity test affords sufficient flexibility to ensure 
that there are mutual responsibility activities that would improve farmers’ 
circumstances in the future. 
Alternative activities for farmers might include, for example, participation in 
Landcare or other natural resources management activities in the community. 
However, the diversity of daily labour requirements of agricultural producers, such 
as between dairy, horticulture and cereal cropping for instance, makes it difficult to 
introduce a standard set of activity requirements for farmers. Furthermore, for some 
farmers, on-farm labour requirements may rise during drought periods — for 
example, with more handfeeding of stock. While Centrelink advised that activity 
testing can be applied flexibly to applicants in rural and remote areas under current 
guidelines (Centrelink, pers. comm., 2008) alternative criteria for rural and farming 
situations have not been developed. 
What about rural and farm dependent small businesses? 
Rural and farm dependent small business operators may also have significant assets 
which prevent them from accessing income support. But, whereas farm assets are 
generally lumpy and non divisible and can be site specific, this is not always the 
case for rural and farm dependent businesses. Furthermore, such businesses are 
generally located in towns and consequently have greater access to casual or 
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part-time employment opportunities and would be better able to meet the activity 
requirements of Newstart. 
Rural and farm dependent businesses do not generally face the same difficulties in 
diversifying income sources as farm businesses and are more able to make 
adjustments to their business model (such as broadening the range of services or 
products that they provide). For example, agricultural contractors (such as 
harvesters) are also more mobile and can seek work in other locales. 
Many factors can have significant negative impacts on the family income levels of 
small business operators. Myriad small businesses risk their capital and, in some 
cases, fail. Little or no government support is provided in these situations. An 
extension of favourable conditions to particular businesses would raise concerns 
about inconsistencies in the treatment of businesses of different types and in 
different locations. 
Concluding comments on farmers’ access to income support 
Overall, the Commission concurs with the conclusions of the 1990 Drought Policy 
Review Task Force that, ‘the possible extension of the unemployment benefit 
system to cover the specific needs of primary producers and their families during 
periods of adversity, while they still remain in farming, would seem inappropriate’ 
(McInnes et al. 1990, vol. 3, p. 68).  
The Commission considers, therefore, that a special income support program 
tailored to farming circumstances is required, but that extension of any such 
program to farm dependent or rural businesses is not appropriate. 
9.4 The Commission’s proposal for an income support 
scheme for farming families 
The Commission considers that an income support scheme designed for farming 
circumstances should be consistent with the principles in box 9.1 and aim to achieve 
a balance between the four following objectives: 
• equity — by enabling all farming families in hardship to access income support, 
not just those within administratively-determined drought boundaries 
• recognition of farm viability — by setting the asset threshold at a higher level 
than Newstart 
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• avoidance of welfare dependence — by limiting the duration of income support 
and assisting farmers to undertake farm planning or training suited to earning 
off-farm income 
• helping recipients determine their future in farming — by providing support for 
viability assessments, counselling and succession planning. 
To meet the first objective, income support should be available to all farm 
households experiencing hardship, irrespective of the cause of this hardship. Such 
an approach received strong support (NFF, sub. 51; NSW Farmers’ Association, 
sub. 98; New South Wales Government, sub. 90; Queensland Government, sub. 77). 
However, any assistance should be consistent with the broader social security 
system — ‘sector-specific income support should not set up any major inequities 
and/or adverse incentives in the way that it interacts with the general social security 
system’ (Industry Commission 1996, p. 37, emphasis added).  
The Commission proposes that assistance should be based on the same payment 
levels and income tests as Newstart with modifications to asset tests and activity 
requirements to appropriately address farmers’ needs. And, to prevent income 
support impeding adjustment in agriculture, there would be mutual responsibility 
and case management. Support should also be time limited. The Commission 
proposes that these objectives be met through a new Farming Family Income 
Support scheme which would be administered by Centrelink and provided under the 
Social Security Act (1991). 
Farmer eligibility  
Support should be conditional on applicants demonstrating that they are farmers 
(based on similar tests to those that apply for TIS — see appendix B). While the 
scheme should operate at the farm household level, eligibility and payments should 
be on an individual basis (unlike ECRP and TIS where successful applicants receive 
payments for themselves and their partner) and where a couple applies they must 
each satisfy this test. In line with Newstart (and other Centrelink payments) where 
an unemployed person’s spouse does not automatically receive payments, a 
farmer’s spouse should not automatically be eligible for assistance through the 
Farming Family Income Support scheme. 
Viability testing 
While it should be compulsory for all income support applicants to seek advice 
regarding the financial situation of their business, support should not be conditional 
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on the farm business being assessed as viable. Accurately identifying viable and 
non-viable farm businesses can be difficult even in good times. Furthermore, there 
will be a range of farm incomes that a farm household is prepared to accept, 
reflecting trade-offs with non financial costs and benefits of farming. Concerns 
about the potential for government support to sustain farmers in non-viable 
activities can be addressed more effectively through mutual responsibility, case 
management and a time limit on assistance. 
Income 
ECRP and TIS use the Newstart income payment levels and eligibility thresholds. 
However, the ECRP program allows an additional $20 000 to be earned in off-farm 
income through wages and salary. This means farming couples on ECRP can earn 
more (over $400 per week) and still receive the full payment of ECRP relative to a 
couple both on Newstart. 
Currently, where a Newstart Allowance recipient earns more than $62 per fortnight, 
or their spouse earns over $769 per fortnight, income support is reduced. Box 9.2 
provides further information regarding this income eligibility rule. 
Some participants disagreed with importing Newstart’s income requirements into a 
farming family income support program. They argued that strict income tests deter 
farming families from earning off-farm income (Tasmania Farmers and Graziers 
Association, sub. 69; Rural Youth Organisation of Tasmania, sub. 88). The National 
Farmers’ Federation (NFF) submitted that ‘imposing barriers to farmers earning off-
farm income to assist with the survival of the farm business … is 
counter-productive’ (sub. DR176, p. 77). 
The alternative view is that ‘welfare is provided by government as a safety net 
measure to ensure that families do not fall below community-acceptable standards 
of hardship. It is not intended to provide a reward structure for good management’. 
(Botterill and Chapman, sub. 52, p. 3). 
An income support safety net is targeted primarily at assisting families in hardship, 
rather than aiming directly to enhance farmers’ self-reliance. That said, given the 
links between viability, income support, welfare dependence and farm adjustment, 
any income support scheme should not pose barriers to earning off-farm income. 
The Commission does not consider that Newstart income eligibility necessarily 
creates a disincentive to earning off-farm income. As shown in box 9.2 and figure 
9.4 (below) for example, the taper rate does not result in effective marginal rates so 
punitive that income in excess of $62 per fortnight is deterred for an individual. 
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Therefore, the Commission sees no case to depart from the income payments and 
eligibility thresholds for Newstart Allowance. 
Assets 
Generally, eligibility requirements for social security payments require that, where 
an individual has significant assets, they liquidate or borrow against these assets to 
support themselves rather than call on the community for assistance.  
Farm household specific income support programs generally have higher asset 
thresholds than programs offered to the general community. For example, the asset 
test for ECRP does not include the value of farm land or farm assets, but has 
restrictions on off-farm assets. TIS imposes a total net asset cap (including the farm, 
family home and farm assets) of $1.5 million and separate off-farm asset and liquid 
asset sub-caps. In comparison, Newstart applies a total asset test of $243 500, 
excluding the family home, for applicants who have a partner. 
Many farmers and industry groups criticised these thresholds for being too 
restrictive and for discouraging diversification. There are, however, a range of 
options for converting assets to income that do not require their sale. One option is 
to convert equity in assets to debt or generate an income stream, for example 
through borrowing, leasing the farm or renting out off-farm property. 
A balance must be struck between targeting those most in need and ensuring that 
farmers are not required to run their equity down to irrecoverable levels. 
Accordingly, the Commission proposes that the asset cap should be set at a level 
higher than for Newstart in accordance with its second objective for an income 
support scheme — to recognise the issue of farm viability — while not being too 
high. 
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Box 9.2 Income eligibility rule for the proposed scheme 
The following figures demonstrate the different combinations of income that can be 
earned for a range of recipient and spouse incomes under the proposed scheme. 
Figure a shows a scenario where both members of a couple receive income support. 
Any combination of income earned within the lined box would mean both members of 
the couple are eligible for payment under the scheme. Any combination of incomes 
within the shaded box would mean both members of the couple were eligible for full 
payment under the scheme. 
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Example 1: Bill (partner 1) and Sarah (partner 2) usually both derive a significant 
proportion of their income from their farm. It is a drought year and their combined farm 
income is $10 500 ($400 on a fortnightly basis). They have off-farm investments which 
provide $500 in deemed income per fortnight. They are both eligible for partial payment 
under the scheme (E1 on figure a) and would receive $191 a fortnight each (see figure 
b). 
Figure b shows how payments are determined given recipient’s incomea. 
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(Continued next page)  
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Box 9.2 (continued) 
Figure c shows a scenario where one member of a couple is receiving income support 
(partner 1) and the other member is working (and not receiving income support) 
(partner 2). Any combination of income earned below the line would mean partner 1 
would be eligible for payment under the scheme. Any combination of incomes within 
the shaded box would mean partner 1 would be eligible for full payment under the 
scheme. 
Example 2: Todd (partner 1) works on the farm and has made a loss of $20 000 for the 
year. Todd occasionally earns some off-farm income, around $50 per fortnight. Todd’s 
partner Jennifer (partner 2) works as a full time nurse and receives a fortnightly salary 
of $700. Todd would be eligible for full payment of $405.40 per fortnight under the 
scheme. Jennifer would not be eligible for a payment (E2 on figure b and figure c) b. 
Example 3: Lee (partner 1) works on the farm full time and has made a loss for the 
year of $50 000. Lee’s partner Kelly (partner 2) works full time as a doctor and earns 
$1600 per fortnight. Both Lee and Kelly are ineligible for assistance under the 
proposed scheme (E3 on figure c). 
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a Income above $62 reduces payments by $0.50 in the dollar. Income above $250 reduces payments by 
$0.60 in the dollar.  b Jennifer is not eligible for a payment as she derives a significant proportion of her 
income from her full-time job.  
 
Asset thresholds 
There was significant disagreement among participants about the Commission’s 
proposed total net asset cap of $2 million tapering to $3 million. Some contended 
that it was unjustifiably generous to provide taxpayer support to people with 
$3 million in net assets. However, most participants felt that the proposed asset limit 
was too low and/or that farm assets should not be included in any determination of 
eligibility for income support.  
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The NFF submitted ‘that a $2 million cap tapering to $3 million is problematic in 
the same way as setting any line in the sand’ (sub. DR176, p. 77). It pointed to 
increases in farm land values due to urban encroachment and argued that property 
values are not an indicator of earning capability. 
The NSW Farmers’ Association agreed, stating ‘farm assets should be considered in 
their income earning capacity to the farming business and therefore should not be 
included in any asset assessment for income support’ (sub. DR182, p. 6). The 
Victorian Farmers’ Federation also argued that farm assets should be exempt from 
the proposed asset cap and stated that ‘the asset thresholds as recommended do not 
sufficiently take into consideration the particular circumstances of modern 
agriculture’ (sub. DR160, p. 4). Horticultural organisations suggested that these 
limits may not be appropriate for the businesses they represent and proposed a study 
into this matter (Horticulture Australia Council, sub. DR169; Growcom, 
sub. DR171). 
The Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee 
examined the impact of social security asset tests for farming families in 1995. The 
Committee recommended that both off-farm and on-farm assets should be taken 
into account when assessing a farm household’s eligibility for income support 
payments. It concluded that exempting farm assets would create equity problems 
with non-farmers and may diminish incentives for self provision. 
A range of thresholds were proposed by participants, including an asset cap of 
$5 million with a taper to $6 million in pastoral areas (Rangelands Drought 
Taskforce, sub. DR153). The NSW Farmers’ Association argued that where a limit 
for farm assets is applied it should be indexed in some way to reflect increases in 
property values. 
The Western Australian Farmers’ Federation supported the concept of a taper but 
considered that the proposed asset cap and taper would be insufficient for most 
farms in that state (sub. DR161). Data provided by the Department of Agriculture 
and Food Western Australia (sub. DR186) shows the financial position of farms in 
the North Eastern Agricultural Region (table 9.1). The financial position of the 
bottom 25 per cent of businesses indicates net asset levels of $1.5 million. This 
suggests that, on average, these businesses could be eligible for support under the 
scheme (not taking into account income or the value of liquid assets). 
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Table 9.1 North Eastern Agricultural Region farm financial positions 
  Top 25% Group average Bottom 25% 
Farm Size ha 5 684 4 801 4 165 
Total farm assets $ ‘000 6 608 4 513 2 852 
Total farm liabilities $ ‘000 1 195 1 270 1 311 
Farm equity $ ‘000 5 413 3 244  1 541 
Source: Department of Agriculture and Food Western Australia (sub. DR186, p. 2). 
The Commission considers that a balance must be met between recognising farm 
viability and the extent to which asset limits should deviate from those applying to 
the general community. In the Commission’s view, this balance is met with a total 
net asset cap beginning at $2 million and with a taper to $3 million (figure 9.4). 
This asset limit would be indexed annually in line with asset limits for other 
Centrelink programs. 
Figure 9.4 Impact of net asset limit on payment rate with linear taperabc 
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a Payment values assume that all other eligibility requirements are fulfilled and that income is below the full 
payment threshold and therefore only assets affect the level of payment received.  b Fortnightly payment is 
reduced by $0.40 for each $1000 over $2 000 000.  c As at February 2009, the maximum fortnightly payment 
for an individual receiving Newstart allowance with a partner is $405. 
Sub-caps 
Many submissions expressed concern that, by imposing limits on off-farm assets, 
the current ECRP restricts farmers’ options to spread their risk and respond to 
adverse circumstances (Macquarie River Food and Fibre, sub. 36; NSW Farmers’ 
Association, sub. 98). They argued that off-farm assets are a legitimate 
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diversification and risk management strategy and that government assistance should 
not discriminate against those who have chosen to invest off-farm. 
To enable flexibility in the structuring of farm assets and off-farm assets, the 
Commission proposes that the asset tests for income support should not distinguish 
between on and off-farm assets. This simplification recognises the complexity of 
farm financial arrangements and aims to avoid disincentives to self-reliance and risk 
management. It also recognises that funds can be easily moved across asset classes. 
However, the Commission proposes a liquid asset sub-cap that would require farm 
households to draw their liquid assets down to $20 000 or below before accessing 
income support. 
There was a mixed response by participants to this proposal. The Pastoralists and 
Graziers Association of Western Australia submitted that ‘liquid assets like FMDs 
should be differentiated from physical ones with the requirement that liquid ones 
are drawn down to get household relief’ (sub. DR121, p. 1). The NFF supported a 
liquid asset cap of $20 000 provided that it excluded Farm Management Deposit 
(FMD) balances. Other organisations submitted that $20 000 was too low (South 
Australian Farmers’ Federation, sub. DR141; South Australian Advisory Board of 
Agriculture, sub. DR157). The Victorian Farmers’ Federation argued that the limit 
should be at $50 000 and not include FMDs (sub. DR160). 
The $20 000 liquids cap is based on the TIS scheme. This is an arbitrary cap, but the 
Commission was not presented with compelling evidence to depart from it, nor why 
FMD balances should be exempt. On the contrary, the Commission notes that the 
liquid asset sub-cap:  
• that applies to the rest of the community is much more stringent — for example 
$5000 for an individual (with a partner) accessing Newstart 
• recognises that a farm requires more working capital than, say, an urban 
household, but also that funds in excess of $20 000 should be drawn down in 
times of need — before the community is called on to provide income support 
• should include FMDs, on the basis that they are designed for farmers to use to 
support themselves through downturns — see also the 2006 Review of the FMD 
scheme (DAFF 2006) and the Corish report (Agriculture and Food Policy 
Reference Group 2006). 
Some contend that it is not appropriate to oblige farm businesses to draw down their 
FMDs, a farm business measure, to be able to access income support for the farm 
household. However, as noted earlier the farm household and business are often 
highly interconnected. This was recognised by the Queensland Government 
(sub. 77), which pointed out that money from business assistance measures, such as 
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the interest rate subsidy, can be spent on family related expenses and that household 
income support, such as ECRP, can also go towards the farm business. 
Given this high level of fungibility between business and household finances the 
Commission considers that FMD deposits should be included in the liquid asset test. 
In essence, whether funds are held in FMDs, savings accounts or ‘under the bed’ 
should not bear on access to income support. Excluding FMDs could simply result 
in transfers of funds to alternative accounts in order to qualify for assistance.  
However, the Commission considers that the liquid asset test should be set at a level 
higher than that applied to the general community to recognise the special 
circumstances of a farm household. 
In cases where an applicant’s liquid assets are above the specified limit, but all other 
requirements are fulfilled, eligibility need not be declined. Rather, eligibility 
assessment could be deferred until liquid assets are drawn down under the limit. 
Where an applicant has funds in FMDs above the liquid asset threshold, Centrelink 
could issue a certificate to enable funds to be withdrawn while still retaining the tax 
benefits as is currently in place for FMD holders in EC declared areas. 
Mutual responsibility 
The Commission’s third and fourth objectives for farm household income support 
are that some conditionality should be imposed to reinforce self-reliance, discourage 
long-term dependency on income support and assist farmers to determine their 
future. 
To access assistance, farm households should be required to seek independent 
advice on the financial situation of their business and develop a ‘Mutual 
Responsibility Contract’ specifying, if necessary, the actions that are to be taken to 
improve self-reliance. 
Participants were generally supportive of incorporating mutual responsibility into an 
income support scheme (NFF, sub. DR176; Australian Dairy Industry Council, 
sub. DR145; Victorian Farmers’ Federation, sub. DR160; Australian General 
Practice Network, sub. DR170). Australia Pork Limited welcomed the 
recommendation to tie financial assistance to independent financial advice on 
business viability (sub. DR155). The Rural Financial Counselling Service South 
Australia stated that: 
It can’t be just a welfare payment. There’s got to be something else attached to it that 
says “Look, this can’t go on forever. This is why you’re in trouble. We now have to 
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work towards getting you out,” and they have to agree to that. That has to be part of the 
deal … (trans., p. 243) 
The ACT Department of Territory and Municipal Services similarly submitted that 
‘encouraging self-reliance may be enhanced by a mutual obligation approach to 
future drought assistance e.g. assistance measures will be dependent on the 
implementation of a business plan incorporating risk management strategies’ 
(sub. 101, p. 2). 
Initial assessment and the ‘Mutual Responsibility Contract’ 
Under the Commission’s proposal, applicants for income support would be required 
to obtain an assessment of the financial situation of their business prior to receiving 
income support (with a grant provided to cover the cost). The results of this 
consultation would not affect eligibility to income support, but rather provide the 
applicant with information to assist them to make decisions so that income support 
is not needed in the future. Once financial advice has been sought, recipients would 
work with Centrelink’s Rural Support Officers to create a ‘Mutual Responsibility 
Contract’. Figure 9.5 illustrates how this process would operate for the proposed 
Farming Family Income Support scheme. 
Figure 9.5 Farming Family Income Support scheme 
- farm financial and business 
planning
- grants for training and advice 
- succession planning
- counselling
Review eligibility & fulfilment of 
Contract every 6 mon hs. 
Reconciliation of payments wi h 
income earned annually.
Update Mutual 
Responsibility 
Contract
Contact 
Centrelink
Eligibility 
assessment 
Seek financial 
advice
Payment 
commences 
Mutual Responsibility 
Contract 
involving (where relevant):
Circumstances change or 3 year out of 
every 7 limit reached and no longer 
eligible
- household income improves
- sell farm
- stay on farm and lease or sharefarm
- go on Newstart (where eligible), look for new job
If in extreme 
hardship can 
access payments 
straight away
By not making support contingent on whether a farm is viable (as has been the case 
for farm household specific income support programs in the past, such as TIS), 
access to assistance is simplified. There is some indication that the farm financial 
assessment for the TIS and the Climate Change Adjustment Program (CCAP) 
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Adjustment Advice and Training Grants programs is too complicated and deters 
farmers from applying (M. Willet, sub. DR125). 
Nevertheless, the initial consultation needs to be conducted by a financial expert 
who is not the farming family’s accountant. Advice regarding the long-term 
viability of the farm should be provided by an unbiased expert who has not had a 
long-term relationship with the applicant. One possibility proposed by participants 
is that ‘appropriately accredited’ rural financial counsellors could also provide this 
service (South Australian Advisory Board of Agriculture, sub. DR157; 
D. McKenzie, sub. DR187). This may assist in reducing the difficulty faced by 
applicants in remote areas in finding an appropriate expert. 
The ‘Mutual Responsibility Contract’ would outline the steps that the farmer plans 
to take to obviate the need for future income support. For most, the Contract would 
require a household financial plan and/or a farm financial and business plan to, at 
least, indicate the sustainable earning potential of the farm business. For viable 
farmers this requirement would not be particularly onerous as most would have 
such plans already.  
The Contract would allow for the recognition of farmers’ particular circumstances 
and preferences. Hence, it could involve commitments to gain skills suited to 
earning off-farm income, or participation in programs such as Landcare or those 
conducted by Catchment Management Authorities. To help farmers determine their 
future, the plan could also include accessing counselling services and advice 
regarding succession planning. 
Where possible, the plan should explicitly take into account ‘family life cycle’ 
factors, such as the changing demands for household income, the occupational and 
life-style preferences of various family members, and where appropriate, planning 
for retirement, managerial succession and the integration of the involvement of 
various family members into farm business planning. 
Grants would be provided to assist the recipient fulfil their responsibilities. These 
grants could be similar to the CCAP Adjustment Advice and Training grants, such 
that where an applicant qualifies for income support they automatically qualify for 
grants for professional advice and training where identified as relevant in the 
Mutual Responsibility Contract. Training need not be farm related but would have 
to be management or income related — farmers would be encouraged to explore 
off-farm income sources. The CCAP program also provides additional grant monies 
to assist with travel and incidental expenses incurred in order to obtain professional 
advice or undertaking training activities.  
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Currently CCAP grants provide up to $5500 for advice and training. Grants are 
provided in the form of a voucher. Funds are then paid directly to the provider of 
advice or training once the activity has been completed. The Commission considers 
that while the quantum of the grant is appropriate, it would be more effective to 
provide applicants with cash and require that funds be spent on approved activities 
(with receipts audited during the six monthly reviews). This would give recipients 
greater control over the quality and type of service they receive using this grant. 
Cash grants may also lead to greater value for money. It was evident during industry 
visits that often where a voucher system is employed, the cost of services tends to 
equal the value of the voucher irrespective of the service provided. 
Regular assessment 
Assistance would be re-assessed every six months, on the basis of compliance with 
conditions — including carrying out the actions identified in the Contract — and 
acquittal of payments against income earned. 
Australia Pork Limited was supportive of income support payments being tied to a 
six month review cycle (sub. DR155). However, some raised concerns about the 
time and expense required to update plans on a six monthly basis and reconcile 
payments, particularly where an accountant or professional needs to be consulted 
(Country Women’s Association of Victoria, trans., pp. 520-1; M. Willet, 
sub. DR125). 
As is currently the case for ECRP and TIS, fortnightly payments would be based on 
an estimate of annual income. Given the high level of variability of farm income, it 
is very difficult for farmers to accurately forecast annual income (especially during 
drought). However, despite this variability ECRP and TIS do not have formal 
reconciliation of estimated and actual income and consequent adjustment of 
payments made. While fortnightly payments are adjusted when new information is 
received, a reconciliation at the end of the financial year using actual taxable 
income would ensure recipients received the correct entitlements. This would 
involve subsequent reparations or recovery actions.  
Any program that involves on-going case management of mutual responsibilities 
will have higher administrative costs than programs without case management (for 
example ECRP). However, effective case management is integral to ensuring that 
farm households are not only supported, but also are in a well-informed position to 
make difficult decisions about their business and their future in agriculture. 
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Succession planning and the Age Pension 
The scheme would also include measures to encourage succession planning. For 
older farmers, accessing professional advice on succession planning will be strongly 
recommended. Furthermore, Centrelink Rural Service Officers should ensure that 
farmers at or near retirement age are fully apprised of their options. Where relevant 
and subject to normal eligibility rules, farmers should be encouraged to move onto 
the Age Pension. Succession is discussed further in section 9.3. 
Time limited support 
A limit on the duration of income support is necessary to ensure the scheme does 
not lead to long-term welfare dependence. The National Rural Advisory Council, in 
its submission to the Expert Social Panel, observed that receiving income support 
payments ‘for a prolonged time may foster a welfare-dependent attitude rather than 
promote self-reliance for some farmers. Long-term profitable farming will hinge on 
farmers’ ability to prepare for, and adapt to, change’ (NRAC 2008, p. 5). 
The Commission has proposed a limit of three years out of every seven per farm 
household for accessing the Farming Family Income Support scheme. The seven 
year period would be applied at the farm household (not enterprise) level and would 
commence from the date of the first income support payment. Any prior income 
support through ECRP or TIS should not affect access. 
The basis for three years out of every seven recognises that, one of the many 
reasons why farm households might get into difficulty, is prolonged dry conditions. 
Virtually all participants accepted that a farm business should be prepared for at 
least a one and probably two year drought. It is likely that those farm households 
potentially eligible for the income support scheme would expend their reserves 
before, say, the third year. In such a situation, three years of assistance would then 
be available to carry people through a drought event lasting for at least five years. 
Further, as shown in figure 2.10 farm cash income tends to recover quickly for 
many farm enterprises after a drought event. 
The concept of a time limit was supported by many participants. For instance, the 
Rural Financial Counselling Service South Australia noted: 
I think it’s absolutely pivotal that it isn’t forever and that they must be working towards 
getting themselves out of that current situation during that period of time. (trans., 
p. 243) 
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However, there was disagreement about the proposed three years in every seven 
time limit. Several organisations argued that the mutual responsibility requirements 
and regular assessment processes should predicate whether continued support is 
warranted, not an administrative limit (NFF, sub. DR176; Western Australian 
Farmers’ Federation, sub. DR161; Australian Pork Limited, sub. DR155). The NFF 
argued that ‘using the three years out of seven to force adjustment with farmers 
leaving the land bears no relationship to the objective of maintaining a viable farm 
during a severe drought event’ (sub. DR176, p. 79).  
The Victorian Farmers’ Federation suggested that the three year limit could be 
bolstered with an additional two years of progressively reduced payments 
(sub. DR160). The Hindmarsh Shire Council supported the three year limit but with 
an option for a fourth year following an independent review of viability and efforts 
to improve self-reliance (sub. DR174). 
The Commission reiterates that it is not an objective of the scheme to force farmers 
to leave farming after three years of access to income support. There are other 
options that a farm household could take such that income support is no longer 
required. Training, advice and counselling is available to support families to make 
these decisions. It is important that this three year out of every seven limit is 
maintained absolutely and that no exemptions or extensions are made. 
At the end of the three years of assistance out of seven, farmers who still require 
financial assistance would have to meet the requirements of programs available to 
all Australians through the social security system. This would involve meeting all 
the income and asset limits and fulfilling any activity requirements. In some 
instances certain Centrelink benefits (for example Health Care Cards, access to the 
Job Network and children’s Youth Allowance payments) could continue for a fixed 
period. An overview and comparison of the conditions and criteria of the 
Commission’s proposed scheme relative to Newstart and ECRP is provided in 
table 9.2. 
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Table 9.2 Comparison of income support programs 
 Newstart EC Relief Payment Farming Family Income 
Support – proposed 
Mutual Responsibility Must be unemployed (not 
underemployed) 
Activity test — must look 
for job and/or undertake 
training or an approved 
activity 
Must be a full time farmer 
in EC area  
Activity test — none 
Must be a full time 
farmer 
 
Activity test — must 
develop a ‘Mutual 
Responsibility Contract’ 
with actions to be taken 
Income test Where claimant earns 
above $62 per fortnight 
or their partner earns 
above $769 per fortnight, 
payments are reducedab 
Based on Newstart 
income test but an 
additional $20 000 
off-farm wage and salary 
income per annum per 
couple exemptc, 
proceeds from forced 
disposal of livestock are 
exemptd 
Same as Newstart 
Asset test (combined 
assets with partner) 
Must have combined 
assets under $243 500. 
Principal home and 
superannuation (if under 
age pension age) are not 
includede 
No total asset limit. Off-
farm asset limit of 
$243 500. Principal 
home, life insurance, 
superannuation of farmer 
(even where over 
pension age) are not 
included 
Must have assets under 
$2 000 000 for full 
payment, and under 
$3 000 000 for any 
payment. House and 
superannuation (where 
under age pension age) 
included in asset test 
Liquid asset test Payment may be 
deferred where liquid 
assets exceed $5000 
(couple or single with 
dependants) 
na Must have under 
$20 000 in liquid assets 
Hardship provisions In severe financial 
hardship and have 
unrealisable, non-income 
producing assetsf 
na Same as Newstart 
Payment to individual 
or couple 
Individual Couple Individual 
Maximum fortnightly 
paymentg 
$405 (each) $405 (each) Same as Newstart 
Additional paymentsh Payable if eligible Payable if eligible Same as Newstart 
a Income for the recipient of $62 to $250 per fortnight reduces payments by 50 cents in the dollar, each dollar 
of income over $250 per fortnight reduces payments by 60 cents in the dollar. As at September 2008, partner 
income above $769 reduces the recipient’s payment by 60 cents in the dollar.  b Practical effect is maximum 
allowable income (after working credit) of $769 per fortnight for the recipient or $1445 for the recipient’s 
partner  c Payment is reduced after earning $769 per fortnight per couple in off-farm income (this $769 is 
proportioned between the two depending on the amount of off-farm income earned by each spouse, plus $62 
each in either off-farm or on-farm income. Assumes application is made at the beginning of the financial  
year — higher earnings may be possible if application is made later in financial year. d Where the proceeds 
go into FMDs or a term deposit of at least 3 months duration.  e This asset test does not include the principal 
home and permanent fixtures, it does include household contents, cars, boats and surrender value of any life 
insurance. f That is, cannot derive income or borrow from assets, or asset is currently for sale or unable to be 
sold due to legal restriction.  g Comparison is for a couple who are home owners.  h Rent assistance, 
pharmaceutical, telephone and zone allowances. 
   
236 GOVERNMENT 
DROUGHT SUPPORT 
 
 
All farmers facing hardship should have access to a Farming Family Income 
Support scheme designed for farming circumstances. It would provide payments 
and have income eligibility thresholds at Newstart levels, subject to: 
• an overall net asset cap, inclusive of the value of the farm house, beginning at 
$2 million with a taper to $3 million 
• a liquid asset sub-cap of $20 000 inclusive of bank balances and Farm 
Management Deposits balances. 
While the scheme should operate at the farm household level, eligibility and 
payments should be on an individual basis and conditional on: 
• meeting the definition of a farmer, based on a similar test to that used 
currently for the Transitional Income Support scheme 
• seeking independent financial advice on the viability of the farming business 
• developing and carrying out a plan of action to improve household 
self-reliance 
• eligibility being reviewed, mutual responsibilities being met and plans updated 
every six months. 
The scheme should be limited to a maximum claim per farm household for three 
years out of every seven. The seven year period should commence from the date of 
receiving the first income support payment. Payments should be acquitted 
annually.  
The Farming Family Income Support scheme should commence on 1 July 2009 
in conjunction with programs to provide counselling, the recognition of prior 
learning and grants for training and professional advice. 
Potential coverage of a Farming Family Income Support scheme 
Estimating the number of farm households that would be eligible for support under 
the Commission’s recommended scheme is complex. Figure 9.6 illustrates the 
potential scope. The analysis underpinning the estimates is in the annex to this 
chapter. In brief the estimates are based on:  
• farm survey data for the broadacre and dairy sectors covering farms with an 
estimated value of agricultural operations over $40 000 — approximately 50 per 
cent of all farms in Australia 
• other survey data for vegetable and sugar farms. 
RECOMMENDATION 9.1 
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In interpreting these indicative estimates, it should be noted that the liquid assets 
and income ‘filters’ may not be as restrictive as implied. Liquids can be drawn 
down and sources of income can fluctuate. The analysis also involves assumptions 
about who is earning income — estimates are sensitive to who applies for support. 
Figure 9.6 Number of potentially eligible farmers for proposed income 
support schemea 
a Figures do not include off-farm assets  b Data on the disposable income levels of vegetable and sugar farms 
is not available and as such no estimate of the number of eligible farms is available for this group or in total. 
Data source: ABARE (2009 unpublished). 
Given the lack of data on all farm types in Australia and of income levels of each 
spouse in the household and the fact that income levels for farm households 
fluctuate considerably, it is difficult to get an accurate picture of the number of 
farmers who may access this scheme, even for a snapshot in time. From figure 9.6 it 
would appear that numbers could involve from 9000 to 17 000 broadacre and dairy 
farmers and something less than 6000 vegetable and sugar farmers – similar to the 
number of Australian farm households that are currently receiving ECRP, but the 
composition and location of recipients could be quite different. 
9.5 Agricultural adjustment 
The Commission’s proposed income support scheme does not seek to force 
structural adjustment through viability assessments. Rather, it aims to use case 
management, grants for advice and training and access to counselling to assist 
farmers to make decisions about their future in farming. In addition, the strict time 
limit of assistance aims to avoid dependence on welfare support. These mechanisms 
may result in some farmers leaving farming. In this context, it is important to 
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understand the issues around adjustment and the reasons why many farmers choose 
not to leave farming even when in persistent hardship. 
Structural adjustment occurs in all sectors of the economy and while often having 
negative associations, it comprises opportunities and challenges. 
At its broadest level, rural adjustment is about changes in rural communities and 
industries. Changes on the farm have outcomes that affect rural communities and have 
implications for regional development. Changes in rural communities also have an 
influence on the lives of farm families. (McColl et al. 1997, p. 16)  
Farmers’ aims and objectives can change and are often based on factors relating to 
the ‘farm family life cycle’, such as changes in household income requirements or 
the need to finance the retirement of the senior generation (Stayner and Musgrave 
1994, p. 2470). Some farmers aim to increase their capital, expand their operations 
and diversify their production. Others may be satisfied with maintaining sufficient 
production to earn a sustainable income over long cycles. For those facing persistent 
insufficient incomes, off-farm income or investments can be drawn on; or 
alternatively where they consider that the business is not viable over the long-term, 
alternative management arrangements can be sought; others may choose to leave 
farming. 
There are a range of actions that can fit under the title of adjustment, including 
changing farm management regimens, taking an off-farm job, or expanding 
operations. Thus, policies for adjustment are not simply policies which remove 
impediments to farmers leaving the land. Other policies that can assist adjustment 
are covered in chapter 8. These include for example, grants for training that result in 
farmers making changes to their current situation. The remainder of this chapter 
discusses policies for leaving farming. 
The decision to leave the farm 
Decisions to leave farms, particularly if they are not viable over the long-term, 
involve many non-financial considerations. In the view of one researcher, farmers 
tend not to exit agriculture until they are forced out by low levels of income and/or 
by high debt (Harris 1970). Box 9.3 provides a collection of views expressed by 
farmers when discussing their experiences and attitudes regarding retirement and 
leaving the farm. 
Where a family chooses to stay on the farm due to its strong attachment to farming, 
this is not, of itself, an issue for government policy. However, it is a policy issue 
where income support assistance is sought to meet the family’s basic needs and/or 
business support is sought to keep the farm business operating. 
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The current drought support measures are seen to help keep non-viable farmers in 
the industry. Indeed many submissions argued that this is, or should be, the 
principle rationale for drought relief, because their imperative is to maintain the 
number of farmers in Australia and the small country towns that have been 
servicing them. However, retaining all farmers currently in the industry and 
maintaining country towns should not be the driving objective of drought or climate 
variability policy (see chapter 2). Such an approach is inconsistent with the 
objectives of improving self-reliance and preparedness (see chapter 7). 
 
Box 9.3 Views on leaving farming 
See our farms they weren’t that big and we had three boys and they had their own 
lives and they didn’t want it anyhow – and if they had you’d have to sell it to one as you 
couldn’t give to all three. There was no use in hanging round because they couldn’t 
share it and we did sell out in a hurry in the end and everybody’s happy – the boys are 
happy and that’s the main thing. (p. 54) 
I’m happy here now, but for the first few years I found it very difficult to settle into town 
life, even though I was involved in the volunteer work, I missed the farm a lot. You’d go 
to bed at night and it’d sort of take over your mind you know, and yes it was very 
difficult. But I wouldn’t like to [be] back out there now, I realise that I wouldn’t be able to 
cope and I’m quite settled in what I’m doing. I’ve got a big vegetable garden by the way 
and that keeps me occupied on days I’m not doing voluntary work. (p. 58) 
When we did sell and come to town my husband was very unhappy … it was a very 
difficult time. (p.57) 
I reckon that one of the saddest things that I say at X, and I visited over 300 farms, was 
the number of people on their own seventy or eighty [years old] and running two or 
three thousand acres on their own and the whole thing going to a wreck, it was a 
wreck, then – the only way I’m going leave here is in a box – if I heard that once I 
heard that dozens of times. I made no apology for challenging those people as to 
whether they should be there. But it takes a change. (p. 58) 
My husband had various accidents during his years and in the west they use a lot of 
motorcycles for mustering and he just wasn’t able any longer physically to work. We 
had two sons who weren’t too sorry to take over – so they are still out there. So, it was 
just the right time to leave. (p. 37) 
I think it is a case of letting go to a certain extent. My experience, not ourselves 
personally, because we sold our farm to our son and moved up here, but what we have 
found, a lot of people just can’t let go. I mean this farm had been left from generation to 
generation … three generations on a farm, and the people in their 70s still hanging 
onto everything, they still hadn’t let go. (p. 56) 
Source: Foskey (2005).  
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Impediments to leaving the farm 
One possible impediment to leaving the farm is the lack of a financial base to be 
able to fund the future. For example, where a farmer’s assets have been significantly 
run down and they are not sufficient to meet the cost of a home elsewhere or the 
farmers are of old age and wish to give the farm to children but have little 
superannuation to support themselves. 
Kerridge (1978) examines farmers’ values and finds that older farmers and those on 
smaller farms tend to strongly value farming as a way of life and may not be 
induced to exit the business through financial incentives. Musgrave (1990) 
discusses how farmers can become trapped in farming where, despite their low 
incomes, the returns from selling the farm and from earnings in off-farm 
employment are not sufficient to compensate for the loss of on-farm benefits (both 
financial and non-financial) and the costs of relocation. This is particularly the case 
where the farmer strongly values the identity and lifestyle of farming. 
There are very significant non-financial impediments to farmers leaving the 
industry. For most farmers, the family home is on the farm, they have a significant 
attachment to the land and feel that farming is part of their identity. One farmer in a 
1997 study commented: 
The thought of handing over the farm to the next generation is a concept that is very 
hard to come to terms with. Means letting go of how I see myself … as a landholder – 
basically of no significance anymore. (Kaine et al. 1997, p. 47) 
Ageing of the farm population has been evident over the past two decades (Barr 
2004) (see box 2.5) with the median age of farmers in 2006 being 52 years old. The 
proportion of farmers older than 65 years of age increased to 18 per cent in 2006 
from 15 per cent in 2001 and the proportion of farmers under 35 years of age 
decreased to 10 per cent in 2006 from 12 per cent in 2001 (ABS 2008c). Currently 
approximately 30 per cent of all ECRP recipients are over 60 years of age 
(Centrelink unpublished 2008). 
While the issue of farmers retiring and selling, or passing on, the farm is important, 
there is often a lack of effective succession planning. 
While older farmers may not always be the main decision makers in farm businesses, a 
lack of effective planning by farm families tends to delay or distort retirement 
decisions, including the intergenerational transfer of property. These delays can 
increase the risk of older farmers facing reduced incomes and poor health, and can slow 
the adoption of best practices. (Agriculture and Food Policy Reference Group 2006, 
p. 170) 
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The problems associated with a lack of succession planning can be made worse by 
drought, which can force some older farmers, especially those without formal 
superannuation, to delay retirement and stay on the farm (Drought Review Panel 
2004; NRAC 2008).  
Planning regulations at a local/regional level can also influence farmers’ choices 
whether to leave the industry. In some areas local governments are setting limits on 
the sub-division of farmland for hobby farms and/or urban development. This can 
prevent farm land being sub-divided from the family home and sold separately so 
that the family may continue to reside in the home. These laws differ from shire to 
shire. 
A lack of information can also inhibit farmers from making adjustments decisions. 
For example, farmers may choose not to leave farming where they are uncertain 
about their employment options outside of farming, or where they have inadequate 
information regarding the future viability of their farm. 
Policy approaches 
Exit package for small block irrigators 
Special exit grants to farmers were discussed in chapter 6 and were found to distort 
markets and raise inequities with other groups in the community. As such, this 
section will not focus on exit grants as delivered through ECRP or the CCAP 
program. 
The exit package offered to small block irrigators in the Murray-Darling Basin 
(announced September 2008) was also examined in chapter 6. This program differs 
from other exit grants in that it has design features which address some of the social 
and informational impediments to leaving the farm. 
Within the context of the southern Murray-Darling Basin, the Small Block Irrigator 
Exit Grant package may be effective in addressing some of the non-financial 
reasons for farmers remaining on the land. 
However, such a model is unlikely to be applicable to all parts of the country or to 
large-scale farming. The question of local sub-division limits is difficult and reflects 
a range of considerations to be taken into account in state, territory and local 
government planning controls. The adjustment benefits of retaining the family home 
need to be weighed against considerations of zoning, buffer zones, environmental 
values, alternative uses and the efficient provision of services to semi-urban areas. 
   
242 GOVERNMENT 
DROUGHT SUPPORT 
 
 
Retirement assistance and succession planning 
Where farmers pass the farm to their children (in the form of a gift, or where it is 
sold below market value) the farmer may not be able to access the Age Pension for 
five years due to gifting provisions (see box 9.4). 
 
Box 9.4 Gifting rules 
Gifting is where assets are given away or transferred to others without adequate return 
for the gift or transfer (in the form of money, goods or services). The allowable gifting 
amount for a single person or couple is $10 000 in each financial year. In addition, 
persons or couples are limited to a maximum allowable gifting amount of $30 000 in 
any five year rolling period. 
Gifting rules apply to any gifts made in the five years before receiving a pension or 
allowance. Where an individual or couple gift assets over the allowable amount these 
assets are called ‘deprived assets’. When assessing eligibility for a pension or 
allowance, deprived assets are included in total assets owned until the fifth anniversary 
of the date the assets were gifted. In addition, the total value of deprived assets is 
added to the value of other financial investments. Deeming rates are then applied to 
these financial investments to calculate assessable income (deeming assumes that 
financial investments are earning a certain rate of income, no matter what income they 
are actually earning). 
Source: Centrelink (2008b).  
 
Temporary schemes have been used to grant an exemption to the gifting rules for 
targeted groups of farmers, for example the Retirement Assistance for Farmers 
Scheme (RAFS) in 1997 to 2001 and the Retirement Assistance for Sugarcane 
Farmers Scheme from 2004 to 2007. These schemes offered a ‘one-off’, three year 
moratorium on the gifting provisions, which allowed eligible farmers to gift farm 
assets valued at up to $500 000 without affecting their eligibility for the Age 
Pension. The RAFS was introduced on recommendation of the Special Rural 
Taskforce and was intended to target farming families with low incomes and low 
net assets, and where farm income was insufficient to support more than one 
generation. 
The uptake of RAFS was projected to be around 2100 farmers. By the end of the 
scheme approximately 2200 farmers had been successful in their application (as at 
May 2001) (Centrelink pers. comm., 2008). A little over half of the successful 
applicants were already receiving a partial payment of the Age Pension and 
therefore obtained a higher rate through RAFS. Centrelink consider that the RAFS 
successfully enabled those farmers with low incomes and low net assets who were 
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receiving income support through ECRP or Farm Help to transfer their farm to the 
next generation and move to the Age Pension (Centrelink pers. comm., 2008). 
The Corish report found that RAFS encouraged the intergenerational transfer of 
small scale and marginally viable farms and that this ‘effectively transferred the 
problem from one generation to the next’ (Agriculture and Food Policy Reference 
Group 2006, p. 170). However, where low incomes are a result of poor management 
and the new owner is prepared to take on more innovative approaches, passing the 
farm onto the next generation may result in improved viability. 
Several participants argued for a temporary or on-going waiver of the gifting rule 
for the intergenerational transfer of family farms (Carrigan and Co Pty Ltd, 
sub. DR129; H. Loller, sub. 49; AgForce, sub. 80). The Rural Financial Counselling 
Service in New South Wales Central West stated that the issue of gifting the farm 
needed to be addressed as a matter of urgency (sub. DR178). AgForce suggested 
that the five year gifting rule could be reduced to two years (sub. DR185). 
Arguably, it is inequitable to allow farmers with viable and valuable farms to 
simply gift them to their children and then receive the pension when this is not 
available to owners of other businesses. One participant reported: 
I did have a lady ring me recently, just as an example, and said, ‘Look, I need to be able 
to access the pension and I can’t.’ ‘Why can’t you, madam?’ ‘Well, we can’t because 
our assets are too highly valued and we’ve given it away to our son.’ I said, ‘Just before 
we go through this, can I ask what the value of it is?’ and she said, ‘About 3.5 million.’ 
I said, ‘And your other family members?’ ‘Well, they didn’t get anything.’ ‘Okay. So 
you’re telling me that you’ve given away $3.5 million to your eldest son, nothing to the 
rest of your family, and you now want the government to support you for the rest of 
your life?’ ‘Yes.’ I had a little bit of trouble with that. (Tasmanian Farmers and 
Graziers Association, trans., p. 19) 
An applicant’s pension is not affected where the farm was gifted more than five 
years prior, suggesting that with effective succession planning and management, the 
problems posed by the gifting rules could be avoided. In addition, there are several 
concessions that primary producers can avail themselves of to avoid having their 
farm assets included in the asset test for the Age Pension (see box 9.5). 
It is possible that there is a lack of awareness regarding these provisions and that 
succession planning efforts could be improved through more widespread 
understanding. This could be achieved through Centrelink and Rural Financial 
Counsellors, for example, ensuring farmers are informed regarding issues of 
succession and how this will impact on their ability to access social security 
payments if applicable. 
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Box 9.5 Provisions that can reduce the impacts of the gifting rules 
Forgone wages – The forgone wages provision is a limited concession designed to 
assist farmers to retire and pass control of the farm to the next generation. Where a 
farmer has transferred the title or effective control of the farm to a close relative the 
value of gifted assets can be reduced by the value of any past contributions to the farm 
by the close relative. Past contributions can include forgone wages, contributions made 
to improve the farm, purchase of livestock and equipment or unpaid care of the farmer. 
New land value concession – For homeowners applying for the Age Pension the value 
of land, greater than two hectares adjacent to the house, is counted for asset test 
purposes. However, in some cases where the home and land is on one title document 
the whole property may be exempt from the asset test. This applies where the 
applicant has had a long-term (20 year) continuous attachment to the land and home 
and where effective use is being made of the land to generate an income given the 
applicant’s capacity to do so. 
Private Trusts Special Concession for Primary Producers – This concession enables 
farmers to pass the farm (where contained in a trust) to the next generation while still 
retaining some control (for example, living in the family home and the ability to prevent 
others from selling the farm) without the assets or income of the private trust being 
attributed to them. While the gifting rule still applies this means that the farm could be 
gifted five years prior to the farmer wishing to apply for the Age Pension with the farmer 
retaining some control of the farm. Alternatively, where the farmer cannot access the 
pension due to the gifting rules they are able to receive income from the farm for the 
five years where they are not able to receive the pension due to the gift. There is an 
income and asset test of eligibility for this concession. 
Sources: Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (2009), Centrelink 
(2008a) and Centrelink (2008e).  
 
Other measures to encourage the intergenerational transfer of farm assets include 
stamp duty exemptions on the transfer of farming properties to younger generations 
and grants for professional advice on succession planning. Such grants are provided 
through the CCAP and Farm Help (although the Exceptional Circumstances 
Professional Advice and Planning Grant does not include advice relating to farm 
succession). Rural Financial Counsellors may also play a role, by encouraging 
farmers to seek advice on succession planning and by providing them with 
information on how to do so. 
The Corish report pointed out that succession planning ‘is of little value where the 
farm enterprise’s fundamentals (size, structure and profitability) are unsound’ 
(Agriculture and Food Policy Reference Group 2006, p. 170). It contended that 
there is little to justify capital assistance to promote farm succession and that there 
are risks that such policy could distort land prices and create impediments to entry 
for those with no direct family links to agriculture. 
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The Commission considers that succession planning is a private matter and that 
governments should not seek to dictate the type and extent of succession 
arrangements used by farming families. Furthermore, market instruments can be 
used to address this issue, such as reverse mortgages which enable farmers to 
remain in their home but with better access to cash flows (AgForce, sub. 80). 
However, there is potentially an information role for government where families are 
seeking income support and succession issues are posing an impediment to 
adjustment. 
Grants for advice, training and recognition of prior learning 
The Commission considers that programs targeted to facilitate a move out of 
farming should incorporate access to information and advice. As submitted by the 
Department of Primary Industries and Water Tasmania: 
There is a need to help farmers see the difference between life style and business 
decisions. Governments need to put more resources into addressing this issue through 
education and training. In this way, smaller non-viable businesses could be encouraged 
to see a life outside farming and in the face of falling income, make a decision to exit 
early with dignity rather than suffering a ‘death by a thousand cuts’. (sub. 85, p. 14) 
This was supported by several participants (Victorian Farmers’ Federation, 
sub. DR160; South Australian Government, sub. 91; Australian General Practice 
Network, sub. DR170; Victorian Murray Mallee Rural Financial Counselling 
Service, sub. DR151). The Hindmarsh Shire Council submitted that ‘further 
consideration should be given to adequate programs supporting farmers considering 
leaving the farm or pursuing off-farm employment options. These should include 
career counselling, training and recognition of prior learning’ (sub. DR174, p. 3). 
As discussed previously, the Commission recommends the use of grants similar to 
that available through the CCAP which provides grants for professional advice and 
adjustment training for those who satisfy income and asset eligibility tests. 
The Commission considers that Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) could also be 
part of this program. RPL is an assessment by trained facilitators which aims to 
recognise the skills and competencies that an individual has outside formal 
education or training. These skills can be gained through training, or through life or 
work experience. RPL can therefore provide pathways to higher qualifications for 
those who may not have had previous access to training and can assist with 
movement to different occupations. 
There was support in submissions for policy which incorporates RPL processes. In 
particular, there was support for Victoria’s ‘Rural Skills Connect’ program (North 
West Municipal Association, sub. 59; Rural City of Wangaratta, sub. DR140; 
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Hindmarsh Shire Council, sub. DR174). This program seeks to identify transferable 
skills of farmers, where formal recognition of these skills have not been obtained, 
and match rural farm workers, owners and operators with employment and 
associated training opportunities in regional areas. Training in key skill shortage 
areas is subsidised. Rural Skills Connect is complemented by ‘Skills Store’ which 
uses RPL to identify how a farmer’s existing skills may be counted towards 
nationally recognised qualifications. 
The South Australian Government also supported RPL programs as part of a 
coordinated response to assisting farmers exit the industry (sub. 91). South 
Australia’s Riverland Drought Response Projects have a RPL component. For 
example, one two year project involves training participants to be assessors of RPL 
and then subsequently assessing farmers to enable them to either earn off-farm 
income or move into alternate employment. 
The Commission agrees that RPL programs have the potential to effectively address 
one of the impediments to adjustment when used in combination with other job 
training and job search tools. The Commission considers that such programs should 
be available to all farmers irrespective of whether they are eligible for income 
support, although where farmers are not accessing income support cost recovery 
should be sought. 
Rural Financial Counselling Service 
As discussed in chapters 6 and 8, Rural Financial Counsellors, while not able to 
assess farm viability, can play a role in assisting certain farmers to realise their 
farms are not viable under their current farm management regimen. This is a 
necessary first step to help those farmers take action to change their management 
arrangements or, alternatively, exit the industry before their equity position 
worsens. Furthermore, Rural Financial Counsellors can facilitate access to advice 
from a range of relevant services to assist those farmers who need to make these 
changes. 
An integrated adjustment approach with income support 
Previous reviews and studies into rural adjustment and drought policy have 
advocated short-term income support to assist those moving out of the industry 
(McInnes et al. 1990; McColl et al. 1997; Special Rural Taskforce 1999; Stayner 
and Barclay 2002). Such programs aim to assist farmers with ‘the transition to an 
alternative career and as the farm sector shifts to self-reliance’ (McColl et al. 1997, 
p. 114). 
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The Commission’s proposal that income support be provided in tandem with case 
management, access to counselling and grants for training and advice received 
strong support in submissions. Victorian Murray Mallee Rural Financial 
Counselling Service stated that ‘realistic long-term support, particularly in training, 
re-location, family education and income support should be part of the total package 
if there is to be any likelihood of farm departure policies being effective in the 
future’ (sub. DR151, p. 4). The South Australian Government stated that individuals 
and families require additional support to assist them through such a significant 
decision as leaving the land. It advocated a ‘coordinated support package’ which 
could ‘assist primary producers to make decisions and access support to exit the 
industry’ and ‘seek alternative business and personal options’ (sub. 91). 
The Australian General Practice Network welcomed such an approach and stated 
that: 
farming families must be supported financially with training and education to make 
their own choices and implement their own changes. A sufficient duration of financial 
support will also help them to transition to alternative income sources, to diversify into 
alternative farming businesses, upskill into new industries and/or exit farming. 
(sub. DR170, p. 12) 
Income support should be provided in conjunction with government programs to 
address impediments to farmers leaving the industry should not purely focus on 
financial matters, but rather should target the wider range of cultural and 
informational impediments to adjustment in a coordinated way. Such an approach 
will reduce the likelihood of income support impeding adjustment or undermining 
incentives for self-reliance. Case management of income support recipients and a 
time limit on assistance will also reinforce this objective. 
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Annex: Indicative eligibility levels for the proposed 
Farming Family Income Support Scheme 
To garner a better understanding of the number and characteristics of farmers who 
may be eligible for the proposed Farming Family Income Support scheme, ABARE 
farm survey data was grouped according to the scheme’s features. Specifically, two 
groups of broadacre and dairy farms were considered: 
• those farms with net farm assets of less than $2 million and liquid assets less 
than $20 000 at the end of 2007-08 
• those farms with net farm assets of less than $3 million and liquid assets less 
than $20 000 at the end of 2007-08. 
These groups are not discrete — the less than $3 million net farm assets group also 
comprises the less than $2 million net farm assets group (unless otherwise 
specified). This dataset only provides information on broadacre and dairy farms 
with estimated value of operations greater than $40 000. This represents 
approximately 50 per cent of all farms in Australia. 
Importantly, no information is available on off-farm assets for either group. As the 
net asset test for the proposed income support scheme includes both on and off-farm 
assets, some farmers may not be eligible for support once their off-farm assets are 
taken into account. 
Given the many assumptions involved in estimating the number of households 
eligible for the proposed scheme and the lack of comprehensive data for the 
agriculture sector, the analysis should be read as purely indicative of the different 
factors involved, and any estimates of eligibility numbers treated as approximate. 
Table 9.3 shows some characteristics of these two groups. On average in 2007-08: 
• both groups made a loss 
• farmers in the less than $3 million net farm assets group had a positive average 
farm cash income 
• both groups had similar levels of debt 
• off-farm income was slightly higher for the less than $2 million net farm asset 
group than for the less than $3 million asset group, due mainly to higher 
off-farm wages of the farm operator. 
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Table 9.3 Characteristics of broadacre and dairy farmers by asset group, 
2007-08 
 
 Net assets < $2m, 
liquid assets < $20k 
Net assets < $3m, 
liquid assets < $20k 
Estimated population of farms no 13 388 17 893 
Net assets $ 1 090 576 1 447 909 
Farm cash income $ -1 435 5 716 
Farm business profit $ -46 112 -52 553 
Total capital value $ 1 315 719 1 738 615 
Farm debt at 30 June $ 229 701 294 636 
Liquid assets $ 4 557 3 930 
Off-farm income $ 45 282 40 221 
Operators off-farm wages $ 18 197 13 736 
Spouses off-farm wages $ 17 575 17 082 
Operators off-farm investment income $ 1 591 1 885 
Spouses off-farm investment income $ 641 669 
Total off-farm wages and investment income $ 37 564 33 023 
Family share off-farm incomea $ 14 187 19 769 
Family disposable incomeb $ 51 751 52 793 
a Defined as family share of net farm income (farm cash income minus depreciation).  b Defined as family 
share of net farm income plus off-farm wages and investment income. 
Source: ABARE (2009 unpublished). 
Figure 9.7 shows the number of broadacre and dairy farmers in each of the two 
asset groups. This indicates that approximately 25 per cent of dairy and broadacre 
farms had net asset levels in 2007-08 under $3 million. There are farmers in each 
state covered represented in both assets groups, but most are in New South Wales. 
These data suggest that: 
• 13 000 broadacre and dairy farmers across Australia had net farm assets below 
$2 million and liquid assets below $20 000, potentially making them eligible for 
full payment under the proposed income support scheme (not taking into account 
other eligibility factors) 
• an additional 4 600 broadacre and dairy farmers had net farm assets above 
$2 million but below $3 million and could be eligible for partial payment under 
the scheme. 
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Figure 9.7 Broadacre and dairy farmers by asset group and state  
2007-08ab 
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a
 This data does not include information for Northern Territory. b Data in this figure is presented on a farm 
enterprise basis. 
Data source: ABARE (2009 unpublished). 
Assessment of eligibility based on income levels is more difficult. For example, in a 
two person household, if both are in receipt of the proposed payment, benefits 
would begin to phase out when incomes rise above $124 per fortnight. 
Alternatively, if only one household member received the proposed payment, 
benefits would begin to phase out when the other's income began to exceed $769 
per fortnight (approximately $20 000 per annum) (box 9.2). Given this, two broad 
but indicative income cut-offs were used to determine potential eligibility: 
• household disposable income (net farm income plus off-farm wages and 
investment income) under $20 000 for full payment 
• household disposable income greater than $20 000 but less than $40 000 for 
partial payment. 
These two income cut-offs suggest that around 5200 broadacre and dairy farmers 
would potentially be eligible for full payment under the income support scheme 
(family disposable income below $20 000) and an additional 1500 would be eligible 
for partial payment (family disposable income below $40 000) (figure 9.8). A 
further 2500 would potentially be eligible for partial payment (those in the group 
with net assets greater than $2 million and below $3 million). This means that the 
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number of broadacre and dairy farmers eligible for income support could be 
reduced from around 17 600 to 9 200 by the income test. 
Figure 9.8 Broadacre and dairy farmers by net asset group with family 
disposable incomeab below given thresholds, 2007-08 
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a Defined as family share of net farm income (farm cash income minus depreciation) plus off-farm wages and 
investment income. b Data in this figure are presented on a farming family basis, that is showing the family’s 
share of net farm assets and income. 
Data source: ABARE (2009 unpublished). 
To gain an appreciation of eligibility of farmers in other industries, further data was 
sourced from ABARE for vegetable and sugar farms. While the sample size was not 
large, it was found that 48 per cent of vegetable farmers and 31 per cent of sugar 
farmers had farm net asset and liquid asset levels in line with eligibility 
requirements for the proposed scheme. (Figure 9.6 in the body of the chapter 
provides a diagrammatic representation of possible eligibility for the proposed 
scheme for available data sets.) 
It should be noted that these figures do not take into account the fact that more than 
one member of a farm household may be eligible for income support. Under ECRP, 
partners of eligible farmers automatically receive payment. This is not the case for 
the proposed scheme where a test will be applied to each individual applicant such 
that all recipients (including partners of farmers) must demonstrate that they 
normally receive a significant proportion of their income from farming. 
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Thus a complicating factor in this analysis is the possibility that in some households 
there will be two members eligible for assistance and in others only one member 
will be eligible. 
At the end of November 2008, there were 19 400 farm households across Australia 
in receipt of ECRP. Given that ECRP is delivered as a single payment for both 
members of a couple this equates to around 30 000 individuals receiving a 
assistance at Newstart levels (as approximately two thirds of ECRP recipients 
receive payments for two adults).2 
This suggests that there will be more recipients eligible for the proposed income 
support scheme than currently projected. However, the proportion of households 
that receive a double payment will be less than that for ECRP. 
Given the lack of data on all farm types in Australia and of income levels of each 
spouse in the household and the fact that income levels for farm households 
fluctuate considerably such that those who may appear eligible given data from 
2007-08 may not be eligible in subsequent years, it is difficult to get an accurate 
picture of the number of farmers who may access this scheme, even for a snapshot 
in time. 
 
                                                 
2 74 per cent of ECRP recipients had partners. However, 7 per cent had partners who were already 
receiving another Centrelink payment. 
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10 Related policies 
 
Key points 
• There is a range of policies outside the agriculture portfolio that are often at cross 
purposes to drought policy. 
– Some of these problems would be rectified by the implementation of the 
recommendations in this report. 
– Other improvements in coordination require changes to water and natural 
resource management policies.  
• The extent to which irrigators will be affected by future periods of low inflows 
depends to a large extent on progress with water reform and the implementation of 
the Water for the Future plan. 
• Effective natural resource management policies can potentially reduce some of the 
negative impacts of drought. 
• Many government-provided human services are important for the wellbeing of 
people in rural and regional areas, including during droughts. In general, it is 
preferable for these services to be provided on a continuous basis, rather than 
being temporarily available during drought.   
 
10.1 Introduction 
A range of policies outside the agriculture portfolio, such as those related to water, 
natural resource management and climate, influence farmers’ abilities to manage 
climate variability and change. Other broader policies, such as those related to 
health, education and industrial relations, influence agricultural performance and/or 
the wellbeing of people in rural and regional areas more generally (figure 7.1). 
The occurrence of drought is but one factor, among many, that needs to be 
considered within these broader policy settings. As it is beyond the scope of this 
inquiry to consider all of the relevant factors, this chapter does not make policy 
recommendations. Rather, its purpose is to explain the influence of non-agricultural 
policies on drought-related outcomes and identify where better coordination 
between these policies and agricultural policies is needed. 
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10.2 Water policy 
Water policy is concerned with, among other things, the arrangements for allocating 
water between individuals and groups that wish to use it for irrigation, industrial 
purposes, mining, servicing rural and urban households and environmental services. 
Water policy reform in Australia has been pursued through the National Water 
Initiative (NWI) and preceding processes established by the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG 2004). 
Where water policy is well designed, the negative impacts of drought will be less 
than they would otherwise be. In this regard, some of the hallmarks of good water 
policy include: 
• entitlements and other water products having well defined characteristics (for 
example, the security of supply) that allow irrigators to understand and manage 
water-related risks 
• trading arrangements that allow water to flow to its highest value use (within 
constraints, such as the physical connectivity of water systems) 
• not unnecessarily restricting irrigators’ choices about water use and trade 
between irrigation seasons (PC 2006). 
There is evidence that some of the policy reforms implemented through the NWI, 
particularly those allowing increased development of water trading, have been of 
benefit to many farmers during the latest drought. According to the Department of 
the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts: 
Water trading has played a vital role in assisting (irrigation) farmers during this period 
of ongoing drought and very low water allocations, and gives them much greater 
flexibility in the way they operate their businesses and manage their risks. 
(sub. 107, p. 11) 
A report examining changes in the Victorian Murray Valley found the following: 
• With or without water trading, drought would lead to tough times and many 
property foreclosures. Water trading delays and prevents some of the sales by 
giving farmers an additional asset with which to manage debt … 
• Without temporary trade the dairy industry would have fared much worse than it 
did during the past 10 years of drought. 
• Even with temporary trading many dairy enterprises collapsed as a result of the 
extraordinarily low seasonal allocations of 2002-03 and 2006-07. Permanent 
trading meant that those farmers left farming with more money than they otherwise 
would have had. 
• Without temporary trading many existing horticultural enterprises in the Goulburn 
system would not have survived the extraordinarily low seasonal allocations.  
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• Many mixed farms survived the low seasonal allocations by selling water on the 
temporary market, thus making more money than they would have done by growing 
crops. (Frontier Economics 2007, p. xiii) 
There would appear to be potential to improve outcomes further by reforming 
various arrangements that govern or influence water trading. First, there is currently 
an annual threshold limit on the level of permanent trade out of irrigation districts of 
4 per cent of the total water entitlement. In some cases this limit prevents trades 
from occurring that would be beneficial to both the buyer and seller. Accordingly, 
the limit imposes costs on the community and it is not clear that there are 
substantive benefits that offset this. On the release of a National Water Commission 
(NWC) report on Australian water markets, Ken Matthews (CEO of the NWC) 
stated: 
… the case previously put by the Commission for reviewing the 4 per cent per annum 
interim threshold limit on permanent trade out of irrigation districts is stronger than 
ever. (NWC 2008b) 
The 4 per cent limit is due for review in 2009.  
Second, irrigators who sell their permanent water entitlement are sometimes 
required to pay exit (or termination) fees. The Productivity Commission has 
previously found that exit fees constrain trade in entitlements and impede 
adjustment (PC 2006). The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission is 
currently considering this issue and its draft advice is that the maximum fee should 
be reduced by one-third (ACCC 2008).  
Finally, the New South Wales Irrigators Council (sub. 62) reports that government 
departments sometimes take an excessively long time to process water trades and 
barriers to interstate trade in water entitlements impede the efficient operation of 
water markets. A report by the NWC confirms that there is room for improvement 
in some states in these areas (NWC 2008c).  
Notwithstanding the benefits delivered by reforms to date, the low inflows over 
recent years have been exacerbated, in some respects, by deficiencies in water 
policy. The major problem is that of overallocation, most notably in the 
Murray-Darling Basin. According to the Department of the Environment, Water, 
Heritage and the Arts: 
This situation has arisen as a result of past decisions by state and territory governments 
to issue more entitlements than can be delivered by water systems, and by a failure in 
water sharing plans to set the pool of water available for consumption at sustainable 
levels. (DEWHA 2008b) 
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To address this overallocation the Commonwealth Government plans to spend 
$3.1 billion on buying back water entitlements from willing sellers as part of the 
Water for the Future plan. Under this plan, a further $5.8 billion has been allocated 
to measures such as upgrading irrigation infrastructure and assisting non-viable 
irrigators to exit the industry (DEWHA 2008a). 
While droughts will continue to have negative impacts on irrigators, the extent of 
these will depend to a large degree on how the Water for the Future plan is 
implemented and on the progress of policy reform, through the NWI and other 
processes. It is not within the scope of this inquiry to make recommendations in 
these areas. 
There is a need for water policy and agricultural policies to be better coordinated to 
prevent poor outcomes, as discussed below.  
Drought relief payments can reduce the gains from water trading 
As discussed in chapter 6, current programs under the National Drought Policy, 
particularly the Exceptional Circumstances Interest Rate Subsidy, have supported 
some unviable farm businesses. As a consequence, some farmers who would 
otherwise have exited, or sought alternative management arrangements for their 
properties, have continued to purchase water for irrigation. Others may have 
purchased more water than they otherwise would have, due to receipt of EC 
payments. Where this occurs water prices for other users will tend to increase, 
making it more difficult to combat overallocation. It can also work against water 
being allocated to higher value uses. The policy approach advocated by the 
Commission in this report will reduce the extent of these unintended outcomes. 
Assistance with drought preparedness measures can reduce inflows 
Some drought preparedness measures, such as laser grading irrigation farms, can 
reduce the quantity of irrigation water used per tonne of agricultural output. 
Because of this, it is often thought that assisting a farmer to implement such 
measures will not only benefit that farmer but will save water that can then be used 
by other irrigators or for environmental flows. Often, however, such measures 
actually reduce the quantity of water available to other water users. This is because 
they tend to reduce the volume of water that leaves the farm to flow back into rivers 
or groundwater sources (PC 2006; Crase and O’Keefe 2008). When farmers decide 
to use the water savings to increase their production, the net result is that there is 
less water available for other water users. Other preparedness measures, such as 
building farm dams, unambiguously reduce the quantity of water available to other 
users. 
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Accordingly, where governments subsidise preparedness measures, for example 
through irrigation management grants, they may effectively be providing a benefit 
to one farmer at the expense of other farmers and of environmental flows. 
It should be recognised, however, that even without subsidies, farmers may 
overinvest in such measures compared to what is socially optimal. This is because 
their decisions are quite legitimately focused on improving their farms and are not 
generally influenced by the costs they impose on downstream water users. This 
problem can only be rectified by changes to water policy to address the connectivity 
of water systems. This issue is recognised in the NWI, but is yet to be adequately 
addressed (Young and McColl 2008). 
Subsidies for irrigation infrastructure can impede adjustment 
There is potential for some of the Water for the Future allocation of funds to 
upgrade irrigation infrastructure to be wasted if there is not effective coordination 
with agriculture policy and recognition of the various adjustment pressures at play 
within agricultural industries that use irrigation water. For example, a costly 
infrastructure upgrade could be made redundant if the farmers it served decided to 
exit and sell their water entitlements. 
Where governments are actively seeking to purchase water, it is counterproductive 
to improve infrastructure, which then increases the value of water rights. It is 
essential to make the buybacks before deciding which infrastructure is worth 
upgrading. 
In commenting on the draft report the National Farmers’ Federation (NFF) 
questioned this conclusion, citing an ACIL Tasman report that says: 
… to effectively manage the risk of paying too much to return the target flows to the 
environment, there is a solid prima facie case for considering urgent active investment 
in identifying and proving up an expanded set of infrastructure projects. 
(ACIL Tasman 2008, p. ii) 
There is a risk that the water buyback program will prove to be more expensive than 
necessary if it is not well designed. However, the Commission cautions against 
using investments in water infrastructure to manage this risk. This is because such 
investments: 
• are often a more costly way of ‘saving’ water compared to buying water in the 
market (PC 2006) 
• can produce savings that are illusory when ‘saved’ water is removed from return 
flows to rivers and groundwater sources 
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• can be rendered redundant if the farmers it serves decide to sell their water 
entitlements. 
Exit assistance provided through water policy can reduce adjustment pressures in 
agriculture  
In September 2008, the Commonwealth Government announced $150 000 exit 
payments for small block irrigators in the Murray-Darling Basin who agree to sell 
all their water entitlement to the Commonwealth (Rudd and Wong 2008). The 
assistance will allow eligible irrigators with permanent water entitlements of at least 
10 megalitres, who choose to leave irrigated farming, to stay on their land. In 
addition, grants of up to $10 000 each will be provided for advice and training, and 
for removal of permanent plantings (such as grape vines). 
If assessed in terms of addressing the overallocation of water, this would appear to 
be an extremely high cost measure. However, it does have the benefit of reducing 
adjustment pressures, as it would be expected that many of those who apply would 
not have a viable future in irrigated agriculture. By allowing people to remain in 
their home and retain their land, the measure also addresses one of the non-financial 
impediments that can prevent people from exiting an unviable farm business 
(chapter 9). Many small irrigators are located near regional centres where 
alternative employment may be available which, in combination with assistance for 
training, lessens the chance that recipients will have difficulty finding employment. 
Deficiencies in water policy can increase calls for drought assistance 
Some inquiry participants expressed the view that government water policy had 
been deficient and that this justified the provision of drought assistance to irrigators. 
For example, the Rural Financial Counselling Service Victoria — Murray Mallee 
argued:  
A major factor contributing to the lack of irrigation water is the poor risk assessment 
associated with the allocation of water rights throughout Australia’s irrigation districts 
by successive governments … Financial support for farmers in a format which 
encourages better performance in the future is therefore justified, governments must 
accept some of the “responsibility” for the current lack of irrigation water, and it is not 
all due to drought and climate change. (sub. DR151, p. 3) 
Water policy is an important avenue through which irrigators’ concerns regarding 
drought should be addressed. In the Commission’s view, efforts should be directed 
to achieving sound water policy, and this leaves no residual role for governments to 
provide any drought-related assistance to irrigators additional to that outlined in 
chapters 8 and 9. The NWI sets out a framework for assigning risks to water access 
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entitlement holders and Commonwealth, state and territory governments regarding 
any future reductions in the availability of water. Calls for extra assistance to 
irrigators through future drought policy amount to an attempt to renegotiate this 
assignment of risk and should be resisted. 
10.3 Land-based natural resource management policy 
Effective natural resource management policies can potentially reduce the negative 
impacts of drought in two ways. First, they can result in agricultural land being in 
better condition at the onset of drought (for example, greater vegetation cover, less 
soil erosion and less salinity). Second, they might involve payments to farmers for 
the provision of explicit environmental services to the broader community. Such an 
additional income stream would likely be relatively independent of climatic 
conditions and could help to diversify farmers’ incomes.   
Several inquiry participants argued that government payments to farmers for 
providing environmental services should be part of the answer to low farm 
profitability due to drought or other cause. For example, Dragon Point Enterprises 
stated: 
My suggestion is that we should turn the environment card face up: support farming 
enterprises to regenerate their production environments through stewardship 
arrangements that provide a return comparable to other investments. (sub. 15, p. 2)  
A range of natural resource management and environmental policies seek to 
improve the environmental management of agricultural and other land. Some of 
these policies do provide for payments to landowners for the provision of specific 
environmental services: 
The Australian Government has recognised the benefits of incentive-based schemes to 
improve environmental conservation and management. The Government already has a 
scheme to purchase high value conservation outcomes for the public good, in the 
Environmental Stewardship Program under the Caring for our Country initiative. 
(Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, sub. 107, p. 12) 
The Environmental Stewardship Program will offer contracts to landholders who 
can provide environmental services on a cost-effective basis. The targets for 
investment are: 
• nationally endangered or vulnerable species and ecological communities 
• migratory species and wetlands for which Australia has international 
responsibilities 
• natural values associated with world and national heritage places. 
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The budget for the program is $50 million over four years, with an indication from 
the Commonwealth Government that this may increase in the future (DAFF and 
DEWR 2008). In addition to this program, some state governments, such as 
Victoria, have programs in place that pay landholders for the provision of 
environmental services.  
The question of whether there should be a greater emphasis on payments to 
landowners to achieve desired environmental outcomes (and perhaps less emphasis 
on proscriptive regulation) is one that should be addressed in the ongoing 
development of these policies. The Commission has previously set out some 
principles for determining who should bear the costs associated with environmental 
protection that are relevant to this process (box 10.1).  
The Commission’s preferred approach, therefore, is to develop natural resource 
management policy based on sound principles and evidence, rather than adjusting 
policy settings to meet drought-related objectives. It would be poor public policy to 
pay farmers for providing environmental services on the rationale that this would 
provide them with private benefits during drought. The Commission’s approach 
would appear to be consistent with that of the NFF, that stated:  
… the NFF is cautious in linking environmental conduct to other programs such as 
drought support … we do believe the merits of environmental stewardship stand on 
their own two feet. (sub. DR176, p. 38) 
Two coordination issues related to natural resource management policy are 
discussed below. 
Drought assistance can result in environmental damage 
Coordination is important because drought policy can unwittingly result in 
environmental damage (chapter 6). This is acknowledged by the Department of the 
Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts: 
Every effort should be made when considering alternative drought policy approaches to 
avoid perversely undermining investments made under the $2.5 billion Caring for our 
Country and other environmental initiatives. (sub. 107, p. 6) 
There is, therefore, a need for natural resource management policy and drought and 
other agricultural policies to be better aligned and coordinated. The approach 
recommended by the Commission improves on past policy in this regard, for 
example, by phasing out fodder subsidies that can promote environmental damage. 
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Box 10.1 Sharing the costs for environmental protection 
The Commission’s 2004 inquiry report Impacts of Native Vegetation and Biodiversity 
Regulations considered cost-sharing arrangements for protecting the environment and 
providing environmental services. The following is an extract from that report. 
Landholders’ responsibilities 
In the Commission’s assessment, it is reasonable to expect landholders in the 
aggregate to bear the costs of actions that directly contribute to sustainable resource 
use and, hence, the long-term viability of their operations. Thus, actions and 
mechanisms to ‘internalise’ efficiently what could be broadly described as externalities 
occurring within and between regions — landholder actions affecting soil and water 
quality, for example — would constitute the responsibility of landholders individually 
and/or as a group. This approach does not mean that individual landholders should 
only be expected to undertake what is in their private interests — it implies a broader 
responsibility to their neighbours and communities and, indeed, where actions have 
broader impacts, surrounding communities. 
Society’s responsibilities 
In the Commission’s assessment, the wider public should bear the costs of actions to 
promote public-good environmental services — such as biodiversity, threatened 
species preservation and greenhouse gas abatement — that it apparently demands, 
and which are likely to impinge significantly on the capacity of landholders to utilise 
their land for production.1 
This assessment is not simply based on some notion of fairness (although perceived 
fairness is not irrelevant when landholders are being relied upon to provide the 
environmental services demanded by the wider community). It is based on the reality 
that achieving the environmental outcomes that society desires on private land as 
efficiently and effectively as possible will require clear specification of the 
environmental outcomes demanded and the ongoing cooperation, knowledge and 
effort of landholders who ultimately must deliver those outcomes on their land. 
Over and above agreed landholder responsibilities, the Commission therefore 
considers that public-good conservation should be purchased from individual, or 
groups of, landholders. 
Source: PC (2004, p. XLI).  
 
                                                 
1 The context for greenhouse gas abatement has changed since 2004. At that time there was no 
general requirement for industries to undertake costly action to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. In such an environment, it would be appropriate for the broader community to pay if 
a particular industry was required to reduce its emissions. Since then the Commonwealth 
Government has announced that the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme will be introduced and 
this will involve the majority of industries (and indirectly, all consumers) paying for whatever 
greenhouse gases they emit. 
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Natural resource management policy have synergies with drought management 
A CSIRO report, which was included in an Australian Conservation Foundation 
submission (DR128), suggested a way that environmental stewardship agreements 
could be designed to have synergies with farmers’ management of drought:  
An agreement might set out … that specified parts of an on-farm conservation area 
could be moderately grazed on a long rotation — such as at 40 per cent of the normal 
stocking rate once every nine years — where this was compatible with the 
environmental outcomes sought. Such provisions might mimic the impacts of natural 
climate variation. Provisions of this kind would provide improved on-farm 
management of climate risk (such as by providing additional fodder), making the 
conservation agreement more attractive to landholders. (Hatfield-Dodds and 
Procter 2008, p. 28) 
This concept, which was also mentioned in an NFF submission (sub. DR176), 
would appear to be worthy of further investigation. 
10.4 Climate policy 
Of all the areas of climate policy that can impact on farmers’ abilities to manage 
climate variability and change, two of the most important are: 
• research aimed at improving seasonal and interannual climate forecasts 
• climate change mitigation measures, such as the planned Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme. 
Research aimed at improving seasonal and interannual climate forecasts is 
discussed in chapter 8. 
The Commonwealth Government has announced that it will introduce the Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme in 2010. This scheme will impose a cost on those 
emitting greenhouse gases in certain sectors of the economy. One consequence is 
that energy and some goods whose manufacture is emissions intensive will be more 
expensive than they would otherwise be, driving up production costs, including for 
farmers. Farmers may also have an opportunity to earn income from the scheme if 
they diversify into eligible forestry activities that remove carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere. Such diversification could make farm businesses more self-reliant 
during drought. 
The Commonwealth Government has indicated that agricultural emissions (such as 
those associated with the digestive processes of livestock and with fertiliser use) 
may be included in the scheme from 2015, suggesting that farmers may need to be 
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planning for the possibility that there will be a price signal on agricultural emissions 
from that time (Department of Climate Change 2008).  
10.5 Other policies 
The outer ring of figure 7.1 includes the more generic policy frameworks that 
impact across the entire community, such as economic policies, human services 
(such as health and education) and the social security safety net. Economic policies 
influence the operations and profitability of all businesses, including farm 
businesses. For example, trade policy can increase profitability through improving 
access to export markets. Human services and the social security safety net, on the 
other hand, focus on the wellbeing and development of individuals and families. In 
the context of hardship caused by drought or other circumstances, these areas are of 
particular importance, as recognised by the Expert Social Panel: 
The Panel believes people should be the priority (and not the farm property or the 
respective industry), and propose future policy be about people: changing perspectives 
on dryness. (Kenny et al. 2008, p. 1) 
The Commission strongly concurs with this conclusion. 
Human services 
A wide range of education, health and aged care services are provided, or funded (at 
least in part) by governments. State and territory governments have the major role 
in delivery of most of these services. 
Governments attempt to achieve equitable access to these services. This often 
entails governments devoting more resources per person to groups in the 
community that have special needs or are more costly to provide accessible services 
to. Accordingly, governments often spend more per person on delivering equivalent 
levels of services, such as school education, to people in rural and regional Australia 
than people in major cities. For example, expenditure per government primary 
school student in New South Wales was 14 per cent higher in nonmetropolitan than 
metropolitan areas, in 2003-04. For Victoria it was 7 per cent higher and for South 
Australia 10 per cent higher (SCRGSP 2006). 
Despite this, people outside the major cities, and particularly those in more remote 
areas, will continue to have greater travel times and have to go to provincial centres 
for higher order services. 
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This context needs to be borne in mind when considering ways to improve services 
to people in rural areas. One theme of the Expert Social Panel’s report is that 
governments should consider the social impacts of withdrawing services from small 
towns affected by dryness. This is important, although it is also necessary to weigh 
up the impacts against the opportunity costs of maintaining services in the face of 
changing patterns of settlement. 
The Expert Social Panel observed that drought-specific human support service 
providers ‘frequently did not appear to have the appropriate training or skills to 
effectively engage farming individuals or rural communities’ (Kenny et al. 2008, 
p. 37). In the Commission’s view, these shortcomings are difficult to avoid when 
temporary services are set up in response to a drought. In addition to potential 
training and skills problems, new service providers inevitably take time to become 
known in the community and to develop relationships with potential clients and 
other service providers. Appendix E discusses various drought-specific human 
support services operated by state and territory governments. 
In the Commission’s view the emphasis should be on human services that are 
available all of the time, rather than on drought-specific services. Services that 
operate on a continuous basis should be responsive to community needs. The 
occurrence of drought is one factor that influences these needs, but chapter 3 
indicates it is often not the major driver of need. 
The Expert Social Panel also found a need for better coordination and referral 
mechanisms between service providers. The Commission agrees with this. The 
Expert Social Panel report includes a detailed consideration of these issues.  
Social security safety net 
Drought and other circumstances can result in some farm families being in hardship. 
As discussed earlier, the Commission’s view is that there should be a 
farmer-specific income support program that is able to be accessed on a temporary 
basis. The design of this program, including how it should be coordinated with the 
general social security safety net, is discussed in chapter 9. Even with a program 
designed for farming circumstances, aspects of the general social security safety net, 
such as the Age Pension, would remain relevant to some farmers. The general social 
security safety net is also available to support operators of farm dependent 
businesses and farm employees (and their families) in a range of circumstances.  
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Tax policy 
Tax policy can interact with drought policy in a number of ways and can influence 
the way farm businesses are managed during drought. Perhaps the most important 
of these relates to the tax treatment of livestock. The value of livestock that are bred 
by a farm business (referred to as natural increase) that is used for tax purposes is 
often substantially less than the market value. For example, cattle can have a tax 
value of $20 per head and a market value of well over $300 per head. 
This creates an incentive for farmers to delay the sale of livestock so as to defer the 
payment of tax. During a drought this can result in farmers delaying destocking, 
which may cause land degradation (Douglas 2002). There is provision in the tax 
system for the profits arising from the forced sale of livestock due to lack of 
pastures caused by drought, fire or flood to be spread over five years. While this 
may to a limited extent counteract the incentive to delay destocking, it is in itself 
inconsistent with the principle that the sale of trading stock should be taxed when it 
occurs, irrespective of the reason for the sale (Douglas 1995).  
There would appear to be scope to alter these tax arrangements so as to achieve both 
a more consistent treatment of agriculture compared to other industries and more 
appropriate incentives for destocking at the onset of drought. Recommendations for 
how this could be achieved are, for example, given in Douglas (1995). It is noted 
that a ‘root and branch’ review of Australia’s tax system is currently being 
undertaken.  
Regional development 
As discussed in chapter 2, provincial and coastal centres are growing in part by 
attracting spending that previously occurred in small towns and by offering 
commercial services, employment, education, health services and retirement 
lifestyles. In addition, small towns are feeling the impacts of farm productivity 
improvements through scale economies and capital substitution for on-farm labour. 
Some inquiry participants saw these changes in a negative light and argued that 
drought policy should seek to slow them. 
While drought can increase the rate of some of these changes, it is not the main 
driver and the pressures for change do not dissipate when a drought is over. 
Accordingly, it is the Commission’s view that the maintenance of small rural 
communities should not be a rationale for drought policy. Any attempt to influence 
the future of rural communities would be better pursued through regional 
development policies. These policies need to be developed with an appreciation of 
the drivers of change. 
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11 Implementation and outlook 
 
Key points 
• The exceptional circumstances (EC) declaration process should be terminated. 
– There is no need for a ‘trigger’ for drought relief, nor for ‘lines on a map’ to show 
eligible areas. The concept of a once in 20-25 year extreme or exceptional 
drought is unnecessary and unworkable given climate variability, let alone, 
climate change. 
– Areas currently in EC should continue to be reviewed as to whether EC status is 
warranted. 
• Most current programs to provide support to farm businesses during drought should 
be wound up as soon as practicable. Any new schemes would require thorough ex 
ante justification and independent ex poste evaluation of their effectiveness and 
efficiency within five years. 
• It is vital that there is a high degree of confidence that the new policy approach will 
be consistently and rigorously applied. This is best achieved through an incentives 
based intergovernmental agreement with independent compliance monitoring. 
• Adopting the Commission’s recommended approach would be likely to result in: 
– agricultural production being slightly higher than it would otherwise be. 
– farm families and rural communities, in the longer term, suffering less acutely 
from the effects of drought because they would be better prepared for the 
variability and change in Australia’s climate.  
 
11.1 Context for reform implementation 
Drought policy in Australia since 1992 has pursued reasonably sound stated 
objectives, but the measures and instruments adopted have been only tenuously 
related to those objectives and, at times, inconsistent and incompatible with them. In 
practice, implementation has been shaped more by political considerations and 
responsiveness to lobbying. Longstanding expectations by many farmers that 
assistance will be provided during drought events, regardless of the policy 
architecture, have proved true. Previous reviews of the National Drought Policy, for 
instance, all recommended the abolition of interest rate and transport subsidies. Yet, 
both subsidy regimes have been expanded. With the latest drought, ad hoc policy 
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changes, without the benefit of review, led to increases in the coverage, quantum 
and expediency of delivery of assistance.  
Despite the compelling evidence from earlier reviews of the need for a policy 
framework that actually promotes farmers’ self-reliance and preparedness, this has 
not been realised. And a set of recommendations from this inquiry — if driven 
solely by fiscal stringency — would likely suffer a similar fate. Appropriately, and 
consistent with its approach more generally, the Commission has balanced 
effectiveness, efficiency and equity to improve the wellbeing of the community as a 
whole. This is evident in its proposed income support scheme for farm households 
which have assets of up to $3 million, and advocacy for sufficient public funding of 
advice, training and extension services — particularly given the level of private 
benefits that arise. Accordingly, this report’s proposals should not be viewed as a 
base from which more munificent policy responses are built. 
If the policy recommendations in this report are adopted, the consistency and rigour 
with which they are implemented will significantly influence outcomes. A 
successful outcome is critically dependent on two key considerations.  
1. Managing the transition from the current to the new approach. A balance must 
be struck between fairness for current beneficiaries of EC assistance on the one 
hand and, on the other, the costs of a prolonged transition involving dual regimes 
running in parallel (section 11.2).  
2. The credibility of the new policy direction. The history of drought policy in 
Australia (chapter 4) demonstrates the problems with instituting reform — 
recommendations from reviews have been ignored; policy making has been 
disjointed and poorly linked to objectives; and commitments entered into by 
governments have been breached (section 11.3 and 11.4).  
11.2 Making the transition 
The Commission’s recommended policy approach does not include any drought-
triggered programs. Drought triggers — whether attempted to be defined as 
‘exceptional’, ‘extreme’ or any other such variation — have proven to be a failure at 
best and divisive at worst. Further, as this report demonstrates, they are not relevant 
to the formulation of programs aimed at developing self-reliance, preparedness and 
sustainability. There is no place for them in any future policy architecture. 
Accordingly, Exceptional Circumstances (EC) declarations will become redundant. 
Therefore, no new EC, prima facie or interim assistance, declarations should be 
made. Areas currently in EC should continue to be reviewed as to whether EC status 
is extended in duration or rescinded.  
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In undertaking the transition however, there should be no sudden change to the 
arrangements in EC declared areas that would leave people worse off. However, to 
mitigate the inequities that would inevitably arise between EC areas and non-
declared areas, the former should not remain declared for too long. 
Under the Commission’s recommendations, farm families in hardship could access 
income support, regardless of drought events, from 1 July 2009 (when the 
Transitional Income Support scheme ends). But for areas still in EC, relief payment 
(ECRP) recipients would continue to access assistance different to that available to 
other farm households — with income and assets tests in excess of those available 
to the rest of the community, no mutual conditionality and no time limits. In 
addition, recipients of the EC interest rate subsidy (ECIRS) — for which a valid 
rationale has never been established — would continue to access unconditional 
funds, whereas farm businesses in non-declared areas could not.1  
Moreover, within a given budget constraint, the effectiveness of new arrangements 
could be constrained if a large proportion of available funding continues to be 
channelled into the decreasing number of remaining EC areas. 
By definition, the inequities and inefficiencies from a dual stream system continue 
as long as any area remains in EC. In recognition of the undesirability of allowing 
such arrangements to perpetuate, the Commission proposed in its draft report that, 
while an area remains EC declared, existing recipients of the ECRP and ECIRS 
should be able to continue to apply for those benefits, but that the schemes should 
terminate on 30 June 2010 (PC 2008a).  
Two weeks after the Commission released its draft report, Ministers with 
responsibility for primary industries affirmed that ‘the EC rules will not change for 
those producers currently receiving assistance in existing EC-declared areas’ (PIMF 
2008b). Subsequently, the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry stated in 
the Parliament that: 
 … [the national review of drought policy] is a review of how we will handle the next 
drought and does not carry changes to the protections people enjoy when they are going 
through the current drought … (Burke 2008a).  
The implication of these developments is that a 30 June 2010 end date for EC 
arrangements would not be accepted.  
                                                 
1 These anomalies would be exacerbated if small business support schemes were to be extended 
beyond 30 June 2009.  
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Minimising transitional costs given governmental undertakings  
Notwithstanding governmental undertakings, the costs and associated inequities of 
having farmers in similar situations subject to different arrangements must 
ultimately be addressed. Allowing such a situation to linger for many years would 
be costly, inequitable — probably more divisive than the current ‘lines on map’ 
problem associated with the EC system — and inefficient.  
The Commission considers that there are actions that could taken to reduce these 
costs, but which are consistent with the undertakings given by government.  
• Given the high level of benefits flowing to some producers in EC areas, the 
pressure placed on assessments of EC status would be amplified. That process 
has been shown to lack transparency and to have been subject to manipulation. 
There is a strong case for the assessments made by the National Rural Advisory 
Council (NRAC) to the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and the 
Minister’s subsequent reasoning to be made transparent. 
• Given the wording of the Primary Industries Ministerial Forum Communiqué — 
that ‘EC rules will not change for those producers currently receiving assistance 
in existing EC-declared areas’ — there should be no new enrolments for EC 
assistance in declared areas. However, in new cases of hardship, ECRP should 
be available until the new farming family income support scheme is operational.  
• The lack of conditionality for farmers receiving EC assistance should be 
rectified even if support continues until an area’s EC status is rescinded:  
– ECRP recipients should be subject to similar case management as that which 
will apply to people accessing the new farming family income support 
scheme 
– ECIRS recipients should be subject to rigorous assessment (as occurs in 
Victoria, for example) including demonstrating appropriate financial and 
business management planning.  
Ultimately, EC assistance in the residual legacy areas cannot run in perpetuity. A 
pre-announced date (even some years into the future) for an end to EC assistance 
would be reasonable in order to facilitate a transition to the new arrangements.  
The Exceptional Circumstances (EC) declaration process should be terminated. 
No new areas, full or interim, should be declared. Currently declared areas could 
have their EC status extended where they meet the criteria. To mitigate the 
inequities and costs of running two regimes in parallel: 
RECOMMENDATION 11.1 
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• assessments and advice made by the National Rural Advisory Council on 
extension or revocation of EC declarations and the Minister’s reasons for the 
subsequent decision should be made public 
• in areas that remain declared, only active recipients of EC assistance 
measures should be eligible to reapply, but enrolments for EC relief payments 
should cease once the Farming Family Income Support scheme commences 
• continuing recipients of EC interest rate subsidies should be subject to 
rigorous assessment including demonstration of appropriate financial and 
business management plans 
• continuing recipients of EC relief payments should be subject to similar 
case-management arrangements as those applying to recipients of the 
Farming Family Income Support scheme 
• an end date for all EC arrangements that provides sufficient time for a 
transition to the new arrangements should be pre-announced. 
In relation to other EC and climate change related measures: 
• EC Small Business Income Support, the EC Exit package and the EC 
Professional Advice and Planning Grant are all scheduled to end on 30 June 
2009. However, given the affirmation by primary industries’ Ministers that the 
EC rules will not change for declared areas, these schemes may be extended.  
• The Murray-Darling Irrigation Management Grant and Transitional Income 
Support programs should end on 30 June 2009, as scheduled. 
• Drought-triggered transaction-based subsidies administered by state and territory 
governments should be terminated as soon as possible — with the timing to be 
determined through negotiation of an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) (see 
below).  
• Some elements of the Climate Change Adjustment Program (CCAP) should be 
subsumed within the new Farming Family Income Support program. Others, 
such as the CCAP exit payments available under this program, do not appear to 
have a clear rationale and so consideration should be given to terminating them. 
• All other new policy measures recommended in this report, together with the 
recommended policy improvements (such as those relating to the enhanced Farm 
Ready program) should be introduced as soon as is feasible. 
The timing of the recommended transitional arrangements is shown in figure 10.1. 
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Figure 11.1 Current and proposed arrangements 
Jun 2008 Jun 2010Jun 2009 Jun 2011 Jun 2012
Transitional Income Support
FarmReady
EC exit package
Climate Change Adjustment Program (CCAP) grants for exit & advice
Current
EC Interest Rate Subsidy (ECIRS)
Rural Financial Counselling Service
Farm Management Deposits
Research, development and extension
Transaction-based subsidies
Irrigation Management Grants
Small Business Income Support
Prof. Advice and Planning Gran
EC Relief Payment (ECRP)
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11.3 Ensuring policy credibility 
Many of the potential advantages of the recommended policy approach will be 
realised only if there is confidence that it will be consistently and rigorously 
applied. Progress towards greater self-reliance and preparedness for periods of 
financial difficulty would be undermined if there is an expectation that governments 
will eventually revert to providing reactive support when droughts recur. To date, 
such expectations have proved well-founded.  
The Commission’s recommendations are similar to those of past reviews. That such 
recommendations have not been adopted, or followed only briefly, highlights that 
policy credibility is a fundamental prerequisite for success. Fortunately, present 
circumstances appear more favourable for reform than previously. Specifically:  
• current projections of climate change add weight to an argument for avoiding 
government support that impedes innovation, adaptation and industry adjustment 
• Australian governments agree that current approaches to drought and EC are no 
longer the most appropriate in the context of a changing climate 
• stakeholders such as the National Farmers’ Federation, the NRAC, the Bureau of 
Meteorology–CSIRO and many individual farmers are also seeking an approach 
that does not involve an EC trigger. 
These circumstances work in favour of achieving a credible commitment to a new 
approach based around self-reliance, preparedness and equity. Nevertheless, 
lobbying for reactive drought support could still create media and political 
dynamics for backsliding that are difficult for governments to resist.  
A mechanism for strengthening policy credibility would be for the Commonwealth, 
state and territory governments to enter into an agreement that committed: 
• the Commonwealth to provide funding to the states and territories through, but 
not necessarily limited to, the Australia’s Farming Future initiative 
• the Commonwealth, state and territory governments to not (re)introduce or 
maintain reactive business support for farmers and farm-dependent businesses. 
By making full funding contingent on outcomes, an IGA would provide an 
incentive for state and territory governments to adhere to commitments. There is no 
complementary measure for achieving such discipline within the Commonwealth 
Government.  
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11.4 Intergovernmental cooperation 
There are many forms of IGAs with varying degrees of effectiveness.2 Typically 
IGAs arise in areas where the Commonwealth Government is best placed to co-
ordinate policy, with state and territory governments undertaking much of the 
implementation. IGAs can therefore improve national consistency — for example, 
through uniform regulation, harmonisation or mutual recognition. 
Various funding models apply to interjurisdictional arrangements. For example, 
under the IGA establishing the National Transport Commission, the Commonwealth 
contributes 35 per cent of the budget with the remainder contributed by the states 
and territories.  
Changes to, and derogations from, commitments can be determined by voting 
arrangements (for example, consensus voting which can allow one jurisdiction to 
‘hold out’, compared to majority voting). However, IGAs are not binding — a point 
the Victorian Government made to an earlier Commission inquiry:  
… no jurisdiction can be made to accept a decision that it sees as disadvantageous to its 
interests, even if supported by a majority of others. This … places the onus on officials-
led coordination to work towards consensus agreement with ministerial negotiation to 
be used … where consensus is not achieved. (cited in PC 2009, p. 12) 
To overcome such limitations, in certain instances, incentives have been used to 
encourage states and territories to adopt reforms. For example, under the National 
Competition Policy (NCP) the Commonwealth made ‘competition payments’ to the 
states and territories conditional on reforms being implemented. Compliance 
monitoring was undertaken by the National Competition Council and in some cases 
payments were withheld. Recently, the Commonwealth indicated that National 
Partnership Payments (NPPs) could be used to encourage the states and territories to 
implement reforms with national benefits (Commonwealth Government 2008). 
A Commission review of the NCP found that granting (and withholding) incentive 
payments was an important element for its success (PC 2005a). However, because 
the Commonwealth did not face financial ‘penalties’, some states and territories 
were critical of its reform effort.  
The Commission’s study on national approaches to regulation arrived at several 
conclusions that are particularly germane to this review:  
                                                 
2 The Commission’s supplement to its inquiry report on Chemicals and Plastics Regulation 
elaborates on national approaches to regulation, including a summary of forms of national 
arrangements (PC 2009).  
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• Effective national approaches need strong governance arrangements covering the 
development of a national policy response and its subsequent implementation, 
monitoring and refinement.  
• Although the states are sovereign entities and hence are not formally bound by 
[IGAs], they promote transparency and accountability. The more successful IGAs 
feature … reporting requirements through which the jurisdictions report back to the 
Ministerial Council (or equivalent) on implementation issues. 
• … monitoring the progress of states and territories in implementing agreed reforms, 
and rewarding those that meet reform goals, can help to progress policies that may 
otherwise falter. (PC 2009, pp. 37–8)  
An intergovernmental agreement to promote farm sector self-reliance 
Under the NCP model, incentive payments arose after a comprehensive assessment 
of the benefits and costs that would flow from achieving a comprehensive reform 
agenda. A similar approach is envisaged for the NPPs. As a general principle, there 
should be material net benefits on offer to warrant proceeding to an IGA. Moreover, 
given that incentive payments have an opportunity cost they should only be used 
where reform outcomes will deliver significant net benefits to the community.  
On these criteria, the case for an IGA to underpin a new policy paradigm for a self-
reliant and prepared farming sector appears compelling.  
First, Australian agriculture operates in a national (and global) market. Yet in some 
cases, inputs and outputs are affected by inter-state distortions. For example, the 
current framework involves border anomalies through inconsistency of 
administration of national programs such as the ECIRS and the effects of state 
programs such as subsidies for stock transport. The status quo, therefore, is less 
effective than it could be.  
Second, as noted, policy credibility will determine the success or failure of the 
recommended shift away from ‘revolving door’ funding unencumbered by any 
requirement to improve self-reliance, to a regime that aims to promote a farm sector 
that can better manage climate variability and change. Any reversion to the policies 
of the past would impose double adjustment costs on the farm sector — the 
transition towards self-reliance and preparedness would be halted and the sector 
would need to re-adjust to an environment in which taxpayers faced more farming 
risk.  
Third, under the Commission’s proposals, the Commonwealth would retain primary 
responsibility for an income support safety net for all Australians. In contrast, 
policy measures that aim to address weaknesses in business and risk management 
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skills, extension services and research and development — with geographic, 
demographic and localised climate dimensions — are better delivered by states and 
territories. For example, the Commission’s proposal to improve the reach of Farm 
Ready would involve program funds being made available to state and territory 
governments to administer.  
Fourth, many current state and territory programs would conflict with the new 
policy direction. Some involve duplication, others are counterproductive and some 
— such as fodder and transport subsidies —conflict directly with the objective of 
self-reliance and preparedness and potentially have adverse environmental impacts. 
There is also a wide range of state and territory policies that appear to confound 
regional development and drought assistance objectives. Related to this, all tiers of 
government provide a range of regional health, social and community services 
reinforcing that consistency in approach is desirable.   
In addition, the need for program funding arising from this review (see chapter 8) in 
part obviates the need for specific and new targeted ‘incentive payments’. 
Conditional commitments could be tied to funding that is already necessary. 
In summary, there is a powerful rationale for an IGA that embodies a systematic 
assessment of compliance. It would not be appropriate for the Commission to devise 
a specific IGA. That is a matter for governments to negotiate. The following 
sections provide a principles based discussion to help guide the derivation of an 
IGA with a focus on:  
• rationales and objectives  
• matters pertaining to the quantum of assistance that might be linked to an IGA 
• identifying areas of government activity that should be circumscribed to the 
extent that incentive payments could be withheld for breaches of commitments  
• compliance monitoring.  
Objectives 
As noted above, the primary rationale for an IGA is to ensure the credibility and 
sustainability of a long term reform path that recognises that the primary 
responsibility for managing risks, including those from climate variability and 
change, rests with farmers. Governments need to agree that the focus of policy 
should be on people and communities, not propping up the ‘bottom line’ of 
individual businesses.  
An IGA would need to be consistent with the revised and extended objectives of 
Australia’s Farming Future (chapter 7). 
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Quantum of assistance 
Specifying the quantum of funds that should be linked to any IGA is properly a 
function of governments to determine, taking into account commitments entered 
into and the relative roles and responsibilities ascribed to the Commonwealth, state 
and territory governments. Some participants contended that the assistance 
delivered through current Commonwealth programs should be earmarked for future 
initiatives — a starting point of well over $1 billion per year based on 2007-08. For 
example, responding to the Commission’s draft report; the Queensland Farmers’ 
Federation drew attention to farm ‘business assistance’ and submitted that:  
… the only substantive ‘new’ initiative offered by the Commission is to expand the 
Australia’s Farming Future (AFF) initiative, especially the Farm Ready component. It 
is the view of QFF that this is neither a reasonable or credible trade-off given that Farm 
Ready is a $26.5 million program over four years. … it seems to us there is about $1.5 
billion of ‘business support’ being removed without any real replacement programs. 
This is unacceptable … (DR123, pp. 1–2)  
The Commission does not consider that past expenditures, particularly in recent 
years that reflect one of the three worst droughts in a hundred years, have validity as 
an ambit claim. (Nor did the Commission contend that current funding for Farm 
Ready was an appropriate indicator of future expenditure needs.)  
Commonwealth funding for preparedness programs should reflect the actions 
necessary to meet specified objectives based on robust rationales. That is, the 
quantum of assistance needs to be sufficient to ensure that warranted programs are 
delivered effectively and efficiently and also account for the implementation and 
transitional costs of changing administrative structures. Expenditures in excess of 
that constitute a transfer of funds for other motivations — such as ‘buying reform’. 
State and territory governments also provide significant drought-related 
expenditures, some of which is inconsistent with encouraging self-reliance and 
preparedness. For example, from 2002-03 to 2007-08, New South Wales and 
Queensland spent over $186 million on transport subsidies (chapter 6 and 
appendix E). Terminating such programs would liberate state funds that could be 
used for more appropriate programs. Indeed, current state and territory expenditures 
on drought-related programs are part of the overall funding calculus that leaves 
open the possibility of an IGA with some matching funding components.  
The cost of providing income support for farming families in hardship (chapter 9) is 
taken as exogenous for the purposes of an IGA-related funding. It is, however, 
relevant to the extent that, like the objectives of an IGA, it aims to not impede 
necessary structural adjustment.  
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Commitments 
Any IGA should: 
• incorporate agreed principles relevant to the types of program delivered by state 
and territory governments — both delivery of national programs (discussed in 
chapter 8) and jurisdiction-specific programs (see appendix E) 
• address overlaps that arise across programs dealing with drought, structural 
adjustment and regional and community development, including: 
– taking into account matters identified in the Expert Social Panel report 
(Kenny et al. 2008) that imply Commonwealth and state funding initiatives to 
meet gaps in social support services available to help people cope with 
change.  
Prior to committing to an IGA, state and territory governments should undertake a 
stocktake of their drought assistance, drought-related and overlapping regional 
programs with a view to consistency with the revised principles of the AFF. 
Consideration should be given to removing all drought triggers (state based drought 
declarations). Persisting with drought-triggered policy responses after the EC 
system has been abandoned would be inimical to treating drought as one of many 
normal risks that must be managed. In relation to this, it is instructive to draw on the 
Victorian Drought Interdepartmental Committee’s proposal that drought assistance:  
• should not undermine the incentive for businesses/farmers to prepare for drought 
• should not be provided to businesses who have not taken available measures to 
prepare for drought 
• should not set a precedent whereby Government will be responsible for climate 
related risks (SACES 2008b).  
To the extent that state and territory governments consider it necessary to retain any 
specific drought-centric programs, then these principles have merit.  
Most fundamentally, assistance should not involve measures that distort farm 
business decision making without a valid rationale. Accordingly, an IGA should 
include commitments that governments will not introduce transactions based 
subsidies (such as subsidies for interest payments and the transport of fodder, water 
or stock). This logic extends to other farm business costs such as rates, fees and 
charges which should not be subsidised by government. While a case might be 
made for deferring some charges in times of low incomes, they remain legitimate 
business costs. If farms are not sufficiently viable to prepare for such charges 
(through for example, Farm Management Deposits or short term business loans), 
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shifting these costs onto taxpayers (or other ratepayers) can only impede necessary 
and desirable adjustment. 
If the IGA gives governments sufficient freedom to persist with providing loans and 
grants to farmers, funding should: 
• be conditional on an assessment to ensure that the farm will be self-supporting in 
the longer term  
• be directed to reinforcing longer term outcomes such as capacity building 
through improving farm business and risk management (see chapter 8), rather 
than specifying a technology or activity (for example, building silos). 
More pragmatically, while government-provided incentives that enable farmers to 
carry out actions, adopt practices or undertake investments that are privately cost-
effective are unlikely to be warranted, they may have a role to play in moving away 
from current flawed practices.  
Greater degrees of freedom should be afforded governments in how they choose to 
meet the general social, health, welfare and recreational needs of regional 
communities. While such programs should be based on robust benefit-cost 
assessments, there may need to be sufficient scope for governments to ‘do 
something’ if extended drought events adversely affect rural and regional 
communities.  
Rather than revert to assistance measures that are inconsistent with self-reliance and 
preparedness, it would be preferable — albeit perhaps not always warranted on 
efficiency criteria — for governments to meet such pressures through more 
generalised counter-cyclical expenditures via their regional programs. In addition to 
addressing the social and health needs of affected communities, this could include 
bringing forward justified regional infrastructure spending and/or increasing 
funding for catchment management authorities, pasture protection boards and shire 
councils to assist communities to manage and cope with change. As noted, the focus 
should be on people and communities, not individual private businesses. 
Such actions would help alleviate the social costs of extended drought periods 
without conflicting with the objective of improving farmers’ self-reliance and 
preparedness or of impeding necessary structural adjustment. As the rationale for 
triggering such measures is an assessment of need, a formulaic drought trigger 
would be inappropriate. 
Finally, while an IGA needs to inhibit the parties from engaging in activities that 
conflict with policy objectives, it should not prescribe uniformity — Western 
Australian broadacre farms and pastoral rangelands are different to irrigated 
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horticulture establishments. States should not be constrained from introducing novel 
measures (consistent with the overarching principles and objectives of an IGA) that 
could be beneficial.  
Compliance 
An IGA can assist state and territory governments to undertake reform. It can put 
governments in a stronger position to resist lobbying by pointing out that reversion 
to inefficient assistance measures will have adverse funding consequences for the 
state. This structure is superior to the strategic incentives within the current EC 
system which all work in the direction of acquiescing to lobbying (chapter 5). 
That said, for policy credibility, there will still be a need for appropriate monitoring 
of compliance and sanctions for breaches of agreed commitments. This can be 
viewed as imposing ‘penalties’, but is more correctly akin to withholding some 
funds for commitments that have not been met. 
A weak agreement that is monitored by the parties themselves who assess their own 
compliance is unlikely to be credible. Ideally, an independent assessor such as the 
CoAG Reform Council should be charged with assessing whether full payments 
should be made, some funds withheld, and the validity of any derogations sought 
and/or extenuating circumstances.  
The extent to which an IGA can provide the appropriate incentive structure to 
discipline the Commonwealth Government from backsliding on commitments is 
problematic. Independent and transparent monitoring and reporting can help by 
subjecting the Commonwealth to public scrutiny for breaching commitments. 
Finally, evaluating compliance in meeting commitments is one thing. Equally, it is 
imperative that all governments ensure that their policy frameworks are robust. This 
means programs are justified, monitored and evaluated. Too often, drought-related 
programs have been introduced without evidence establishing that they were 
warranted. Indeed, many drought programs appear to have been based on objectives 
other than improving outcomes for the community. Also of concern is the lack of 
evaluation of programs, many of which have run for years. This is primarily a 
matter for jurisdictions’ regulation impact assessment and gatekeeper protocols.  
The Commonwealth, state and territory governments should enter into an 
intergovernmental agreement linking Commonwealth funding to the states and 
territories to a range of commitments. These commitments should include: 
RECOMMENDATION 11. 2 
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• ensuring policies and instruments are compatible with the extended objectives 
of the Australia’s Farming Future initiative  
• avoiding the use of reactive business assistance measures such as interest rate 
subsidies and other transactions-based subsidies, including waivers for 
legitimate business expenses 
• ensuring that if assistance is provided to farm businesses rather than farm 
households, it is conditional on an assessment of whether the farm will be 
self-supporting in the longer term and directed to reinforcing longer term 
capacity building. 
The disbursement of funds linked to an intergovernmental agreement should be 
dependent on an arms-length evaluation of the extent to which the parties have 
met their agreed commitments. The agreement should be established, and 
independent monitoring and assessments undertaken, at the Council of 
Australian Governments level. 
11.5 The outlook under the new approach 
The policy approach recommended in this report places a strong emphasis on 
self-reliance and preparedness for drought, with farmers and farm-dependent 
businesses taking responsibility for managing climate variability and governments 
playing a supporting role to better equip them to do so. The Commission also 
recommends that a greater emphasis be placed on government support for families 
in genuine need and less emphasis on supporting businesses that experience 
financial difficulties during drought or other periods of climatic variability.  
This approach is consistent with reforms in agricultural policy over the last two 
decades that have reduced government subsidies and given greater responsibility 
and control for managing risks to farm businesses (for example, through the 
unwinding of statutory marketing arrangements). These past reforms have 
contributed to productivity growth in the agriculture sector and freed up resources 
that have then been available to meet other community priorities. There have also 
been costs at the farm level, however, with some farmers no longer benefiting from 
government support and, in some cases, leaving farming when their personal 
preference would have been to continue.  
In broad terms, the Commission’s view is that implementation of the 
recommendations in this report would have results in line with those of these past 
reforms. The likely outcomes for agricultural production, risk management and the 
impacts of drought are outlined below. 
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Agricultural production 
Several inquiry participants suggested that the removal of drought-triggered 
business support could have a significant impact on Australia’s agricultural 
production and the need to import food. This concern, for example, would seem to 
be behind this request from the Australian Beef Association: 
Before analyzing drought we ask that the Productivity Commission addresses macro 
issues including: … Food production – does Government want to import a high 
percentage of food? (sub. 100, p. 1) 
In terms of overall food security it is worth noting that Australia exports around 
60 per cent of all its agricultural production (ABARE 2008b). For the removal of 
drought-triggered assistance to result in a major decline in that production, farmers 
responsible for producing a significant proportion of production would need to exit 
farming as a result and be replaced by owners who produced much less food from 
those same farms. 
The ECIRS is by far the most significant drought-triggered business support 
measure available at present. Appendix C shows that the proportion of producers 
who accessed ECIRS at least once over the period 2001-02 to 2007-08 was 
25 per cent in New South Wales and considerably less in the other states and 
territories for which data are available (table C.4). Termination of the ECIRS, 
therefore, would leave the large majority of farmers, at worst, unaffected.  
Further, information on the characteristics of recipients suggests that only a small 
proportion of those on ECIRS were financially vulnerable to such an extent that 
they might be forced to exit farming in the absence of ECIRS: 
• eighty-one per cent of recipients had high equity and only 8 per cent had both 
low equity and a negative income (table C.8) 
• the average recipient had net farm assets of well over $2 million (table C.8), 
while the average subsidy payment was just under $37 000 in 2007-08 
(figure C.2). 
Further analysis shows that the equity ratio (net equity divided by total capital 
value) of an average ECIRS recipient was around 0.86 after three years of receiving 
ECIRS payments. Without ECIRS payments the equity ratio would have been 0.83 
— marginally lower but still at a high level (appendix C). Even without ECIRS 
payments, net assets would have increased in real terms (in other words, these 
farmers would have become wealthier over the three year period, even allowing for 
the effects of inflation). There would of course be some recipients who would have 
been more strongly impacted if they had not had access to ECIRS payments.  
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This suggests that removing drought-triggered business support would be likely to 
result in a very small number of forced exits from farming. This conclusion would 
appear to be consistent with the statement by the Australian Bankers Association 
that, while debt levels had increased in recent years, ‘the number of agribusiness 
customers categorised by banks as being ‘at risk’ has remained at historically low 
levels’ (sub. 76, p. 2). In addition to forced exits, there might be some other farmers 
who choose to exit because of the absence of government support.  
The influence of this, likely small, increase in farm exits on agricultural production 
is hard to determine. Many of the farms involved would be purchased by more 
successful farmers with greater capital backing, who would be expected to increase 
production. Other farms might be purchased for an alternative use, such as 
plantation forestry or the provision of environmental amenity.  
The net result overall would seem likely to be a small increase in agricultural 
production. Even where some farms were taken out of agricultural production the 
outcome for the community would be expected to be positive. If the highest bidder 
for land has a non-agricultural use in mind, this generally indicates that agriculture 
is not the highest value use of that land. 
Self-reliance and preparedness  
The Commission expects that implementation of the recommendations in this report 
would result in improvements in farm businesses’ and farm-dependent businesses’ 
self-reliance and preparedness for periods of financial difficulty. This will not, 
however, occur for all businesses. Most farmers are already self-reliant and 
prepared and many of these may be only marginally affected by the changes 
proposed. Others operate businesses that have little chance of being viable in the 
long-term and so government investment in improving their preparedness would be 
unlikely to be successful. The Commission instead advocates that, where needed, 
these farmers be provided with short-term income support and other assistance with 
transitioning to new endeavours. 
The Commission has a five part plan to bring about improvements in self-reliance 
and preparedness. The first two parts remove some of the impediments to 
self-reliance and preparedness, and the final three provide active government 
support to better equip farmers to deal with future climate variability and other 
risks. 
First, current measures such as the ECIRS can impede the development of private 
arrangements for risk sharing (Malcolm 2006). Removing these measures would 
increase the incentive for the development of private arrangements to allocate risk 
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to those best able to bear it. This might include greater use of alternative forms of 
farm business activity, such as sharefarming or leasing, that are at present less 
common in Australia than in many other countries (Agriculture and Food Policy 
Reference Group 2006). The development of weather derivatives for use in a 
farming context is another possibility (chapter 8). 
Second, the removal of all forms of drought-triggered business support signals the 
need for all farmers to take responsibility for managing risks associated with 
climate variability. Provided that this policy change is well communicated and 
farmers accept that governments will not revert to providing reactive drought 
support, it would be expected to result in improved self-reliance and preparedness 
among the current population of farmers. This could occur through changes to 
on-farm practices and increases in off-farm diversification. In addition, a greater 
appreciation of the risks faced by farmers may influence exits and entries. Those 
who are unwilling or unable to accept these risks may be more likely to exit and less 
likely to enter farming. Over time this would be expected to result in greater levels 
of self-reliance. 
Third, it is recommended that farm management deposits be retained as a risk 
management tool. These have proven to be effective in helping farmers prepare for 
and recover from drought events (chapter 8). 
Fourth, it is recommended that the most successful elements of FarmBis be brought 
into the FarmReady scheme to strengthen the program. Grants for business training 
and professional advice that are well targeted and have an educational outcome can 
deliver public, as well as private, benefits (chapter 8). 
Finally, it is recommended that significant public funding be provided for 
agricultural research, development and extension. There are sound rationales for 
governments to assist farmers to build their capacity through funding for research, 
development and extension (chapter 8).  
Social impacts of drought 
Droughts have a range of negative social impacts as discussed in chapter 3 and in 
the Expert Social Panel report (Kenny et al. 2008). As acknowledged by many 
inquiry participants, government policy can hope to ameliorate these impacts. The 
relevant question, therefore, is how the recommended approach, including the 
Farming Family Income Support program, is likely to perform in this regard, 
relative to current policy or relative to some other benchmark of what might 
reasonably be expected. 
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The Commission’s approach places a high priority on assisting those who are least 
able to cope with loss of income due to drought or other cause. At the same time, 
the possibility of creating an ongoing dependence on this support is guarded against 
by requiring that steps be taken towards a self-reliant future and through placing a 
time limit on it. The Commission also acknowledges the importance of the various 
human services provided by governments that can be particularly important to 
people who are vulnerable to the impacts of drought. 
Not all farmers or farm-dependent business owners who experience serious 
difficulties during drought do so because of poor management. Luck and timing 
also play a part. There have been many sound farmers who have relied on the 
current assistance measures to help them stay on their properties. The 
Commission’s proposed increase in training, research and development and 
extension may enable many of these farmers to achieve a pathway to viability. The 
Commission acknowledges, however, that under its approach there will be some 
farmers who may leave farming who may have been able to return to viability under 
the old arrangements.  
At the community level, the social impacts of drought under the Commission’s 
approach are likely to be, in the short term, fairly similar to those under the existing 
arrangements. Removal of ECIRS would be expected to result in a small reduction 
in expenditure by recipients in some towns, with a consequential loss of income. 
For example, it is estimated that the annual incomes of people in smaller towns (less 
than 5000 people) in EC declared areas would have been, on average, around $37 
less in 2007-08 (the peak year for payments) had ECIRS payments not been made 
(appendix C). For larger towns the effect on incomes would have generally been 
less than this. 
One of the benefits of the proposed changes would be that the social divisiveness 
created by the inequities of the current arrangements would be largely removed. In 
the longer term it would be expected that both farm families and rural communities 
would suffer less acutely from the effects of drought because they will be, overall, 
better prepared for the variability and change of Australia’s climate. 
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A Conduct of the inquiry 
This appendix outlines the inquiry process and lists the organisations and 
individuals that have participated. Following receipt of the terms of reference on 
20 June 2008, the Commission placed a notice in the metropolitan, rural and 
regional press inviting public participation in the inquiry. It released an issues paper 
in early July to assist participants to prepare their submissions. Prior to the release 
of the draft report in October 2008, the Commission received 107 initial 
submissions. After the Commission’s draft report was released, a further 81 
submissions were received. (table A.1) 
The Commission held informal discussions with organisations and government 
departments and agencies, conducted roundtables with various groups and held 
open regional public forums. It conducted a total of 81 meetings, attended a total of 
24 roundtables, and visited rural cities in all states (listed in table A.2) before 
releasing its draft report. In doing so, a range of agricultural operations were 
covered, such as broadacre cropping, horticulture and viticulture, in both marginal 
and reliable farming regions. The scale of operations encountered spanned from 
large pastoral properties to the extensive broadacre areas in the Western Australian 
wheatbelt, and down to small scale irrigators in the Riverland. In all, the 
Commission held meetings in 31 towns and cities around Australia and conducted a 
teleconference with government officials in Darwin prior to releasing its draft 
report. Subsequently, the Commission held 7 public hearings and 5 roundtables in 
November and December 2008 after the release of its draft report (table A.3). 
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Table A.1 List of submissions 
Individual or organisation Submission number
AACL DR117
ACT – Department Territory and Municipal Services 101
AgForce  80, DR185
Allen, D. and T. 20
Anderson, G. 31
Anglicare 57
Australian Bankers’ Association 76
Australian Beef Association 100
Australian Conservation Foundation 106, DR128
Australian Dairy Industry Council 58, DR145
Australian Fodder Industry Association DR172
Australian General Practice Network DR170
Australian Institute of Family Studies 92
Australian Land Management Group 24
Australian Pork Limited 95, DR155
Beale, J.A. 39, DR135
Belalie Pastoral Company 67
Bennett, M. 55
Berger, J. DR138
Boardman, S. and A. 43
Botterill, L. and Chapman, B. 52, DR139
Buloke Shire Council DR158
Bureau of Meteorology 33
Burnett, V.D. DR112
Calder, K. 29
Canegrowers Australia 47
Carrigan and Co. Pty. Ltd. 32, DR129
Central Darling Shire Council 99
Centrelink (confidential) 104
Centroc 105
Citizens Electoral Council (Qld) DR127
Chappel, K. DR120
Clark, H. 78, DR175
Climate Adaption Flagships 108
Community and Neighbourhood Houses and Centres Association Inc. DR159
Coonamble Shire Council 63, DR133
Cooper, J. 10
Cotton Australia 9
Country Women’s Association –  NSW DR137
Country Women’s Association – Tasmania  17
Crocker Farming Co. 45
Cunningham, L. (MP) 7
 
(continued on next page)
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Table A.1 (continued) 
Individual or organisation Submission number 
Dampney, J. and P. 16
Department of Agriculture and Food Western Australia 65, DR186
Department of Climate Change 109
Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts 107
Department of Primary Industries and Water - Tasmania 85, DR179
Department of Primary Industry, Fisheries and Resources - NT DR142
Dragon Point Enterprises 15
Duncan, Hon. W. (MLC) 50
Eyre Peninsula Drought Task Force 11
Fenton, C. and M. 64
Fleurieu Regional Development 18
Foundation for Australian Agricultural Women DR124
Freeman, L. 87
Gadsby, A. and K. 96
Gannawarra Shire 75
Geldard, M., Geldard, D. and T. Reid  46
Government of South Australia DR192
Grady, G. 19, DR143
Greater Shepparton City Council DR183
Growcom 93, DR171
Hallam, G.J. and P.C. DR156
Hardie, G. 12, DR116
Hickey, P. DR111
Hindmarsh Shire Council DR174
Horsham Rural City Council DR167
Horticulture Australia Council 66, DR169
Highview 37
JJ Hallam Pty. Ltd. 2
Kelley, P. DR146
Kettlewell, M. DR150
Lexo Pty. Ltd. 54
Local Government Association of NSW 102, DR184
Linnett, C. DR131
Loller, H. 49
Macquarie River Food and Fibre 36
Mallee Sustainable Farming DR168
Mangelsdorf, P. 30
Mann, L. 42
McKenzie, D. DR187
Mengel’s Heli Services Pty Ltd 3
Mid Lachlan Alliance of Councils 38
Mid Western Regional Council 1
 (continued on next page)
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Table A.1 (continued) 
Individual or organisation Submission number 
Moira Shire Council 25, DR154
Morris, P. 23
Murray Dairy 70
Murray Lands Regional Development Board Inc. 68
Murray Valley Citrus Board and Sunraysia Citrus Growers Inc. 89
Nason, C. 6
National Farmers’ Federation 51, DR176
North East Riverina Rural Counselling Service Inc. DR149
North West Municipalities Association 59
Northern Grampians Shire DR173
Northern Yorke Drought Taskforce 61, DR152
NSW Farmers’ Association 98, DR182
NSW Farmers’ Association – Bourke District Council 81
NSW Government 90
NSW Irrigators’ Council 62
O’Donnell, C. 5, DR132
Oil Mallee Association 8
Otto Agribusiness DR189
Pastoralists’ Association of West Darling 79, DR130
Pastoralists and Graziers Association – WA DR121
Pearson, S. 28
Plant Health Australia DR166
Plunkett Orchards 13
Polkinghome, A.G. and J.C. 103
Pristine Forage Technologies DR162
Proctor, G. DR114
Productive Nutrition DR122
Queensland Farmers’ Federation 82, DR123, DR165
Queensland Government 77, DR190
Queensland Murray-Darling Committee (confidential) 41
Ramsay, J. DR113
Rangelands Drought Taskforce 60, DR153 
Riverland Drought Taskforce 56
Riverland Horticultural Reference Forum 21
Rogerson, W.R.B and S.J. 53
Rural Business Development Corporation 83
Rural City of Wangaratta DR140
Rural Directions Pty. Ltd. 35
Rural Financial Counselling Service, NSW – Bourke DR181
Rural Financial Counselling Service, NSW – Central West 73, DR178
Rural Financial Counselling Service – Gippsland 34
 
(continued on next page)
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Table A.1 (continued) 
Individual or organisation Submission number 
Rural Financial Counselling Service - Tasmania DR164
Rural Financial Counselling Service, Victoria – North Central DR136
Rural Youth Organisation of Tasmania 88
Salvation Army – Geraldton Community Church DR148
Schmidt, G. 4
South Australian Advisory Board of Agriculture 71, DR157
South Australian Country Women’s Association Incorporated 72
South Australian Farmers’ Federation 84, DR141
South Australian Government 91, DR192
Southern Riverina Irrigators DR188
Stothers, K. DR163
Strathbogie Shire Council DR144
Such, B. DR191
Tasmanian Department Primary Industries and Water 85
Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association 69
Tasmanian Women in Agriculture DR115
Toms-Morgan, R. DR126
Towong Shire Community Support Committee 40
Trua Pty. Ltd. 48, DR180
Uebergang, J. 27
Victoria Murray Mallee DR151
Victorian Farmers’ Federation 74, DR160
Victorian Government 110
Wallace, P. 97
Watts Price and Associates DR134
Wells, G. DR118
Western Australian Farmers’ Federation 26, DR161
Western Australian Rural Counselling Association Incorporated 22
Whelan, G. DR147
White, B. 94
Willett, M. DR125
Wimmera Development Association DR177
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Table A.2 Pre-draft report consultations 
Interested parties/location 
NEW SOUTH WALES 
Meetings 
Australian Farm Institute 
Cotton Australia  
Expert Panel on social impacts of drought  
Meat and Livestock Australia  
NSW Department of Primary Industries (NSW DPI) 
NSW Farmers’ Association 
NSW Rural Assistance Authority 
Roundtables  
Moree (22 participants) including farmers, rural financial counsellors and bank representatives 
Narrabri (15 participants) including farmers, rural financial counsellors and bank representatives 
Dubbo (12 participants) including farmers and rural financial counsellors 
Parkes (12 participants) including farmers, rural financial counsellors and bank representatives 
Wagga Wagga (8 participants) including farmers, NSW Farmers’ Association and ANZ Bank 
West Wyalong (6 participants) including farmers, rural financial counsellor, agronomist 
Hay (11 participants) including farmers, rural financial counsellor, NSW DPI, agronomist 
Deniliquin (10 participants) including farmers, Ricegrowers’ Association of Australia, NSW DPI, 
agronomists 
NSW Farmers’ Association Annual Conference (12 participants) 
VICTORIA 
Meetings  
Australian Dairyfarmers’ Association  
Australian Dried Fruits Association 
Bureau of Meteorology 
Centrelink 
CSIRO 
Mildura Rural City Council 
Murray Valley Citrus Board 
Murray Valley Winegrape Growers Association 
Robinvale Table Grape Growers Association 
Rural Finance Corporation of Victoria  
Sunraysia Rural Financial Counselling Service 
Victorian Farmers’ Federation 
Victorian Department of Primary Industries 
Roundtables 
Birchip Cropping Group (BCG) (12 participants) including farmers, BCG chair and staff, Buloke 
Shire Mayor 
Echuca dairy stakeholders (5 participants) including dairy farmers, Murray Dairy and Fonterra Milk 
Australia 
Murray River Group of Councils (6 participants) including Campaspe, Gannawarra and Loddon 
Shires 
Tatura horticulture stakeholders (7 participants) including orchardists, National Australia Bank, 
Fruitgrowers Victoria and GMH Agcare. 
(Continued on next page)
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Table A.2 (continued) 
Interested parties/location 
QUEENSLAND 
Meetings 
AgForce 
Canegrowers Australia 
Cotton Australia Limited 
Growcom  
Herron, Todd, White  
Queensland Dairyfarmers’ Association 
Queensland Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries (QDPIF) 
Queensland Farmers’ Federation 
Queensland Rural Adjustment Authority (QRAA)  
Woods, Professor Beth (QDPI) 
Roundtables  
Cunnamulla (24 participants) including sheep and cattle graziers, Paroo Shire Mayor, QRAA, 
AgForce 
Roma (16 participants) including grains, sheep and cattle producers, QRAA, Mayor  
Biloela (28 participants) including grains and pastoral interests 
Kingaroy (28 participants)a  
 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
Meetings 
Chance, Kim, MLC, former Minister for Agriculture and Food, Forestry, (Leader of the Government 
in the Legislative Council Department) 
Department of Agriculture and Food Western Australia (DAFWA) 
Mid West Regional Council  
National Australia Bank 
North East Farming Futures Group 
Pastoralists and Graziers Association 
Planfarm Consultants 
Rabobank 
RSM Bird Cameron 
Rural Business Development Corporation 
Western Australian Farmers’ Federation 
Wheatbelt Men’s Health 
Roundtables  
Merriden Shire (15 participants) including farmers, small businesses and shire representatives 
Mullawa Shire (10 participants) including farmers, DAFWA North East Office  
Wyalkatchem Town Hall (20 participants) including farmers and local small businesses 
(Continued on next page)
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Table A.2 (continued) 
Interested parties/location 
SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
Meetings 
Advisory Board of Agriculture 
Ag Excellence Alliance 
Australian Women in Agriculture 
ANZ Bank 
Bank SA 
Commonwealth Bank 
Expert Panel on Social Impacts of Drought 
Lucas Group 
McColl, Jim  
McEwen, Hon. Rory, MP, Minister for Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, Minister for Forests and 
Minister Responsible for Matters Relating to Drought 
Primary Industries and Resources of South Australia (PIRSA) 
Rabobank 
Regional Communities Consultative Committee 
Regional drought taskforces 
Regional Development SA 
Rural Directions Pty Ltd 
Rural Finance and Development (PIRSA) 
Rural Solutions SA 
South Australian Farmers’ Federation 
Roundtables  
Tumby Bay (12 participants) including farmers; ANZ Bank; Centrelink; Commonwealth Bank; 
PIRSA; Drought taskforce; Centacare. 
Murray Lands Regional Development Board (18 participants) including Lower Murray Drought 
Group and dryland farmers from the Mallee Drought Group 
Barmera (25 participants) including irrigation farmers, SA Citrus Board, Centrelink, PIRSA, rural 
financial counsellors 
Burra (8 participants) including farmers, regional drought task force members 
 
TASMANIA 
Meetings 
Tasmanian Country Women’s Association 
Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association 
Tasmanian Department of Primary Industries and Water  
Tasmanian Rural Financial Counselling Service 
Tasmanian Women in Agriculture  
(Continued on next page)
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Table A.2 (continued) 
Interested parties/location 
ACT 
Meetings 
ACT Department of Territory and Municipal Services  
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry  
Australian Government Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts  
Australian Government Department of the Treasury  
Australian Pork Limited 
Botterill, Linda 
Bureau of Rural Sciences  
Centrelink  
CSIRO  
Horticulture Australia  
Murray Darling Basin Commission 
National Water Commission 
National Farmers’ Federation 
National Rural Advisory Council 
 
NORTHERN TERRITORY 
Teleconference 
Northern Territory Department of Primary Industries, Fisheries and Mines (teleconference) 
a Productivity Commission unable to attend owing to bad weather. Meeting record taken by AgForce.  
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Table A.3 Post-draft public hearings and regional roundtables 
Interested parties/location 
NEW SOUTH WALES 
Public Hearings 
Country Women’s Association - NSW 
NSW Farmers’ Association 
NSW Irrigators’ Council 
Local Government and Shires Association – NSW 
Roundtables  
Dubbo  
VICTORIA 
Public Hearings 
Australian Bankers’ Association 
Birchip Cropping Group 
Citizens Electoral Council 
Country Women’s Association - Victoria 
Victorian Farmers’ Federation 
Roundtables  
Mildura 
QUEENSLAND 
Public Hearings 
AgForce 
Citizens Electoral Council 
Freeman, L. 
Growcom 
Queensland Farmers’ Federation 
Willett, M. 
Roundtables  
Roma 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA  
Public Hearings 
AACL 
Department of Agriculture and Food – WA 
Pastoralists and Graziers Association – WA 
Rural Business Development Corporation 
Stehlik, D. 
Western Australian Farmers’ Federation 
Roundtables  
Northam 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table A.3 (continued) 
Interested Parties/location 
SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
Public Hearings 
Agvance Rural Services 
South Australian Farmers’ Federation 
Pristine Forage Technologies 
Productive Nutrition 
Rural Clay Services 
Rural Financial Counselling Service – SA 
Roundtables  
Port Lincoln 
TASMANIA 
Public Hearings 
Department of Primary Industries and Water – Tasmania 
McKenzie, D. 
Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association 
Tasmanian Institute of Agricultural Research 
Tasmanian Women in Agriculture 
ACT 
Public Hearings 
Australian Beef Association 
Botterill, L. and Chapman, B. 
Grady, G. 
National Farmers’ Federation 
North East Riverina Rural Counselling Service 
Trua Pty. Ltd. 
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B Income support for rural families 
Farm families and small business owners in financial need in drought affected areas 
have access to the broad social security measures available to others in financial 
need in the community such as the unemployed, the disabled and the aged. They 
also have access to a number of assistance programs that are specifically targeted at 
the rural sector. Some of these latter programs, including Exceptional 
Circumstances Relief Payments, Small Business Income Support and Interim 
Income Support, are triggered by government declarations of drought within a 
region. There are also programs such as Transitional Income Support and Farm 
Help Income Support, which provide income support and adjustment assistance to 
farmers in financial difficulty for reasons not necessarily related to drought. The 
community sector also provides emergency financial assistance to individuals and 
small groups in rural areas.  
In this appendix, the main features of these programs and the eligibility criteria that 
farmers or small rural businesses must satisfy to receive financial assistance are 
outlined. Characteristics of recipients under each program are discussed and an 
assessment is made of the appropriateness of the programs, the effectiveness with 
which each program operates, including its accessibility to rural families and the 
efficiency with which it is delivered.  
B.1 EC Relief Payments 
Drought related family income support has been in place for farmers since 1994 as 
‘Drought Relief Payments’, and was renamed the EC Relief Payment (ECRP) in 
1997. ECRP is the primary avenue by which the Commonwealth Government 
provides income support to eligible farm families in drought declared areas. The 
payment is intended to assist with day to day family and personal living expenses, 
rather than farm business operation expenses.  
The ECRP is paid fortnightly by Centrelink according to guidelines set by, and with 
funding provided through, the Commonwealth Government Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF). Payment of ECRP is at a rate 
equivalent to the Newstart allowance (that is, currently a maximum of $810.80 per 
fortnight for a couple), and is taxable. In addition to the basic income support, 
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ECRP recipients and their families receive a Health Care Card and may also be 
eligible for concessions under the Youth Allowance and Austudy means test for 
dependent children. 
ECRP can be received for up to two years from the time that EC is declared in a 
region, although extensions for subsequent years may be made. The initial two year 
period is inclusive of any income support paid under the Interim Income Support 
program (see section C.2). Continued eligibility for ECRP is reviewed by 
Centrelink on a six monthly basis. 
Eligibility for ECRP 
To be eligible for ECRP, a farm family must demonstrate that they: 
• are farmers, when under ‘normal’ conditions 
• contribute a significant part of their labour and capital to the farm enterprise 
• derive a significant part of their income from the farm enterprise 
• are Australian residents located in Australia 
• are located in an EC region (this can be demonstrated by obtaining an EC 
certificate from Centrelink, but with the large increase in the coverage of EC 
areas in recent years, these certificates are no longer consistently used). 
What constitutes a ‘significant’ contribution of labour, capital and income is 
determined largely at the discretion of Centrelink.  
Receipt of ECRP is also subject to assets and income tests that are a modified 
version of the general Newstart allowance tests (table B.1):  
• Certain assets — the principal home (and up to 2 hectares surrounding the home 
on the same title), formal superannuation (even when over pension age), life 
insurance (of the farmer only), and essential farm assets (such as farm land and 
machinery) — are excluded from the assets test for ECRP.  
• Furthermore, proceeds from the forced disposal of livestock due to drought are 
excluded from the ECRP income test, but farmers are required to deposit the 
proceeds from the forced sale into either a Farm Management Deposit (FMD) or 
a financial institution term deposit of at least 3 months duration.  
• From 25 September 2007 until 30 June 2009, ECRP recipients can also earn an 
additional $20 000 in off-farm salary and wages each financial year and still 
retain their ECRP in full. The additional allowance on off-farm salary and wages 
may continue to be available beyond 30 June 2009 for current recipients in areas 
that remain EC declared (Primary Industries Ministerial Forum 2008b). 
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• In contrast to Newstart allowance, there is no activity test (such as job seeking or 
training) or other formal mutual obligation required of ECRP recipients. 
Table B.1 Comparison of Newstart and ECRP eligibility criteriaa 
 Newstart ECRP 
Mutual responsibility Must be unemployed (not 
underemployed) 
Activity test — must look for job 
and/or undertake training or an 
approved activity 
 
Must be a fulltime farmer in EC area  
 
Activity test — none  
Income test Where claimant earns above $62 per 
fortnight or their partner earns above 
$769 per fortnight, payments are 
reducedbc 
Based on Newstart income test but 
an additional $20 000 off-farm wage 
and salary income per annum per 
couple exemptd, proceeds from 
forced disposal of livestock are 
exempte 
 
Assets test  
 (combined assets with 
partner) 
Must have combined assets under 
$243 500. Principal home and 
superannuation (if under age 
pension age) are not included f 
No total asset limit. Off-farm asset 
limit of $243 500. Principal home, life 
insurance, superannuation of farmer 
(even where over pension age) are 
not included 
 
Liquid asset test Payment may be deferred where 
liquid assets exceed $5000 (couple 
or single with dependants). 
 
Not applicable 
Hardship provisions In severe financial hardship and 
have unrealisable, non-income 
producing assetsg 
 
Not applicable 
Payment to 
individual or couple 
 
Individual Couple 
Maximum fortnightly 
paymenta 
 
$405 (each) $405 (each) 
Additional 
paymentsh 
Payable if eligible Payable if eligible 
a Comparison is for a couple who are home owners.  b Income for the recipient of $62 to $250 per fortnight 
reduces payments by 50 cents in the dollar, each dollar of income over $250 per fortnight reduces payments 
by 60 cents in the dollar. As at September 2008, partner income above $769 reduces the customers payment 
by 60 cents in the dollar.  c Practical effect is maximum allowable income (after working credit) of $769 per 
fortnight for the recipient or $1445 for the recipient’s partner  d Payment is reduced after earning $769 per 
fortnight per couple in off-farm income (this $769 is proportioned between the two depending on the amount of 
off-farm income earned by each spouse, plus $62 each in either off-farm or on-farm income. Assumes 
application is made at beginning of financial year — higher earnings may be possible if application is made 
later in financial year.  e Where the proceeds go into FMDs or a term deposit of at least 3 months duration.  
f This asset test does not include the principal home and permanent fixtures, it does include household 
contents, cars, boats and surrender value of any life insurance.  g That is, cannot derive income or borrow 
from assets or asset is currently for sale or unable to be sold due to legal restriction.  h Rent assistance, 
Pharmaceutical, Telephone, Zone Allowances. 
Source: Centrelink (2008 unpublished). 
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ECRP recipients 
At the beginning of 2009, there were around 20 000 farm families across Australia 
in receipt of ECRPs. This equates to around 30 000 individuals who are receiving 
support under ECRP (as approximately two thirds of recipient farm families receive 
ECRP payments for two adults). While most families have received assistance 
continuously for 1 to 2 years (figure B.1), around half have been supported for 
longer, with the earliest current recipients having received ECRP assistance 
continuously since late 2002 (Centrelink 2009 unpublished). Since 2002-03, a total 
of $1.23 billion in ECRP has been paid to farm families across Australia. The 
average amount received by each farm family is now around $13 000 per year 
(compared with a maximum possible $21 080 per year), more than double that 
received in 2002-03.  
Figure B.1 Length of time in continuous receipt of ECRPa 
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a
 In addition to those who have received assistance continuously, each group may also include families who 
ceased to receive assistance for a short period and then recommenced receipt.  
Data source: Centrelink (2009 unpublished). 
Farmers in New South Wales and Victoria received just over 70 per cent of 
Australia’s ECRP payments over the period from 2002-03 to the end of 2008, with 
most of the remainder being in Queensland (figure B.2). Use of the program has 
escalated in all states in recent years. In 2008-09 to date, the total number of 
recipients has declined due to a number of EC areas expiring. Within the areas that 
remain in EC, the number of recipients has gradually risen over recent months with 
slightly more new applicants for ECRP than there are recipients leaving the 
program (Centrelink pers. comm. 2009).  
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The most common reason for claimants no longer receiving ECRP in the first half 
of 2008-09 is that the drought end date has been reached in the relevant area (nearly 
40 per cent of claimants). The end of EC was also associated with a reduction in 
claimants in earlier years (18 per cent of cancelled claims in 2007-08). However, 
income levels that precluded entitlement to assistance (25 per cent of claimants) and 
failure of the claimant to reply to Centrelink correspondence (18 per cent of 
claimants) were also common reasons for cessation of ECRP in 2007-08.  
There were also approximately 104 farms (19 per cent of cancelled claims) in the 
first half of 2008-09, 284 farms (3 per cent of cancelled claims) in 2007-08 and 184 
farms (8 per cent) in 2006-07 reporting that they had left farming or the farm 
business, and therefore ceased to receive ECRP. The majority of those ECRP 
recipients who left farming were irrigated dairy farms in the Goulburn-Loddon, 
Campaspe and Victorian Murray regions; or dryland grazing and mixed farms in 
South Western Victoria.  
Figure B.2 ECRP recipients and payments by state, 2002-03 to 2008-09ab 
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a
 The number of recipients and total payments in the ACT and Northern Territory are omitted but are very 
small (fewer than 15 recipients per year and total payment over the 6 year period of less than $500 000). 
b
 Recipient numbers for 2008-09 represent the number of farm families receiving ECRP at end November 
2008. Payment estimates for July to November 2008 are not comparable with estimates for previous complete 
financial years and are therefore not presented. 
Data source: Centrelink (2008 unpublished). 
Given how widespread Australia’s drought declarations have been in recent years, 
farmers in all industry groups have received ECRP, albeit to varying extent. The 
number of ECRP recipients and the total amount paid is highest in the mixed crops 
and livestock industry (table B.2). Approximately two thirds of all farms in this 
industry group are estimated to have received ECRP assistance in 2007-08. A high 
proportion of farms in the dairy, cropping and sheep–beef industries also received 
assistance. Centrelink (2008 unpublished) indicated that the majority of long term 
recipients of ECRP (those who have received assistance continuously since 
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2002-03) are sheep and mixed sheep–beef producers in western NSW, which may 
partly reflect early EC declarations in this part of Australia (see chapter 5).  
Table B.2 ECRP recipients and payments by industry, 2007-08 
 Number of 
recipients 
Proportion of all 
farms in industrya 
Average gross 
receipts 
Total gross 
receipts
 Number % $ $ million 
Beef 4 659 10 12 999 60.6 
Dairy 3 940 44 13 109 51.6 
Cropping 2 369 21 12 718 30.1 
Mixed crops & livestock 9 121 66 13 222 120.6 
Sheep–beef 2 003 24 13 193 26.4 
Sheep 1 678 14 12 488 21.0 
Other livestock 413 9 12 333 5.1 
Fruit & viticulture 1 876 14 11 945 22.4 
Other crops b 732 5 12 957 9.5 
Other c 2 096 na 14 082 29.5 
Total d 28 887 na 13 045 376.8 
na Not available.  a There may be some differences in the industry reported by ECRP recipients compared 
with the classification given to their farm by the ABS on the basis of production.  b Includes vegetables, 
flowers, nursery, rice, cotton and sugar.  c Most of this group is reported to be ‘other non-irrigated’, although 
‘aquaculture’ and ‘not stated’ are also included in the aggregate.  d Total includes all recipient farm 
households during 2007-08 (both ongoing recipients and those who received payments for only a part of the 
year). 
Sources: ABS (2008b); Centrelink (2008 unpublished).  
There have been several surveys of ECRP recipients in recent years that shed some 
light on the similarities and differences in the farms of recipients and non recipients. 
The South Australian Centre for Economic Studies (SACES 2008a) reported the 
characteristics of 263 recipients of ECRP in 2007. Boero Rodriguez, Watson and 
Mues (2006) provided information on 320 farms that received ECRP and ABARE 
(2008 unpublished) provided information based on 1435 recipients of ECRP over 
the period 2002-03 to 2007-08.  
During this period, ECRP recipients had farms that were smaller, on average, than 
those of non recipients. SACES (2008a) reported that 20 per cent of ECRP 
recipients had farms of less than 200 hectares, but 37 per cent had farms that were 
greater than 1000 hectares (non recipients in EC areas have, on average, farms of 
around 5000 hectares). ABARE estimates indicate that amongst surveyed broadacre 
and dairy farms, those of ECRP recipients are smaller in both land area and scale of 
operation (table B.3). On average, ECRP recipients tend to have lower sheep 
numbers, lower wool production and lower beef cattle numbers, than non-recipients 
within EC areas. There is no evidence of a significant downsizing having occurred 
on the farms of ECRP recipients over the survey period, suggesting that these farms 
were smaller than average prior to the drought. 
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Table B.3 ECRP recipients and non recipients: physical and short term 
financial position of farms 
Average annual data per farm for the period 2002-03 to 2007-08a 
  Farms in EC declared areas Farms in
  Recipients Non recipients non EC areas
Physical     
Area of land operated  ha    3 262    5 655    7 320
Area irrigated ha 5 8 5
Scale of operations sheep equiv.    5 994    7 063    10 710
Wheat yield per hectare sown tonnes 1.0 1.4 1.7
Barley yield per hectare sown tonnes 1.0 1.6 1.9
Sorghum yield per hectare sown tonnes 2.3 2.8 3.0
Sheep numbers at end June no. 1 010 1 138 1 660
Change in sheep numbers % -4.3 -3.5 0.8
Wool cut per sheep shorn kg 4.2 4.4 4.3
Beef cattle numbers at end June no. 169 299 327
Change in beef cattle numbers % 1.0 0.5 0.5
Dairy cattle numbers at end June no. 54 31 45
Milk production litres    166 248 103 407    144 791
Stocking rate (sheep equiv.) per ha 1.0 0.7 0.8
Receipts   
Total cash receipts $    267 545    355 566    444 748
Cash receipts per sheep equiv. $ 45 50 42
Costs   
Sheep and lamb purchases $    7 099    6 489 8 440
Beef cattle purchases $    15 122    37 807 16 826
Other livestock purchases $ 1 574     821 1 189
Seed $    3 320    3 729 3 626
Fodder $    33 251    30 580 22 026
Agistment $    3 850    2 483 1 695
Fertilizer and sprays $ 25 348 33 549 69 254
Fuel, oil and lubricants $ 17 890 18 954 23 800
Repairs and maintenance $ 21 443 23 327 30 982
Livestock materials & expenses $ 8 669 11 238 15 509
Administration expenses $ 8 872 9 569 11 882
Freight, handling and marketing  $ 11 554 16 992 24 590
Rent and rates $ 12 695 13 613 15 600
Interest payments $ 29 516 23 915 31 926
Hired labour $ 6 784 13 508 15 453
Payments to sharefarmers $ 846 3 076 3 041
Other cash costs $ 30 475 42 732 48 380
Total cash costs $ 238 308 292 383 344 222
Cash costs per sheep equiv. $ 40 41 32
Fodder expenditure per sheep equiv. $ 11 8 4
Farm financial performance   
Farm cash income $    29 237 63 184 100 527
Farms with negative cash income % 33 30 26
a All estimates, except those italicised, have a relative standard error of less than the estimate.  
Source: ABARE (2008 unpublished). 
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In contrast, and reflecting the high dependence of the dairy industry on ECRPs, 
recipients tend to have significantly higher stocks of dairy cattle and higher milk 
production than either non recipients within EC areas or other farms in non-EC 
areas. Stocking rates (the number of animals per hectare of land) are also 
significantly higher, on average, on farms of ECRP recipients than non recipients. 
There is little difference evident in the financial and business structure of ECRP 
recipients compared with other farms. Both SACES (2008a) and Boero Rodriguez, 
Watson and Mues (2006) reported that, in line with the majority of farms in 
Australia, sole trader and family partnerships are the dominant forms of farm 
ownership for ECRP recipients. Furthermore, one third of ECRP farm units had 
more than one family unit supported by the farm (SACES 2008a). 
Farm income levels were found to be substantially lower for ECRP recipients than 
for other farms. ABARE estimated that farm cash income levels (cash receipts less 
cash costs) of ECRP recipients averaged around $29 000 — about 46 per cent of the 
average farm cash income level of non recipients in EC areas and about 29 per cent 
of the average farm cash income level of those not in an EC area. The lower farm 
cash income is partly due to the smaller overall size of recipient farms but is also 
attributable to lower cash receipts — crop yields tend to be lower, on average, on 
the farms of ECRP recipients.  
However, the cost structure of these farms also differs. Recipients tend to spend less 
on hired labour and payments to share-farmers, and a greater share of farm activities 
tends to be undertaken by the owner/manager and family members. Recipients also 
spend substantially less on fertilisers and sprays, and freight, handling and 
marketing expenses, but more on agistment and fodder. ECRP recipients spend 
significantly more on fodder per animal (on a sheep equivalent basis), on average, 
than do non recipients. It is not clear whether the cost structure of ECRP recipients, 
compared with non recipients, reflects receipt of government subsidies for fodder 
transport in some states or retention of greater numbers of stock (in particular, dairy 
cattle) on lower quality pastures.  
One immediate implication of the lower farm cash income levels of ECRP 
recipients is a substantially lower level of liquid assets and reduced capacity to meet 
debt payments. While the absolute level of debt for recipients is marginally lower, 
on average, than that of farms not in EC areas, the liquidity to debt ratio is around 
11 per cent for recipients, compared with 52 per cent for farms in EC areas but not 
receiving assistance and 37 per cent for farms not in EC areas (table B.4). Another 
implication of lower farm cash income levels is that the balance held in FMDs and 
the proportion of farms increasing their FMD balance is lower amongst ECRP 
recipients than non recipients.  
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There is evidence that some farmers, particularly those with smaller operations, 
have offset lower farm income with off-farm earnings. ABARE (2008 unpublished) 
estimated that 42 per cent of small ECRP recipients (on the basis of the scale of 
operations), 36 per cent of medium and 32 per cent of larger ECRP recipients 
earned some off-farm income. SACES (2008a) reported that the number earning 
off-farm income was highest amongst irrigators, which may reflect the proximity of 
many of Australia’s irrigation areas to towns and opportunities for off-farm 
employment.  
Off-farm income from investments, wages and salaries was, on average, around 
$12 300 for ECRP recipients over the period 2002-03 to 2007-08 (ABARE 2008 
unpublished). This was less than half of recipient’s total off-farm income, with the 
remainder sourced from the government. Income from government sources consists 
not just of ECRPs, but also assistance provided as Dairy Structural Adjustment 
Payments, ECIRS and ‘other government sourced income’. It was estimated that 44 
per cent of farms that get ECRP also received farm business support in the form of 
ECIRS. In contrast, non-recipients of ECRP within and outside of EC areas earned 
an average of around $30 000 per year in off-farm income — almost all from 
investments, wages and salaries.  
There is no evidence that age is a defining characteristic of ECRP recipients. 
Approximately 70 per cent of recipients are less than 60 years of age, and the 
median age of recipients (52 years in 2007-08) is equivalent to the median age of 
the wider farming community (Centrelink 2008 unpublished and ABS 2008c).  
While recipients generally have considerable experience in farming, their 
knowledge of best practices and other off-farm investments, and their capacity to 
consider alternative approaches, could be improved. SACES reported that 76 per 
cent of surveyed farmers had 10 years or more of farming experience. However, 
they also noted that little more than half of ECRP recipients had a written business 
plan and 60 per cent had not had a financial assessment of their farm in the last two 
years. It was also found that about 80 per cent of recipients had not undertaken any 
courses or training while on ECRP, although those ECRP farmers who had 
participated in training found the courses ‘very helpful’. Amongst the 30 per cent of 
recipients aged over 60 years, most did not have a retirement or succession plan in 
place. 
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Table B.4 ECRP recipients and non recipients: capital, debt and liquidity 
position of farms 
Average annual data per farm for the period 2002-03 to 2007-08a 
  Farms in EC declared areas Farms in
  Recipients Non recipients non EC areas
Farm profit and return  
Farm business profit $    -55 396 -19 769 16 432
Profit at full equity $ -19 971 10 117 56 928
Rate of return excl. capital apprec. % -0.9 0.3 1.6
Rate of return incl. capital apprec. % 4.7 6.5 8.6
Farm capital and debt  
Capital value of livestock $ 240 057 316 106 406 708
Capital value plant & equipment $ 238 454 270 139 354 454
Capital value land & improvements $ 2 009 511 2 572 538 3 065 687
Total capital value $ 2 499 593 3 173 753 3 841 776
Farm business debt at 30 June $ 401 165 304 636 422 156
Change in farm debt within year % 8.5 9.2 10.8
Net farm assets $ 2 157 991 3 034 151 3 581 209
Equity ratio at 30 June  % 83 90 88
Capital additions and disposals 
Net capital additions $ 26 073 34 783 51 085
Farms acquiring land % 4.1 5.1 6.1
Farms selling land % 4.3 3.9 5.5
Farm liquid assets  
Liquid assets $ 43 567 159 150 154 572
Farms with liquid assets < $20 000 % 58 39 39
Liquid assets to debt ratio % 10.9 52.2 36.6
FMDs at 30 June $ 8 173 27 434 31 130
Change in FMDs within year % 5.0 2.9 15.8
Farms with increasing FMDs % 5.1 8.2 9.5
Off-farm income  
Investment income $ 4 112 12 527 11 251
Wage and salary income $ 8 207 20 411 16 232
ECRP $ 14 668
Dairy structural adjustment 
payment 
$ 
2 004 1 259 1 750
Other govt household support $ 2 592 1 594 1 348
Total off-farm income $ 29 578 34 532 28 830
Farms with off-farm wages % 36.5 39.1 36.8
Government assistance to farm business 
Total govt business assistance  $ 15 551 1 443 1 084
ECIRS $ 10 944 0 0
Other govt business assistance $ 4 264 1 282 1 005
Farms receiving ECRP & ECIRS % 44.2 0 0
Survey sample details     
Estimated population no. 11 879 34 843 21 095
Sample of farms contributing no. 1 435 4 274 3 394
a All estimates, except those italicised, have a relative standard error of less than the estimate. 
Source: ABARE (2008 unpublished). 
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Evaluation of the ECRP program 
Appropriateness of ECRP 
A widespread acceptance of the need for income support as a safety net measure to 
ensure that the standard of living for farm families is maintained at a community 
accepted level was confirmed by the Commission’s initial consultations with 
farming groups, industry and government representatives.  
Although the NDP objectives do not provide for a particular family welfare 
outcome, household income support (through ECRP) is one of the main programs 
under the NDP. Provision of income support by the government is appropriate in 
the interests of maintaining a socially acceptable standard of living in rural 
communities. In times of drought there is the potential for living standards to fall 
and for households to experience extreme hardship as otherwise productive assets 
controlled by the household become unproductive — as noted in chapter 3 and in 
the Expert Social Panel’s report (Kenny et al. 2008). ECRP potentially maintains 
individual households as part of the agricultural resource base. 
Farming families may also have difficulty in accessing broader safety net payments 
(those available to other Australians more generally) due to the value of their farm 
assets, despite these assets being currently unproductive due to drought. To the 
extent that broader income support programs are inaccessible to farm households, it 
is appropriate on an equity basis for the government to provide ECRP as an 
accessible income support program for this group. 
Effectiveness of ECRP — accessibility issues 
A key consideration in the effectiveness of income support is the accessibility of 
assistance. That is, are those families which are most in need of financial assistance 
receiving income support? From data presented in the previous section, it is 
apparent that ECRP recipients have lower farm and off-farm income levels than non 
recipients, on average, which indicates that ECRP is well targeted.  
However, a number of inquiry participants argued that eligibility for ECRP is too 
limiting and families who need assistance are not able to access support. For 
example:  
WAfarmers understands that eligibility tests have deterred many families from 
applying for assistance. (sub. 26, p. 6) 
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Some criticisms of ECRP accessibility are related to the farm income and off-farm 
income threshold levels. These threshold levels are generally considered by farming 
groups to be too low and result in some drought affected farmers not receiving 
income support. For example, the Coonamble Shire Council claimed that: 
The level of combined farm and off-farm income that is used by Centrelink to limit 
eligibility for relief payments is too low. No consideration is given to the cost of travel 
to work or the cost of childcare … (sub. 63, p. 10) 
However, the off-farm income threshold for ECRP is up to 12 times that applicable 
in eligibility tests for other income support such as Newstart or disability 
allowances. On the one hand, a generous off-farm income threshold may enable 
some ECRP recipients to maintain off-farm income bearing assets or off-farm 
employment necessary for the farm family to move toward financial self-reliance in 
the future. On the other hand, generous access criteria for income support could also 
discourage farm families from becoming financially self-reliant. ECRP is intended 
to assist those families in EC areas who are having difficulty in meeting basic living 
expenses and those who exceed the income or asset thresholds could be considered 
to have sufficient resources to meet their living requirements. 
The necessity for an area to be EC declared before income support is available has 
also been criticised. The ‘lines on maps’ used to narrow the scope of those who can 
apply for EC support may be a useful means of targeting assistance, but only if it 
reflects the actual scope of drought affected areas or of those in need of income 
support (chapter 5 also discusses EC boundaries and issues that have arisen in their 
application). For example, drought can contribute to a widespread increase in some 
input prices (such as feed grain) which can potentially impact on farming businesses 
well beyond EC declared regions. L. Botterill and B. Chapman noted that: 
Basing access to the welfare safety net on geographical boundaries creates inequities 
and the causes of low farm incomes should not be relevant if farmers do not have the 
resources to meet basic family needs. (sub. 52, p. 4) 
Similarly, the Australian Landcare Management Group suggested that: 
… policies and programs should be aligned to the ongoing and widespread social needs 
of farmers irrespective of whether these needs arise because of drought or other factors. 
(sub. 24, p. 6) 
For the most part, these criticisms of the accessibility of ECRP relate not so much to 
access issues of those in EC areas, but rather, to there being farmers outside of EC 
areas who are nevertheless in need of income support.  
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Effectiveness of ECRP — self reliance and preparedness issues 
The distinction between support for the farm family and support for the farm 
business has become blurred in recent years. For example, an increase in the off-
farm income threshold level in September 2007 to 12 times that applicable to 
Newstart applicants, was part recognition that off-farm earnings are used by farmers 
to support their business. The Queensland Government indicate that ‘it is not 
unusual for producers to indicate that ECRP has been used to feed livestock’ 
(sub.77, p. 19). To the extent that household support is used to subsidise farm 
business operations, ECRP may be reducing incentives for business risk 
management and undermining the risk management objectives of NDP.  
While there is little direct evidence that the availability of ECRP alters incentives of 
farmers to prepare for drought, there is some indication of differences (that have 
likely arisen for a variety of reasons) in the capacity of recipients and non recipients 
to cope with variability in farm income. For example, ECRP recipients and non-
recipients were equally likely to use seasonal climate forecasts as a farm 
management tool, but strategies to deal with drought differ considerably between 
recipients and non recipients. In particular, Boero Rodriguez, Watson and Mues 
(2006) estimated that the proportion of ECRP recipients using short term debt to 
cope with drought impacts is more than double the proportion of non recipients. 
This was also evident from the analysis of ECRP recipients in the previous section. 
To some extent, these actions may reflect the lack of alternatives available to ECRP 
recipients as they also tend to have lower farm cash income than non recipients and 
lower levels of off-farm wages and salaries and investments. However, a lack of 
alternative sources of income to meet debt repayments when farm income is very 
low does not suggest a high level of preparedness for drought.  
Along these lines, several participants in this inquiry have indicated that financial 
preparedness is crucial and that off-farm assets and income from wages, salaries or 
investments is a necessary part of becoming self-reliant and able to cope with a 
highly variable farm income (J. Cooper, sub. 10 and H. Loller, sub. 49). However, 
SACES (2008a) indicated that in response to the current drought, less than 4 per 
cent of surveyed ECRP recipients had earned additional off-farm income. To some 
extent, this may reflect a lack of employment opportunities in the more remote rural 
areas. Nevertheless, a lack of diversification of income sources prior to and during 
drought may have increased the vulnerability of some ECRP recipients to variations 
in farm income. DoTRS (2005, p.10) noted that this is a source of considerable 
tension within some communities:  
… farmers who ‘do the right thing’, diversifying the business base of their farms and 
households, are ineligible, and resent seeing neighbours who have ‘done nothing’ sit 
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back and access government assistance. This has been described as an incentive to not 
diversify, which if true would exacerbate drought impacts in communities. 
These sentiments were also evident in inquiry submissions, with J. Cooper, a farmer 
on Flinders Island, claiming:  
It is disconcerting to see a number of ‘inefficient’ graziers on Flinders Island receiving 
drought assistance when they have done little to plan and manage the risks of drought, 
or other production or market risks for that matter. (sub. 10, p. 2) 
The Riverland Drought Taskforce also indicated that: 
There are many enterprises which are too small to sustain the farmer and family 
without income support. This was a factor before the drought. In effect these farmers 
are using a scarce resource to provide negative income and are using Centrelink 
payments to support their lifestyle. (sub. 56, p. 12) 
Farmers who received ECRP were more likely to also have received assistance 
under other government support programs including ECIRS, FarmBis and the Rural 
Financial Counselling Service (Boero Rodriguez, Watson and Mues 2006). This 
may indicate a continued reliance on government assistance over a number of years, 
rather than a temporary use of assistance to improve preparedness for long term 
self-reliance.  
From a survey of the 100 longest term recipients of ECRP, Centrelink reported that 
while nearly all intended to continue farming, only 60 per cent considered that they 
will be ‘self sufficient’ post EC and the remainder considered that they will require 
further support. Over half of the longest term ECRP recipients are currently 
accessing assistance in addition to ECRP and some current measures available that 
could further enhance self sufficiency are not widely adopted — only 4 per cent 
have FMDs and just over half have a business plan (Centrelink 2008c).  
One way that other social security programs (such as Newstart) attempt to limit long 
term dependence is through the inclusion of activity conditions that accompanies 
receipt of assistance. There are no such conditions with ECRP receipt, although as 
do all farmers, recipients have ongoing responsibilities for the welfare of their 
animals and for farm maintenance.  
On the other hand, there is evidence that some ECRP recipients are aware that they 
could have done more to prepare for drought and have subsequently attempted 
preparations for greater self-reliance in the future. SACES (2008a) found that 26 per 
cent of ECRP survey respondents indicated that they could have been better 
prepared for drought and that only 7 per cent claimed that they ‘can’t make 
changes’ to their current practices. In response to the drought, the main areas that 
were being improved were more rapid destocking, improved water storage and 
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transmission and better fodder storage. Specifically, 25 per cent of survey 
respondents indicated that they had undertaken water management (such as dam 
deepening and irrigation measures) and 23 per cent reported destocking or stock 
containment. (There are no data on how these drought responses compare with 
preparations of those farms not receiving assistance.) 
Implications of ECRP provision for the condition of the environmental resource 
base are not conclusive. Higher stocking rates and fodder expenditure per animal on 
farms of ECRP recipients suggest that income support may have been provided, on 
average, to those who have attempted to retain higher numbers of animals on lower 
quality pastures. It is also apparent that expenditure on improving land, capital and 
equipment is lower for ECRP recipients than non-recipients, which may indicate 
that even if ECRP is freeing up funds that would otherwise be directed to household 
maintenance, the outcome is not necessarily maintenance or improvements in the 
natural resource base. Nevertheless, Boero Rodriguez, Watson and Mues (2006) 
report similar land degradation issues for both recipients and non recipients and 
ABARE (2008 unpublished) report no significant difference between recipients and 
non recipients in terms of seeking advice on and managing land and resources. 
Overall, there is little conclusive evidence to assess whether ECRP contributes to 
the NDP objective of maintaining the environmental resource base. 
Efficiency of ECRP delivery 
Centrelink has actively delivered ECRP assistance to those rural areas experiencing 
drought with several ‘drought buses’ and the creation of ‘Rural Support Officers’. 
Inquiry participants were generally supportive of these measures and the efficiency 
with which Centrelink has delivered ECRP. For example, Lexo Pty Ltd, a merino 
wool, meat and breeding enterprise, indicated that: 
Centrelink and the RAA have been very efficient and friendly when dealing with 
support issues … (sub. 54, p. 4) 
There are a number of areas in which income support provided by Centrelink to 
farm families differs from that provided to other parts of the community (as detailed 
in table B.1). Some of these differences may simply be a consequence of ECRP 
being instigated under legislation other than the Social Security Act 1991. While 
these differences generally favour ECRP recipients, they may nevertheless be a 
source of confusion for farm families, raise equity issues within communities, 
necessitate additional resources in program implementation, and reduce the 
efficiency with which programs can be delivered. 
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A further point of inconsistency is that while eligibility for ECRP is based on the 
income and assets of the farm family, the payment is made (at double the Newstart 
partner rate) to one member of a couple. As ECRP is assessed as taxable income, 
this can create issues with regard to structure of the farm business and marginal tax 
rates paid. Some other Centrelink payments, such as Newstart, are assessed 
separately and paid to each member of a couple.  
In their applications for ECRP, farmers are required to estimate their net farm 
income level for the coming year, with their estimate affecting the rate at which the 
relief payment will be paid. This is similar to requirements of some other programs, 
such as the Family Tax Benefit. But expecting a farmer in the middle of extreme 
drought to be able to accurately estimate income for the coming year is unrealistic. 
More problematically, unlike these other programs, there is no routine 
reconciliation at the end of the financial year. This means that if a recipient’s 
income is higher than estimated, there is little action that can be taken by Centrelink 
to recover benefits paid out. If income is lower than estimated by the farmer, then 
there is no revision to the rate paid. This provides a significant incentive for farmers 
to underestimate their income in order to meet ECRP eligibility criteria and is not 
an adequate way of dealing with a group that potentially has highly variable 
incomes. It is in contrast to the reporting responsibilities and treatment of all other 
groups in the community that receive income support.  
Summing up on ECRP 
Provision of income support to farm households in EC areas under the ECRP 
program is: 
• appropriate in its intent to address the potential for living standards to decline 
during drought and the difficulties that farm households have in accessing the 
community’s broader income support programs 
• accessible, but the program is more generous than other income support 
programs in the community and there is evidence that some farmers have 
become dependent on the availability of government income support 
• efficiently delivered, but the overall efficiency of the program is reduced by 
inconsistencies with other income support programs in the community and the 
absence of a regular reconciliation of payments with income actually earned. 
B.2 Interim income support 
Interim income support (IIS) provides short term financial support to farmers and 
small businesses that are in regions not yet EC declared, but are believed to be 
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experiencing financial difficulties as a result of drought. IIS was introduced in 
September 2002 after the Commonwealth Government announced early assistance 
would be provided to farmers in the central north/north western region of New 
South Wales where a prima facie case for EC assistance had been demonstrated. 
With the announcement of the Commonwealth Government’s drought package in 
September 2007, IIS also became available to farmers and small businesses in 
selected areas for which a case for EC assistance had not yet been established:  
• IIS in Prima Facie areas — Once it is announced by the Minister for 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry that an EC application has demonstrated a 
prima facie case for a full EC declaration, the application is referred to NRAC 
for advice and IIS is available. In this situation, the duration of support is for a 
period up to six months from when it is announced that an EC application has 
demonstrated a prima facie case, or until EC is declared (whichever occurs 
earlier).  
• IIS in Interim Assistance Areas — Alternatively, if the Commonwealth 
Government declares an area to be an Interim Assistance Area, then IIS is 
available in that area for a period specified by the Government. The purpose of 
Interim Assistance Areas is to provide short term relief while state governments, 
farming organisations and communities consider the development of an EC 
application.  
Centrelink delivers IIS on behalf of DAFF. Payments under IIS are at an equivalent 
rate to those of ECRP and SBIS and are subject to the same asset and income tests, 
although no ancillary benefits (such as health care card or youth allowance 
concessions) are available. The duration of any subsequent payments received under 
ECRP or SBIS is reduced by the number of months for which Interim Income 
Support has been received. However, for areas that have had their EC declaration 
extended well beyond two years, a reduction in the duration of ECRP or SBIS (with 
up to 6 months of IIS) is not likely to be of any practical consequence. 
IIS applicants 
After early October 2008, there were no longer any areas in Australia that were 
eligible to receive IIS. During 2007-08 there were around 30 Prima Facie areas that 
received IIS, but these have since been assessed by NRAC and have been declared 
EC areas. In addition, there were 14 Interim Assistance Areas declared in Australia 
by the then government in September 2007 and all received IIS for the twelve 
months to the end of September 2008, even though these end dates did not 
necessarily match production and income cycles for some farms. Six of these 
Interim Assistance Areas were in Western Australia, four in South Australia, three 
in Tasmania and one in New South Wales. As no applications were made for EC 
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consideration of an Interim Assistance Area, farmers and small businesses in these 
areas are no longer receiving assistance.  
A total of $7.6 million was provided for Interim Income Support to farmers across 
Australia in 2007-08. $4.8 million of this was for 1562 farmers in Prima Facie areas 
and $2.7 million was for 338 farmers in Interim Assistance Areas (table B.5). A 
further $1.3 million was provided for IIS in Interim Assistance Areas from July to 
October 2008. Even though these areas did not progress to EC status, recipient 
farmers in these areas are not required to repay the $4 million in support that they 
received. 
The number of small businesses receiving IIS was much smaller. In the three years 
that support has been available to small businesses, fewer than 150 businesses 
received a total of $560 000 in interim support.  
Table B.5 Interim income support, 2002-03 to 2008-09a 
 2002-03 
 
2003-04
 
2004-05
 
2005-06
 
2006-07
 
2007-08 
 
2008-09 
Jul-Oct 
Farmers in prima facie areas       
Claimants  no. 3 401 6 477 417 187 3 698 1 562  
Average amount  $’000 2.49 2.39 2.20 1.67 3.11 3.00  
Total amount  $’000 8 461 15 508 919 312 11 517 4 823  
Farmers in interim assistance areas      
Claimants  no.      338 312 
Average amount  $’000      8.12 4.13 
Total amount  $’000      2 745 1 289 
Small businesses in prima facie areas      
Claimants  no.     69 34  
Average amount  $’000     2.77 3.11  
Total amount  $’000     191 106  
Small businesses in interim assistance areas     
Claimants  no.      24 20 
Average amount  $’000      7.98 3.63 
Total amount  $’000      191 72 
Total IIS paid  $’000 8 461 15 508 919 312 11 708 7 865 1 362 
a At the date of finalisation of this report, no areas had received IIS beyond October 2008. 
Source: Centrelink (2008 unpublished). 
Evaluation of IIS 
A number of participants in this inquiry have indicated that the process of getting a 
region EC declared can be cumbersome and time consuming (chapter 5). To the 
extent that this is the case, IIS potentially enables government income support to be 
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provided to farmers and small business families with a considerable degree of 
flexibility and responsiveness and could minimise the cost to recipients of ‘red 
tape’. Early access to formal income support may also enable access to other 
training and community support programs and could prevent family financial 
problems from escalating. 
However, the provision of IIS could reinforce an impression that recipients are 
‘entitled’ to support or create the expectation within the recipient communities that 
EC status will ultimately be confirmed. Such a view could be further supported by 
the continued availability of IIS for 6 months, even if the region is rejected for EC 
status. IIS also raises the potential for political intervention in the provision of EC 
support as assistance can be provided without due consideration of eligibility 
through the EC process. For example, none of the Interim Assistance Areas 
declared by the government in September 2007, were subsequently considered for 
EC status, and the Tasmanian Minister for Primary Industries and Water described 
the interim assistance areas in that state as an ‘election stunt’ (Llewellyn 2008).  
B.3 Farm Help income support 
Farm Help was established under the Agriculture – Advancing Australia package in 
1997. The training and redevelopment aspects of the Farm Help program are 
discussed in appendix D. Farm Help also has an income support program that is 
intended to provide short term financial support to farm families who are 
experiencing severe financial difficulties meeting living expenses and are unlikely 
to obtain a loan from a financial institution. The assistance aims to help farmers 
while they take action to improve their long term financial prospects, either by 
improving the financial performance of their farm enterprise, finding alternative 
sources of off-farm income or re-establishing outside farming. Importantly, the 
availability of Farm Help income support is not linked to the existence of drought. 
Farm Help income support is paid at the same rate as the Newstart Allowance for up 
to 12 months. Support is subject to income and assets tests and, as for Newstart 
allowance, the amount received starts to decline once total (farm and non farm) 
income exceeds $62 per fortnight. Unlike Newstart allowance, farmers do not have 
to satisfy an ‘activity test’ and farm assets are excluded from the asset test. 
Recipients are required to attend an initial professional advice session and develop a 
‘Pathways plan’ (a plan to best position the farm family for a financially secure 
future) in conjunction with a Centrelink Rural Services Officer. 
Applications for Farm Help income support closed on 30 June 2008, but some 
farmers may still be receiving payments until 30 June 2009. 
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Eligibility for Farm Help income support 
To be eligible for Farm Help income support, the applicant must: 
• for a continuous period of at least two years immediately before applying for the 
program 
• have been a farmer 
• have derived more than 50 per cent of gross income from the farm enterprise 
• have contributed more than 50 per cent of capital and working hours to the 
farm enterprise 
• be unable to borrow against their assets 
• be at least 18 years of age, an Australian resident living in Australia 
• not, in any way, have lost management control of their farm (for example, 
through bankruptcy) 
• satisfy the Farm Help income test (same as for Newstart) and assets test (same as 
for Newstart but applies to non farm assets only). 
Farm Help income support recipients 
Over the 12 years that the program operated, a total of about $107 million was 
provided in income support to 10 463 farmers (that is, an average of about $10 000 
each). 31 per cent of recipients were located in Victoria and 26 per cent in each of 
New South Wales and Queensland (figure B.3). Use of the program has largely 
declined since the late 1990s, with increased use of other income support programs, 
such as ECRP (figure B.4). 
SACES (2008a) reported that the demographic profile and length of farming 
experience of most Farm Help recipients is not dissimilar to ECRP recipients. One 
key difference between the two groups is that Farm Help recipients tend to operate 
smaller farms than ECRP recipients (who also had smaller farms than non recipients 
in EC declared areas). Boero Rodriguez, Watson and Mues (2006) similarly 
estimated that Farm Help recipients operate farms that are generally smaller and 
have a significantly lower market value than those of non-recipients (although only 
2 per cent of farms within the scope of the ABARE survey received Farm Help).  
   
 INCOME SUPPORT 
FOR RURAL FAMILIES
319
 
Figure B.3 Farm help income support recipients by state, 1997-98 to 
2008-09a 
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a Figures for 2008-09 are based on recipient numbers at end November 2008; no new recipients could join 
the program after June 2008. 
Data source: DAFF (2008 unpublished). 
Figure B.4 Farm help income support recipients and payments, 
1997-98 to 2008-09a 
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a Figures for 2008-09 are estimates based on expected numbers for the full financial year with clients 
expending their full entitlements.  
Data source: DAFF (2008 unpublished). 
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The majority of farm families who have received Farm Help assistance do not have 
off-farm income or off-farm investments, and are therefore less likely to include 
off-farm income as a risk management strategy than non-recipients (Boero 
Rodriguez, Watson and Mues 2006). Furthermore, Farm Help recipients were more 
likely to have accessed other forms of government assistance (such as rural 
financial counsellors, ECIRS and the sugar industry reform package) than those 
farmers who did not receive Farm Help. 
Evaluation of Farm Help income support 
Given the eligibility criteria for Farm Help income support, the program is clearly 
aimed at helping the smallest, most vulnerable farms. Of particular concern is that 
the program targets those who are unable to borrow against their assets from 
commercial lenders. This means that the government is supporting families on 
farms which are commercially unviable in the long term and thereby making 
adjustment in the industry more costly to achieve.  
A further shortcoming of Farm Help income support is that (in contrast to Newstart) 
there is no end of year ‘reconciliation’ to check that those farmers who received 
income support had income and asset levels during the year that were consistent 
with the eligibility criteria. 
The necessity for recipients to complete a ‘Pathway Plan’ is one of the more 
beneficial aspects of the Farm Help income support program. SACES (2007) found 
that Pathways Planning prompted families to consider whether their financial 
position could be improved if they were to earn off-farm income. As a result, 22 per 
cent of survey respondents increased their reliance on off-farm income within a year 
and half of leaving the program. The sources of off-farm income were evenly 
divided between rural and non rural occupations. SACES (2008a) also noted that 
after participation in the Farm Help program, most recipients improved their 
financial position and increased their self-reliance. 
B.4 Transitional income support 
The Transitional Income Support (TIS) program was introduced under the 
government’s Climate Change Adjustment Program in June 2008. TIS assists farm 
families to manage the impacts of climate change on their farm business by 
providing short term income support and advice and training opportunities. While 
there are some differences in eligibility criteria, TIS effectively replaces the income 
support and advice that was available under Farm Help. As is the case for Farm 
Help, provision of TIS is not related to drought. 
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TIS is taxable and is paid fortnightly by Centrelink at a rate equivalent to the 
Newstart allowance. Support is available for up to twelve months from 16 June 
2008 to 30 June 2009.  
Eligibility for transitional income support 
Unlike ECRP, application for TIS is not conditional on the farm being located 
within an EC declared area — it is available to farmers Australia-wide. Income 
support under TIS can be back-dated for farmers in areas that are coming out of EC 
(if the application is made within 28 days of the end of EC) so that income support 
is continuous from the day the EC declaration ceases. To be eligible for TIS, a 
farmer must demonstrate that they have been, for a continuous period of at least two 
years immediately before applying: 
• a farmer in Australia 
• derived a significant amount of their gross income from farming and have 
contributed a significant amount of their labour and capital to the farm enterprise 
• not received assistance from the Farm Help Advice and Training Scheme or 
Advice and Planning Grant after June 2008. 
Assessment of eligibility for TIS requires several steps. Applicants who have total 
net assets (which includes both farm and non farm assets, debt and the principal 
residence) of more than $1.5 million or liquid assets (including FMDs) of more than 
$20 000 are immediately ineligible for income support. For applicants with assets 
below these thresholds, a financial assessment is then required.  
The financial assessment is a determination of the financial circumstances of the 
applicant and farm business and takes into account non-farm assets, liquidity, debt 
to equity ratios and total net assets. Specifically: 
• the farming family’s estimated total income (farm and off-farm) for the next 12 
months must be less than $39 988 (consistent with the personal income test for 
Newstart allowance); and 
• the value of off-farm assets of the applicant and partner (including FMDs), less 
debt on these assets, must be below $243 500; and either 
• the balance of cash held is less than current liabilities; or  
• the farmer has a debt level that exceeds the level of equity in the farm. 
The financial assessment forms a part of the required Farm Business Analysis and 
Financial Assessment. This assessment provides the farmer with an independent 
appraisal of their farm business and is intended to assist the farmer to decide what is 
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best for the future of the farm business and their family. Farm Business Analysis 
and Financial Assessments must be completed by a professional financial advisor. 
After successful completion of the Farm Business Analysis and Financial 
Assessment, the TIS applicant is directed to a rural financial counsellor to develop a 
Climate Change Adjustment Program (CCAP) Action Plan for their farm. The 
CCAP Action Plan maps out the process that the farm family will follow to adjust to 
the impacts of climate change and improve the family’s long term financial security. 
The plan will establish goals, actions, timelines and expected outcomes. TIS 
recipients are provided with an advice and training grant of $5500 to access 
professional advice to assist them in developing the action plan. 
Once the CCAP Action Plan is certified by a rural financial counsellor, payment of 
TIS commences (but can be back dated to the end of the EC period) and recipients 
become eligible for assistance to receive further advice or training pursuant to their 
Action Plan. 
Farmers deemed by Centrelink to be in severe financial hardship will immediately 
receive TIS payments. The farmer then has three months to obtain the Farm 
Business Analysis and Financial Assessment and complete a CCAP Action Plan. 
All farmers in receipt of TIS are obliged to take action to achieve financial self-
reliance and increase preparedness for changing economic and climatic conditions. 
Rural financial counsellors have an ongoing role of case management of TIS 
recipients. 
Transitional income support applicants 
At mid December 2008, Centrelink had received almost 650 applications for TIS. 
There were 96 farmers receiving TIS payments and a further 154 farmers were 
approved to receive TIS, subject to the outcome of their Farm Business Analysis 
and Financial Assessment. The remaining 400 farmers were unsuccessful in their 
applications to obtain TIS. The main reasons for rejection of TIS applications were 
a failure to supply documentation, withdrawal of the customer (often following an 
EC extension decision), and liquid assets exceeding threshold levels for receipt of 
support (Centrelink 2008 unpublished). Amongst those who were unsuccessful in 
obtaining TIS, around 260 were nevertheless found to be eligible for advice and 
training grants under the CCAP (DAFF 2008 unpublished). 
In total, the government paid $170 000 to farmers under the TIS program in the 
three months to the end of September 2008. There is no information available on the 
farm characteristics of TIS recipients, but virtually all TIS recipients were 
previously in receipt of ECRP (Centrelink 2008 unpublished).  
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Evaluation of transitional income support 
Since its introduction in July 2008, there has been widespread criticism from 
farming groups of the accessibility of TIS. Of most focus is the $1.5 million 
threshold level for the net assets test. With regard to Queensland horticultural 
producers, Growcom stated that: 
… this test is totally unrealistic for horticultural producers. Just about any landholding 
in a horticultural production area would push growers over this limit — and it thus 
rules most growers out of eligibility for any assistance. (Growcom 2008, p. 1) 
More generally, it was speculated by an agricultural consultant that: 
… as few as 1000 farmers will qualify for the new payments because the value of their 
land and farm assets is too high. (Paton 2008, p. 1)  
However, ABARE data (2009 unpublished) indicates that there were close to 
10 000 broadacre and dairy farms across Australia that had less than $1.5 million in 
farm net assets and less than $20 000 in liquid assets in 2007-08, in addition to 
around 1500 vegetable growers and 800 sugar growers (and this does not include 
farms in other agricultural industries).  
The Western Australia Pastoralists and Graziers Association believe the funding is: 
… targeted at eastern states’ farmers who are being phased out of years of dependency 
on federal assistance … probably its not going to have a huge impact in WA. (ABC 
News 2008, p. 1) 
Compared with asset tests for other household income support programs, the $1.5 
million threshold under the TIS is significantly higher, but recognises that farms 
may have high net assets but little or negative net income. Nevertheless, limiting 
assistance to manage climate change to farmers with smaller operations, could 
inadvertently delay a restructuring in farming industries that may be necessary to 
best adapt to climate change. 
The necessity to undertake a financial assessment in order to be eligible for income 
support under TIS would potentially place considerable pressure on the applicant’s 
financial advisor, who has the role of determining the extent of further support 
available to the applicant. The necessary skilled professional advice for the financial 
assessment may not be available in some parts of Australia.  
As for Farm Help Income Support, TIS does not ensure that recipients operate 
farms which are commercially viable. However, and in contrast to Farm Help, the 
financial assessment in TIS does at least attempt to limit income support to those 
farm households which have insufficient liquid resources to support themselves or 
meet their immediate expenses.  
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A further shortcoming of TIS is that (as for Farm Help income support, and in 
contrast to Newstart) there is no end of year ‘reconciliation’ to check that those 
farmers who received TIS had income and asset levels during the year that were 
consistent with the eligibility criteria. This lack of reconciliation places additional 
importance on the accuracy of applicant’s initial income estimates and may also be 
a problem if there are TIS applicants who received immediate support under 
hardship provisions and were subsequently found to be ineligible for TIS. 
B.5 Small business income support 
Agriculture-dependent small business operators who are either based within, or 
dependent upon, an EC (or Prima Facie or Interim) declared region, have been 
eligible to apply for small business income support since 7 November 2006. The 
eligibility criteria for small businesses were expanded on 25 September 2007 to 
allow small business operators in EC (or Prima Facie or Interim) areas, other than 
those that are agriculture-dependent, to also apply for income support.  
Small business income support (SBIS) is intended to assist with day to day family 
and personal living expenses of small business owners, rather than operating 
expenses of the business.  
As for ECRP, SBIS is paid fortnightly by Centrelink according to guidelines set by, 
and with funding provided through DAFF. Payment is at a rate equivalent to the 
Newstart allowance and is taxable. In addition to the basic income support, SBIS 
recipients and their families receive a Health Care Card and may also be eligible for 
concessions under the Youth Allowance and Austudy means test for dependent 
children. However, an individual cannot receive SBIS, ECRP and other income 
support (such as Farm Help) at the same time. 
SBIS can be received continuously until either the end of the EC declaration in the 
relevant area or 30 June 2009, whichever is earliest. The continued eligibility of 
SBIS recipients is reviewed every six months and those who are engaged in casual 
employment are required to report income earned to Centrelink every fortnight.  
Eligibility criteria for SBIS 
To be eligible to receive SBIS, small business operators must demonstrate that:  
• they have a right or interest in a small business, a current Australian Business 
Number and carry out commercial activities 
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• are at least 18 years of age, are an Australian resident or have permission to 
permanently live in Australia 
• they employ up to 100 full time equivalent staff 
• under ‘normal’ circumstances, they contribute significant labour and capital to 
the small business and gain a significant part of their income from the small 
business 
• their business is dependent on income from farmers, farm workers and their 
families because they 
– derived (in an earlier period of ‘normal’ turnover) at least 70 per cent of their 
income from the provision of goods or services to farming activities in an EC 
(or Prima Facie or Interim) declared region; or 
– are located in a town that is substantially reliant on-farm incomes, has a 
population of 10 000 or less and is located in an EC (or Prima Facie or 
Interim) declared area 
• they have experienced a significant downturn in total business turnover as a 
result of the impact of drought on farms located in EC (or Prima Facie or 
Interim) declared areas 
• they (and their partner) have received less than $20 000 from any non-business 
salary and wages during the financial year. 
Income and assets tests similar to those for Newstart allowance apply, but assets 
essential to the running of the small business, superannuation and life insurance of 
the applicant, are not included. 
SBIS applicants 
The Commonwealth Government has provided income support of $27 million to the 
family owners of almost 1500 businesses over the three years that the SBIS program 
has been in operation (figure B.5). Most of these businesses (over 80 per cent) have 
received assistance for more than a year. The majority of the assisted small 
businesses are located in New South Wales (Riverina, Central North-North West 
and South West Slopes and Plains) and in Victoria (Mallee – Northern Wimmera, 
South Western Victoria and North East Victoria).  
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Figure B.5 Small business income support payments by state, 
2006-07 to 2008-09a 
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a Estimates for 2008-09 payments are for the period July to November 2008 only.   
Data source: Centrelink (2008 unpublished). 
In each year that assistance has been offered, the main type of small business that 
received income support was contractors (table B.6). This group could include a 
wide variety of professions such as fencing contractors, plumbers and shearers and 
could correspond with the reduction in expenditure on hired labour by ECRP 
recipients (discussed in section C.1). To a significant, but lesser extent, other 
businesses affected include ‘suppliers’, ‘other services and suppliers’ and ‘transport 
services’. DoTRS (2005) reported that these types of small businesses are most 
vulnerable to drought because they are not only dependent on farmers but also sell 
goods and services that can be ‘done without’ when funds are tight. In contrast, 
businesses such as financial services, accommodation services and 
manufacturing/wholesale, which received lower levels of support, could be 
expected to have a broader customer base and be less dependent on farm 
expenditure.  
Since SBIS was introduced, a total of 743 recipients (50 per cent) have had their 
support cancelled. As for ECRP, the most common reason for cancellation of 
income support was that the EC end date in the relevant region had been reached, 
income precluded entitlement or that the customer failed to reply to correspondence 
from Centrelink. Most recipients have remained in operation during the past three 
years of drought with only 3 per cent of small business claimants having their 
assistance cancelled because they left or sold their business. 
 
   
 INCOME SUPPORT 
FOR RURAL FAMILIES
327
 
Table B.6 Small business income support recipients and payments by 
industry, 2006-07 and 2008-09a 
Proportion of all recipients Total gross payments  
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
 % % % $’000 $’000 $’000 
Accommodation services 0 0 1 0 35 58 
Contractors 52 39 33 2 515 6 504 2 221 
Consultants 1 2 2 40 197 96 
Construction 0 1 1 0 68 50 
Financial services 0 0 0 0 5 25 
Hospitality 0 2 3 0 227 243 
Irrigation services 4 4 4 189 663 242 
Manufacturing/wholesale 0 0 1 0 81 50 
Other services & 
suppliers 17 15 14 735 2 474 982 
Retail services 0 3 5 0 263 308 
Retail goods 0 7 10 0 594 583 
Rural services 0 2 2 0 201 153 
Suppliers 13 12 11 625 2 010 732 
Transport services 14 13 13 617 2 198 847 
Total 100 100 100 4 721 15 521 6 589 
a Estimates for 2008-09 recipient numbers and payments are for the period July to November 2008 only.   
Source: Centrelink (2008 unpublished). 
Evaluation of SBIS 
SBIS is evaluated here first from the perspective of how appropriate it is within the 
context of NDP, and second, by considering its effectiveness in terms of 
accessibility to the families of small businesses. 
There may have been less need for assistance for small businesses during the latest 
drought (at least during the earlier years) than in previous droughts. From a survey 
of small businesses in drought areas, DoTRS (2005, p.2) reported that:  
Many of our interviewees shared the view that the current drought is having less of an 
impact on non-farm small businesses and communities that the devastating 1994 
drought. The key factors seem to be: lower interest rates … higher land values … better 
farm management in general and better farm financial management in particular …  
DoTRS (2005) indicated that EC support to farmers is filtering through to non farm 
small businesses and communities. They also reported that financial support for 
farmers on its own is ‘not enough to mitigate all non-farm and community impacts’. 
In this respect it is not the purpose of government assistance to assume all the risks 
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of a particular change in the operating environment. If government assistance were 
to fill such a role then it could be expected that small businesses would have little 
incentive to act to mitigate the effect of drought on their business and families.  
A related concern with the provision of SBIS is the extent to which longer term 
influences on business performance are labelled as ‘drought’ impacts. In its report 
on the social impacts of drought, the government’s Expert Social Panel provided 
evidence that a reduction in the number of skilled labourers and a loss of small 
businesses can have a devastating consequence for regional communities (Kenny et 
al. 2008). While these changes in communities can be exacerbated by drought, they 
can also be a symptom of longer term underlying changes taking place within the 
community — such as an aging population, lack of diversity in employment 
opportunities and high dependence on a single industry (farming).  
Levantis (2001) noted that the smaller the town, the more important is farm 
expenditure to the town economy (farm expenditure was estimated to represent at 
least one third of the economy in towns with fewer than 1000 people). Somewhat 
problematically though, the greater was the reliance of a town’s economy on 
expenditure by farmers, the lower that town’s population growth was found to be 
over the 10 years to 1996. To the extent that such longer term changes within 
communities are occurring, drought based assistance is unlikely to be an appropriate 
or well targeted government tool to best facilitate community development. 
The objective of SBIS is to be accessible to the families of those small businesses 
who, because of drought, are unable to meet their day to day family and personal 
living expenses. Whether the program is effective in achieving this outcome is 
difficult to determine. What is apparent from the analysis presented in the previous 
section is that most SBIS recipients are small businesses that are likely to be 
dependent on farm expenditure (such as contractors and suppliers). Further, 
businesses which could be expected to have a broader customer base within 
communities (such as accommodation and financial services) and therefore may be 
less directly impacted by drought, have received little SBIS. 
This potentially raises an equity issue between businesses within and between 
communities — there may be factors other than drought which have significant 
negative impacts on businesses but for which no government assistance is available.  
Finally, and as for ECRP, the lack of an end of year reconciliation of income 
estimates with income outcomes provides an incentive for small businesses to 
underestimate incomes in order to receive ECRP. 
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B.6 Other community assistance 
There are a number of community organisations, church groups and charities which 
provide emergency assistance to rural families in financial difficulty. 
Commonwealth, state, territory and local governments also have a range of 
programs, exemptions and special facilities in place to assist rural and regional 
communities in managing issues that may arise from their isolation or lack of access 
to infrastructure and services. 
Farmhand Foundation 
The Farmhand Foundation, in association with Australian Red Cross, raised and 
distributed $24.6 million to around 18 000 farm families between October 2002 to 
June 2003 (Farmhand nd). Most of these funds went to farmers in New South Wales 
($11 million) and Queensland ($6.5 million) (ABC 2003). The intended uses of 
these funds were food, electricity and phone bills, vehicle maintenance, medical 
costs and stock feed.  
Country Women’s Association Emergency Drought Aid Fund 
From November 2002 to June 2008, the Commonwealth Government provided 
funding support to the Country Women’s Association (CWA) to establish an 
emergency drought aid fund. This funding was to enable grants to be made to rural 
families to help meet their household expenses and to assist community groups to 
run events that boost morale in drought declared regions.  
Under the CWA scheme, farming families or local small businesses dependent on 
spending by farming families could apply for up to $2000 for one-off emergency 
payments covering non-farm expenses such as dental or medical costs, utility 
accounts, school bills, car expenses. Community groups or other not-for-profit 
organisations wanting to hold gatherings, outings or information sessions for 
drought affected communities could apply for up to $3000.  
The CWA has also received funds for distribution to farmers from state 
governments and donations from the community and private companies 
(sub. 17, p. 1). 
The initial Commonwealth Government donation of $1 million in December 2002 
was distributed to each state and territory based on an estimate of the number of 
people affected by the drought. Funding ran out in New South Wales, Western 
Australia, Victoria and Queensland between February and April 2003 and unspent 
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funds from the Northern Territory and Tasmania were reallocated to these States. 
Some 90 per cent of the $1 million fund was spent between January and March 
2003. This was much earlier than the expected 30 June 2004 end date (Australian 
National Audit Office 2005). A further $15 million was donated by the 
Commonwealth Government to the CWA during 2005-06, 2006-07 and 2007-08 to 
enable continued provision of emergency aid to drought affected rural families and 
communities.  
Other drought related community initiatives  
The Commonwealth Government has a range of other drought related initiatives 
that primarily operate as concessions to existing broader programs for drought 
affected farmers and farm workers. Some of these include: 
• Employment initiatives for redundant rural workers in drought affected areas, 
such as access to Job Search Support, early access to intensive support and job 
search training, the Drought Force program for skilled unemployed people in EC 
or prima facie declared areas, and flexible arrangements for access to Newstart 
allowance. 
• Taxation initiatives relating to lodgement and payment of income tax and 
activity statements, treatment of farm management deposits, landcare operations 
and profit from forced disposal of livestock. 
• Social support initiatives. The Expert Social Panel, in its assessment of the social 
impacts of drought, provide details of a range of health and counselling services 
introduced for those in drought affected communities. 
Other Commonwealth Government sourced regional assistance 
Australian governments, at all levels, offer a vast range of assistance programs 
targeted at rural and regional areas, not only in times of drought, but on an ongoing 
basis. These programs are broadly intended to offset higher costs of providing 
services of a socially acceptable standard in regional areas and satisfy the 
governments’ commitments to equity in provision of key communication, education 
and health services in particular. Community assistance is generally narrow in scope 
but can have the advantage of being well targeted at those groups most in need at a 
particular point in time. However, in times of drought, a community’s capacity to 
provide this support is likely to be at its weakest (DoTRS 2005). 
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Commonwealth Government initiatives 
The Commonwealth Government (through DAFF) provides businesses with grants 
under the ‘International Agricultural Cooperation’ program to improve market 
access and trade. Other programs are directed at natural resource management such 
as the National Landcare Program (replaced in 2008 with Caring for our Country — 
Landcare), ‘Healthy Soils for Sustainable Farms’ Program, the Environmental 
Stewardship program and National Water Initiatives. The Commission estimates 
that over $1.1 billion in non-EC assistance was provided to agricultural industries 
by the Commonwealth Government alone in 2006-07 — this does not include some 
major funding initiatives for irrigators (PC 2008b).  
A number of regional development programs are also provided through the 
Commonwealth Government Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional 
Development and Local Government. For example, the $176 million Better Regions 
Program provides community infrastructure to enhance the liveability of regions 
and regional towns. Other programs administered by the department include the 
Regional Partnerships program and the Foundation for Rural and Regional 
Renewal. 
Education is a key area of government support in regional areas. The 
Commonwealth Government provides financial assistance to schools directly 
affected by drought. Rural and remote government and non-government (primary 
and secondary) schools located in EC declared areas, in towns with a population of 
less than 10 000, can apply for assistance of up to a maximum of $10 000 per year 
for the duration of the EC declaration. The Commonwealth Government (through 
the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations) also provides 
regional assistance through the ‘Assistance for Isolated Children Scheme’ (support 
for children in remote locations), the ‘Country Areas Program’ (additional funding 
for schools in geographically isolated areas), the Non-government School Term 
Hostels program (assists not-for-profit non-government school hostels to provide 
affordable alternatives to boarding schools), and regional and remote funding 
loading for non-government schools. 
Regional health assistance is provided through the Department of Health and 
Ageing. As part of the 2008-09 Federal Budget, the Commonwealth Government 
announced the establishment of the National Rural and Remote Health 
Infrastructure Program. The program aims to improve access to health services by 
providing funding to rural and remote communities where the lack of infrastructure 
is a barrier to the establishment of new, or enhanced, health services. More than $46 
million has been allocated over the next four years to the program. 
  
 
   
 EC TRIGGERED 
BUSINESS SUPPORT 
333
 
C Exceptional Circumstances triggered 
business support 
Australia’s National Drought Policy (NDP) came into effect in 1992. The objectives 
of the policy are to: 
• encourage primary producers and other sections of rural Australia to adopt 
self-reliant approaches for managing climatic variability 
• maintain and protect Australia’s agricultural and environmental resource base 
during periods of extreme climate stress 
• ensure early recovery of agricultural and rural industries, consistent with 
long-term sustainable levels. 
While self-reliance is a key objective, the NDP allows for short-term drought 
assistance and support. It states that there are ‘rare and severe drought events — 
Exceptional Circumstances (EC) — that are beyond the ability of even the most 
prudent farmer to manage’. Support is therefore provided to individuals, farm 
businesses and farm dependent rural businesses experiencing such circumstances.  
In this appendix, the appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of the support 
provided to farm businesses and farm dependent rural small businesses during 
severe drought events is analysed.  
C.1 Available EC business support 
Two main assistance measures have been developed by the Commonwealth 
Government to target farm and farm dependent small businesses that are 
experiencing an EC event: interest rate subsidies and an exit grant (only farm 
businesses) for those wishing to leave the industry. When the NDP was agreed in 
1992, it was determined that business assistance during EC events would take the 
form of an interest subsidy so as to avoid ad hoc policy development during times 
of crisis (Drought Review Panel 2004).  
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EC programs  
As a result of an EC declaration, primary producers (and small business in towns of 
less than 10 000 people who are reliant on primary production — termed farm 
dependent rural small businesses) can access a range of support measures (box C.1).  
 
Box C.1 Commonwealth Government support to farm and farm 
dependent rural small businesses tied to an EC declaration 
The Commonwealth Government’s drought related policies include:  
• EC interest rate subsidies 
• EC exit package (farm businesses only) 
• Early access to Farm Management Deposits funds (farm businesses only) 
• Declared drought area incentives: additional commencement incentive for 
businesses employing apprentices  
• Australian Tax Office provisions allowing farm businesses in drought affected areas 
additional time to lodge tax documents. 
Source: DAFF (2008d).  
 
Interest rate subsidies are provided to farmers and farm dependent rural small 
businesses that are viable in the long-term, but are currently in financial difficultly 
due to an EC event (DAFF 2008d). A subsidy of up to 50 per cent of the interest 
payable on new and existing loans (with the exception of new property purchases, 
which do not attract the subsidy if purchased within the last 12 months) is provided 
for in the initial year of an EC declaration, with provision for a subsidy of up to 
80 per cent in the second and subsequent years. Payments are taxable and are 
capped at $100 000 in any 12 month period and $500 000 over five years. The 
subsidy is paid directly to producers and not to the institution to whom the debt is 
owed. The eligibility requirements of the scheme include: 
• an off-farm (or out of small business) asset test of $750 000 applies. This 
excludes assets held in Farm Management Deposits (FMDs), bona fide insurance 
and superannuation (this is to be reduced to close to $500 000 post June 2009) 
• farmers (and small businesses owners) must, under normal circumstances, have 
contributed at least 75 per cent of their labour to the enterprise  
• they must have derived at least 50 per cent of their income from farming (or the 
small business).  
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This policy is 90 per cent funded by the Commonwealth Government, with the 
remainder funded by state and territory governments. EC interest rate subsidies 
have been available to farmers since 1993, and to small businesses since 2006, and 
are administered by state and territory government authorities.  
For those farm businesses viewed as unviable whose owners want to leave the 
industry, an exit package is available. The EC exit package consists of an EC Exit 
Grant, an EC Advice and Retraining Grant, and an EC Relocation Grant. The Exit 
Grant provides a taxable one-off payment of up to $150 000 for farmers leaving the 
industry, and who are selling their farm enterprises (box C.2).  
 
Box C.2 Eligibility requirements for the EC exit package 
The EC Exit Package consists of a taxable one-off payment of up to $150 000 for 
farmers within an EC declared area who decide to sell their farm, along with retraining 
and relocation grants, both up to $10 000. In order to be eligible, the applicant has to 
have contributed a significant amount of labour and capital to the farm enterprise, and 
derived a significant amount of their income from the farm enterprise. Other 
requirements are that: 
• the applicant must have owned or held an interest in the farm for at least five years, 
or inherited/taken ownership of a farm that has been in the family for at least five 
years  
• the applicant or their partner must not have previously received a successful exit-
grant, re-establishment grant or restructuring grant under previous Commonwealth 
Government packages 
• the farm enterprise must not be involved in bankruptcy proceedings, involuntary 
mortgagee possession arrangements, or issued with an eviction order, or lost 
management control of the farm in any other way 
The maximum amount of $150 000 can only be received if the applicant’s net assets 
(including the family home) are less than $350 000. For every $3 in assets above 
$350 000, the amount of the grant is reduced by $2 up to net assets of $575 000. 
Successful applicants must agree to exit the industry for at least five years, otherwise 
the grant must be paid back in full.  
To access the retraining grant, the applicant must discuss exit advice, training needs 
and options with Centrelink. All of the elements of the EC Exit Package are 
administered by Centrelink.  
Source: DAFF (2008e).  
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The EC Exit Package is also available more widely to all farmers under the Climate 
Change Adjustment Re-establishment Grant until 2012 (but the retraining grant is 
limited to $5500). An additional exit package for irrigators in the Murray-Darling 
Basin is also available under a recently announced exit grant package (box C.3). As 
with the EC interest rate subsidies, the rationale for the EC exit package has not 
been linked to the objectives of the NDP. 
 
Box C.3 Small block irrigators exit package 
The Commonwealth Government recently announced an exit package for small scale 
irrigators as part of the water buy back in the Murray-Darling Basin. The package is 
intended to be short term (applications close 30 June 2009) and is available to 
irrigators farming less than 15 hectares. It consists of: 
• a taxable exit grant of up to $150 000 
• up to $10 000 for advice and training (including skills development, direction setting 
plans, business advice and succession planning) 
• up to $10 000 for the removal of permanent plantings and other irrigation production 
related infrastructure.  
The program will not require irrigators to move off their land, but does require them to 
sell all of their water entitlement (must be at least 10 ML) to the Commonwealth 
Government. As at December 2008, the package was only available in South Australia 
(available to irrigators in Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland as of February 
2009) and, despite many expressions of interest, no payments had yet been made.   
 
C.2 Assessment of EC triggered business support 
In this section, the appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of EC triggered 
business support measures are assessed.  
EC Interest Rate Subsidy for farmers 
The EC Interest Rate Subsidy (ECIRS) has been in place since 1993. During this 
period, the eligibility criteria to gain access to the payment have changed several 
times, altering the potential number of farmers who are eligible. In particular, from 
October 24 2006 the maximum subsidy payable over 5 years increased from 
$300 000 to $500 000. Further, over the period from 25 September 2007 to 30 June 
2009, the off-farm asset threshold was lifted from double the Newstart Allowance 
asset test for partnered homeowners of close to $500 000 (in 2008 — Centrelink 
(2008a)) to $750 000 (DAFF 2008e). As such, changes over time in the uptake of 
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the subsidy need to be interpreted with caution. Over this period total expenditure 
on ECIRS has increased significantly (figure C.1).  
Prior to the current series of declarations, ECIRS payments reached a high of $69.4 
million in 1995-96. In 2007-08, total payments were $604.1 million. As at 
December 2008, a further $155.3 million in payments have been made to 4758 
farmers across Australia.  
Figure C.1 Total ECIRS payments to farmers, 1992–93 to 2007–08 
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Data sources: DAFF (2008 unpublished); Manins et al. (2001). 
The changes in ECIRS payments reflect, in part, the proportion of Australia’s 
agricultural land that has been declared as experiencing an EC event. The 
proportion of agricultural land under an EC declaration fell from 30 per cent in 
1992 to just under 1 per cent in 2000 (table C.1). Between 2002 and 2004 there was 
a significant increase in the area of land EC declared, which was matched by an 
increase in EC payments. However, since 2004 the proportion of agricultural land 
EC declared has remained at close to 50 per cent. As such, the significant increase 
in ECIRS payments in 2006-07 and 2007-08, while partly reflecting increased stress 
on a number of farm businesses because of the prolonged drought in some areas, 
appears to be largely driven by changes to the design of the scheme. 
The average amount received per application in 2006-07 and 2007-08 increased, 
again reflecting, in part, the increasing generosity of the scheme (figure C.2).  
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Table C.1 Agricultural land under EC declaration by state, 1992 to 2008 
Per cent 
 NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas NT ACT Australia 
 % % % % % % % %  
1992 –  – 100  –  –  –  –  – 30 
1993  –  – 100  –  –  –  –  – 30 
1994 37  – 100  –  – 25  –  – 36 
1995 53 18 100 4  – 25  –  – 39 
1996 37  – 72  –  –  –  –  – 27 
1997 31 4 64  –  –  –  –  – 24 
1998 11 9 11  –  – 4  –  – 5 
1999 6 13 6  –  – 4  –  – 3 
2000 2 12  –  –  – 15  –  – 1 
2001  – 3 2  – 2 11  –  – 1 
2002 44  – 3  – 4  –  –  – 8 
2003 96 38 50 24 43  –  –  – 44 
2004 97 38 57 35 41  –  – 100 47 
2005 97 63 59 35 37  –  – 100 47 
2006 96 63 59 35 7  –  – 100 40 
2007 98 100 61 97 20 47 26 100 57 
2008 96 100 41 97 20 47 26 100 50 
Averagea 47 27 52 19 10 10 3 29 29 
a Average for 1992 to 2008. 
Source: DAFF (2008 unpublished).  
Figure C.2 ECIRS recipient numbers and average annual payments, 
2001-02 to 2007-08 
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Data source: DAFF (2008 unpublished).  
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In all states except Western Australia, the number of recipients has increased since 
2001-02 (table C.2). New South Wales had the largest number of ECIRS recipients 
in 2007-08 (8245) while the Northern Territory had the lowest number of recipients 
(7). Recipients in the Northern Territory, however, received the largest average 
payment (over $90 000), reflecting the size of their land holdings and thus potential 
debt levels. This is also the first year that any part of the Northern Territory has 
been EC declared. Farmers in Western Australia received, on average, the second 
highest subsidy per recipient (just over $50 000), followed by those in New South 
Wales (close to $40 000).  
Table C.2 ECIRS payments by state, 2001-02 to 2007-08 
 NSW QLD VIC
  
Recipients 
Total 
paid 
Average 
paid Recipients 
Total 
paid 
Average 
paid 
 
Recipients 
Total 
paid 
Average 
paid 
 no. $m $ no. $m $'000s no. $m $'000s 
2001-02 – – – 285 4 14 993 – – –
2002-03 1 320 22 16 836 994 16 16 536 820 13 16 345
2003-04 2 627 52 19 772 1 716 32 18 752 679 12 17 651
2004-05 3 009 68 22 536 2 316 37 16 112 751 13 17 866
2005-06 5 324 155 29 131 2 260 62 27 380 1 247 29 23 089
2006-07 9 686 303 31 250 3 372 113 33 412 3 726 124 33 184
2007-08 8 245 329 39 953 2 638 95 35 966 3 476 116 33 350
 WA SA TAS 
2001-02 172 6 32 842 – – – – – –
2002-03 174 5 29 527 19 >1 13 455 – – –
2003-04 202 6 27 724 42 1 13 718 – – –
2004-05 212 5 25 004 56 1 12 134 – – –
2005-06 115 4 37 859 104 2 23 425 – – –
2006-07 80 3 33 985 375 10 27 620 – – –
2007-08 182 9 50 543 1 669 50 29 964 127 4 32 332
Source: DAFF (2008 unpublished).  
Over the period July 2001 to December 2008 the proportion of ECIRS claims 
approved averaged 84 per cent. Across the states, New South Wales had the highest 
approval rate of 83 per cent, followed by Queensland and Victoria with 79 per cent 
and 75 per cent respectively. Western Australia had the lowest approval rate with 
71 per cent. The primary reason for rejection in all states was that the applicant was 
deemed to be ‘not in need’ of assistance — 50 per cent of total rejections (8 per cent 
of total applications). This also varied across the states, with the proportion of 
applicants deemed not in need varying from 74 per cent of total rejections in 
Victoria (16 per cent of total applications) to 11 per cent of rejections in South 
Australia (3 per cent of total applications). New South Wales and Queensland also 
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had relatively low rejection rates due to an assessment of ‘not in need’ — 6 per cent 
of total applications in both states. Nationally, 1 per cent of applications were 
rejected on the basis of the farm not being viable.  
Farmers within the mixed farming, beef, sheep and beef and dairy industry groups 
received the largest ECIRS payments over the period 2001-02 to 2007-08 
(table C.3).  
Table C.3 Payments to industry by state and territory 
Total paid from 2001-02 to 2007-08 
Industry group NSW QLD VIC SA TAS NT Australiaa
 $m $m $m $m $m $m $m
Beef 79.8 164.7 13.3 0.8 0.1 0.4 259.1
Cropping 112.0 12.0 53.2 5.6  –  – 182.8
Dairy 58.3 21.8 139.0 3.2 0.3  – 222.6
Fruit and grapes 30.0 7.1 16.5 7.1  –  – 60.7
Mixed 277.7 54.3 51.3 34.2 2.1  – 419.6
Other crops 60.1 43.2 2.7 1.7  –  – 107.7
Other livestock 8.0 6.7 – 0.7  –  – 15.4
Sheep 80.3 15.2 16.5 1.0 0.4  – 113.4
Sheep-beef 204.5 11.2 8.1 8.3 0.9  – 233.0
Other 1.4 0.6 0.3 0.1  –  – 2.4
Total 912.2 336.8 301.0 62.8 3.8 0.4 1 617.0
a Excludes Western Australia as industry data from ECIRS recipients is not collected. Excludes payments 
made in 2008-09 to applications received in 2007-08.  
Source: DAFF (2008 unpublished).  
The mixed farming, beef, sheep and beef and dairy industries accounted for over 
70 per cent of total payments made in the states and territories which recorded 
recipient industry information. Relative to the total number of farmers in each 
industry group, dairy farmers and mixed agricultural enterprises received a greater 
share of payments.  
Many recipients of the ECIRS have accessed support on multiple occasions, 
meaning it is difficult to gain a picture of how many producers have accessed the 
scheme by examining the number of recipients alone. Where data are available — 
New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory — 
examining the number of applicants provides an indication of the coverage and 
uptake of the ECIRS program. In New South Wales, 25 per cent of all producers 
had accessed ECIRS payments over the period (table C.4). This proportion was 
greatest for those in the sheep-beef and mixed industry groups. Mixed agricultural 
producers also had the highest usage rates in South Australia and Tasmania.  
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Table C.4 Total producers accessing ECIRS payments by industry group 
Selected states and territories 2001-02 to 2007-08a 
Industry group NSW SA TAS NT
 % % % %
Beef 9 2 – 3
Cropping 42 5 13 –
Dairy 45 15 1 –
Fruit and grapes 14 11 – –
Mixed 54 40 89 –
Other crops 17 6 – –
Other livestock 6 4 – –
Sheep 23 3 4 –
Sheep-beef 55 19 8 –
Total 25 13 3 1
a Includes all farmers who accessed support payments over the period expressed as a proportion of 
producers in each industry group in 2006-07. As recipient classification is based on individual state agencies’ 
classification, differences are likely to exist between these and those of the ABS. For other states and 
territories records by applicants are not available. Excludes payments made in 2008-09 in respect of 
applications received in 2007-08. 
Sources: DAFF (2008 unpublished); ABS (Agricultural Commodities, Australia 2006-07, Cat. no. 7121.0). 
With producers in Tasmania only having access to EC payments in 2007-08 and the 
relatively small number in South Australia receiving assistance, an examination of 
the behaviour of New South Wales producers offers the best opportunity to gain an 
insight into how long producers remain on ECIRS assistance. In New South Wales, 
the incidence of new ECIRS recipients was relatively high from 2002-03 to 2003-04 
and again from 2006-07 to 2007-08 (table C.5). These increases are in line with 
actual rainfall results despite the proportion of New South Wales under an EC 
declaration remaining relatively unchanged at over 95 per cent throughout the 
whole period from 2003 onwards. For example, from the beginning of 2001 to the 
end of 2002 around 27 per cent of New South Wales experienced exceptionally low 
rainfall — in the 5th lowest percentile (Hennessy et al. 2008). From the start of 2003 
to the end of 2005, less than 1 per cent of the state experienced exceptionally low 
rainfall, increasing to over 11 per cent over the period from beginning of 2006 to 
the end of 2007.  
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Table C.5 Incidence of ECIRS recipients in New South Wales, 2002-03 to 
2007-08a 
Number 
Industry group 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
Beef 260 311 85 192 250 229
Cropping 91 292 118 173 324 184
Dairy 133 192 34 36 55 54
Fruit and grapes 19 55 28 25 213 165
Mixed 179 330 169 484 977 520
Other crops 11 29 42 191 162 135
Other livestock 20 24 7 22 24 36
Sheep 119 270 159 237 246 124
Sheep-beef 281 648 159 492 460 303
Total 1 113 2 151 801 1 852 2 711 1 750
Agricultural land EC 
declared (%) 
 
95.5 96.8 96.8 96.2 
 
98.2 96.0
a Excludes claims made in 2007-08 for which payments were received in 2008-09. 
Source: DAFF (2008 unpublished). 
While low rainfall is associated with an increase in the number of farmers accessing 
support measures for the first time, once accessed, many farmers remain on ECIRS 
assistance. Over the period 2002-03 to 2007-08, many farmers made claims in each 
year that their area was EC declared. Those that entered the scheme for the first 
time in 2002-03 made an average of four successful claims (table C.6).  
Table C.6 Successful ECIRS claims per farm business by year of first 
claim in New South Wales, 2002-03 to 2007-08a 
Average number per farm business  
Industry group 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
Beef 3 3 3 3 2 1
Cropping 4 4 4 3 2 1
Dairy 4 3 3 3 2 1
Fruit and grapes 2 4 3 2 2 1
Mixed 4 4 4 3 2 1
Other crops 2 3 3 3 2 1
Other livestock 3 5 3 3 2 1
Sheep 4 5 4 3 2 1
Sheep-beef 4 4 4 3 2 1
Weighted average 4 4 4 3 2 1
a The number of farm businesses that made successful claims prior to 2002-03 is unknown. Excludes claims 
made in 2007-08 for which payments were received in 2008-09. 
Source: DAFF (2008 unpublished).  
   
 EC TRIGGERED 
BUSINESS SUPPORT 
343
 
This was repeated for those that entered in 2003-04. However, those in the sheep 
and other livestock industry groups made an average of five successful claims. For 
later periods, those that made their first ECIRS application remained on support for 
the entire reporting period. Over this period only 39 claimants had both successful 
and unsuccessful claims.  
Is ECIRS appropriate? 
The appropriateness of ECIRS assistance rests on whether it is tied to a valid 
rationale for government intervention. Given the NDP objectives, there appears to 
be little rationale for the provision of interest rate subsidies. However, as interest 
rate subsidies has been directed at farmers who are experiencing liquidity problems 
during severe drought events, it appears policy makers believe that there is some 
impediment to farmers accessing carry-on finance during these periods.  
But given high equity levels of recipients (average of over 80 per cent), and 
according to the Australian Bankers’ Association, the availability of credit to viable 
businesses in the rural sector both in times of drought and otherwise, it does not 
appear that significant barriers to accessing carry-on finance normally exist: 
During the drought individual banks have offered: 
• to provide carry-on finance to meet short term needs; 
• to restructure existing loans, to reduce annual payments or defer payments without 
cost; 
• to waive costs on accessing deposits including Farm Management Deposits; 
• no change in risk margins where interest rate subsidies are received … 
Banks have also increased their competitiveness for rural business/agribusiness during 
the past decade by increasing the range of products available. (sub. 76, pp. 2-3) 
The Australian Bankers’ Association concluded: 
There is no compelling case that there is a failure of rural credit financial markets that 
warrants Government intervention in the provision of financial services to agribusiness. 
(sub. 76, p. 3) 
The Commission found no evidence that farmers’ access to capital departed in any 
significant way from that faced by other small businesses, even with changes in 
economic cycles.  
Interest rate subsidies also create a number of perverse unintended outcomes, to: 
• build debt and/or not reduce debt when faced with drought risk as governments 
are likely to step in and subsidise costs (having financial reserves has been 
shown to be an important hedge against drought risks) 
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• be less responsive to drought conditions as financial support provided in times of 
drought increases the potential to spend money on additional variable inputs 
(such as fodder) to maintain production levels. 
Overall, these incentives may mean farm businesses adopt less self-reliant strategies 
prior to droughts in the belief that governments will help to maintain the farm 
business during droughts.  
Effectiveness of ECIRS assistance to farmers 
Since 1993, governments have made significant payments to agricultural producers 
in the form of subsidies paid on the basis of the cost of their debt. Evidence from 
many participants is that these payments have assisted them to remain in the 
industry during EC events. As stated by AgForce: 
This assistance proved to be very popular amongst those able to access it. It provided 
significant relief to producers by providing bulk cash injection to enable them to 
continue business operations and stay on top of debt during times of extreme cash flow 
restrictions due to lack of crops and normal stock turnover. (sub. 80, p. 2) 
Nevertheless, there is a separate question as to whether these subsidies have been 
effective in achieving the objectives of the NDP, including whether payments have 
encouraged a greater degree of self-reliance during, or preparedness prior to, 
exceptional circumstances.  
There are numerous differences between farmers within EC areas who receive 
interest rate subsidies and those who do not and between those in EC areas and 
those in areas which have not been declared (table C.7). It should be noted, 
however, that factors not specific to individual farmers may explain the observed 
differences between ECIRS recipients and non recipients within EC declared 
regions, including: 
• drought effects within EC declared regions are not uniform 
• the large area of the country recently declared as experiencing exceptional 
circumstances means there is a wide variation in agricultural practices, expected 
crop yields, stocking rates and farm profitability, making comparisons difficult 
• differences exist in administration of the eligibility criteria by the states and 
territories meaning similar farms experiencing an EC event can be receiving 
different levels of assistance (discussed later in this appendix). 
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Table C.7 Farm characteristics of ECIRS recipients and non recipients 
Average annual data per farm, 2002-03 to 2007-08a 
  Farms EC declared 
  Receiving 
ECIRS 
Not receiving 
EC support 
Non-EC 
declared farms
Physical     
Area of land operated  ha    4 241    5 655   7 320
Scale of operations sheep eq.   7 431   7 063   10 710
Wheat yield per hectare sown tonnes 1.1 1.4 1.7
Barley yield per hectare sown tonnes 1.0 1.6 1.9
Sorghum yield per hectare sown tonnes 2.4 2.8 3.0
Change in sheep numbers % -3.0 -3.0 1.0
Wool cut per sheep shorn kg 4.3 4.4 4.3
Change in beef cattle numbers  % 2.0 -1.0 2.0
Milk production litres 160 712 103 407 144 791
Receipts    
Total cash receipts $ 357 250 355 556 444 748
Costs    
Sheep and lamb purchases $ 9 356 6 489 8 440
Beef cattle purchases $ 27 231 37 807 16 826
Other livestock purchases $ 1 900  821 1 189
Seed $ 4 222 3 729 3 626
Fodder $ 38 365 30 580 22 026
Agistment $ 4 315 2 483 1 695
Fertilizer $ 19 706 21 077 45 755
Sprays $ 14 138 12 472 23 499
Fuel, oil and lubricants $ 23 187 18 954 23 800
Repairs and maintenance $ 25 358 23 327 30 982
Livestock materials $ 5 247 5 772 6 723
Shearing and crutching expenses $ 5 801 5 466 8 786
Administration expenses $ 10 933 9 569 11 882
Freight, handling and marketing  $ 15 263 16 992 24 590
Rent and rates $ 14 757 13 613 15 600
Interest payments $ 43 517 23 915 31 926
Hired labour $ 10 062 13 508 15 453
Payments to sharefarmers $ 1 163 3 076 3 041
Other cash costs $ 38 781 42 732 48 380
Total cash costs $ 313 302 292 383 344 222
Farm financial performance    
Farm cash income $  43 948  63 184  100 527
Farm business profit $ -40 283 -19 769 16 432
Profit at full equity $ 10 244 10 117 56 928
Rates of return:    
 - excluding capital appreciation % 0.3 0.3 1.6
 - including capital appreciation % 6.8 6.5 8.6
Farms with negative cash income % 30 30 26
a All estimates, except those italicised, have a relative standard error of less than the estimate. 
Source: ABARE (2008 unpublished).  
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Despite this, it would be expected that, on average, farms within any specific EC 
regions would face similar climatic conditions and have similar productivity and 
profitability potential. Thus, observed average differences for those within EC 
regions do provide some insight into the types of farms receiving ECIRS assistance 
and those that do not. Although recipients and non recipients operate similar sized 
farms (the average size of non recipients is slightly larger on an area basis but 
smaller on a sheep equivalent basis) and generate a similar amount of on-farm cash 
receipts, there are some differences (table C.7): 
• non recipients have higher average crop productivity levels (measured as yield 
per hectare) suggesting the possibility of better managerial ability of non 
recipients or that they are farming more productive land 
• average total cash costs are lower for non recipients (in particular for fodder 
costs) suggesting a greater responsiveness to drought conditions and less effort 
to maintain production level in the drought circumstances, resulting in higher on-
farm cash income. 
The proportion of small (average size 1800 ha), medium (average size 2500 ha) and 
large (average size 9600 ha) farms in EC areas receiving ECIRS assistance — 
14 per cent, 20 per cent and 22 per cent respectively — indicates that the small 
farms are less likely to receive the subsidy (ABARE 2008 unpublished).  
Observed differences between debt structures of farm businesses provide an insight 
into how well the policy has been targeted and how interest rate subsidy payments 
may have altered behaviour (table C.8).  
As the ECIRS is targeted towards those farmers who are currently experiencing 
financial difficultly due to drought, it would be expected that the liquidity ratio 
(liquid assets to debt levels partly represent the ability of producers to repay debts 
and remain operational) would be lower than that of non recipients, with average 
absolute debt levels being higher. This is seen to be the case with the average 
liquidity ratio for recipients at 9 per cent, compared to 52 per cent of non recipients, 
and average absolute debt levels of recipients close to twice that of non recipients 
(table C.8).  
Despite this, the distribution of those earning positive or negative income against 
equity levels is relatively similar for recipients and non recipients — over 
60 per cent of both groups have high equity and positive income. Also, land and 
improvement values are similar for recipients and non recipients at $2.6 million. 
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Table C.8 Debt and equity characteristics of ECIRS recipients and non 
recipients 
Average annual data per farm, 2002-03 to 2007-08a 
  Farms EC declared  
  Receiving 
ECIRS 
Not receiving EC 
support 
Non-EC declared 
farms
Farm capital and debt      
Capital value of livestock $ 297 020 316 106  406 708 
Capital value of plant & equipment $ 280 834 270 139  354 454 
Capital value land & improvements $ 2 565 687 2 572 538  3 065 687 
Total capital value $ 3 159 981 3 173 753  3 841 776 
Farm business debt at 1 July $ 531 925 279 028  380 950 
Farm business debt at 30 June $ 577 514 304 636  422 156 
Change in total farm debt % 9 9  11 
Equity ratio at 30 June  % 82 90  88 
Distribution of farms by cash flow and equity ratio   
Low equity - negative income  % 8 3  4 
Low equity - positive income  % 11 3  6 
High equity - negative income  % 21 28  22 
High equity - positive income  % 60 66  68 
Farm liquid assets      
Liquid assets $ 51 441 159 150  154 572 
FMDs at 1 July $ 9 508 26 649  26 873 
FMDs at 30 June $ 10 023 27 434  31 130 
Change in FMDs within year % 5 3  16 
Liquid assets to debt ratio % 9 52  37 
Off-farm income      
Investment income $ 4 807 12 527  11 251 
Wage and salary income $ 13 933 20 411  16 232 
Total off-farm incomeb $ 31 540 34 532  28 830 
Farms with off-farm wages % 42 39  37 
Government assistance to farm business    
Total government assistance  $ 31 652 1 443  1 084 
ECIRS $ 26 262 0  0 
Other government assistance $ 5 234 1 282  1 005 
Forms of government assistance received    
Farms receiving ECRP % 53 –  – 
Farms receiving ECIRS % 100 –  – 
Capital additions and disposals    
Farms acquiring land % 4 5  6 
Farms selling land % 3 4  6 
Other      
Age of operator years 50 51  50 
a All estimates, except those italicised, have a relative standard error of less than the estimate. b Includes 
government household support payments.  
Source: ABARE (2008 unpublished).  
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However, non recipients have higher equity levels compared to recipients — 
90 per cent and 82 per cent respectively. They also have higher off-farm earnings 
(excluding government assistance) and FMD deposit levels than do recipients, 
suggesting they use non-farm income or investment income sources to manage 
liquidity problems during drought events in order to be self-reliant. 
These characteristics, along with similarities in on-farm cash receipts and farm size, 
suggest that the liquidity problems experienced by ECIRS recipients may be related 
to the risk management approach taken. That is, non recipients appear to have 
diversified their income sources to a greater extent, and held lower absolute debt 
levels and higher FMD reserves, which has improved their ability to be self-reliant 
during EC drought events.  
But such a risk management approach would not be possible for all producers. In 
particular, those in a start-up phase, or those who have recently expanded, would 
not necessarily be able to minimise debt levels, hold sufficient off-farm assets, or 
generate sufficient off-farm income to be self-reliant. That said, expansion or entry 
decisions should also be made with consideration to the potential risks, including 
droughts.  
Overall, the characteristics of recipients and non recipients suggest that the targeting 
of the ECIRS has been effective — that is, those facing a current liquidity constraint 
are in receipt of assistance. Despite this, assessed against the objectives of the NDP, 
in particular the first objective of improving self-reliance, it appears that the ECIRS 
has been ineffective. Farmers in receipt of these payments appear to be, on average, 
less responsive to drought conditions in terms of altering their cost structures. 
Payments go to those who adopt a less self-reliant risk management approach. This 
suggests that the ECIRS program has provided assistance to farmers who may have 
been less effective in managing their operations for drought. It is unlikely that this 
form of assistance will encourage these producers to adopt more self-reliant 
strategies because payments are made as unconditional cash grants based solely on 
indebtedness — no requirement to undertake plans to improve viability.  
Implementation of ECIRS assistance measures 
A number of concerns were raised in relation to the implementation of the ECIRS 
program. Specifically, concerns were expressed over differences in the 
interpretation of the eligibility criteria between jurisdictions and over the 
complexity of the application process.  
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Some producers felt that the administering state body (usually the rural assistance 
authority or similar) in some states (such as Victoria) had a stricter interpretation of 
the eligibility criteria than others (for example, New South Wales). Such problems 
arise as each state has responsibility for implementing the ECIRS program despite it 
being mainly Commonwealth Government funded. Differences in applying the 
criteria have the potential to lead to different coverage and effectiveness in different 
states. For example, it would be possible for two otherwise identical farms in 
different states, both experiencing an EC event, to receive different levels of 
assistance.  
In Victoria, for example, access to assistance was based on the financial need of the 
applicant and not only having met the eligibility criteria. This has the potential for 
some farmers to have an unsuccessful claim in Victoria, whose claim would be 
successful if located elsewhere given the same circumstances. As claimed by 
farmers Colin and Mary Fenton based on a farmer that operated in two states: 
We have knowledge of farmers who applied and received a knock back in Victoria for 
example and applied for support in NSW and gained the Exceptional Circumstances 
approval. (sub. 64, p. 1) 
Indeed, consultations conducted by the Commission as part of this inquiry revealed 
differences in the interpretation of ECIRS eligibility criteria between jurisdictions. 
Such differences give rise to criticisms of ECIRS on equity grounds as well. They 
also lessen the potential for the policy to meet its objectives if less stringent 
interpretations mean that non-viable producers receive assistance, contrary to the 
intention of the program.  
Another concern raised was over the inefficiencies of the program, in particular the 
complexity and resulting cost of accessing the subsidy. As payments are only made 
to those farmers who are viable in the long term, there is a significant reporting 
requirement placed on applicants. For example, as put by the Mid Lachlan Alliance 
of Councils: 
The time taken and cost incurred by farmers and farm businesses to prepare the 
necessary documentation is substantial but is viewed more as a means to an end with 
the complexity of the application requiring the services of an accountant. The time 
following submission to the best of our knowledge is measured in months rather than 
weeks. (sub. 38, p. 8) 
Indeed, to overcome the reporting requirements governments have provided grants 
to the Rural Financial Counsellors Service and run extensive advertising campaigns 
to encourage farmers to not self assess but instead to seek professional advice. This 
has led to one government drought support program (the Rural Financial 
Counsellors) targeted at helping farmers access another program (the ECIRS). And, 
in the case of the Rural Financial Counsellors, this additional responsibility has 
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potentially detracted from their intended purpose. As stated by Rural Directions Pty. 
Ltd.: 
Without a network of rural counsellors in South Australia, many farmers would not 
have coped with the amount of paperwork required for different application pathways. 
This has tied up valuable counsellor time in administrative roles which has reduced the 
time allowed for other essential counselling services. (sub. 35, p. 7) 
The complexity in its delivery has led to there being considerable compliance costs 
associated with the ECIRS assistance program.  
The impact of ECIRS assistance on recipients 
While having many drawbacks, ECIRS payments have provided valuable support to 
some. Despite this, the majority of farmers have not received any payments under 
the scheme. For example, in New South Wales only around 25 per cent of farmers 
accessed ECIRS at least once over the period 2001-02 to 2007-08 (table C.4). 
Further, while recipients had relatively poor liquidity positions, only a small 
proportion appear to be financially vulnerable — 8 per cent had low equity levels 
and negative incomes — with instead: 
• 81 per cent of recipients having high equity levels (table C.8) 
• the average recipient having net farm assets of well over $2 million (table C.8). 
Coupled with subsidy payments averaging $37 000 in 2007-08, the ECIRS 
payments are unlikely to represent the difference between viability and non-
viability of recipient businesses. 
It is interesting, therefore, to examine the effect that ECIRS payments have had on 
the ‘average’ recipient. Based on ABARE farm survey data, the characteristics for 
the average broadacre and dairy ECIRS recipient in 2005-06 is given in table C.9. 
For a hypothetical average farm, working forward four years and assuming cash 
costs (including household costs), income and asset values change in line with 
average ECIRS recipients for subsequent years, those in receipt of the average 
ECIRS payment over the period would see their average equity ratios fall from 
88 per cent to 86 per cent.  
In the absence of ECIRS payments, many farmers would likely build any shortfalls 
into debt. Indeed, a survey of ECIRS recipients found that almost 50 per cent said 
they would borrow more money to maintain farm operations if there were no 
ECIRS scheme (SACES 2008a). Assuming that all farmers build any shortfalls into 
debt (with costs, incomes and capital appreciation remaining as above) the average 
farm would see its equity ratio fall — from 88 per cent to 83 per cent — but remain 
within levels considered high. Such averages, however, mask any distributional 
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effects. It is likely that for many of those 8 per cent of farms that have low equity 
levels and negative incomes any shortfalls would not be able to be built into debt, 
resulting in some of these farm businesses exiting.  
Table C.9 Impact of ECIRS for the ‘average’ recipient  
Base year 2005-06a 
  2005-06 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Income     
Total farm cash receipts $ 336 283 321 123 466 134 ..
ECIRS $ 27 906 31 630 36 666 ..
Total other income $ 33 306 35 421 30 124 ..
Total income $ 397 495 388 175 532 925 ..
Expenses     
Total farm cash costs $ 275 412 297 521 418 772 ..
Household expenditure $ 60 000 61 752 63 852 ..
Assets     
Capital value land & improvements $ 2 440 146 2 629 312 2 884 020 3 025 993
Total farm-related capital value $ 3 040 028 3 258 389 3 509 902 3 660 836
Farm business debt $ 373 633 412 695 471 902 520 379
Net equity $ 2 666 395 2 845 694 3 038 000 3 140 457
Equity ratio % 88 87 87 86
Equity ratio without ECIRS % 88 86 85 83
a Equity ratios without ECIRS payments assume any shortfall is built into debt levels. 
Source: PC estimates using ABARE (2008 unpublished).  
Impacts on small communities 
ECIRS payments also flow through to rural communities. Many participants believe 
these payments have been vital in maintaining many small towns and communities 
during the latest drought. But the extent to which payments flow through to small 
communities is dependent on the spending behaviour of recipients.  
Expenditure by farmers in smaller rural towns, those with a population less than 
5000, represents a significant component of their economies compared with larger 
towns and cities. On average, an estimated 29 per cent of farmers’ expenditure 
occurred in towns with a population of less than 5000 (Levantis 2001). Assuming 
that ECIRS recipients’ spending behaviour followed this pattern and further that 
they spend half of all their payments, the remainder paying back debt, a total of 
$91.9 million would flow to towns with populations less than 5000 within EC areas 
(based on payments received during 2007-08 of $633.6 million including small 
business interest rate subsidy payments — see following section). This equates to 
approximately $74 per person living in these towns (based on ABS Census data and 
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the proportion of agricultural land under an EC declaration giving an estimated 1.2 
million people living in towns of less than 5000 people within EC areas).  
But not all of these expenditure would remain within the local economy as income 
for residents or those in the wider region. Much would be ‘transferred’ out to cover 
the cost of goods sold amongst other things. In many cases only a retail margin 
remains within the town. If it is assumed that 50 per cent stays within the town 
(likely an overestimate) subsidy payments in 2007-08 could have resulted in an 
average income boost of about $37 per resident of towns with a population of less 
than 5000 within EC areas. However, given the uneven distribution of ECIRS 
recipients across Australia, for some small towns increased expenditures would be 
greater, whereas for others it would be significantly less.  
EC exit package 
As of 5 December 2008, only 98 applicants have received the exit package from a 
total of 469 processed claims. Of the remaining claims, 262 were rejected and 109 
are in the assessment stage (table C.10). A total of $12.8m has been paid out in exit 
grants with an additional $108 000 paid in advice and relocation assistance.  
Table C.10 Characteristics of successful and unsuccessful exit package 
claimants 
December 2007 to December 2008 
  Successful Unsuccessful
Average age years 53 52
Average payment $ 130 956 –
Average assets $ 346 941 671 501
Average liabilities $ 94 244 295 232
Average net assets $ 252 697 376 268
Average time on EC assistance months 17 18
Applicants no. 98 262
Source: DAFF (2008 unpublished).  
Of those who received exit assistance, 64 of the 98 had also received other EC 
assistance (ECIRS and/or EC Relief Payment) for an average of 17 months prior to 
leaving the industry. Not surprisingly given the assets threshold, most EC recipients 
had low average asset and net asset levels prior to leaving the industry — of around 
$347 000 and $253 000 respectively. Among those who were unsuccessful in their 
claims, average asset and net asset levels were higher recognising that assistance 
reduces to zero for those with net assets exceeding $575 000.  
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For those farmers who were unsuccessful in receiving the exit package, most were 
refused on the ground that they did not supply information to support the claim 
(32 per cent). Following this, the main reason for an unsuccessful claim related to: 
• not being a farmer for at least 5 years — 16 per cent 
• not deriving sufficient income from farming over the period examined — 
13 per cent 
• asset levels being too high — 11 per cent. 
Close to half of all Exit Package recipients had operated horticultural activities. 
Other recipients were spread relatively evenly across other agricultural industries.  
While recipients were spread amongst a wide range of EC areas, the River Murray 
and Lower Lakes EC area had the greatest number of recipients — 10 from the total 
98. Of those from this area with information recorded on industry, all had been 
involved in horticultural activities prior to exiting the industry. On a state by state 
basis, close to half of the recipients were based in Victoria (46), with the majority of 
the remainder coming from New South Wales (28) and South Australia (20).  
Given the similarities, any criticisms made of the EC exit package are likely to 
equally apply to the Climate Change Adjustment Re-establishment Grant.  
Is EC exit assistance appropriate? 
Where assets are site-specific or ‘lumpy’, as for most agricultural producers, exit 
decisions may be delayed due to expected large capital losses (Industry Commission 
1996). Further, information barriers may exist that mean farmers have little 
information on alternative uses of farm assets or potential alternative job 
opportunities (McColl et al. 1997). These characteristics create impediments to 
industry adjustment and, to the extent that they exist, may provide a rationale for 
government intervention.  
However, the Industry Commission (1996) concluded that whilst the above factors 
could impede adjustment, it is not clear that they present significant obstacles. The 
Industry Commission examined data on bankruptcies and land sales in the sector 
and found no indication of significant barriers. Moreover, it points out that where 
barriers exist it is likely that they also apply to other industries. 
Importantly, as financial incentives alone are unlikely to overcome the cultural 
barriers to adjustment, it is likely that exit grants are an inappropriate means to 
facilitate rural adjustment. This view was also put forward by the mid-term review 
of the Rural Adjustment Scheme (RAS) which concluded that grants are not the best 
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approach (McColl et al. 1997). Instead exit assistance programs should focus on the 
provision of complementary information and advice to address impediments to 
movements of people and resources. 
Effectiveness of exit assistance for farmers 
EC exit assistance has had very little usage, with only smaller farmers, with low 
asset levels, being able to access these payments. Thus, EC exit assistance has done 
little to facilitate adjustment within the industry in times of drought. Further, given 
the similarities with the Climate Change Adjustment program, the problems faced 
by the EC exit package are equally likely to apply.  
There are a number of reasons why EC exit assistance has been ineffective. First, it 
is likely that the asset limits within the eligibility requirements exclude many 
farmers who may otherwise wish to exit. As put by accountants Carrigan & Co Pty. 
Ltd.: 
We believe that the reason why there has been little take up is simple — it is virtually 
impossible to have net assets under $350,000 and not have already been forced to sell 
by your bank. We argue that a farmer would need to have at least $500,000 to $700,000 
in equity to even contemplate remaining ‘on the farm’. Most farmers with lesser equity 
than this will have already quit the industry or have been advised to quit by their 
bankers. (sub. 32, p. 4) 
Despite industry variations in the equity levels required to remain viable, current 
asset caps have likely had a significant impact on potential coverage of the scheme 
— especially since average total capital asset value for those farmers experiencing 
hardship and receiving the EC Relief Payment is close to $2.3 million.  
A number of non-financial factors are also likely to limit the effectiveness of the EC 
exit package. When considering exiting from the industry, farmers not only face the 
decision of changing occupations, but more often also need to move away from the 
family home, lifestyle and the community in which they have lived. These factors 
make the exit decision complex. As stated in one submission: 
… relocation out of area is proving to be a major sticking point for many … They wish 
to exit farming and have indicated they are pleased the grant is available to assist them 
to do so but do not wish to move from the local area to which many have a long term 
attachment, family, friends etc. (confidential submission) 
Also, as put by the Mid Lachlan Alliance of Councils: 
Current exit programs funded by the Federal Government whilst contained within a 
sound policy framework are insufficient to induce farm families to leave farms and re-
establish elsewhere. Further they do not account for the strong connection land holders 
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have with the land. Generally this professional loyalty runs very deep, spanning 
generations throughout the good and bad cycles of farming. (sub. 38, p. 5) 
Many farmers also do not see themselves as having the necessary skills for being 
able to find work in other industries. For these, retraining grants and recognition of 
prior learning is likely to have been effective in aiding the transition out of farming. 
The complexity of the exit decision has been argued to be the reason why, in part, 
previous schemes aimed at encouraging rural adjustment have not been successful 
(Botterill 2001). Farmers’ attitudes in terms of ‘country mindedness’, where there 
are non-economic attributes to working on the land which are valued highly, are 
believed to be a major impediment to the effectiveness of exit schemes: 
Country mindedness has important implications for farm adjustment policies. Hardship 
and adversity are seen as character building and part of the moral value of farming. 
Farming is regarded as a way of life with intrinsic, non-monetary values. Alternative 
lifestyles are regarded with suspicion and distaste. Under these circumstances, it would 
seem that offering a reestablishment grant is not the inducement the policy-makers 
intend it to be. (Botterill 2001, p. 12) 
As a result, policies offering economic incentives which disregard non-economic 
factors are unlikely to be successful (Kerridge 1978; Botterill 2001).  
It is also possible that other EC related programs, such as the EC Relief Payment 
and ECIRS, inhibit the effectiveness of the exit package. Where drought assistance 
measures enable non-viable farmers to remain on the land longer than they would 
have otherwise, they impede adjustment. Even with the provision of income support 
payments, there is the potential for drought assistance to work counter to any exit 
assistance measures (O’Meagher 2005; Cockfield and Botterill 2006).  
Assistance to farm dependent rural small businesses 
Between October 2006 and December 2008 a total of 2052 farm dependent rural 
small businesses had received a payment through the interest rate subsidy assistance 
package. In total, over this period $60.5 million was paid at an average of just under 
$30 000 per recipient (table C.11). Over the two and a half financial years of 
operation, the number of successful claims remained steady.  
Most claimants were from New South Wales (close to 65 per cent of claims and 
assistance paid) followed by Victoria and Queensland. In the remaining states and 
territories only 62 successful claims have been made. In terms of business types, 
most claimants operated businesses that provided rural services such as contractors 
and farm supplies (73 per cent). Following this, 16 per cent of claimants had 
transport related businesses and 2 per cent were retail businesses.  
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Table C.11 Recipient numbers and payments of interest rate subsidies to 
small businesses 
October 2006 to December 2008 
Year Recipients Total amount paid Average amount received
 no. $ m $
2006-07 759 23.7 31 242
2007-08 984 29.5 29 999
2008-09a 309 7.3 23 781
Total 2 052 60.5 29 523
a Figures from July 2008 to December 2008.  
Source: DAFF (2008 unpublished). 
A number of small businesses have also been unsuccessful in their claim for 
assistance — 815 over the period. The main reason for rejection was that the 
businesses were deemed to be not in need of financial assistance (49 per cent). A 
further 10 per cent were unsuccessful as their businesses were not farm dependent. 
Only 6 per cent of unsuccessful claimants were denied assistance because they were 
deemed unviable.  
Apart from broad usage data there is little information collected on the financial 
status of recipients and non recipients. As such, no comparisons can be made 
between those businesses that are managing drought conditions without assistance 
and those that receive help. 
Appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of assistance to rural dependent 
small businesses 
Small business assistance has only been in place since 2007. As with the interest 
rate subsidy paid to farmers, small business assistance is intended to target those 
viable businesses experiencing temporary financial difficulty due to an EC event.  
Despite a number of businesses accessing EC small business assistance, given the 
short time in operation there is little available evidence on the characteristics of 
participants, making an assessment of effectiveness difficult. What evidence is 
available suggests that the programs have not been a useful tool to help manage 
drought. For example, a study into the effects of drought on small businesses in the 
New South Wales town of Wee Waa by Spanswick et al. (2008), found that for 
those who accessed drought support: 
… over 50% of businesses who accessed this service did not find it useful … One 
business commented that drought relief seemed to offer no benefit to well run 
businesses that were doing it tough. (Spanswick et al. 2008, p. 3) 
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Spanswick et al. (2008) found that business adopted a range of drought management 
strategies including: 
• tighter inventory control 
• reduced expenditure and tighter cash flow management 
• maintaining good communication with bank or other financial lending institution 
• diversifying their business 
• reduction in staff numbers and the use of more flexible management options. 
These strategies, often developed in consultation with their accountant or bank, 
were viewed as useful strategies for managing the downturn in income brought 
about from drought conditions.  
Despite this, a number of submissions argued that assistance should be provided to 
maintain small business in towns during times of severe drought. For example, as 
put forward by Centroc: 
If government genuinely wishes to maintain rural communities, strategies must be put 
in place to support their future including research and development to facilitate 
sustainable farming, training and drought financial assistance measures … The 
government via drought support measures provides an important means of survival for 
not only farm families but the Australian agriculture sector. This also extends to rural 
contractors and businesses that all form part of the agriculture economy and who 
without their support and service provision the farming process would be incomplete 
and in some cases obsolete. (sub. 105, p. 2) 
But such concerns are generally based on the notion that governments should 
provide support to rural communities in order to maintain their functioning and 
social fabric in the face of broader external factors which are inducing change. 
While it is likely that droughts or other exceptional circumstances exacerbate the 
forces of change, it is not the usual cause of long-term adjustment. Whether or not 
government intervention could be justified, such policies should not comprise part 
of a national drought policy, and indeed, lie outside the objectives of the current 
NDP.  
A lack of data on the characteristics of small business recipients makes it difficult to 
assess these measures against the NDP objectives. However, as with the ECIRS 
paid to farmers, it is unlikely that the nature of interest rate subsidy payments made 
to small businesses, paid as unconditional grants, would be effective in helping 
develop better drought management strategies in order to improve self-reliance. 
Further, it is unlikely that appropriate rationales exist for the provision of this type 
of support in times of drought. Indeed, attempts to pursue objectives of maintaining 
rural communities through drought policy would likely lead to the delivery of ad 
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hoc support to different communities at different times and do nothing to alleviate 
the longer term structural change pressures that are affecting most communities.  
Summing up 
EC support provided to farm businesses and farm dependent rural small business: 
• appears to be well targeted and thus has been effective in providing support to 
those that whom policy makers intended to help. While little information is 
available for small businesses, the ECIRS payment has been received by those 
farmers who are experiencing liquidity problems.  
• has been ineffective in achieving the goals of the NDP and has been delivered in 
the absence of appropriate rationales for government intervention. In particular, 
the ECIRS has done little to promote self-reliance and may have even created 
incentives for producers to be less self-reliant in the face of climate variability.  
• while government support to promote industry adjustment may be appropriate, 
the EC exit package has been poorly designed and subsequently ineffective. 
Moreover, there is little justification for the use of exit grants to encourage such 
adjustment. Instead, government policies should focus on alleviating 
impediments to the movement of labour and resources through, for example, 
training and recognition of prior learning.  
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D Preparedness programs 
Various government measures available to farmers are intended to assist them to 
deal with income volatility, improve their financial risk management or implement 
plans to increase preparedness. These measures are not specific to drought and are 
intended to provide assistance more broadly. In this appendix, an assessment of the 
appropriateness, efficiency and effectiveness of these measures is presented. 
D.1 Farm Management Deposits 
Farm Management Deposits (FMDs) are financial tools used to overcome the 
effects of income variability and help to manage risks. They can be used to prepare 
for periods of income deficit.  
The scheme allows farmers to make interest bearing deposits of pre-tax income into 
FMD accounts offered by financial institutions. Deposited sums are deducted from 
taxable income in the year they are deposited and then included in the year in which 
they are withdrawn. There is typically a 12 month minimum waiting period after a 
sum is deposited before it may be withdrawn, along with a number of other 
eligibility requirements (box D.1).  
The FMD scheme commenced in April 1999 as a part of the Agriculture — 
Advancing Australia (AAA) policy package. It replaced the Income Equalisation 
Deposits and Farm Management Bonds schemes. The primary objective of the 
scheme at the time was to provide a commercial tax-linked risk management tool, 
as stated by the then Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry: 
The FMD scheme, and associated website, fulfils an election promise to offer primary 
producers a single, fully commercialised, tax-linked deposit scheme that guarantees 
freedom of choice and pays interest on the full deposit … FMDs are an exceptional risk 
management tool, offering primary producers freedom to choose a financial product 
and institution to suit their needs. (Vaile 1999)  
   
360 GOVERNMENT 
DROUGHT SUPPORT 
 
 
 
Box D.1 Eligibility criteria for farm management deposits 
Criteria for FMDs are set out in Schedule 2G, Division 393 of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act. Key criteria of the scheme include: 
• FMDs are only available to individual primary producers and not to companies or 
trusts. However, beneficiaries receiving primary production income from a trust can 
make deposits. 
• The minimum size allowed for an FMD is $1000, while the maximum amount that an 
individual may hold as an FMD is $400 000. Where a farm business is operated as 
a partnership, each partner may hold up to $400 000 in an FMD. 
• FMDs are tax deductible in the year of deposit and assessable in the year of 
withdrawal. However, a depositor’s tax deductibility entitlement can not exceed 
taxable primary production income for the year. 
• Tax deductible deposits can only be made in years where off-farm income (including 
interest on FMDs) does not exceed $65 000.  
• An FMD must be held for a minimum of 12 months. The only exception is where an 
Exceptional Circumstances (EC) certificate is held and the deposit was made prior 
to EC declaration. 
• An individual may hold FMDs at only one financial institution at a time. 
The thresholds on deposit size and off-farm income were initially $300 000 and 
$50 000 respectively. They were raised in 2006 following the 2006 review of FMDs. 
The 2006 review recommended that they be increased to maintain their real value. In 
the case of the deposit limit, the report noted that a $365 000 limit (in 2006) would be 
equivalent, but that the increasing scale of farm businesses meant that there might be 
scope for a higher limit. The review also recommended that the off-farm threshold be 
increased to $65 000. 
Sources: DAFF (2006); McGauran (2006).  
 
The scheme was enthusiastically endorsed on its introduction by the industry. For 
instance, the National Farmers’ Federation stated: 
We believe that FMDs will provide an effective risk management tool which will help 
offset two of the great unknowns in our business — commodity price movements and 
the weather. We strongly believe that FMDs will also be effective in promoting greater 
self-reliance … [and] one of the less obvious benefits will be another incentive for the 
financial sector and farmers to include risk management in farm financial planning … 
(NFF 1999) 
The FMD scheme is administered under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. 
Eligible financial institutions offering FMD accounts are required to report details 
on FMD holdings to the Commonwealth Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry (DAFF) on a quarterly basis.  
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Interactions with other tax arrangements 
FMDs are not the only provision primary producers can use to manage their 
taxation in the presence of variable incomes. Tax averaging arrangements and other 
taxation smoothing measures have been designed to address the disproportional 
taxation burden placed on primary producers with variable income.  
The tax measures available to primary producers provide benefits by potentially 
reducing their overall tax liability through tax averaging and income smoothing. It 
is generally accepted that in the presence of a progressive income tax there will be 
inequity in the taxation of people whose incomes fluctuate between tax periods 
compared with people who earn the same average income without the fluctuations. 
The people whose incomes fluctuate pay more tax than those who earn stable 
incomes. This is often referred to as period inequity. Income variation does not raise 
the same issues in the case of companies, because of the flat tax rate.  
While climatic variation can have large impacts on inter-year income variations, it 
is not the only cause. Price movements for both outputs and inputs (for instance, 
fuel and fertilizer) are also major contributors to variation in farm incomes. 
There is considerable overlap between the operation of FMDs and that of the other 
taxation measures available to primary producers. The main area of overlap is with 
tax averaging. Tax averaging allows the current taxable income of primary 
producers to be assessed for income tax at the tax rate applicable to their average 
income in the current year and the four preceding years. The scheme is designed to 
ensure that primary producers do not pay more tax than people on the same average, 
yet steady income — that is, address period inequity. Primary producers using tax 
averaging pay less tax when their income is above their five year average income, 
but pay additional tax in years when income is lower than the five year average, 
than if they did not use tax averaging. By reducing the tax rate applicable to primary 
producers in high income years and increasing it in low income years, tax averaging 
reduces the potential tax saving, and interest income, to such producers from 
depositing money in FMDs, nevertheless, FMDs can also contribute to reducing 
period inequity. 
There is also potential for overlap with other taxation concessions, although these 
are relatively minor. Forced disposal of livestock provisions allow a primary 
producer who disposes of stock because of drought (amongst other things) and will 
use the proceeds for the purpose of replacing the livestock to elect to either spread 
the income over five years, or defer the income and use it to reduce the cost of 
replacements in any of the five years, with any remaining profit included in 
assessable income in the fifth year. In the case of double wool clip provisions, 
where the sale of two wool clips in a single year arises because of early shearing 
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caused by drought (or fire or flood), the grower may elect to defer the income from 
the second shearing to the following year (ATO 2008a). 
Removing period inequity 
Tax averaging is the main provision available to address period inequity for 
Australian primary producers. However, it is unclear that the tax averaging scheme 
for primary producers fully removes the period inequity in taxation. According to 
Jeffery (1981, p. 141), the starting point for appropriately addressing period 
inequity needs to be: 
… the identification of the fundamental cause of period inequity: period inequity will 
be incurred if a given total taxable income is so distributed between normal assessment 
periods that the total amount of taxable income, which is eligible to be taxed at 
negative and/or lower positive marginal rates of taxation, is not taxed at those rates.  
Period inequity can be addressed by: 
• Taxation rate adjustment. This is the approach taken in taxing the approximately 
80–90 per cent of Australian primary producers who opt for tax averaging. Tax 
payable in the current year is calculated by applying the average tax rate 
applicable to the average taxable income in the most recent five years (including 
the current year) to the current year’s taxable income. Although this tax rate 
adjustment does reduce the tax payable over several years by farmers with 
fluctuating incomes to a level closer to the tax paid by farmers earning the same 
average income without the fluctuations, Jeffery found that its ability to achieve 
period equity is ‘restricted and indeterminate … rather than removing the 
influence of the distribution of a given total taxable income between normal 
assessment periods (characteristics of the taxable income stream) from the 
amount of taxation payable, the amount of tax payable under the tax rate 
adjustment schemes is influenced by that distribution’ (Jeffery 1981, p. 159). 
• Income transfer measures. These involve the transfer of taxable income, either 
directly or in effect, between normal assessment periods. In an evaluation of four 
income transfer measures — taxation loss transfers, Income Equalisation 
Deposits (forerunner to FMDs), block averaging and cumulative assessment — 
Jeffery (1981) concluded that only block averaging and cumulative assessment 
offered satisfactory solutions to period inequity, and that only cumulative 
assessment passed an extra test of complying with five constraints for meeting 
the overall objectives of personal taxation.1 The theoretical superiority of 
cumulative assessment — which involves taking a lifetime approach to income 
— had been accepted earlier by others (Vickrey 1939; Asprey 1975).  
                                                 
1 The five constraints are consistency, simplicity, compatibility, rate-neutrality and immediacy. 
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While Australia’s tax averaging for primary producers is not entirely effective at 
redressing period inequity, it is a practical compromise that reduces the effect of 
fluctuating incomes on tax payable over a run of years in the presence of a 
progressive income tax schedule. 
Additional benefits from FMDs in addressing period inequity 
In an assessment of FMDs for a review in 2006, it was noted that tax averaging was 
not completely effective in reducing the average tax burden over time of individuals 
with variable taxable income and that the FMD scheme provides an additional 
benefit through allowing primary producers to shift real income from above average 
years to future years, while only eventually having to pay tax on the nominal 
amount of income originally deposited (DAFF 2006).2 
Tax averaging provisions affect the time-flow of the benefits from investing in 
FMDs. In the year of an FMD deposit primary producers benefit because their 
taxable income in the year of the deposit is reduced. But, where depositors also use 
tax averaging, the reduction in income in the deposit year also acts to reduce tax 
payable in the subsequent four years, compared with what it would otherwise be. 
Conversely, when a withdrawal is made, the FMD holder increases their taxable 
income for that year, and must therefore pay more tax. However, with tax 
averaging, the effect of the withdrawal will also be to increase tax payable over the 
subsequent four years as well (compared with what it would otherwise be). 
For the relatively small number of primary producers that do not practise tax 
averaging, the return from investing in FMDs may be larger than for those who use 
tax averaging (DAFF 2006). That said, it is unclear whether or not primary 
producers are better off to formally cease income averaging for tax purposes, and 
use FMDs to spread their income over time in a more tax effective manner. If 
producers did this, the caps on FMDs could be binding for some high income 
producers. Overall, it appears the potential for FMDs to contribute to period equity 
may be greater for primary producers who do not engage in tax averaging. 
However, period equity may be enhanced also for those producers who use tax 
averaging. 
National overview of FMD use 
As at June 2008, aggregate FMD holdings totalled almost $2.9 billion. Total 
deposits grew substantially in the June quarter of 2002 after a relatively slow start 
                                                 
2 Tax is payable also on interest income earned on FMDs. 
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following their inception in 1999. Since June 2002, deposits have slowly increased. 
Further, at the aggregate national level, there has been no apparent large-scale 
withdrawal of deposits in response to either the 2002 or 2006 drought events or the 
years in between or since (figure D.1).  
Deposits follow a distinct annual pattern where deposits peak in the June quarter. 
This is a function of the tax-based operation of the scheme, whereby deposits peak 
at the end of the financial year, allowing deferral of tax liability, and withdrawals 
are highest in the first quarter of the next financial year. 
Figure D.1 Total Farm Management Deposit holdings, June 1999 to 
September 2008 
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Data source: DAFF (2008h). 
The trend in the total value of FMDs is mirrored by similar changes in the number 
of deposit holders (figure D.2). Early growth in the total value of FMDs was driven 
mostly by an increasing number of farmers utilising them. The number of holders 
has remained fairly stable since June 2002, although a slight decline is noticeable 
since 2006, potentially indicative of the effect of the recent prolonged drought. With 
an average of around 40 000 deposit holders since June 2002, penetration of the 
scheme is relatively modest. ABARE 2006 farm survey results indicated that a 
significant number of farms had multiple FMD holders and that overall, around 
30 000 farms had FMDs (DAFF 2006).  
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Figure D.2 Total number of Farm Management Deposit holders, June 1999 
to September 2008 
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Data source: DAFF (2008h). 
Average FMD amounts have been trending upwards since the inception of the 
scheme, peaking at an average of $70 000 per holding in June 2008 (figure D.3). A 
similar pattern of June quarter peaks is observed in average FMD holdings. Over 
the life of the scheme, June quarter average holdings have increased by an average 
of 11 per cent from the preceding March quarter. 
Figure D.3 Average Farm Management Deposit holding, June 1999 to 
September 2008 
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Data source: DAFF (2008h). 
There have been some differences in the value of FMD holdings by state. These 
changes reflect the relative magnitudes of the agricultural sectors in each 
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jurisdiction, as well as changes in production and income over time (a function of 
relative seasonal conditions and commodity prices). At June 2008, Queensland had 
the highest holdings of FMDs, followed by Victoria and New South Wales (figure 
D.4). Total holdings in Queensland have continued to increase considerably since 
2002. In contrast, in New South Wales, total holdings have remained relatively 
stationary over the period. Deposit holdings in South Australia dropped 
significantly in 2006 and have continued to fall since then. 
Figure D.4 Total Farm Management Deposit holdings by State, June 2002 
to June 2008 
Data source: DAFF (2008h). 
The difference in deposit holding behaviour between the states appears to be driven 
by the deposit holding behaviour of different agricultural sectors within each state 
(table D.1) and the conditions they are experiencing. For instance, the growth in 
FMD holdings in Queensland has been in the horticulture, sugar and other crops 
sectors, as well as fairly stable holdings in the cattle sector. In contrast, total 
holdings in the southern states generally declined during the drought in 2006 due to 
the considerable rundown in total FMD holdings in the grains sector. The large 
jump in Victorian holdings in 2008 can be attributed to the increases in the dairy 
and mixed farming sector — a consequence of high grain and milk prices.  
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Table D.1 Farm Management Deposit holdings by industry 
Numbers as at June of each year 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Horticulture        
total holdings ($m) 184 226 264 296 297 383 394 
number of holders  3 346 3 371 3 712 3 896 4 377 5 346 5 291 
Sugar        
total holdings ($m) 31 38 43 51 68 96 101 
number of holders  980 1 126 1 119 1 132 1 431 1 719 1 595 
Crops        
total holdings ($m) 76 91 107 111 103 153 142 
number of holders  1 458 1 365 1 562 1 439 1 492 2 649 2 340 
Grain        
total holdings ($m) 544 714 663 650 558 464 460 
number of holders  10 643 11 029 10 144 9 588 9 114 6 727 6 884 
Grain–Sheep/Beef        
total holdings ($m) 419 508 542 572 468 507 583 
number of holders  8 999 8 352 8 490 8 680 7 944 7 265 8 979 
Beef        
total holdings ($m) 302 312 352 406 439 437 398 
number of holders  5 524 5 418 6 110 6 342 6 912 6 695 6 252 
Sheep–Beef        
total holdings ($m) 132 158 184 192 170 167 170 
number of holders  2 775 2 939 3 120 3 104 3 084 3 059 3 089 
Sheep        
total holdings ($m) 121 161 170 171 160 156 143 
number of holders  3 121 3 523 3 329 3 148 3 271 3 033 2 879 
Pigs        
total holdings ($m) na na 13 15 18 16 13 
number of holders  na na 217 225 244 202 178 
Intensive livestock        
total holdings ($m) 111 123 127 141 146 153 128 
number of holders  2 112 2 101 1 938 2 031 2 432 2 444 2 080 
Dairy        
total holdings ($m) 139 128 133 164 188 179 226 
number of holders  4 153 3 315 3 256 3 667 3 984 3 652 4 123 
Forestry and Fishing        
total holdings ($m) 16 20 21 21 21 70 120 
number of holders  289 338 312 310 335 1 146 2 068 
TOTAL        
total holdings ($m) 2 074 2 480 2 619 2 792 2 797 2 782 2 879 
number of holders  43 400 42 877 43 309 43 562 42 365 40 574 41 355 
a
 Total is less than the sum of industry figures because some holders are counted in more than one industry. 
Sources: DAFF (2008h, 2008 unpublished). 
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The appropriateness of FMDs 
In considering the appropriateness of the FMD scheme it is necessary to consider 
the rationales for government intervention. The National Drought Policy (NDP) 
implies that there is some market failure in self-reliance and preparedness. This 
might be due to a range of factors such as missing insurance markets to mitigate risk 
and a lack of information on predicting droughts. Analysis of farm financial 
performance suggests that liquidity is an important determinant of farm profitability 
and self-reliance, including during droughts. If there are market failures that mean 
that farmers are not establishing sufficient financial reserves, then there may be a 
reason for government to provide incentives to increase those reserves. That said, 
there is no evidence of significant impediments to farmers building financial 
reserves. 
However, to the extent that FMDs contribute to greater financial performance, in 
turn leading to greater self-reliance in coping with climate variability, then the 
program may reduce reliance on more remedial government assistance measures. 
FMDs may also contribute to achieving period equity in the taxation of primary 
producers — as noted earlier in this appendix. Any contribution in this area could 
be more significant for those primary producers who do not practise tax averaging, 
but there could be period equity benefits also for the majority who use tax 
averaging. 
Assessing the effectiveness of FMDs 
This section considers the effectiveness of FMDs in helping achieve the objectives 
of the NDP.  
While it appears that farmers use FMDs to improve self-reliance and preparedness 
with respect to drought, it is clear that farmers use FMDs for a variety of reasons. 
The 2006 FMD review identified a number of reasons why farmers used FMDs, 
including to: 
• earn interest on otherwise taxed income 
• pay a lower eventual tax rate in situations where there is an expectation that tax 
rates will be lowered in the future 
• leverage up the effects of Exceptional Circumstances (EC) interest rate subsidies 
• obtain flexibility in superannuation planning 
• obtain a commercial option to make better timed expenditure decisions (DAFF 
2006). 
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In the National Farmer Survey 2006, ABARE asked farmers who held FMD 
accounts reasons why they used FMDs (table D.2). The most common reasons were 
tax management and income smoothing. While tax minimisation was cited by 
farmers in the survey as the main reason for using FMDs, most holders also viewed 
FMDs as an important risk management tool. Eleven per cent of FMD holders said 
that FMDs were their most important risk management strategy. 
In the 2006 survey, around two-thirds of farms holding FMDs reported having made 
a withdrawal from their accounts at some stage, although this was higher in the 
cropping sector and more generally, in New South Wales. The most common reason 
cited for making a withdrawal from FMDs was for general expenses, or working 
capital — a reason given by 77 per cent of respondents. Other reasons were varied. 
For instance only 11 per cent cited debt reduction as a purpose of FMD withdrawals 
and only 10 per cent cited capital purchases. Interestingly, tax management, which 
was cited as the most common reason for deposits, was given as a purpose of 
withdrawal by only 7 per cent of respondents. Early access provisions for farms in 
EC areas do not appear to have been heavily utilised, with only 5 per cent of farms 
who made withdrawals, doing so under the early access provisions (Boero 
Rodriguez, Watson and Mues 2006). 
Table D.2 Characteristics of FMD use 
 Per cent of farms that held
at least one FMD account
 %
Reasons to use FMDs 
Tax management 50
Income smoothing 31
Business strategy 12
Personal savings 1
Retirement savings 1
Other 5
 
Importance of FMDs in risk management 
Most important 11
Highly important 37
Important 35
Of minor importance 12
Not important 2
 
Debt increased while holding an FMD 17
 
Have made a withdrawal from FMD 66
  
Source: Boero Rodriguez, Watson and Mues (2006). 
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The most common reason for farmers to not hold FMDs, given by 60 per cent of 
farmers without FMDs, was insufficient surplus cash (Boero Rodriguez, Watson 
and Mues 2006). However, the next most frequent reason, given by 28 per cent of 
respondents without FMD accounts, was that they did not know enough about the 
scheme. Eighteen per cent of respondents said that the reason they did not use the 
scheme was because they used tax averaging. It appears that only a relatively small 
number of farmers did not use the scheme because of the eligibility restrictions. 
Four per cent of respondents said that their business structure did not allow them to 
use FMDs, while 3 per cent cited too high off-farm income as a reason for not using 
FMDs.  
FMDs and drought 
The FMD scheme appears to be being used as a financial tool to manage risk such 
as that presented by drought. While national aggregate data for the FMD scheme 
appears to mask any correlation between drought and FMD draw downs, sectoral 
data shows a much more dynamic use of the scheme (table D.1). An examination of 
annual holdings for selected industries (figure D.5) illustrates that the pattern of 
usage for the livestock and grain sectors is consistent with expectations of how the 
scheme would be used over the course of a drought.  
For livestock enterprises, many producers have been selling livestock as an active 
destocking response to drought, thus generating additional income from the 
disposal. This income may then be kept in an FMD account in order to rebuild 
numbers post-drought and is indicative of the scheme being used for risk 
management purposes. Of course, some farmers may draw down FMDs during the 
drought to purchase fodder or meet other expenses and so the aggregate changes in 
FMD holdings may be less distinct.  
Similarly for grain farmers, it appears that FMDs have been used as an active risk 
management tool. It is expected that FMDs would increase in a good year and then 
be drawn down during a poor year. Such behaviour is consistent with current FMD 
use, with a considerable draw down of FMD holdings in 2006 and subsequent years 
in the grain sector. Successive poor, or failed crops, coupled with high input prices 
for fuel and fertilizer appears to have increased reliance on FMD holdings to 
finance new plantings and maintain farm operations.  
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Figure D.5 Total Farm Management Deposit holdings, June 2002 to June 
2008 
As at June — selected industriesa 
a
 Sheep and cattle includes beef only and sheep only farms; Mixed farming includes farms producing grain 
and sheep and/or cattle; Intensive livestock includes dairy and pigs; Other crops includes sugar. 
Data sources: DAFF (2008h, 2008 unpublished). 
At an individual farm level, those with FMD holdings typically have superior 
financial performance to those who do not. In its 2005-06 survey, ABARE found 
that those farms with FMDs typically had: higher turnover; higher farm cash 
incomes; higher farm business profits; and a lower proportion of farms recording 
negative farm cash incomes. In its 2005-06 survey, ABARE found that farms with 
FMDs, on average, received significantly less other government assistance, such as 
the EC interest rate subsidy and the EC relief payment. To further analyse the 
relationship, they then compared only farms in EC-declared areas during 2005-06. 
The differences between farms with and without FMDs in EC areas were broadly in 
line with the differences nationally (Levantis and Martin 2007).  
In EC areas, those farms increasing their FMD holding during the year did not have 
substantially better financial performance than those decreasing or maintaining their 
FMD holdings. This was attributed to a range of factors including: slightly higher 
cash incomes; lower additions to farm capital; increases in debt; and higher 
government assistance. While most respondents who did not make withdrawals 
from FMDs during 2005-06 indicated that this was because they had sufficient 
income to meet their needs, 20 per cent indicated that they did not draw down 
FMDs because they had received other government assistance (Levantis and Martin 
   
372 GOVERNMENT 
DROUGHT SUPPORT 
 
 
2007). This appears to be consistent with changes in average FMD holdings for 
farmers who receive assistance versus those who do not (figure D.6).  
Figure D.6 Change in FMD holdings by EC status, 2002-03 to 2007-08 
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a
 Based on ABARE farm surveys for broadacre and dairy farms. 
Data source: ABARE (2008 unpublished). 
Views on the FMD scheme expressed by participants in the inquiry process, both in 
submissions and through industry visits and meetings, were generally in favour of 
the scheme. The two particular issues raised in respect of FMDs related to access, 
thresholds and eligibility criteria. For instance, one participant, in the horticulture 
industry, said: 
To mitigate risk in our business we utilise the Farm Management Deposit (FMD) 
scheme … However, the current $400 000 cap per partner is horrendously insufficient 
for our business. … The aim of our business would be to have enough reserves to 
completely support our business through a disaster year, and increased FMD allowance 
would be an effective way to do this. (Plunkett Orchards, sub. 13, pp. 1–2) 
Similarly, the Western Australian Farmers Federation said: 
… FMDs are by far the key mechanism utilised to enable farmers to prepare for severe 
drought. … however, the upper limit on FMDs is considered inadequate to meet the 
average operational costs of Western Australian farming systems. (sub. 26, p. 7) 
   
 PREPAREDNESS 
PROGRAMS 
373
 
And AgForce stated that FMDs are a ‘vital tool’, but: 
The scheme needs further refinement in terms of ceiling limitations and also those with 
Trust and Company structures instead of simple partnerships. (sub. 80, p. 5) 
The effectiveness of FMDs may also be constrained by the eligibility thresholds and 
criteria. A number of participants commented on the restrictiveness of the cap on 
contributions, and it is likely that for some individuals, $400 000 might be an 
insufficient financial buffer to completely offset losses in a bad year. But given the 
average deposit is only $70 000, this is unlikely to be an issue for most FMD 
holders. 
In addition, the scheme was found to be meeting its objectives as a risk management 
tool when reviewed in 2006 (DAFF 2006) and the Corish Report considered that 
FMDs are a vital risk management tool available to farmers and recommended that 
they be retained subject to assessment that they were meeting objectives 
(Agriculture and Food Policy Reference Group 2006). 
While not exclusively a drought oriented measure, FMDs are generally effective in 
addressing the objectives of the NDP. FMDs provide an option to better time 
deductible expense decisions. The incentive created by the scheme is to maintain a 
financial buffer, or reserve of funds available for future expenditure needs. By 
promoting the maintenance of financial buffers, the scheme promotes a more self-
reliant approach to risk management, consistent with the first objective of the NDP. 
Further, this financial buffer can assist farmers maintain their operations during 
drought and assist with recovery though provision of a source of funds to engage in 
recovery activities, such as rebuilding livestock numbers or planting crops.  
Eligibility and other constraints on the effectiveness of FMDs 
A number of issues potentially constrain the effectiveness of FMDs. The FMD 
scheme provides an incentive to retain financial reserves in a tax effective manner 
to deal with income variability. As such, it can only be utilised by farms that have 
traded profitably in previous years. The scheme is therefore unavailable to farmers 
who are unviable, regardless of seasonal conditions, or those who have not traded 
profitably since the scheme’s inception, including due to ongoing drought. 
The presence of alternative assistance measures reduces the extent to which the 
scheme is drawn down in response to drought. The largest impact arises from 
interaction with interest rate subsidies. While the nature of the scheme can create 
incentives to borrow additional money to fund expenditure, rather than withdraw 
funds from an FMD account, this is exacerbated by the provision of interest rate 
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subsidies. As such, it is likely that in the absence of competing forms of assistance, 
reliance on FMDs to manage for risks, such as drought, would be higher. 
The efficiency of FMDs 
Eligibility thresholds are applied because the scheme is not costless. It results in 
foregone tax revenue as users defer payment of tax upon deposit and can use the 
scheme to smooth cash flow over time, potentially resulting in a lower overall tax 
liability. The cost of the scheme in recent years, in terms of annual forgone tax 
revenue, was estimated to range between $75 million (in 2006-07) and $245 million 
(in 2003-04), for 2008-09, forgone tax revenue was estimated at $100 million 
(Department of the Treasury 2007, 2009). Annual costs are sensitive to deposits and 
withdrawals in the given year. Expanding or removing the caps on deposit limits 
and/or off-farm income would increase the cost of the measure, although this may 
be offset to some extent by a decrease in the cost arising from tax averaging, which 
involved average annual forgone tax revenue of just over $100 million between 
2003-04 and 2006-07.  
Given that average deposits in the scheme are well below the cap, and that high off-
farm income is cited by relatively few as a reason for not using FMDs, expansion of 
the thresholds is unlikely to improve the effectiveness of the scheme in helping 
most farmers mitigate the effects of drought. 
In an operational sense, the FMD scheme relies heavily on financial institutions, so 
the administration costs to government are likely to be relatively small. 
Summing up 
• While aggregate FMD holdings have not declined markedly during drought 
periods, closer sectoral analysis shows usage consistent with expectations. In 
particular, there have been significant drawdowns of FMD holdings amongst 
grain farmers as a consequence of drought.  
• To some degree, the use of FMDs in response to drought has been tempered by 
the availability of other measures, including interest rate subsidies and tax 
averaging provisions.  
• Overall, FMDs appear to be an effective tool for farmers to manage risk, 
including with respect to severe drought, and are consistent with the objectives 
of the NDP.  
• FMDs may also contribute to achieving period equity for primary producers. 
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• The rationale for government provision of FMDs is mixed. The scheme is not 
costless to government and the ability to defer tax liability provides a substantial 
benefit to eligible farmers that is not available to other taxpayers. However, it is 
less distortionary than other forms of assistance such as interest rate or transport 
subsidies and does not alter business decisions as much as those assistance 
measures.  
• Unlike EC triggered assistance, availability of the scheme is continuous and 
utilisation is not dependent on drought declaration. In this respect it is a more 
appropriate method of assisting farmers achieve self-reliance. 
D.2 Grant programs 
Grants are a common form of government assistance provided to farmers and there 
are numerous different grant-based drought related programs. They fall into two 
broad categories. The first is grants for training, advice or counselling. This includes 
programs such as the Professional Advice and Planning Grant and the Rural 
Financial Counselling Service. Elements of the Farm Help and FarmBis programs 
(both now discontinued) as well as the new FarmReady program also fall into this 
category. Essentially these programs are aimed at increasing human capital or 
achieving social outcomes. The second broad category of grants is aimed at 
improving the physical or tangible capital base and includes the Irrigation 
Management Grant. 
Professional advice and planning grants 
Professional Advice and Planning Grants (PAPG) of up to $5500 (including GST) 
are provided by the Commonwealth Government and allow farm businesses 
affected by drought to obtain professional advice to aid in drought management and 
recovery. Grants may be used for purposes such as obtaining advice on farm 
viability and the development of a farm business plan incorporating a drought 
management and recovery plan. Previous recipients of the grant can access an 
additional $2200 to re-evaluate their plans after a minimum of six months. In order 
to be eligible to receive a grant, a farmer must be located in an EC declared area 
(farmers located in prima facie declared areas may not apply) and meet the various 
eligibility criteria, which are similar to that for EC interest rate subsidies. The farm 
must meet the farm financial viability assessment and if the applicant has not had an 
assessment within the previous 12 months for an interest rate subsidy, then this 
must be obtained. An initial portion of the grant may be used for this purpose, with 
funding for the remainder of the grant contingent on the viability assessment. The 
grant is administered by Centrelink. 
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The PAPG was introduced in October 2006, as part of a range of extended drought 
assistance measures and was initially available to farmers in areas that had been EC 
declared for at least three years (McGauran 2006). Changes to the grant were 
announced in September 2007, removing the three year requirement. Additionally, 
farmers could apply up to 12 months after the expiry of an EC declaration. The 
PAPG is available till June 2009 (DAFF 2008j). 
Since the inception of the scheme, around 7700 farmers have been granted access to 
the PAPG. However, not all of those have actually accessed grant monies. Up to 
December 2008, approximately 4300 farmers utilised grant funds for professional 
advice. Further, most recipients have not yet utilised the full grant amount. Of those 
who have utilised the grant, the average payment was $3909. In total, almost $16.9 
million has been provided under the scheme. Initial use of the PAPG scheme was 
quite low, as noted in the draft report. However, there has been a considerable 
increase in the use of the scheme more recently, with over half of the total funds, or 
almost $9 million, provided in the second half of 2008 alone (figure D.7).  
Figure D.7 Monthly utilisation of PAPGa 
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 Aggregate of monthly claims is higher than total number of recipients as recipients can make multiple claims 
up to allowable grant limit. 
Data source: DAFF (2009 unpublished). 
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Appropriateness of the PAPG 
The rationale for government intervention through planning and advice style grants 
appears to be mixed. The benefits from advice provided by consultants are largely 
private in nature, with few community wide benefits. It could be expected that 
farmers would invest optimally in consultancy services on the basis of the return 
that these will generate for their businesses. That said, it is likely that there are some 
information failures in the market for education, training and advice, in the form of 
a lack of awareness of the training and advice available, as well as the likely 
benefits such advice would yield. Hence to the extent that grants have an 
educational outcome, assistance through grants could provide positive net 
community benefits and therefore be an appropriate form of government assistance.  
Effectiveness of the PAPG 
The PAPG scheme is consistent with the objectives of the NDP. The Commission 
received submissions that the PAPG had been useful in helping some farmers to 
undertake planning activities, such as developing a drought management plan. For 
instance, one participant submitted that they had used the grant to develop a drought 
management strategy and gain advice on diversifying their income stream to include 
off-farm assets to overcome cash-flow constraints (D. and T. Allen, sub. 20). 
Similarly, Centrelink provided examples of grant recipients who had utilised the 
grant and as a result had implemented changes to their enterprise that were expected 
to return the farm to profitability or increase that profitability. 
However, there was also comment made to the Commission that grants for advice 
were potentially of limited value, for reasons such as:  
• farmers already possessing knowledge or plans 
• a lack of suitable consultants in their area and/or  
• increases in consultant fees where a grant is available.  
A further concern, expressed by some, was that the timing of the grant — during 
rather than prior to a drought — limited its effectiveness in meeting the NDP 
objective of improving self-reliance. 
Limited effectiveness of the PAPG in improving self-reliance of the farming sector 
may also be evidenced by the relatively low utilisation of the scheme compared 
with that of other programs available to drought affected farmers.  
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Rural Financial Counselling Service 
The Rural Financial Counselling Service (RFCS) program was initially established 
in 1986. Since 1997 it has been an element of the AAA package, but is now a stand 
alone program, and is scheduled to receive funding until 30 June 2011. Although 
not specifically a drought assistance measure, the RFCS program are often in high 
demand during times of drought. The RFCS provides free and impartial (and 
confidential) financial counselling to farmers, fishers and agriculture-dependent 
small businesses.  
The stated list of services that rural financial counsellors can provide includes: 
• help clients identify financial and business options  
• help clients negotiate with their lenders  
• help clients adjust to climate change through the Climate Change Adjustment 
Program, identify any advice and training needed and develop an action plan  
• help clients meet their mutual obligations under the Transitional Income Support 
program  
• give clients information about government and other assistance schemes  
• refer clients to accountants, agricultural advisers and educational services  
• refer clients to Centrelink and to professionals for succession planning, family 
mediation and personal, emotional and social counselling (DAFF 2008l).  
It is specifically stated that rural financial counsellors can not provide family, 
emotional or social counselling, or financial advice and succession planning 
services. In these cases they are only permitted to provide information and referrals 
(DAFF 2008l). 
The RFCS program provides grants to state or regional level organisations to 
provide the counselling. As at June 2008, the program was delivered by 14 service 
providers with approximately 120 counsellors (some are part-time, equivalent to 
around 110 full-time equivalents). Use of the program has increased over time, with 
approximately 14 000 clients in 2007-08 (table D.3). While not a drought specific 
program, it would appear that drought has a considerable impact on use of the 
program, with higher use of the scheme in more severe and widespread drought 
years. 
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Table D.3 Rural Financial Counselling Service client numbers, 2001-02 to 
2008-09 a 
Year Total clients New clients Existing clients
 No. % % 
2001-02 6 225 37 63 
2002-03 10 236 50 50 
2003-04 8 246 31 69 
2004-05 7 933 30 70 
2005-06 8 332 25 75 
2006-07 12 287 47 53 
2007-08 14 241 52 48 
2008-09 (Jul-Dec) 6 596 na na 
na Not available. a Numbers likely to be overestimated because if a client sees more than one counsellor they 
may have duplicate entries in the database. 
Source: DAFF (2008 unpublished). 
In 2007-08, the service cost to the Commonwealth Government was $16.5 million. 
In addition, contributions are made by state governments. In general, each state 
contributes around $20 000 per counsellor in their state, although some states 
provided additional funding. In 2007-08, states contributed a total of an estimated 
$2.8 million. In addition, Queensland funds a similar farm financial counselling 
service, which operates in addition to the RFCS and covers separate areas of that 
state. 
The program has undergone substantial review. It was subject to an audit in 2003, 
followed by a review in 2004. The 2003 audit determined that none of the service 
providers fully complied with their funding agreement. It identified issues such as: 
poor corporate governance; provision of services outside boundaries of funding 
agreement; poor budgeting; inefficient provision of services; and inconsistent 
counsellor qualifications (Acumen Alliance 2006). 
The subsequent 2004 review considered that there was a ‘continuing need for a 
Rural Financial Counselling Service’, but it did make a number of 
recommendations. A key recommendation was for an alternative funding approach, 
rather than requiring local communities to provide matching funding. This was in 
recognition of the fact that disadvantaged regions most in need of the service were 
missing out. It also contributed to institutionalisation of services in particular areas 
and a lack of mobility to service areas of greatest need. The review also 
recommended changes including: improved counsellor supervision; a move away 
from social or welfare needs to an adjustment focus; and a re-skilling of 
counsellors, as required (AAA Rural Financial Counselling Service Review 
Committee 2004). 
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In response, in October 2005, the Primary Industries Ministerial Council agreed to 
restructure the program, addressing issues raised in the 2003 audit and 2004 review. 
The key changes to the program were new arrangements with service providers — 
reducing the number of service providers from 68 to 16, now 14. In addition the 
annual budget for the program was substantially increased, removing the need for 
matched community funding. Counsellor numbers have also been increased by 
50 per cent since the implementation of the new arrangements. 
There has also been recent expansion in the role of the RFCS, with responsibility 
for providing mandatory case management to recipients of the Transitional Income 
Support and Climate Change Adjustment Program.  
Appropriateness of the RFCS 
As with grants for training and advice, the largely private benefits from financial 
counselling mean that the rationale for government intervention is mixed. However, 
it is likely that there are some information market failures and that government 
intervention though the rural financial counselling service could provide net 
community benefits. To maximise the benefits from RFCS, the program needs to be 
responsive and transitive. The largest benefits to clients will be in their early stages 
of use of the program as information gaps are filled and/or they receive some basic 
financial skills. Beyond this point, counsellors should refer clients to appropriate 
services, such as commercial financial planning services (these could be funded by 
grants) to avoid duplication of services.  
Effectiveness of rural financial counselling 
While not a drought specific service, the objectives of the program are not 
inconsistent with the NDP objectives. The RFCS is popular and was considered to 
be an effective service by many participants in this inquiry. For instance, AgForce 
submitted: 
Continuation of Rural financial counsellors is imperative. These counsellors provide 
significant services to clients and can in the future place further emphasis on climate 
variability planning to help producers become more proactive in this area. (sub. 80, 
p. 9) 
Similarly, the NSW Government considered the RFCS to be effective: 
NSW considers the program to be equitable, needs driven and cost effective. It is very 
highly regarded in the community and achieves significant penetration of the farm 
sector. This Program is considered to be an effective means of facilitating improved 
farm businesses risk management and adjustment across rural NSW. (sub. 90, p. 6) 
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However, there are potential issues that can reduce the effectiveness of program. 
Many such issues were identified in the 2003 audit and 2004 review and subsequent 
changes to the program appear to have addressed many of these. But it appears 
some issues remain. With only 120 counsellors, gaps in coverage remain. There is 
also a relatively high retention rate of existing clients, although expansion of the 
service in the last two years has resulted in substantial numbers of new clients 
(table D.3). It is likely that the effectiveness of the service diminishes over time for 
regular clients.  
The effectiveness of the program is also affected by cross-over and duplication 
between the RFCS and other services that are available, including: other state-
funded counsellors and drought support workers, charitable organisations and other 
commercially available services, including those that might be accessed using 
government grants. 
Other training assistance programs 
Farm Help 
Farm Help was a short-term financial measure to assist farm families who were 
experiencing severe financial difficulties and were unable to attain a loan from a 
financial institution to meet their living expenses. It was part of the AAA package. 
Assistance under Farm Help was aimed at assisting farmers while taking action to 
improve their long-term financial prospects, either through improving the financial 
performance of their farm, finding off-farm income or exiting the industry. One 
element of the program was an Advice and Training Grant. This could be used to 
obtain advice, undertake training and purchase appropriate computer software. First 
time applicants were eligible for a grant of up to $5500. Those re-entering the Farm 
Help program could access an additional grant of up to $2500. The deadline for 
applicants to utilise the grant is April 2009 (DAFF 2008g). 
Over the 11 years to 2007-08, the grant was utilised by over 9400 recipients, with 
total expenditure of almost $22 million. Use of the scheme declined over time. For 
instance, just over 100 recipients utilised the grant in 2007-08. 
FarmBis 
This program provided subsidies for a wide range of training activities. FarmBis 
originally commenced in 1998 and was available in all states and territories. In 
2005, a new version of the program was launched under the AAA policy. The AAA 
FarmBis program was not offered in New South Wales or the ACT. Additionally, 
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Victoria ceased offering the program at the end of June 2007. While the AAA 
FarmBis program was jointly funded by the Commonwealth and state governments, 
in July 2007 the Commonwealth commenced a fully funded national FarmBis 
program in states where AAA FarmBis was not offered. It was intended to extend 
the national FarmBis program to all states and territories, but the scheme was 
subsequently abolished prior to the introduction of FarmReady (DAFF 2008f). 
FarmBis provided a partial subsidy for approved training activities. Under the 
second FarmBis round between July 2001 and December 2004, across all 
jurisdictions, just over 72 000 people undertook almost 147 000 training activities. 
Total cost to governments over this period was $102 million, of which $82 million 
was paid to participants, representing an average of $1136 per participant, or $558 
per training activity.  
The subsequent AAA FarmBis scheme was utilised by a total of almost 30 000 
participants. Lower participation may be partially attributed to the program being 
unavailable in some states. Total Commonwealth and state government expenditure 
on AAA FarmBis totalled $41 million over three and a half years, comprising about 
$11 million in program provision, $3 million in targeted industry initiatives and $27 
million in payments for approved learning activities. Average payments for learning 
activities under AAA FarmBis were similar to those provided under the previous 
version at $912 per participant or $554 per training activity. 
The national FarmBis program operated relatively briefly and was only utilised in 
New South Wales, Victoria and to a very limited extent, South Australia. In all, 880 
participants utilised the scheme for 1064 training activities. The average funding 
provided under this scheme was similar to that under other FarmBis programs at 
$792 per person or $655 per training activity. 
FarmBis appears to have been a quite popular program and has received strong 
support from many inquiry participants at public hearings and roundtables, as well 
as in written submissions. For instance, AgForce said: 
One of the main assistance measures which receives a very high level of support has 
been the FARMBIS program. … This program needs to be reinvigorated and supported 
at both levels of Government. (sub. 80, p. 5) 
There was a reasonably consistent message from participants that FarmBis had 
encouraged a broader range of farmers to undertake training activities than would 
have occurred otherwise. Similarly, a mid-term review of FarmBis found that for 
the most part, FarmBis had opened up training to rural and regional areas and that it 
had catalysed significant levels of repeat participation (PWC 2006). This suggests 
that FarmBis was an effective form of assistance in addressing the impediments to 
farmers accessing information and training. 
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FarmReady 
This program was introduced as part of the Australia’s Farming Future package. It 
was announced in July 2008 as a program to provide assistance for training to help 
farmers deal with the effects of climate change (Burke 2008d). Two types of grant 
are available under FarmReady. The first is a reimbursement grant of up to $1500 
per year for primary producers and indigenous land managers to attend approved 
courses. Up to an additional $500 per year is available to cover costs associated 
with course attendance, such as child care and travel costs in certain circumstances. 
While the program has a ‘climate change adaptation’ focus, the range of approved 
learning areas is relatively broad and covers a range of farm training activities. The 
stated key learning areas include: 
• understanding the implications of climate variability and change 
• integration of new techniques for sustainable production, as a result of climate 
change 
• natural resource planning and adaptive management, as a result of climate 
change 
• farm business management and risk assessment  
• development of research and analytical skills 
• strategic planning 
• holistic management 
• financial management  
• human resource management (DAFF 2008i). 
Learning areas for FarmReady have a climate change and/or farm planning focus 
and funding does not cover courses covering production, technical or operational 
topics unless there is a link to climate change adaptation (DAFF 2008i). 
The second type of grant available under FarmReady is an industry grant of up to 
$80 000 per year for eligible industry, farming and natural resource management 
groups to develop strategies to improve industry self-reliance and preparedness to 
adapt to climate change. Industry grants may be offered for projects such as: 
• identifying strategies to combat climate change issues 
• industry specific training plans 
• climate change communication campaigns 
• facilitating uptake of best management techniques (DAFF 2008i).  
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Calls for applications for the first round of industry grants were made in December 
2008 and closed on the 17 February 2009 (Burke 2008b). 
The FarmReady program has only just become available and so there was no 
training undertaken through the program in 2008. The program has strong parallels 
with the discontinued FarmBis, although with a narrower scope for training courses. 
The available reimbursement is well above the average grant that was provided 
under FarmBis. However, the FarmReady program has been allocated $26.5 million 
over four years, which equates to significantly less average annual funding than that 
expended on FarmBis programs. 
Climate Change Adjustment Program Advice and Training Grants 
This is a grant of up to $5500 delivered under the Australia’s Farming Future 
program. In the first instance, recipients of the grant must obtain a farm business 
analysis and financial assessment. Recipients are then required to develop a climate 
change adjustment action plan. Additional grant funds can be used for advice or 
training activities identified in the action plan. Advice or training must be, either 
directly or indirectly, related to adjusting to the impacts of climate change (DAFF 
2008c).  
Because these grants have only been offered since July 2008, there is little 
information on their utilisation. As at December 2008, there were 640 applications 
for the grant. Of these, 261 were granted access, with 86 claims for payment lodged. 
So far, applications for the grant have come from those applying for Transitional 
Income Support (TIS), as TIS applications include an application for the grant as 
well. However, the grant is not restricted to TIS applicants.  
Irrigation Management Grant 
Irrigation Management Grants (IMGs) were introduced on 25 September 2007 in 
response to the on-going effects of substantially reduced water allocations in the 
Murray-Darling Basin (MDB). In a media release, the then Minister for Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Forestry said: 
The Government recognises that this is an unprecedented situation for most irrigators 
and that there is a need for immediate financial assistance … These grants will be made 
available to MDB irrigators to help them respond to significantly reduced water 
allocations. (McGauran 2007b) 
The IMG is a taxable grant of up to $20 000 available to irrigators in the MDB. 
Claims are made to Centrelink. Grants will be paid up till 30 June 2009, but 
applications close on 31 March 2009. 
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To receive a payment, a farmer must identify an eligible activity. Eligible activities 
that are covered by the grant are: 
• piping, troughs and associated activities for stock and domestic water 
• fixed water charges 
• sinking/extending/refurbishment of bores (and pumps) 
• pruning activities to minimise the impact of low water allocations 
• reconfiguring irrigation systems 
• equipment replacement to maintain irrigation systems (including computer 
software, piping and pumps) 
• costs associated with implementing water efficient crop options and 
• laser leveling (DAFF 2008k).  
It is not available for other farm costs such as purchasing vehicles, purchasing water 
or fodder, or refinancing. 
To qualify for the grant, the applicant must meet certain criteria. They must 
establish that they have been a farmer for at least two years prior to application. 
They must also have had an irrigation enterprise as at 25 September 2007. To 
qualify as an irrigator they must hold an active entitlement to an irrigation water 
source in the MDB, or demonstrate that in the last three years they have derived 
income from, or would have if not for reduced allocations, an irrigation activity. 
Irrigators only qualify for irrigation from a regulated water source, and not where 
irrigation water has been used purely for stock and domestic purposes. 
The asset test limits for the grant are the same as for the EC interest rate subsidy. 
However, there are no off-farm income limits. The grant is only available once per 
enterprise and applicants who own multiple enterprises can only apply once. It is 
not restricted by business structure and is available to sole traders, partnerships, 
companies and trusts. 
Use of IMGs 
From the program’s inception until mid-December 2008, a total of 11 645 claims 
for the IMG were lodged. Of these, 9497 irrigators were granted the IMG, including 
4923 recipients in Victoria, 3196 in New South Wales, 1229 in South Australia and 
125 in Queensland. A further 1714 applications were rejected. In the case of those 
receiving the grant, the average grant paid was $18 611, resulting in total payouts 
under the scheme of almost $177 million. 
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It was estimated that there were 18 634 agricultural businesses irrigating in the 
MDB (ABS 2008f) in 2005-06. This would suggest that the grant has been accessed 
by just over half of the irrigators across the MDB. However, the grant has not been 
taken up uniformly across the states (figure D.8). In New South Wales, 
approximately 48 per cent of irrigators have utilised the scheme, and in South 
Australia, 49 per cent, which is similar to the basin-wide average. Take up of the 
scheme has been considerably higher in Victoria, where approximately 62 per cent 
of irrigators have accessed the grants. At the other end of the spectrum, only 
8 per cent of irrigators in the MDB in Queensland have accessed the grant.  
Figure D.8 Irrigators in the Murray-Darling Basina 
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 Includes IMG recipients up to mid-December 2008. 
Data sources: ABS (2008f); Centrelink (2008 unpublished). 
Appropriateness of IMGs 
In assessing the appropriateness of the grant, it is necessary to consider the 
rationales for government intervention and whether there are any market failures 
that may warrant government intervention. In terms of improving self-reliance and 
maintaining the agricultural resource base and capacity to recover, there would 
appear to be little evidence of market failure. In contrast to investments in human 
capital (through education and training), there would seem to be virtually no 
information barriers or rural credit market constraints (Australian Bankers 
Association, sub. 76) that prevent irrigators from undertaking financially 
worthwhile infrastructure improvements. While there are considerable community 
wide issues with respect to water use efficiency that might justify government 
intervention, these are not specifically targeted by the grant. Overall, there would 
seem to be no rationale for government intervention with respect to market failures.  
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How effective have IMGs been? 
The stated purpose of the grants is to help irrigators cope with the effect of cuts to 
water allocations. To this end, grants are permitted to be used on a range of 
infrastructure projects, which are primarily aimed at improving on-farm water use 
efficiency. However, grants may also be used to pay fixed water charges. 
The grant was viewed as an effective form of assistance by some participants to this 
inquiry. For instance, Murray Dairy stated: 
This grant has not only allowed farmers to increase on-farm efficiencies but also 
provided work to small business that would traditionally have little work during 
drought. (sub. 70, p. 5) 
In the context of assisting with the short-term effect of water shortages, the grant is 
no doubt beneficial for irrigators, given its generosity and fungibility and so the 
grant is potentially effective in improving the survival of farmers in the face of 
climate variability and climate change. Projects that improve water use efficiency 
may assist farmers to maintain productivity in face of lower water availability. In 
this regard the grant could be effective in addressing all three of the NDP objectives 
as it provides assistance in maintaining agricultural production and could improve 
the productivity of water when allocations increase.  
The effects of the grant will ultimately depend on how the grant is used. If grants 
are used to pay bills that a farmer would otherwise have had to pay or used to 
undertake capital works that would have been undertaken regardless, then the grant 
will not affect irrigator behaviour, but merely represent an income transfer from 
taxpayers to the irrigator. Because of the broad range of expenditure options, where 
the benefit of any option is captured largely by the private irrigator, grant receipts 
are highly fungible. As a result, the effectiveness of the program in meeting specific 
objectives is likely to be diminished.  
Interaction with other assistance measures 
There is some interaction between assistance measures and it is common for 
farmers to receive assistance under more than one program. In the 2007-08 financial 
year, Centrelink estimated that a total of 9558 irrigators in the MDB accessed one or 
more of the drought assistance programs — EC relief payments, IMGs and exit 
payments — that they administer (table D.4).  
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Table D.4 Drought assistance received by irrigators in the Murray-Darling 
Basin, 2007-08 
Program Number of recipients
IMG only 4 433
IMG and EC relief payment 2 997
IMG, EC relief payment and exit grant 2
EC relief payment only 2 108
EC relief payment and exit grant 10
Exit grant only 8
Total 9 558
Source: Centrelink (2008 unpublished). 
Of the 7432 irrigators that received the IMG in 2007-08, 2999, or 40 per cent, also 
received the EC relief payment. Of these, two recipients also subsequently accessed 
the exit grant as well. It also seems that there were over 2000 irrigators in the MDB 
who accessed income support, but not the IMG. It is unclear why this might be the 
case. Possible reasons could be a lack of awareness of the grant program, a lack of 
suitable projects, or irrigators could still be planning the best use of the grant. 
There also appears to have been considerably greater take up of the IMG than the 
Professional Advice and Planning Grant (PAPG). Of the 9558 irrigators in the MDB 
who received Centrelink administered assistance, 1630 also accessed the PAPG. Of 
IMG recipients, 1480 (20 per cent) also accessed the PAPG. While this may 
partially reflect differences in eligibility criteria, it is also likely to reflect the greater 
discretion available to the recipient over how the funds are spent in the IMG.  
Summing up 
• Overall, the appropriateness of grant based assistance measures is mixed and 
depends on the type of outcome being targeted by the grant.  
• The rationale for government intervention through grant programs is generally 
weak. This is because the benefits from assistance are largely private in nature, 
meaning that individual farmers have an incentive to invest optimally in the 
training, professional advice, or capital works being targeted by the grant.  
• However, it is possible there are some information market failures with respect 
to education and training. In this case, grants for training and professional advice 
that are well targeted, area appropriate and have an educational outcome may 
provide net community benefits and be worthwhile.  
• The effectiveness of current training and advice programs varies. The PAPG 
appears to be effective in some cases, but this is tempered by relatively low 
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levels of utilisation. On the other hand, the RFCS is seen as an effective program 
and has higher utilisation rates.  
• While the IMG has been relatively popular, in terms of the NDP, its 
effectiveness is reduced by its broad scope and highly fungible nature. Further, 
there are no market failures to justify the grant as the benefits are largely private 
in nature, with no specific community wide benefits. 
• Provision of education services may not always be effective if they do not 
address farmers’ requirements. Additionally, such services can also ‘crowd out’ 
provision of training and consultancy services by the private sector. As such, 
grants or subsidies for training or education, such as the discontinued FarmBis or 
FarmReady may be more appropriate methods of providing assistance to farmers 
to improve their self-reliance and preparedness. 
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E State and territory drought policies 
and measures 
Many state and territory governments have drought policies that operate along side 
the National Drought Policy (NDP) and deliver a wide array of drought assistance 
measures to farmers, farm households and small businesses in rural areas. While 
this appendix does not provide a comprehensive catalogue or assessment of all 
measures delivered to drought affected businesses, household and consumers, 
details of the main drought related policies and measures are analysed. Many of the 
measures delivered by state and territory governments involve small amounts of 
funding, have limited coverage and operate over relatively short time frames. Other 
measures also delivered in part by state and territory governments such as the 
Exceptional Circumstances (EC) Interest Rate Subsidy (ECIRS) and the Rural 
Financial Counselling Service are discussed in appendixes C and D respectively.  
E.1 State and territory government drought policy 
platforms, objectives and measures 
A number of state and territory governments have drought policies and measures 
directed at assisting farmers and rural communities experiencing hardship caused by 
drought. Some of these policies repeat the objectives of the NDP while others have 
their own objectives.  
Under these policies are a vast array of assistance measures that vary in generosity, 
coverage and purpose. They can be broadly categorised into seven main groups: 
• transport and other transaction subsides — payments made to farmers to reduce 
production costs during drought events 
• business subsidies and grants — direct government outlays to support farmers or 
businesses within rural towns 
• waivers of rates and other government charges — exemptions for farmers and 
businesses in rural areas from normal government fees and charges, which 
reduce government revenues 
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• environmental measures — measures aimed at preventing the degradation (or 
improving the quality) of natural assets during drought 
• concessional business loans — financial assistance to farmers and small 
businesses in rural areas involving some mutual responsibility 
• household and community support measures — measures aimed at providing 
support to farming families experiencing hardship due to drought conditions and 
to maintain the fabric of rural communities under stress due to drought 
• drought related training, research, development and extension — activities to 
improve the ability of the farming sector to prepare for and cope with drought.  
As well as drought assistance policies and measures, each state and territory 
government provides a range of programs and initiatives to facilitate sustainable 
economic, social and environmental outcomes for regional Australia. These include 
business investment and development programs, regional economic development 
schemes, community economic development and the payroll tax incentive scheme. 
For example, Regional Development Victoria provides the ‘Small Towns 
Development Fund’, the Queensland Department of Tourism, Regional 
Development and Industry provides a program for ‘Building Rural Leaders’ and the 
South Australian Department of Trade and Economic Development has a ‘Regional 
Development Infrastructure Fund’ and ‘Rural Town Development Fund’.  
Similarly, local governments often have an economic development role and 
undertake measures to promote communities, provide infrastructure, protect rural 
environments, and conserve or manage cultural heritage through a variety of 
mechanisms.  
New South Wales 
New South Wales does not have a documented drought policy beyond the NDP. 
Despite this, the state has implemented a range of additional government support 
programs in response to drought (box E.1). Some programs were of limited 
timeframe and are no longer operating. Since 2002, $396 million in drought 
assistance has been provided including: 
• $131 million in transport subsidies 
• $90 million for the state share of ECIRS 
• $40 million in fee waivers 
• $21 million in services to farmers 
• $29 million on town water supply problems 
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• $11 million in payroll tax waivers (NSW Government, sub. 90). 
 
Box E.1 New South Wales drought assistance measures 
Transport and other transaction subsidies 
• Transport subsidies — available for stock, water and fodder movements to farmers 
in state drought declared areas. 
Business subsidies and grants 
• Drought feedlot grant — A grant of $10 000 was made available by some 
Catchment Management Authorities for the establishment of drought feedlots. This 
grant is not currently offered. 
• Business Improvement and Recovery Strategies — grant of up to $3000 for small 
businesses in regional areas dependent on agriculture sector and affected by 
drought to sustain their operations. 
Waivers of rates and other government charges 
• Since 2002, $40 million in fees has been waived. Includes fees such as western 
land lease fees, wild dog and pest insect levies, apiary site fees and some irrigation 
fees. 
• Payroll tax concessions — available to eligible businesses with less than 200 
employees. There have been 108 recipients since 2002 with concessions totalling 
$11 million. 
Concessional business loans  
• Special conservation scheme — low interest loans to undertake conservation works, 
including upgrading of water/irrigation infrastructure and fodder/grain storage. 
Expenditure on the scheme has totalled $55 million since 2002. 
Household and community support measures  
• Drought support workers — drought support workers provide support to families 
during drought, including providing information on available services and assisting in 
application processes. There are 10 drought support workers across the state. 
• Farm family gatherings — organised community social events. Access to 
information and services is incorporated into the events. Up to June 2008, 2092 
gatherings were conducted. An average of around $700 in additional cash costs 
were incurred by the NSW Government per event.  
• Grant for tank water — up to $400 for low income rural households dependent on 
tank water. 
• Department of Community Services (DoCS) Drought relief payment — up to $2000. 
Available to those unable to access Centrelink provided income support. 
Sources: DPI (New South Wales) (2008); NSW Government (sub. 90).  
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Victoria 
Victoria’s drought-related initiatives pre-date its recently announced agricultural 
policy Future Farming. While the Future Farming policy has a broader focus which 
may encompass drought-related policies, it is unclear whether the current suite of 
drought-related initiatives will become part of this policy.  
While no formal drought policy exists, the Victorian Government is reported to 
have two key objectives for its drought assistance. These are to provide: 
• short term support to help families and communities cope with the temporary 
impact of exceptional circumstances 
• longer term assistance for structural adjustment for farming and other businesses 
whose ongoing viability is threatened by adverse climatic conditions 
(SACES 2008b).  
In recognition of the nexus between short-term emergency support and the 
incentives for preparing for future droughts and the management of natural 
resources by farmers, the Victorian Government has developed four drought 
assistance principles in designing measures: 
• drought should be treated as a legitimate business risk that farmers and other 
businesses should prepare for 
• drought relief measures should be environmentally sustainable 
• drought related assistance should target household welfare and community 
resilience through support for social and economic infrastructure 
• drought policy should aim to manage the long term structural adjustment 
process.  
Despite this, a number of drought measures (box E.2) do not appear to be designed 
with these principles in mind. For example, some payments are targeted directly at 
farm business costs that should have been planned for if drought was viewed as a 
legitimate business risk. Further, Victorian drought policy is directly targeted at 
managing structural adjustment despite drought being only one factor that places 
pressure on farm businesses and rural communities.  
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Box E.2 Victoria drought assistance measures and costs, 2006-07 
Business subsidies and grants ($7.3 million) 
• Regional Infrastructure Development Fund ‘Water for Industry’ program — subsidies 
for public water businesses and private firms to reduce potable water use, costing 
$1.9 million. 
• Water tank rebate — a one-off rebate on water storage infrastructure for household 
and livestock use in the Grampians Wimmera Mallee during 2006-07, costing 
$1.836 million.  
• Pumping of the Waranga Basin — 87 billion litres of water was pumped from the 
Waranga Basin for use in the Goulburn system at a cost of $2.52 million ($30/ML).  
• Drought apprenticeship retention bonus — $1500 cash grant for businesses in EC 
areas to retain apprentices (total cost of $1.02 million).  
• Regional Industry Investment Program — support for businesses relocating to, or 
expanding capital works in, EC areas. No uptake of the allocated $5 million.  
• On-farm productivity grants — grants of up to $3000 to assist farmers to undertake 
on-farm works that will improve productivity and mitigate the future impacts of 
drought (allocated funding of $10 million in 2007-08). 
Waivers of rates and other government charges ($44 million) 
• Rebates on fixed water rates — rebates of up to $5500 on the fixed component of 
water bills for those receiving less that 50 per cent of their allocation (total cost of 
$34.5 million).  
• Municipal and family shire rate rebate — 50 per cent rate subsidy for farmers 
receiving the EC Relief Payment, costing $9.5 million.  
Environmental measures ($10.5 million) 
• Drought employment program — Catchment Management Authorities provide 
employment on projects to restore natural assets on private land, costing 
$10 million.  
• Stock containment facilities — subsidies to farmers to build stock containment 
infrastructure to minimise soil erosion, costing $0.5 million. 
Household and community support measures ($35.76 million) 
• Communication strategy — information provided to rural communities on how to 
manage drought and what programs are available to assist them (allocated funding 
of $1.5 million in 2007-08). 
• Small town development fund — grants of up to $250 000 for projects in regional 
towns in EC areas, costing $2.9 million. 
(Continued on next page)  
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Box E.2 (continued) 
Household and community support measures (continued) 
• Local Infrastructure Works Program — grants to local councils and shires in EC 
areas to undertake minor works and local infrastructure projects, costing 
$16.8 million.  
• Roads projects — fast track the upgrade of six roads in EC areas, costing 
$5.358 million. 
• Rural skills connect — funding for 10 pilot projects aimed at finding workers for 
businesses experiencing skill shortages, through engaging farmers and workers 
laid-off due to drought (allocated finding of $3.25 million in 2007-08). 
• Tourism marketing campaign — grants to drought-affected regional tourism 
campaign committees (allocated funding of $0.3 million in 2007-08).  
• Drought relief for community and country sport and recreation (various programs) — 
grants to maintain sport and recreation-related infrastructure costing $4.652 million. 
• Tackling rural poverty and supporting families through drought initiatives — funding 
grants to kindergartens in drought-affected regions for Christmas hampers and toys, 
assistance for back to school costs and the development and enhancement of local 
information and referral networks, costing $1.241 million.  
• Mental health and drought counselling — to improve early intervention, coverage 
and outcomes from mental health programs, costing $3.225 million.  
• School and kindergarten fee relief packages — fee subsidies and grants to schools 
in drought-affected regions ($0.834 million spent on kindergarten fee relief). 
• Building resilient communities — grants for community events and programs to 
assist drought-affected communities with drought recovery and to build community 
resilience, costing $0.75 million.  
• Planning for change — grants provided to local councils in drought-affected areas to 
assist community engagement in planning and regional adjustment (allocated 
funding of $0.6 million in 2007-08). 
• Sustainable farm families — workshops and information to improve awareness of 
health, wellbeing and safety issues facing farm families (allocated funding of $1.35 
million in 2007-08). 
Drought related training, research, development and extension ($2.9 million) 
• One-to-one extension services — information and advice to farmers in drought ‘hot-
spots’, costing $0.5 million. 
• Future farm planning — information and planning advice for farmers to improve 
decision making, costing $0.65 million. 
(Continued on next page)  
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Box E.2 (continued) 
Drought related training, research, development and extension (continued) 
• Rural futures forums — information for communities and industries to improve 
adjustment decisions (allocated funding of $0.83 million in 2007-08). 
• Goulburn and Murray Irrigation horticulture assistance — one-to-one advice for 
horticulturalists to improve decision making (allocated funding of $1.2 million in 
2007-08). 
• Drought recovery program — advice to help farmers recover from drought through 
evaluating current circumstances, planning for the future and the implementation of 
plans (allocated funding of $1.2 million in 2007-08). 
• Business continuity program — information provided to farm and non-farm 
businesses in EC areas to improve business decision making, delivered through 
workshops, forums and one-to-one meetings, costing $1.75 million.  
• Business transitioning program — workshops, forums and one-to-one business 
counselling to drought-affected non-farm businesses (allocated funding of $1 million 
in 2007-08). 
Source: SACES (2008b).  
Queensland 
Queensland’s drought policy, Drought — Managing for Self-Reliance, was adopted 
in 1992 and reiterates the objectives of the NDP. The primary aim of the policy is: 
To achieve a level of self-reliance within Queensland’s rural industries such that the 
risk of drought is adequately covered by sound property planning and management 
practices. (Queensland Government, sub. 77, p. 3) 
The Queensland Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries (DPIF) delivers its 
drought assistance measures through the Drought Relief Assistance Scheme 
(DRAS). The DRAS, which has been in place since the 1960s, was to be phased out 
after the development of the NDP and Queensland’s drought policy in 1992, but has 
instead been retained subject to annual review.  
The main measure delivered under the DRAS is a transport subsidy — freight 
subsidies for fodder and water during drought, and freight subsidies for livestock 
returning from agistment, or for restocking properties recovering from drought.  
A number of other drought assistance measures are also available from other 
departments and agencies within the Queensland Government (box E.3). These 
range from the provision of carry-on finance for drought-affected producers 
(Queensland Rural Adjustment Authority) to publicly funded research and 
development (Environmental Protection Agency).  
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Box E.3 Queensland drought assistance measures 
Transport and other transaction subsidies 
• Transport subsidy — freight subsidies paid to farmers in State drought-declared 
regions for: the transportation of fodder and water; stock going to and from 
agistment; and restocking.  
Business subsidies and grants 
• Small business emergency assistance scheme — an interest rate subsidy of up to 
50 per cent (capped at $10 000 per annum) on interest payments on new and 
existing loans incurred by locally owned small businesses in, dependent on, or 
adjacent to EC declared areas. 
Waivers of rates and other government charges 
• Irrigators fixed water charges rebate — a rebate of up to $10 000 per financial year 
on fixed water charges incurred by producers over the period 1 July 2006 to 
30 June 2008 in areas that have previously had, or currently have, low water 
availability.  
• Hardship provisions for rent or lease instalments on state land — deferral 
allowances for those businesses experiencing hardship and unable to pay rent on 
lease instalments on state land.  
• Transport concessions — concessions for primary producers such as payment 
options for vehicle inspection fees, drought road train permits and increased vehicle 
height limit when transporting machined baled hay.  
• Electricity tariff concessions — concessions to primary producers declared as 
experiencing drought conditions (state-based declaration).  
Concessional business loans  
• Drought carry-on finance — provides subsidised finance for primary producers 
affected by drought (up to $100 000). As at the financial year ending 2007-08, 150 
loans were in place at a value of $5.492 million with $93 840 remaining to be repaid. 
• Drought recovery loan scheme — formally the drought crop loan and drought 
restocking loan, the recovery loan allows producers to borrow amounts up to 
$200 000 (capped at $60 000 to purchase crop materials and $100 000 for non-
breeding stock purchases) at concessional rates. At the end of the 2007-08 financial 
year, 67 loans were in place, initially worth $4.034 million with $41 247 remaining to 
be repaid.  
(Continued on next page)  
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Box E.3 (continued) 
Household and community support measures  
• Hardship provisions for rent or lease instalments on state land — reduced rent 
payments on state land for families experiencing hardship.  
• Transport concessions — farming families in drought-affected areas that drive their 
children to school or connect with a school bus may be eligible for an increase in the 
school transport allowance. 
Drought related training, research, development and extension 
• ‘Long Paddock’ — decision-support information services to better manage climatic 
risks and opportunities.  
Sources: DPIF (2008a, 2008 unpublished).   
 
Western Australia 
There is no specific drought policy in Western Australia and there have been 
relatively few state drought assistance measures (box E.4). While there is no state 
drought declaration process, state assistance under the 2007 Dry Season Assistance 
scheme was based on shire boundaries.  
 
Box E.4 Western Australia drought assistance measures 
Business subsidies and grants 
• 2007 Dry Season Assistance Scheme — grants of up to $8000 for eligible farmers 
in specified shires, funds for rural counselling services, funds for councils or 
community organisations to undertake community activities and financial advice for 
small businesses. Announced in August 2007 and applications closed March 2008. 
In total, $4.3 million in grants was paid to 507 recipients.  
Drought related training, research, development and extension 
• Farm Training WA — state funded scheme to replace FarmBis. Funded for one year 
commencing 1 July 2008 ($1.5 million). 
Source: RDBC (2008).  
 
South Australia 
While the South Australian Government has a set of objectives to help guide the 
development of drought assistance measures, it does not have a formal drought 
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policy of its own. Instead, the NDP is used as the overarching policy. Based on the 
three NDP objectives, the South Australian Government has five core objectives 
that underpin its drought assistance measures: 
• Achieving self reliance by farmers in managing risks stemming from normal 
climatic variability by increasing the focus on drought preparedness; 
• The provision of appropriate assistance to producers experiencing conditions of 
exceptional circumstances; 
• Ensuring that the provision of this assistance is equitable, efficient and timely and is 
based on the best science and information; 
• Facilitating the maintenance and protection of Australia’s agriculture and 
environmental resource base during periods of increasing climatic stress; and 
• Facilitating the early recovery of agricultural and rural industries, consistent with 
long-term sustainable levels. (South Australian Government, sub. 91, p. i) 
A range of assistance measures are delivered by the South Australian Government 
which are detailed in box E.5.  
 
Box E.5 South Australian drought assistance measures 
Business subsidies and grants 
• Farm debt mediation — $2000 grant for farmers in drought-affected areas for an 
independent mediator to negotiate with their bank.  
• Planning for recovery grants — grants of up to $14 000 for those receiving ECIRS 
for expert support in preparing ($4000) and completing ($5000) farm plans, and to 
undertake immediate farm works ($5000).  
• Computers for drought — subsidised provision of ex-government computers and 
training for ECIRS recipients.  
• Drought apprenticeship retention program — payments for employers in 
drought-affected regions for apprentices and trainees enrolled in selected rural, 
horticultural trades that support agricultural production.  
Waivers of rates and other government charges 
• Mortgage stamp duty relief — mortgage stamp duty exemptions for producers 
needing to extend finance as a result of drought. 
• Water transfer fee exemptions — River Murray licence holders who buy water in 
2008-09 to top-up their water access to a level that does not exceed their water 
allocation can apply to have the $335 application fee waived. 
• Ex gratia payments — payments made to offset 50 per cent of the natural resource 
management water levy for River Murray licence holders. 
(Continued on next page)  
 
   
 STATE AND 
TERRITORY 
DROUGHT POLICIES  
401
 
 
Box E.5 (continued) 
Waivers of rates and other government charges (continued) 
• Freeholding perpetual leases — the postponement of payment deadlines for 
farmers in drought-affected areas who are part of the accelerated freeholding 
project. 
Household and community support measures  
• Energy and school costs concessions and remissions — concessions and 
remissions for energy costs and school fees for families impacted by drought. 
• Community counselling — confidential emotional counselling provided to individuals 
in drought-affected communities.  
• Mental health support — a 24 hour emergency assistance and information service 
directed at primary producers affected by drought.  
• Community support grants — grants of up to $5000 for rural communities to stage 
activities that build resilience and help in coping with the drought.  
• School expenses — $150 per student for drought-affected families with access to 
benefits through the School Card to assist with educational expenses.  
• Young farmer package — a rural leadership program targeting up to 20 leaders in 
drought-affected regions to assist them to become mentors for their community. 
Drought related training, research, development and extension 
• Technical advice and information workshops — to assist farmers and irrigators to 
manage their farms, finances and families through the drought and to recovery.  
• Labour market transition program — training for people in regional areas who derive 
75 per cent of their income from primary production to obtain licences to drive 
forklifts, front end loaders, heavy vehicles and dump trucks.  
• Research and development to reduce the impact of drought on River Murray 
horticulture and broadacre farms — several research and development programs 
ranging from improved drought tolerance of wheat and lucerne to improved water 
use efficiency. 
Sources: South Australian Government (sub. 91); Government of South Australia (2008).   
 
Tasmania 
Tasmania does not have an explicit drought policy and state assistance provided to 
farmers is done of the basis of Commonwealth EC declarations. Additional state 
funded direct drought assistance to farmers has been relatively minor in Tasmania 
with small numbers of programs (box E.6). However, the Tasmanian Government 
does have high level Drought Task Force and has developed a ‘Drought Proofing 
Tasmania Strategy’, which is aimed at providing water security for rural 
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communities and allowing growth in irrigated agriculture (DPIW 2008). In March 
2008, a Tasmanian Irrigation Development Board was announced to oversee 
development of large scale irrigation projects. Public funding of $220 million has 
been allocated, comprising $140 million from the Commonwealth and $80 million 
from the Tasmanian Government. 
 
Box E.6 Tasmania drought assistance measures 
Business subsidies and grants 
• Assistance to support essential breeding stock — initially a grant of up to $5000 per 
farm for farmers in EC areas and receiving either ECIRS or EC Relief Payments for 
purchases of fodder or water between March and June 2008. Extended in July 2008 
to a total of $10 000 per farm and available until 30 September 2008. About 
$2.3 million was provided to 257 applicants through the scheme. 
Household and community support programs  
• Support grants — a total of $350 000 available to provide one-off grants to 
community organisations providing drought support programs. Announced in April 
2008. 
Drought related training, research, development and extension 
• Increase in extension services and provision of information by DPIW on issues such 
as drought feeding of livestock. 
Sources: DPIW (sub. 85, trans., p. 24–42).  
 
Australian Capital Territory 
Despite reporting that the ACT is reviewing its policy on drought declarations and 
assistance (sub. 101), no public enunciation of the existing policy is available. 
However, the ACT has two assistance measures (box E.7). 
 
Box E.7 ACT drought assistance measures 
Waivers of rates and other government charges 
• There has been a waiver of land rates and stock levies while the ACT has been 
drought declared. 
Drought-related training, research, development and extension 
• Two workshops directed at rural lessees affected by drought were conducted in 
2007-08, covering sustainable grazing practices and post-drought recovery 
strategies. 
Sources: ACT Government (sub. 101); TAMS (2008).  
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Northern Territory 
The Northern Territory’s drought policy has three objectives reflecting those of the 
NDP. The broad objectives are to: 
• encourage primary producers and those associated with the rural industries to adopt 
self-reliant approaches in managing risk, especially climatic variability  
• facilitate the maintenance and protection of the agricultural and environmental 
resource base of the Northern Territory during periods of increasing climatic stress 
• facilitate the early recovery of rural industries consistent with long-term sustainable 
levels. (DPIFM 2008, p. 1) 
Along with transport subsidies, the Northern Territory Government has 
concessional loan and grants available to producers with properties declared as 
being in severe drought (box E.8). There has been no uptake of these measures in 
the past three years.  
 
Box E.8 Northern Territory drought assistance measures 
Transport and other transaction subsidies 
• Transport subsidy — paid to farmers with drought-declared properties to help with 
the cost of transporting breeding stock to and from agistment.  
Business subsidies and grants 
• Drought grants — grants up to the value of the concessional benefit of a loan are 
available to help producers with additional costs imposed by droughts but, unlike 
loans, allow producers to make their own financial arrangements in sourcing 
finance.  
Concessional business loans  
• Drought loans — loans of up to $60 000 per producer per year are available to 
those with properties declared as being in severe drought (loan term of five years).  
Source: DPIFM (2008).  
 
E.2 State and Territory drought declarations 
Three state and territory governments have also retained their own formal drought 
declarations that trigger support — New South Wales, Queensland and the Northern 
Territory. In all three, a declaration allows producers to access transport subsidies. 
Both Queensland and the Northern Territory have a producer or local community 
initiated declaration process, but for New South Wales, assessments are made by 
Rural Lands Protection Boards. In all cases, there is potential for differences to exist 
between what would be characterised as an EC drought and what a state or territory 
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government would declare as a drought that warrants (its) government assistance. 
Tasmania, South Australia, the ACT, Western Australia and Victoria do not have 
separate drought declarations.  
In Queensland, areas, shires or individual farms experiencing a severe climatic 
event (one that is likely to occur no more than once every 10 to 15 years) can be 
drought declared and access assistance measures. For areas and shires, an 
assessment is made by the Local Drought Committee, which then recommends to 
the Minister for Primary Industries and Fisheries whether an area should be drought 
declared. The Minister makes a declaration based on this recommendation. For 
individual farms, owners outside declared areas who believe their property is 
affected by drought must apply to the Queensland Department of Primary Industries 
and Fisheries to have their properties declared as an ‘Individually Droughted 
Property’ (IDP). The criteria used to assess conditions for the area and individual 
applications are the same, but applied more broadly to assess areas (box E.9).  
 
Box E.9 Criteria for Queensland drought declarations 
The criteria for drought declarations in Queensland vary by enterprise type. All 
enterprises (and areas) must, however, meet the rainfall criteria — low rainfall must 
represent a one in 10 to 15 year event. For IDP applications, individuals must 
demonstrate that they have responded to drought conditions and been self-reliant to 
some degree.  
For livestock dominated enterprises, the following are considered in assessing an 
application or area: 
• the amount and distribution of rainfall over the previous 12 months, and its 
effectiveness during the previous two summer pasture growth seasons  
• availability of pasture and water relative to neighbouring holdings 
• the fat score of breeders and non-breeder animals (not applicable to dairy cattle) 
• whether or not the drought-like conditions have been caused by overstocking (an 
IDP declaration will not be made if there has been overstocking) 
• the degree of drought-induced forced sale and agistment movement (stock numbers 
should generally be reduced in line with the deteriorating seasonal conditions) 
• the amount of drought feeding undertaken — hand-feeding without which the stock 
would perish.  
For cropping, horticultural or sugar enterprises, the rainfall criteria applies and an 
assessment is made of the soil moisture level of the property, crop yields (expected 
reductions) and the availability of irrigation water. Additional criteria are applied to 
sugar enterprises regarding planting decisions, rainfall timing and whether the crop is 
required to be ploughed out.  
Source: DPIF (2008b).   
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Once applications are received they are processed within ten working days. For 
individuals, they are notified as to the outcome of their application after this period, 
with the declaration remaining in place for 12 months unless revoked or replaced by 
an area declaration. In contrast, area declarations are open-ended, and continue until 
the area is revoked by the Minster. Revocations occur following widespread rainfall 
and under the recommendation by the Local Drought Committee that the area has 
come out of drought.  
Declarations of severe drought in the Northern Territory, which trigger the 
availability of assistance, are made on an individual property basis. While the 
objectives of the NDP are reiterated in the Northern Territory’s drought policy, the 
definition of a severe drought differs to EC definition used by the Commonwealth. 
A severe drought is defined as a property declared to be in drought in at least two 
out of three consecutive years (box E.10). As with Queensland, a severe drought is 
one that is expected to occur no more than once every 10 to 15 years. Declarations 
last for one year and run from 1 January to 31 December.  
 
Box E.10 Drought declarations in the Northern Territory 
Farmers with pastoral properties who believe their property is experiencing drought 
must apply annually to the Northern Territory Department of Primary Industries, 
Fisheries and Mines (DPIFM) to gain a declaration. Applications must be made 
between 1 April and 30 April in the year the declaration is sought. Applications must 
include: 
• proposed turnoff numbers in the year of application 
• details of turnoff for the previous seven years 
• summary of drought management arrangements proposed for the property, 
including the recovery period 
• type and level of assistance sought 
• proposed use of funds sought.  
In assessing applications, DPIFM will assess the severity of the drought and the extent 
to which producers have managed their stock numbers to take account of seasonal 
conditions. DPIFM take into account whether property owners have access to other 
properties (either by ownership or commercial arrangement) and assess the conditions 
in all properties when making a drought declaration. Severe drought conditions for an 
individual property are declared by DPIFM when a property has been drought declared 
for at least two of the past three consecutive years.  
Source: DPIFM (2008).  
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E.3 Evaluation of drought assistance measures 
Available information on assistance measures varies greatly. Given data limitations, 
many measures can only be evaluated in terms of their appropriateness in line with 
the rationales for government intervention discussed in chapter 5. Where possible, 
the effectiveness of other measures is also examined by using available data and by 
drawing upon existing reviews. It should be noted that many of the measures used 
by state and territory governments operate over relatively short timeframes 
(minimising the potential for perverse incentives), involve relatively small amounts 
of money or are accessed by a relatively small proportion of the community.  
Transport and other transaction subsidies 
Several state and territory governments initially introduced transport subsidies for 
stock, fodder and water in order to maintain flocks and herds and to promote animal 
welfare outcomes. For example, the Queensland government’s Drought Relief 
Assistance Scheme (DRAS) with transport subsidies intended to: 
… maintain as far as possible the livestock resource of a property during drought, and 
assist in the return and restoration of that resource after drought. (Queensland 
Government, sub. 77, p. 14) 
Similarly, New South Wales’ transport subsidy scheme (transportation of stock, 
fodder and water) is intended to: 
… assist farmers to ensure their livestock have access to adequate feed and water and 
thereby alleviate immediate animal welfare concerns and pasture and environmental 
degradation. (NSW Government, sub. 90, p. 6) 
The Northern Territory also runs a transport subsidy schemes with similar 
objectives, although the scheme also aims to help reduce grazing pressure on 
drought-affected properties through encouraging agistment. In Tasmania, a recently 
introduced but now closed subsidy scheme for farm inputs (such as water, fodder 
along with agistment costs) was available to maintain essential breeding stock. 
Details of the schemes are provided in box E.11.  
Transport and other input subsidies have been used widely by producers in New 
South Wales and Queensland, but significantly less so by producers in the Northern 
Territory. In New South Wales for example, the subsidies are viewed by the NSW 
Government as: 
… popular with farmers, in part due to their low administration costs, general 
accessibility to a wide range of farm businesses, and the timeliness of their provision. 
(sub. 90, p. 6) 
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Box E.11 Transport subsidy schemes 
Queensland’s DRAS provides freight subsidies on fodder and water during drought 
events, and freight subsidies for restocking and returning from agistment at the end of 
a drought for two years from the date a state drought declaration is revoked. In any 
financial year, the maximum amount claimable is $20 000, but this may be extended to 
$40 000 with approval.  
The NSW Government provides a 50 per cent rebate on transportation costs for the 
movements of water for domestic use, water and fodder for stock, stock to and from 
agistment and stock to sale or slaughter. To be eligible, claimants must own the stock 
and operate an agricultural holding or farm business entity. Payments are capped at 
$20 000 in any one calendar year for water and fodder for stock, stock to and from 
agistment and stock to sale or slaughter movements and at $5000 a year for domestic 
water movements. Operators of intensive livestock enterprises, such as piggeries, are 
not eligible for the subsidy.  
In the Northern Territory, a freight subsidy of up to 100 per cent of actual costs of 
transporting breeding stock up to a distance of 1500 kilometres is available. Payments 
are capped at $20 000 per year and available to farmers in Territory drought declared 
areas.  
Sources: Tasmanian Department Primary Industries and Water (sub. 85); DPI (New South Wales) (2008); 
DPIF (2008b); DPIFM (2008).   
 
As a result, an estimated 1 in 6 farmers in New South Wales have accessed the 
scheme over the period 2002 to 2008 (sub. 90). In total, the three remaining 
jurisdictions with transport subsidies provided over $186 million in assistance 
(table E.1).  
Table E.1 Transport subsidies, 2002-03 to 2007-08 
 New South Wales Queensland Northern Territory
 Claims Amount Claims Amount Claims Amount 
 no. $'000 no. $'000 no. $'000 
2002-03 23 701 26 012 5 409 7 676   
2003-04 20 046 20 803 5 380 12 395   
2004-05 17 617 18 773 2 186 5 594   
2005-06 14 785 14 794 2 972 6 176   
2006-07 30 432 30 615 6 250 13 484 9 172 
2007-08 18 702 19 336 4 796 10 476 4 64 
Total 125 283 130 333 26 993 55 801 13 236 
Sources: Unpublished data obtained from NSW Department of Primary Industries; Queensland Department of 
Primary Industries & Fisheries and Northern Territory Department of Primary Industry, Fisheries and Mines. 
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In Queensland in 2006-07, over 87 per cent of freight subsidies were directed to the 
haulage of fodder, with around 9 per cent paid to farmers sending stock for 
agistment. A similar pattern was observed in New South Wales, with the majority 
spent on the transport of fodder (71 per cent) and agistment (11 per cent). New 
South Wales also pays subsidies on stock transported for sale, which accounted for 
11 per cent of total expenditure. The Northern Territory only provides subsidies for 
transport to agistment.  
Are transaction-based subsidies appropriate? 
There is little or no valid rationale for the provision of transport subsidies. In some 
instances, attempts to justify such subsidies have been based on animal welfare 
grounds or as attempts to limit environmental degradation by making it cheaper to 
move stock from drought-declared areas. However, such justifications cannot be 
supported for the following reasons. 
• Animal welfare outcomes are likely to be more effectively achieved through 
improved responsiveness to environmental conditions (such as early destocking). 
Further, from a policy perspective, the prevention of animal cruelty is likely to 
be more effectively achieved by direct policy targeting, such as through the use 
of regulations. 
• By their nature drought declarations must be ex post and this can create 
incentives to hold stock to access transport subsidies. Accordingly, such 
payments are more likely to make environmental outcomes worse.  
In terms of the rationales associated with improving self-reliance — reducing 
information barriers, supporting drought-related research and development, and 
correcting for market imperfections — transport subsidies are an inappropriate 
policy response.  
Effectiveness of state-based transport subsidies 
Little information is collected on the outcomes achieved by transport subsidies. 
Some participants to this inquiry were of the view that such payments were useful 
in providing farmers with greater flexibility in managing their business in times of 
drought. For example, as argued by the NSW Farmers’ Association: 
The transport subsidy has been very beneficial to farmers providing valuable assistance 
to mitigate effects of drought on livestock … it is felt that the subsidy is assisting 
farmers to make decisions and supporting the welfare objectives of the subsidy. 
(sub. 98, p. 20) 
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Despite this, the effectiveness of these provisions has been questioned by previous 
reviews of drought policy (chapter 4) and also by those governments that provide 
this assistance. As suggested by the Queensland Government, transaction-based 
subsidies have the potential to alter behaviour in unintended ways by: 
• encouraging producers to maintain higher stocking levels during drought 
(potentially leading to environmental degradation) 
• encouraging the maintenance of stock through agistment whereas it may have 
been better to dispose of stock 
• encouraging the purchase of fodder and other inputs during drought rather than 
building fodder storages 
• increasing the demand for fodder during droughts which has a detrimental effect 
on other industries and producers in other states that do not receive the subsidies 
(sub. 77). 
In addition, the NSW Government suggested that along with distorting incentives 
for current production decisions, such payments could have a longer term impact on 
sustainable production through creating permanent changes to production decisions 
(sub. 90). These comments were also echoed by the South Australian Government 
(sub. 91). Further, whether such payments provide material gains to those farmers 
who take advantage of them is also questionable. However, as the NSW 
Government notes, some of this gain is likely to be capitalised into the cost of 
transport services and fodder (sub. 90).  
In terms of the NDP objectives, it is unlikely that the provision of these subsidies 
encourages producers to become more self-reliant. Payments encourage producers 
to be less reactive to changes in climatic conditions and thus they are likely to have 
greater exposure to climate risks.  
Transport subsidies can also work against the objective of maintaining and 
protecting the environmental resource base during drought events. As noted by 
some, it enables producers to maintain their livestock even though their farm and 
region is in drought which in turn increases potential for environmental degradation 
through effects such as increased soil erosion. 
Business subsidies and grants 
Business subsidies or grants are used by most jurisdictions. They are typically 
aimed at specific infrastructure projects, such as water storage, or at costs that are 
exacerbated by drought, such as the costs of feed and water cartage.  
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There is typically no valid rationale for the provision of this type of business 
assistance. This is because the benefits of the grant are largely private in nature and 
there are few impediments to farmers accessing credit for worthwhile investments, 
given the generally high levels of equity held by farmers. That said, in some 
circumstances there may be positive externalities from on-farm activities. In these 
cases a grant or subsidy may be an appropriate form of assistance if the assistance is 
well targeted and linked to specific public benefits, such as achieving environmental 
benefits (see below). 
However, most of the business grants and subsidies provided by state governments 
are not targeted at addressing market failures. The benefits of grants for livestock 
feed, such as that undertaken in Tasmania, or for farm costs more generally, such as 
the that provided in Western Australia, are entirely private and there is therefore no 
rationale for their provision. 
Further, most subsidies or grants offered by state governments are short-term 
contingency measures in response to the effects of drought. In this context, they are 
generally ineffective in improving self-reliance, and are therefore inconsistent with 
the first objective of the NDP.  
Waivers of rates and other government charges 
Waiving government charges is a relatively easily administered form of business 
assistance and hence, this form of assistance is used by a number of jurisdictions. 
They are typically aimed at waiving charges in relation to goods or services that are 
drought affected, such as rates or rentals on state-owned drought-affected land, or 
water charges where allocations are reduced. 
Waving government charges is similar in effect to providing subsidies for other 
business expenses. Government charges are known business costs that are relatively 
stable. Many of these costs relate to the provision of service where there are fixed 
annual costs. For instance, in the case of water delivery, there are fixed costs for 
water delivery infrastructure that are incurred by government regardless of how 
much water is supplied in any year. As waivers do not address any market failure, 
there is no rationale for waivers of government charges as a form of assistance. 
Government levies should be set to cover the average costs of service provision 
over the long run. While it is inappropriate to waive these in response to drought or 
other hardship, there may be scope to vary the way in which government charges 
are levied over time, provided that overall, fees meet the average cost of service 
provision over the long run. For instance, deferral of fees would be more a more 
appropriate assistance measure than a waiver. 
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Further, waivers are a relatively blunt form of assistance, which can reduce their 
effectiveness. One example is the Victorian water rebate scheme, which while an 
easily administered scheme, was poorly targeted, as rebates were made to recipients 
regardless of need. Further, such assistance measures do not align with the 
Victorian Government’s drought assistance principles (SACES 2008b).  
As with other business subsidies, fee and levy waivers do not improve self-reliance 
and are inconsistent with the principles of the NDP.  
Environmental measures 
Only Victoria has drought measures targeted at achieving environmental outcomes, 
with even these simultaneously aimed at other objectives. The Drought 
Employment Program is also targeted at providing employment opportunities for 
‘drought-affected rural Victorians’ with stock containment also aimed at improving 
farm productivity. From a first principles viewpoint, such initiatives can have some 
merit.  
Measures that seek to achieve environmental outcomes can lead to net community 
benefits if they are targeted towards correcting environmental externalities. If this is 
the case, it is possible that the benefits from intervention will exceed the costs of 
doing so. But depending on the environmental outcomes sought, it is questionable 
whether identified externalities only occur during droughts or whether to ameliorate 
the affects of the externality would require longer term sustained funding.  
Assessments of the two Victorian schemes show mixed results. Grants provided to 
producers to build stock containment facilities in order to maximise vegetative 
cover and reduce soil erosion have reported significant environmental benefits 
(SACES 2008b). These grants were provided alongside technical advice from soil 
specialists. The drought employment program, on the other hand, was believed to be 
less successful. While it aimed at restoring and enhancing natural assets of 
community significance on private land, it was found that projects were selected to 
reflect employment priorities and were not necessarily those of environmental 
significance. Part of the reason this was believed to occur was related to funds 
initially been allocated to farmers to undertake works on their own properties. In the 
second round this was prohibited.  
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Concessional business loans 
Concessional loans provided to farm businesses by state and territory governments 
have been targeted towards providing carry-on finance or to allow farmers to 
undertake productivity enhancing capital works. However, as with interest rate 
subsidies, concessional loans provided to maintain viable farm businesses during 
drought can only be justified if there is some failure in capital markets that restrict 
these businesses from borrowing. Given the availability of rural credit for viable 
farm businesses (Australian Bankers’ Association, sub. 76) and high average equity 
levels, it is likely that such support measures cannot be justified on market failure 
grounds.  
Despite this, concessional loans are more likely to achieve the goal of self-reliance 
than would other subsidies and grants, as producers are less likely to take on more 
risk than they otherwise would. Indeed, in the case of Queensland, concessional 
loans paid to farmers have mostly been paid back in full, with none of those holding 
outstanding amounts assessed as being at risk of default. In this sense, support for 
concessional loans can be viewed from a ‘second best’ perspective.  
Household and community support measures 
All state governments, with the exception of Western Australia, provide some form 
of drought-related household or community support. These measures are the most 
numerous among all the drought support measures provided and aim to achieve two 
broad objectives, to: 
• ease the hardship faced by farming and rural households as a result of droughts 
• promote rural community resilience and growth during droughts.  
Household support 
The underlying rationale for household support is to ensure that all households 
achieve some basic acceptable standard of living. This includes providing them with 
the capacity to access government services to a similar level to others also in receipt 
of support.  
While welfare payments are predominately the domain of the Commonwealth 
government, state governments provide support through concessions for state 
government provided services (such as education, school related transport and 
energy). These concessions are provided directly to households and are targeted at 
maintaining farm family access to merit goods and those viewed as essential 
services. Concessions made to farming households during drought appear, in the 
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broad, to be well targeted to the household (relate to household and not business 
costs) and are not paid as cash grants. However, one notable exception to this is the 
NSW Government’s DoCS Drought Relief Payment which consists of a one-off 
grant of up to $2000.  
Community support 
Rationales for rural community support relate to the building of social capital (or 
the capacity/infrastructure of local communities to do this), maintaining/expanding 
populations within rural communities and overcoming information failures 
surrounding government support programs.  
In terms of social capital, governments have provided support in order for 
communities to develop or strengthen the informal links that exist with 
communities. To achieve these outcomes, governments have provided support to 
maintain local sporting clubs and facilities as well as to establish local groups. To 
date, little evaluation of these support measures has been done so their effectiveness 
is unknown.  
In order to maintain or expand rural communities, some state governments have 
provided incentives for individual businesses to relocate into certain areas. 
However, these measures are rare and, most commonly, community support has 
been targeted at promoting information about support services for those within 
communities facing hardship. These range from mental health awareness programs 
to establishing organisations to coordinate and disseminate information.  
Given the small scale of many of community support measures, and the lack of 
formal evaluation, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of these measures. 
Measures to improve sporting facilities in Victoria, for example, are believed to 
have preformed well (SACES 2008b), but little information exists in terms of 
measures delivered by other states. 
It is also difficult to assess the appropriateness of these measures. For example, in 
the communities that received support, did impediments exist to them building 
social capital? Does the broader community value maintaining/expanding 
populations in rural centre as an outcome in itself? The former relates to the under 
provision of what could be termed a local public good due to drought conditions, 
with the latter a societal preference — both of which are difficult to assess. Despite 
this, in relation to social capital, if failures are taken as given, then the provision of 
support (as broadly done by most state governments) appears to be appropriate as it 
is targeted towards these goods. Instead, where attempts are made to maintain or 
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expand rural towns, it is likely that the ad hoc nature of drought-related measures is 
inappropriate as the pressures for rural decline extend beyond drought events.  
Drought-related training, research, development and extension 
Drought-related extension and training measures are a common form of assistance 
by state governments. The extent of drought-specific research by states is less clear. 
The rationale for government intervention through research and development and 
extension services was discussed in detail in chapter 8. As noted in that chapter, the 
case for government funding of research is likely to be greatest in the case of basic 
research or where there are clear spillover benefits. Similarly, because there is scope 
for government provided extension services to crowd out private service providers, 
government provision of extension services should be directed mainly to areas 
where private provision of services is unlikely to develop. It is also important to 
note that the provision of research, development and extension should be 
continuous, rather than reactive in response to drought.  
Summing up 
• While not all states and territories have stated drought policies, they all, to 
differing extents, provide drought assistance measures of various forms. 
• Many of the measures delivered by state and territory governments involve small 
amounts of funding, have limited coverage and operate over relatively short 
timeframes. 
• State-based transport subsidies are an inappropriate response to the rationales 
underpinning the NDP. Further they are likely to work against the rationales for 
intervention, placing producers in a less self-reliant position and potentially 
creating adverse environmental outcomes.  
• Business subsidies are generally aimed at drought specific infrastructure or 
costs. By their nature, they are ex-post short-term contingency measures that are 
ineffective in improving long-term self-reliance. 
• Waiving government charges has a similar effect to providing other forms of 
business subsidies. They are typically poorly targeted forms of assistance that do 
not consider the need for assistance or involve any form of mutual responsibility. 
• Measures to achieve environmental outcomes can have net community benefits 
if they address environmental externalities. However, they need to be well 
targeted. Further, many externalities are likely to exist irrespective of drought.  
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• Concessional business loans are an alternative form of subsidy, but because of 
their longer-term nature and because producers still bear some risk they are more 
likely to encourage self-reliance than straight forward grants. 
• Household and community support measures are generally well separated from 
business assistance. However, some are targeted towards hardships that are not 
created by droughts and thus should be provided outside of drought policies. 
Training and extension assistance is an appropriate form of assistance for states to 
provide where market failures exist and provision by private service providers is not 
feasible. 
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